draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap-03.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap-04.txt 
Network Working Group S. Frankel Network Working Group S. Frankel
Internet Draft NIST Internet Draft NIST
Obsoletes: 2411 (if approved) S. Krishnan Obsoletes: 2411 (if approved) S. Krishnan
Intended Status: Informational Ericsson Intended Status: Informational Ericsson
Expires: January 2010 July 13, 2009 Expires: April 2010 October 1, 2009
IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap IP Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap
<draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap-03.txt> <draft-ietf-ipsecme-roadmap-04.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2010.
Copyright and License Notice Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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This document is a snapshot of IPsec- and IKE-related RFCs. It This document is a snapshot of IPsec- and IKE-related RFCs. It
includes a brief description of each RFC, along with background includes a brief description of each RFC, along with background
information explaining the motivation and context of IPsec's information explaining the motivation and context of IPsec's
outgrowths and extensions. It obsoletes the previous IPsec Document outgrowths and extensions. It obsoletes the previous IPsec Document
Roadmap [RFC2411]. Roadmap [RFC2411].
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. IPsec/IKE Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. IPsec/IKE Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Interrelationship of IPsec/IKE Documents . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Interrelationship of IPsec/IKE Documents . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Versions of IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Versions of IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Differences between "old" IPsec (IPsec-v2) and 2.2.1. Differences between "old" IPsec (IPsec-v2) and
"new" IPsec (IPsec-v3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 "new" IPsec (IPsec-v3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Versions of IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Versions of IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1. Differences between IKEv1 and IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3.1. Differences between IKEv1 and IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. IPsec and IKE IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. IPsec and IKE IANA Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. IPsec Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. IPsec Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Base Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Base Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1. "Old" IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1. "Old" IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.2. "New" IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1.2. "New" IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. MIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.3. MIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Additions to IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4. Additions to IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.5. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. IKE Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4. IKE Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. Base Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1. Base Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.1. IKEv1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1.1. IKEv1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.2. IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.1.2. IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2. Additions and Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2. Additions and Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.1. Peer Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.2.1. Peer Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.2. Certificate Contents and Management . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.2.2. Certificate Contents and Management . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3. Dead Peer Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2.3. Dead Peer Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.4. Remote Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.2.4. Remote Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Cryptographic Algorithms and Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Cryptographic Algorithms and Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Algorithm Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. Algorithm Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2. Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3. Integrity-Protection (Authentication) Algorithms . . . . . 26 5.3. Integrity-Protection (Authentication) Algorithms . . . . . 27
5.3.1. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.4. Combined Mode Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.5. Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.4. Combined Mode Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.6. Cryptographic Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.4.1. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.7. Diffie-Hellman Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.5. Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6. IPsec/IKE for Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.6. Cryptographic Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7. Outgrowths of IPsec/IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.7. Diffie-Hellman Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1. IPComp (Compression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6. IPsec/IKE for Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2. IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. Outgrowths of IPsec/IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7.3. Better-than-Nothing Security (BTNS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.1. IPComp (Compression) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 7.4. Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK) . . . . . . 41
7.2. IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MobIKE) . . . . . . . . . . 38 7.5. IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.3. Better-than-Nothing Security (Btns) . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7.6. IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY) . . . . 42
7.4. Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (Kink) . . . . . . 40 8. Other Protocols that use IPsec/IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.5. IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.1. Mobile IP (MIPv4 and MIPv6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.6. IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY) . . . . 41 8.2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. Other Protocols that use IPsec/IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 8.3. Host Identity Protocol (HIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8.1. Mobile IP (MIPv4 and MIPv6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.3. Host Identity Protocol (HIP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.4. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Update 8.4. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Update
(EMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 (EMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.5. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) . . . . . . . . 45 8.5. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) . . . . . . . . 46
8.6. Fibre Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 8.6. Fibre Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.7. Robust Header Compression (ROHC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.7. Robust Header Compression (ROHC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.8. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.8. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.9. IPsec benchmarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 8.9. IPsec benchmarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Appendix A. Summary of IPsec/IKE Document Requirement Levels . . . 57 Appendix A. Summary of IPsec/IKE Document Requirement Levels . . . 60
Appendix B. Summary of Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . 60 Appendix B. Summary of Algorithm Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . 63
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
IPsec is a suite of protocols that provides security to Internet IPsec (Internet Protocol Security) is a suite of protocols that
communications at the IP layer. The most common current use of IPsec provides security to Internet communications at the IP layer. The
is to provide a Virtual Private Network (VPN), either between two most common current use of IPsec is to provide a Virtual Private
locations (gateway-to-gateway) or between a remote user and an Network (VPN), either between two locations (gateway-to-gateway) or
enterprise network (host-to-gateway); it can also provide end-to-end, between a remote user and an enterprise network (host-to-gateway); it
or host-to-host, security. IPsec is also used by other Internet can also provide end-to-end, or host-to-host, security. IPsec is
protocols (e.g. MIPv6) to protect some or all of their traffic. also used by other Internet protocols (e.g. MIPv6) to protect some or
all of their traffic. IKE (Internet Key Exchange) is the key
negotiation and management protocol that is most commonly used to
provide dynamically negotiated and updated keying material for IPsec.
IPsec and IKE can be used in conjunction with both IPv4 and IPv6.
In addition to the base documents for IPsec and IKE, there are In addition to the base documents for IPsec and IKE, there are
numerous RFCs that reference, extend, and in some cases alter the numerous RFCs that reference, extend, and in some cases alter the
core specifications. This document is an attempt to list and briefly core specifications. This document is an attempt to list and briefly
describe those RFCs, providing context and rationale where indicated. describe those RFCs, providing context and rationale where indicated.
The title of each RFC is followed by a letter that indicates its The title of each RFC is followed by a letter that indicates its
category in the RFC series [RFC2026], as follows: category in the RFC series [RFC2026], as follows:
o S: Standards Track (Proposed Standard, Draft Standard, or o S: Standards Track (Proposed Standard, Draft Standard, or
Standard) Standard)
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o E: Experimental o E: Experimental
o B: Best Current Practice o B: Best Current Practice
o I: Informational o I: Informational
For each RFC, the publication date is also given. For each RFC, the publication date is also given.
This document also categorizes the requirements level for the IPsec, This document also categorizes the requirements level for the IPsec,
IKE and cryptographic algorithms documents for use with IKEv1, IKEv2, IKE and cryptographic algorithms documents for use with IKEv1, IKEv2,
IPsec-v2 and IPsec-v3.. These requirements are summarized in IPsec-v2 and IPsec-v3. These requirements are summarized in
Appendices A and B. Appendices A and B.
For each core IPsec and IKE RFC, this document will classify its
Requirements Level for each protocol (IKEv1, IKEv2, IPsec-v2,
IPsec-v3), as either MUST, SHALL or MAY [RFC2119]; optional;
undefined; or N/A (not applicable). Optional means that either the
RFC describes features that are not required to be implemented or
settings or procedures that are recommended but not mandatory.
Undefined means that some aspect of the RFC is not fully defined for
the specific version of the protocol. N/A means that use of the RFC
is inappropriate in the context (e.g., combined mode algorithms, a
new feature in IPsec-v3, for use with IPsec-v2). The classification
of the cryptographic algorithm RFCs is further explained in Section
5.
The usage of terms in this document conforms to definitions in The usage of terms in this document conforms to definitions in
[RFC4949]. [RFC4949].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. IPsec/IKE Background Information 2. IPsec/IKE Background Information
2.1. Interrelationship of IPsec/IKE Documents 2.1. Interrelationship of IPsec/IKE Documents
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term IKE is used, it pertains to both versions of IKE. term IKE is used, it pertains to both versions of IKE.
2.3.1. Differences between IKEv1 and IKEv2 2.3.1. Differences between IKEv1 and IKEv2
As with IPsec-v3, IKEv2 incorporates "lessons learned" from As with IPsec-v3, IKEv2 incorporates "lessons learned" from
implementation and operational experience with IKEv1. Knowledge was implementation and operational experience with IKEv1. Knowledge was
gained about the barriers to IKE deployment, the scenarios in which gained about the barriers to IKE deployment, the scenarios in which
IKE is most effective, and requirements that needed to be added to IKE is most effective, and requirements that needed to be added to
IKE to facilitate its use with other protocols as well as in IKE to facilitate its use with other protocols as well as in
general-purpose use. The documentation for IKEv2 replaces multiple, general-purpose use. The documentation for IKEv2 replaces multiple,
at time contradictory documents, with a single document; it also at times contradictory documents, with a single document; it also
clarifies and expands details that were underspecified or ambiguous clarifies and expands details that were underspecified or ambiguous
in IKEv1. in IKEv1.
Once an IKE negotiation is successfully completed, the peers have Once an IKE negotiation is successfully completed, the peers have
established two pairs of one-way (inbound and outbound) SAs. The established two pairs of one-way (inbound and outbound) SAs. Since
first SA, the IKE SA, is used to protect IKE traffic. The second SA IKE always negotiates pairs of SAs, the term "SA" is generally used
provides IPsec protection to data traffic between the peers and/or to refer to a pair of SAs (e.g., an "IKE SA" or an "IPsec SA" is in
other devices for which the peers are authorized to negotiate. It is reality a pair of one-way SAs). The first SA, the IKE SA, is used to
called the IPsec SA in IKEv1 and, in the IKEv2 RFCs, it is referred protect IKE traffic. The second SA provides IPsec protection to data
to variously as a CHILD_SA, a child SA, and an IPsec SA. This traffic between the peers and/or other devices for which the peers
document uses the term "IPsec SA". are authorized to negotiate. It is called the IPsec SA in IKEv1 and,
in the IKEv2 RFCs, it is referred to variously as a CHILD_SA, a child
SA, and an IPsec SA. This document uses the term "IPsec SA". To
further complicate the terminology, since IKEv1 consists of two
sequential negotiations, called phases, the IKE SA is also referred
to as a phase 1 SA and the IPsec SA is referred to as a phase 2 SA.
Changes to IKE include: Changes to IKE include:
o Multiple alternate exchange types replaced by a single, shorter o Multiple alternate exchange types replaced by a single, shorter
exchange exchange
o Streamlined negotiation format to avoid combinatorial bloat for o Streamlined negotiation format to avoid combinatorial bloat for
multiple proposals multiple proposals
o Protects responder from committing significant resources to the o Protects responder from committing significant resources to the
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cryptographic algorithm RFCs cryptographic algorithm RFCs
o Cryptographic Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec o Cryptographic Suites for IKEv1, IKEv2, and IPsec
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/crypto-suites): names of (http://www.iana.org/assignments/crypto-suites): names of
cryptographic suites in [RFC4308] and [RFC4869] cryptographic suites in [RFC4308] and [RFC4869]
3. IPsec Documents 3. IPsec Documents
3.1. Base Documents 3.1. Base Documents
IPsec protections are provided by two extension headers: the IPsec protections are provided by two special headers: the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header and the Authentication Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Header and the Authentication
Header (AH). There are 3 base documents: one that describes the IP Header (AH). In IPv4, these headers take the form of protocol
security architecture, and one for each of the IPsec headers. headers; in IPv6, they are classified as extension headers. There are
3 base IPsec documents: one that describes the IP security
architecture, and one for each of the IPsec headers.
3.1.1. "Old" IPsec 3.1.1. "Old" IPsec
o RFC 2401, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (S, 3.1.1.1. RFC 2401, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (S,
Nov. 1998) Nov. 1998)
[RFC2401] specifies the mechanisms, procedures and components [RFC2401] specifies the mechanisms, procedures and components
required to provide security services at the IP layer. It also required to provide security services at the IP layer. It also
describes their interrelationship, and the general processing describes their interrelationship, and the general processing
required to inject IPsec protections into the network architecture. required to inject IPsec protections into the network architecture.
The components include: The components include:
- SA (Security Association): a one-way (inbound or outbound) - SA (Security Association): a one-way (inbound or outbound)
agreement between two communicating peers that specifies the IPsec agreement between two communicating peers that specifies the IPsec
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protection, and traffic that requires IPsec protection. protection, and traffic that requires IPsec protection.
The RFC describes general inbound and outbound IPsec processing; it The RFC describes general inbound and outbound IPsec processing; it
also includes details on several special cases: packet fragments, also includes details on several special cases: packet fragments,
ICMP messages, and multicast traffic. ICMP messages, and multicast traffic.
Requirements levels for RFC2401: Requirements levels for RFC2401:
IPsec-v2 - MUST IPsec-v2 - MUST
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 2402, IP Authentication Header (S, Nov. 1998) 3.1.1.2. RFC 2402, IP Authentication Header (S, Nov. 1998)
[RFC2402] defines the Authentication Header (AH), which provides [RFC2402] defines the Authentication Header (AH), which provides
integrity protection; it also provides data origin authentication, integrity protection; it also provides data origin authentication,
access control, and, optionally, replay protection. A transport mode access control, and, optionally, replay protection. A transport mode
AH SA, used to protect peer-to-peer communications, protects AH SA, used to protect peer-to-peer communications, protects
upper-layer data, as well as those portions of the IP header that do upper-layer data, as well as those portions of the IP header that do
not vary unpredictably during packet delivery. A tunnel mode AH SA not vary unpredictably during packet delivery. A tunnel mode AH SA
can be used to protect gateway-to-gateway or host-to-gateway traffic; can be used to protect gateway-to-gateway or host-to-gateway traffic;
it can optionally be used for host-to-host traffic. This class of AH it can optionally be used for host-to-host traffic. This class of AH
SA protects the inner (original) header and upper-layer data, as well SA protects the inner (original) header and upper-layer data, as well
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unpredictably during packet delivery. Because portions of the IP unpredictably during packet delivery. Because portions of the IP
header are not included in the AH calculations, AH processing is more header are not included in the AH calculations, AH processing is more
complex than ESP processing. AH also does not work in the presence complex than ESP processing. AH also does not work in the presence
of Network Address Translation (NAT). Unlike IPsec-v3, IPsec-v2 of Network Address Translation (NAT). Unlike IPsec-v3, IPsec-v2
classifies AH as mandatory-to-implement. classifies AH as mandatory-to-implement.
Requirements levels for RFC2402: Requirements levels for RFC2402:
IPsec-v2 - MUST IPsec-v2 - MUST
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 2406, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Nov. 1998) 3.1.1.3. RFC 2406, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Nov.
1998)
[RFC2406] defines the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which [RFC2406] defines the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which
provides confidentiality (encryption) and/or integrity protection; it provides confidentiality (encryption) and/or integrity protection; it
also provides data origin authentication, access control, and, also provides data origin authentication, access control, and,
optionally, replay and/or traffic analysis protection. A transport optionally, replay and/or traffic analysis protection. A transport
mode ESP SA protects the upper-layer data, but not the IP header. A mode ESP SA protects the upper-layer data, but not the IP header. A
tunnel mode ESP SA protects the upper-layer data and the inner tunnel mode ESP SA protects the upper-layer data and the inner
header, but not the outer header. header, but not the outer header.
Requirements levels for RFC2406: Requirements levels for RFC2406:
IPsec-v2 - MUST IPsec-v2 - MUST
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
3.1.2. "New" IPsec 3.1.2. "New" IPsec
o RFC 4301, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (S, 3.1.2.1. RFC 4301, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (S,
Dec. 2005) Dec. 2005)
[RFC4301] obsoletes [RFC2401], including a more complete and detailed [RFC4301] obsoletes [RFC2401], including a more complete and detailed
processing model. The most notable changes are detailed above in processing model. The most notable changes are detailed above in
Section 2.2.1. IPsec-v3 processing incorporates an additional Section 2.2.1. IPsec-v3 processing incorporates an additional
database: database:
- PAD (Peer Authorization Database): contains information - PAD (Peer Authorization Database): contains information
necessary to conduct peer authentication, providing a link between necessary to conduct peer authentication, providing a link between
IPsec and the key management procotol (e.g. IKE) IPsec and the key management procotol (e.g. IKE)
Requirements levels for RFC4301: Requirements levels for RFC4301:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - MUST IPsec-v3 - MUST
o RFC 4302, IP Authentication Header (S, Dec. 2005) 3.1.2.2. RFC 4302, IP Authentication Header (S, Dec. 2005)
[RFC4302] obsoletes [RFC2402]. Unlike IPsec-v2, IPsec-v3 classifies [RFC4302] obsoletes [RFC2402]. Unlike IPsec-v2, IPsec-v3 classifies
AH as optional. AH as optional.
Requirements levels for RFC4302: Requirements levels for RFC4302:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 4303, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Dec. 2005) 3.1.2.3. RFC 4303, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Dec.
2005)
[RFC4303] obsoletes [RFC2406]. The most notable changes are detailed [RFC4303] obsoletes [RFC2406]. The most notable changes are detailed
above in Section 2.2.1. above in Section 2.2.1.
Requirements levels for RFC4303: Requirements levels for RFC4303:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - MUST IPsec-v3 - MUST
3.2. Policy 3.2. Policy
The IPsec Policy Working Group (ipsp) originally planned an RFC that The IPsec Policy Working Group (ipsp) originally planned an RFC that
would allow entities with no common Trust Anchor and no prior would allow entities with no common Trust Anchor and no prior
knowledge of each others' security policies to establish an knowledge of each others' security policies to establish an
IPsec-protected connection. The solutions that were proposed for IPsec-protected connection. The solutions that were proposed for
gateway discovery and security policy negotiation proved to be overly gateway discovery and security policy negotiation proved to be overly
complex and fragile, in the absence of prior knowledge or compatible complex and fragile, in the absence of prior knowledge or compatible
configuration policies. configuration policies.
o RFC 3586, IP Security Policy (IPSP) Requirements (S, Aug. 2003) 3.2.1. RFC 3586, IP Security Policy (IPSP) Requirements (S, Aug. 2003)
[RFC3586] describes the functional requirements of a generalized [RFC3586] describes the functional requirements of a generalized
IPsec policy framework, that could be used to discover, negotiate and IPsec policy framework, that could be used to discover, negotiate and
manage IPsec policies. manage IPsec policies.
Requirements levels for RFC3586: Requirements levels for RFC3586:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - N/A IKEv2 - N/A
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 3585, IPsec Configuration Policy Information Model (S, Aug. 3.2.2. RFC 3585, IPsec Configuration Policy Information Model (S, Aug.
2003) 2003)
As stated in [RFC3585], "This document presents an object-oriented As stated in [RFC3585], "This document presents an object-oriented
information model of IP Security (IPsec) policy designed to information model of IP Security (IPsec) policy designed to
facilitate agreement about the content and semantics of IPsec policy, facilitate agreement about the content and semantics of IPsec policy,
and enable derivations of task-specific representations of IPsec and enable derivations of task-specific representations of IPsec
policy such as storage schema, distribution representations, and policy such as storage schema, distribution representations, and
policy specification languages used to configure IPsec-enabled policy specification languages used to configure IPsec-enabled
endpoints." This RFC has not been widely adopted. endpoints." This RFC has not been widely adopted.
Requirements levels for RFC3585: Requirements levels for RFC3585:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - N/A IKEv2 - N/A
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
3.3. MIBs 3.3. MIBs
Over the years, several MIB-related Internet Drafts were proposed for Over the years, several MIB-related Internet Drafts were proposed for
IPsec and IKE, but only one progressed to RFC status. IPsec and IKE, but only one progressed to RFC status.
o RFC 4807, IPsec Security Policy Database Configuration MIB (S, 3.3.1. RFC 4807, IPsec Security Policy Database Configuration MIB (S,
Mar. 2007) Mar. 2007)
[RFC4807] defines a MIB module that can be used to configure the SPD [RFC4807] defines a MIB module that can be used to configure the SPD
of an IPsec device. This RFC has not been widely adopted. of an IPsec device. This RFC has not been widely adopted.
Requirements levels for RFC4807: Requirements levels for RFC4807:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
3.4. Additions to IPsec 3.4. Additions to IPsec
Once the IKEv1 and IPsec-v2 RFCs were finalized, several additions Once the IKEv1 and IPsec-v2 RFCs were finalized, several additions
were defined in separate documents: negotiation of NAT traversal, were defined in separate documents: negotiation of NAT traversal,
extended sequence numbers, and UDP encapsulation of ESP packets. extended sequence numbers, and UDP encapsulation of ESP packets.
Additional uses of IPsec transport mode were also described: Additional uses of IPsec transport mode were also described:
protection of manually-configured IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels and protection protection of manually-configured IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels and protection
of IP-in-IP tunnels. These documents describe atypical uses of IPsec of IP-in-IP tunnels. These documents describe atypical uses of IPsec
transport mode, but do not define any new IPsec features. transport mode, but do not define any new IPsec features.
Once the original IPsec working group concluded, additional Once the original IPsec working group concluded, additional
IPsec-related issues were handled by the IPsecme (IPsec Maintenance IPsec-related issues were handled by the IPsecME (IPsec Maintenance
and Extensions) working group. One such problem is the capability of and Extensions) working group. One such problem is the capability of
middleboxes to distinguish unencrypted ESP packets (ESP-NULL) from middleboxes to distinguish unencrypted ESP packets (ESP-NULL) from
encrypted ones in a fast and accurate manner. Two solutions are encrypted ones in a fast and accurate manner. Two solutions are
described: a new protocol that requires changes to IKEv2 and described: a new protocol that requires changes to IKEv2 and
IPsec-v3, and a heuristic method that imposes no new requirements. IPsec-v3, and a heuristic method that imposes no new requirements.
o RFC 3947, Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE (S, Jan. 2005) 3.4.1. RFC 3947, Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE (S, Jan. 2005)
[RFC3947] enables IKEv1 to detect whether there are any NATs between [RFC3947] enables IKEv1 to detect whether there are any NATs between
the negotiating peers, and whether both peers support NAT traversal. the negotiating peers, and whether both peers support NAT traversal.
It also describes how IKEv1 can be used to negotiate the use of UDP It also describes how IKEv1 can be used to negotiate the use of UDP
encapsulation of ESP packets for the IPsec SA. For IKEv2, this encapsulation of ESP packets for the IPsec SA. For IKEv2, this
capability is described in [RFC4306]. capability is described in [RFC4306].
Requirements levels for RFC3947: Requirements levels for RFC3947:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306) IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306)
o RFC 4304, Extended Sequence Number (ESN) Addendum to IPsec 3.4.2. RFC 3948, UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets (S, Jan. 2005)
Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for Internet Security Association
and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) (S, Dec. 2005) [RFC3948] defines how to encapsulate ESP packets in UDP packets to
enable the traversal of NATs that discard packets with protocols
other than UDP or TCP. This makes it possible for ESP packets to
pass through the NAT device without requiring any change to the NAT
device itself. The use of this solution is negotiated by IKE, as
described in [RFC3947] for IKEv1 and [RFC4306] for IKEv2.
Requirements levels for RFC3948:
IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional
3.4.3. RFC 4304, Extended Sequence Number (ESN) Addendum to IPsec
Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for Internet Security Association and
Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) (S, Dec. 2005)
The use of ESNs allows IPsec to use 64-bit sequence numbers for The use of ESNs allows IPsec to use 64-bit sequence numbers for
replay protection, but to send only 32 bits of the sequence number in replay protection, but to send only 32 bits of the sequence number in
the packet, enabling shorter packets and avoiding a re-design of the the packet, enabling shorter packets and avoiding a re-design of the
packet format. The larger sequence numbers allow an existing IPsec packet format. The larger sequence numbers allow an existing IPsec
SA to be used for larger volumes of data. [RFC4304] describes an SA to be used for larger volumes of data. [RFC4304] describes an
extension to IKEv1 to negotiate the use of ESNs for IPsec-v3 SAs. extension to IKEv1 to negotiate the use of ESNs for IPsec-v3 SAs.
For IKEv2, this capability is described in [RFC4306]. For IKEv2, this capability is described in [RFC4306].
Requirements levels for RFC4304: Requirements levels for RFC4304:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306) IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306)
o RFC 3948, UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets (S, Jan. 2005)
[RFC3948] defines how to encapsulate ESP packets in UDP packets to
enable the traversal of NATs that discard packets with protocols
other than UDP or TCP. This makes it possible for ESP packets to
pass through the NAT device without requiring any change to the NAT
device itself. The use of this solution is negotiated by IKE, as
described in [RFC3947] for IKEv1 and [RFC4306] for IKEv2.
Requirements levels for RFC3948:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 4891, Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnels (I, May 3.4.4. RFC 4891, Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4 Tunnels (I, May
2007) 2007)
[RFC4891] describes how to use IKE and transport-mode IPsec to [RFC4891] describes how to use IKE and transport-mode IPsec to
provide security protection to manually-configured IPv6-in-IPv4 provide security protection to manually-configured IPv6-in-IPv4
tunnels. This document uses standard IKE and IPsec, without any new tunnels. This document uses standard IKE and IPsec, without any new
extensions. It does not apply to tunnels that are initiated in an extensions. It does not apply to tunnels that are initiated in an
automated manner (e.g., 6to4 tunnels [RFC3056]). automated manner (e.g., 6to4 tunnels [RFC3056]).
Requirements levels for RFC4891: Requirements levels for RFC4891:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 3884, Use of IPsec Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing (I, 3.4.5. RFC 3884, Use of IPsec Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing (I,
Sep. 2004) Sep. 2004)
[RFC3884] describes the use of transport-mode IPsec to secure [RFC3884] describes the use of transport-mode IPsec to secure
IP-in-IP tunnels, which constitute the links of a multi-hop, IP-in-IP tunnels, which constitute the links of a multi-hop,
distributed virtual network (VN). This allows the traffic to be distributed virtual network (VN). This allows the traffic to be
dynamically routed via the VN's trusted routers, rather than routing dynamically routed via the VN's trusted routers, rather than routing
all traffic through a statically-routed IPsec tunnel. This RFC has all traffic through a statically-routed IPsec tunnel. This RFC has
not been widely adopted. not been widely adopted.
Requirements levels for RFC3884: Requirements levels for RFC3884:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility, Wrapped ESP for Traffic 3.4.6. draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility, Wrapped ESP for Traffic
Visibility (S) Visibility (S)
ESP, as defined in [RFC4303], does not allow a network device to ESP, as defined in [RFC4303], does not allow a network device to
easily determine whether protected traffic that is passing through easily determine whether protected traffic that is passing through
the device is encrypted, or only integrity-protected (referred to as the device is encrypted, or only integrity-protected (referred to as
ESP-NULL packets). [ipsecme-5] extends ESP to provide explicit ESP-NULL packets). [ipsecme-5] extends ESP to provide explicit
notification of integrity-protected packets, and extends IKEv2 to notification of integrity-protected packets, and extends IKEv2 to
negotiate this capability between the IPsec peers. negotiate this capability between the IPsec peers.
Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o draft-kivinen-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics, Heuristics for 3.4.7. draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics, Heuristics for Detecting
Detecting ESP-NULL packets (I) ESP-NULL packets (I)
[ipsecme-6] offers an alternative approach to differentiating between [ipsecme-6] offers an alternative approach to differentiating between
ESP-encrypted and ESP-NULL packets, through packet inspection. This ESP-encrypted and ESP-NULL packets, through packet inspection. This
method does not require any change to IKEv2 or ESP. method does not require any change to IKEv2 or ESP.
Requirements levels for draft-kivinen-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
3.5. General Considerations 3.5. General Considerations
o RFC 3715, IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility 3.5.1. RFC 3715, IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility
Requirements (I, Mar. 2004) Requirements (I, Mar. 2004)
[RFC3715] "describes known incompatibilities between NAT and IPsec, [RFC3715] "describes known incompatibilities between NAT and IPsec,
and describes the requirements for addressing them." This is a and describes the requirements for addressing them." This is a
critical issue, since IPsec is frequently used to provide VPN access critical issue, since IPsec is frequently used to provide VPN access
to the corporate network for telecommuters, and NATs are widely to the corporate network for telecommuters, and NATs are widely
deployed in home gateways, hotels, and other access networks deployed in home gateways, hotels, and other access networks
typically used for remote access. typically used for remote access.
Requirements levels for RFC3715: Requirements levels for RFC3715:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 5406, Guidelines for Specifying the Use of IPsec Version 2 3.5.2. RFC 5406, Guidelines for Specifying the Use of IPsec Version 2
(B, Feb. 2009) (B, Feb. 2009)
[RFC5406] offers guidance to protocol designers on how to ascertain [RFC5406] offers guidance to protocol designers on how to ascertain
whether IPsec is the appropriate security mechanism to provide an whether IPsec is the appropriate security mechanism to provide an
interoperable security solution for the protocol. If this is not the interoperable security solution for the protocol. If this is not the
case, it advises against attempting to define a new security case, it advises against attempting to define a new security
protocol; rather, it suggests using another standards-based security protocol; rather, it suggests using another standards-based security
protocol. The details in this document apply only to IPsec-v2. protocol. The details in this document apply only to IPsec-v2.
Requirements levels for RFC5406: Requirements levels for RFC5406:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
4. IKE Documents 4. IKE Documents
4.1. Base Documents 4.1. Base Documents
4.1.1. IKEv1 4.1.1. IKEv1
o RFC 2409, The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (S, Nov. 1998) 4.1.1.1. RFC 2409, The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (S, Nov. 1998)
This document defines a key exchange protocol that can be used to This document defines a key exchange protocol that can be used to
negotiate authenticated keying material for SAs. This document negotiate authenticated keying material for SAs. This document
implements a subset of the Oakley protocol in conjunction with ISAKMP implements a subset of the Oakley protocol in conjunction with ISAKMP
to obtain authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP, and for to obtain authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP, and for
other security associations such as AH and ESP for the IETF IPsec other security associations such as AH and ESP for the IETF IPsec
DOI. While historically IKEv1 was created by combining two security DOI. While historically IKEv1 was created by combining two security
protocols, ISAKMP and Oakley, in practice the combination (along with protocols, ISAKMP and Oakley, in practice the combination (along with
the IPsec DOI) has commonly been viewed as one protocol, IKEv1. The the IPsec DOI) has commonly been viewed as one protocol, IKEv1. The
protocol's origins can be seen in the organization of the documents protocol's origins can be seen in the organization of the documents
that define it. that define it.
Requirements levels for RFC2409: Requirements levels for RFC2409:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
(Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v2, but (Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v2, but
alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.) alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.)
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key Management 4.1.1.2. RFC 2408, Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP) (S, Nov. 1998) Protocol (ISAKMP) (S, Nov. 1998)
This document defines procedures and packet formats to establish, This document defines procedures and packet formats to establish,
negotiate, modify and delete Security Associations (SAs). It is negotiate, modify and delete Security Associations (SAs). It is
intended to support the negotiation of SAs for security protocols at intended to support the negotiation of SAs for security protocols at
all layers of the network stack. ISAKMP can work with many different all layers of the network stack. ISAKMP can work with many different
key exchange protocols, each with different security properties. key exchange protocols, each with different security properties.
Requirements levels for RFC2408: Requirements levels for RFC2408:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 2407, The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for 4.1.1.3. RFC 2407, The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
ISAKMP (S, Nov. 1998) for ISAKMP (S, Nov. 1998)
Within ISAKMP, a Domain of Interpretation is used to group related Within ISAKMP, a Domain of Interpretation is used to group related
protocols using ISAKMP to negotiate security associations. Security protocols using ISAKMP to negotiate security associations. Security
protocols sharing a DOI choose security protocol and cryptographic protocols sharing a DOI choose security protocol and cryptographic
transforms from a common namespace and share key exchange protocol transforms from a common namespace and share key exchange protocol
identifiers. This document defines the Internet IP Security DOI identifiers. This document defines the Internet IP Security DOI
(IPSEC DOI), which instantiates ISAKMP for use with IP when IP uses (IPSEC DOI), which instantiates ISAKMP for use with IP when IP uses
ISAKMP to negotiate security associations. ISAKMP to negotiate security associations.
Requirements levels for RFC2407: Requirements levels for RFC2407:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
o RFC 2412, The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol (I, Nov. 1998) 4.1.1.4. RFC 2412, The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol (I, Nov. 1998)
[RFC2412] describes a key establishment protocol using which two [RFC2412] describes a key establishment protocol using which two
authenticated parties can agree on secure and secret keying material. authenticated parties can agree on secure and secret keying material.
The Oakley protocol describes a series of key exchanges-- called The Oakley protocol describes a series of key exchanges-- called
"modes"-- and details the services provided by each (e.g. perfect "modes"-- and details the services provided by each (e.g. perfect
forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication). forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication).
This document provides additional theory and background to explain
some of the design decisions and security features of IKE and ISAKMP;
it does not include details necessary for the implementation of
IKEv1.
Requirements levels for RFC2412: Requirements levels for RFC2412:
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - N/A IPsec-v3 - N/A
4.1.2. IKEv2 4.1.2. IKEv2
o RFC 4306, Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol (S, Dec. 2005) 4.1.2.1. RFC 4306, Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol (S, Dec.
2005)
This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
protocol. It covers what was covered previously by separate protocol. It covers what was covered previously by separate
documents: ISAKMP, IKE and DOI. It also addresses NAT traversal, documents: ISAKMP, IKE and DOI. It also addresses NAT traversal,
legacy authentication and remote address acquisition. IKEv2 is not legacy authentication and remote address acquisition. IKEv2 is not
interoperable with IKEv1. interoperable with IKEv1.
Requirements levels for RFC4306: Requirements levels for RFC4306:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
(Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v3, but (Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v3, but
alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.) alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.)
o RFC 4718, IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines (I, 4.1.2.2. RFC 4718, IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation Guidelines
Oct. 2006) (I, Oct. 2006)
[RFC4718] clarifies many areas of the IKEv2 specification that may be [RFC4718] clarifies many areas of the IKEv2 specification that may be
difficult to understand for developers who are not intimately difficult to understand for developers who are not intimately
familiar with the specification and its history. It does not familiar with the specification and its history. It does not
introduce any changes to the protocol, but rather provides introduce any changes to the protocol, but rather provides
descriptions that are less prone to ambiguous interpretations. The descriptions that are less prone to ambiguous interpretations. The
goal of this document is to encourage the development of goal of this document is to encourage the development of
interoperable implementations. interoperable implementations.
Requirements levels for RFC4718: Requirements levels for RFC4718:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis, Internet Key Exchange Protocol: 4.1.2.3. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis, Internet Key Exchange Protocol:
IKEv2 (S) IKEv2 (S)
[ipsecme-1] combines the original IKEv2 RFC [RFC4306] with the [ipsecme-1] combines the original IKEv2 RFC [RFC4306] with the
Clarifications RFC [RFC4718], and resolves many implementation issues Clarifications RFC [RFC4718], and resolves many implementation issues
discovered by the community since the publication of these two discovered by the community since the publication of these two
documents. This document was developed by the IPsecme (IPsec documents. This document was developed by the IPsecME (IPsec
Maintenance and Extensions) working group, after the conclusion of Maintenance and Extensions) working group, after the conclusion of
the original IPsec working group. the original IPsec working group.
Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis:
IPsec-v2 - N/A IPsec-v2 - N/A
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
(Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v3, but (Automatic key distribution is required for IPsec-v3, but
alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.) alternatives to IKE may be used to satisfy that requirement.)
4.2. Additions and Extensions 4.2. Additions and Extensions
4.2.1. Peer Authentication Methods 4.2.1. Peer Authentication Methods
o RFC 4478, Repeated Authentication in Internet Key Exchange 4.2.1.1. RFC 4478, Repeated Authentication in Internet Key Exchange
(IKEv2) Protocol (E, Apr. 2006) (IKEv2) Protocol (E, Apr. 2006)
[RFC4478] addresses a problem unique to remote access scenarios. How [RFC4478] addresses a problem unique to remote access scenarios. How
can the gateway (the IKE responder) force the remote user (the IKE can the gateway (the IKE responder) force the remote user (the IKE
initiator) to periodically re-authenticate, limiting the damage in initiator) to periodically re-authenticate, limiting the damage in
the case where an unauthorized user gains physical access to the the case where an unauthorized user gains physical access to the
remote host? This document defines a new informational message that a remote host? This document defines a new status notification, that a
responder can send to an initiator, notifying the initiator that the responder can send to an initiator, notifying the initiator that the
IPsec SA will be revoked unless the initiator re-authenticates. IPsec SA will be revoked unless the initiator re-authenticates within
a specified period of time.
Requirements levels for RFC4478: Requirements levels for RFC4478:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o RFC 4739, Multiple Authentication Exchanges in the Internet Key 4.2.1.2. RFC 4739, Multiple Authentication Exchanges in the Internet
Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol (E, Nov. 2006) Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol (E, Nov. 2006)
IKEv2 supports several mechanisms for authenticating the parties but IKEv2 supports several mechanisms for authenticating the parties but
each endpoint uses only one of these mechanisms to authenticate each endpoint uses only one of these mechanisms to authenticate
itself. [RFC4739] specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the itself. [RFC4739] specifies an extension to IKEv2 that allows the
use of multiple authentication exchanges, using either different use of multiple authentication exchanges, using either different
mechanisms or the same mechanism. This extension allows, for mechanisms or the same mechanism. This extension allows, for
instance, performing certificate-based authentication of the client instance, performing certificate-based authentication of the client
host followed by an EAP authentication of the user. This also allows host followed by an EAP authentication of the user. This also allows
for authentication by multiple administrative domains, if needed. for authentication by multiple administrative domains, if needed.
Requirements levels for RFC4739: Requirements levels for RFC4739:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o RFC 4754, IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve 4.2.1.3. RFC 4754, IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (S, Jan. 2007) Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (S, Jan. 2007)
[RFC4754] describes how the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature [RFC4754] describes how the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) may be used as the authentication method within the Algorithm (ECDSA) may be used as the authentication method within the
IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols. ECDSA provides many benefits including IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols. ECDSA provides many benefits including
computational efficiency, small signature sizes, and minimal computational efficiency, small signature sizes, and minimal
bandwidth compared to other available digital signature methods like bandwidth compared to other available digital signature methods like
RSA and DSA. RSA and DSA.
Requirements levels for RFC4754: Requirements levels for RFC4754:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
4.2.2. Certificate Contents and Management (PKI4IPsec) 4.2.2. Certificate Contents and Management (PKI4IPsec)
The format, contents and interpretation of Public Key Certificates The format, contents and interpretation of Public Key Certificates
proved to be a source of interoperability problems within IKE and proved to be a source of interoperability problems within IKE and
IPsec. PKI4Ipsec was an attempt to set in place some common IPsec. PKI4IPsec was an attempt to set in place some common
procedures and interpretations to mitigate those problems. procedures and interpretations to mitigate those problems.
o RFC 4809, Requirements for an IPsec Certificate Management 4.2.2.1. RFC 4809, Requirements for an IPsec Certificate Management
Profile (I, Feb. 2007) Profile (I, Feb. 2007)
[RFC4809] enumerates requirements for Public Key Certificate (PKC) [RFC4809] enumerates requirements for Public Key Certificate (PKC)
lifecycle transactions between different VPN System and PKI System lifecycle transactions between different VPN System and PKI System
products in order to better enable large scale, PKI-enabled IPsec products in order to better enable large scale, PKI-enabled IPsec
deployments with a common set of transactions. This document deployments with a common set of transactions. This document
discusses requirements for both the IPsec and the PKI products. discusses requirements for both the IPsec and the PKI products.
Requirements levels for RFC4809: Requirements levels for RFC4809:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o RFC 4945, The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of IKEv1/ISAKMP, 4.2.2.2. RFC 4945, The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of
IKEv2, and PKIX (S, Aug. 2007) IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX (S, Aug. 2007)
[RFC4945] defines a profile of the IKE and PKIX frameworks in order [RFC4945] defines a profile of the IKE and PKIX frameworks in order
to provide an agreed-upon standard for using PKI technology in the to provide an agreed-upon standard for using PKI technology in the
context of IPsec. It also documents the contents of the relevant IKE context of IPsec. It also documents the contents of the relevant IKE
payloads and further specifies their semantics. It also summarizes payloads and further specifies their semantics. It also summarizes
the current state of implementations and deployment and provides the current state of implementations and deployment and provides
advice to avoid common interoperability issues. advice to avoid common interoperability issues.
Requirements levels for RFC4945: Requirements levels for RFC4945:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o RFC 4806, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions 4.2.2.3. RFC 4806, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions
to IKEv2 (S, Feb. 2007) to IKEv2 (S, Feb. 2007)
When certificates are used with IKEv2, the communicating peers need a When certificates are used with IKEv2, the communicating peers need a
mechanism to determine the revocation status of the peer's mechanism to determine the revocation status of the peer's
certificate. OCSP is one such mechanism. [RFC4806] defines the certificate. OCSP is one such mechanism. [RFC4806] defines the
"OCSP Content" extension to IKEv2. This document is applicable when "OCSP Content" extension to IKEv2. This document is applicable when
OCSP is desired and security policy (e.g. firewall policy) prevents OCSP is desired and security policy (e.g. firewall policy) prevents
one of the IKEv2 peers from accessing the relevant OCSP responder one of the IKEv2 peers from accessing the relevant OCSP responder
directly. directly.
Requirements levels for RFC4806: Requirements levels for RFC4806:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
4.2.3. Dead Peer Detection 4.2.3. Dead Peer Detection
o RFC 3706, A Traffic-Based Method of Detecting Dead Internet Key 4.2.3.1. RFC 3706, A Traffic-Based Method of Detecting Dead Internet
Exchange (IKE) Peers (I, Feb. 2004) Key Exchange (IKE) Peers (I, Feb. 2004)
When two peers communicate using IKE and IPsec, it is possible for When two peers communicate using IKE and IPsec, it is possible for
the connectivity between the two peers to drop unexpectedly. But the the connectivity between the two peers to drop unexpectedly. But the
SAs can still remain until their lifetimes expire, resulting in the SAs can still remain until their lifetimes expire, resulting in the
packets getting tunneled into a "black hole". [RFC3706] describes an packets getting tunneled into a "black hole". [RFC3706] describes an
approach to detect peer liveliness without needing to send messages approach to detect peer liveliness without needing to send messages
at regular intervals. This RFC defines an optional extension to at regular intervals. This RFC defines an optional extension to
IKEv1; dead peer detection (DPD) is an integral part of IKEv2. IKEv1; dead peer detection (DPD) is an integral part of IKEv2, which
refers to this feature as a "liveness check" or "liveness test".
Requirements levels for RFC3706: Requirements levels for RFC3706:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306) IKEv2 - N/A (included in RFC4306)
4.2.4. Remote Access 4.2.4. Remote Access
The IPsecme working group identified some missing components needed The IPsecME working group identified some missing components needed
for more extensive IKEv2 and IPsec-v3 support for remote access for more extensive IKEv2 and IPsec-v3 support for remote access
clients. These include: efficient client resumption of a previously clients. These include: efficient client resumption of a previously
established session with a VPN gateway; efficient client redirection established session with a VPN gateway; efficient client redirection
to an alternate VPN gateway; and support for IPv6 client to an alternate VPN gateway; and support for IPv6 client
configuration using IPsec configuration payloads. configuration using IPsec configuration payloads.
o draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption, IKEv2 Session Resumption 4.2.4.1. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption, IKEv2 Session Resumption
(S) (S)
[ipsecme-4] enables a remote client that has been disconnected from a [ipsecme-4] enables a remote client that has been disconnected from a
gateway to re-establish SAs with the gateway in an expedited manner, gateway to re-establish SAs with the gateway in an expedited manner,
without repeating the complete IKEv2 negotiation. This capability without repeating the complete IKEv2 negotiation. This capability
requires changes to IKEv2. requires changes to IKEv2.
Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect, Re-direct Mechanism for IKEv2 4.2.4.2. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect, Re-direct Mechanism for
(S) IKEv2 (S)
[ipsecme-3] enables a gateway to securely re-direct VPN clients to [ipsecme-3] enables a gateway to securely re-direct VPN clients to
another VPN gateway, either during or after the IKEv2 negotiation. another VPN gateway, either during or after the IKEv2 negotiation.
Possible reasons include, but are not limited to, an overloaded Possible reasons include, but are not limited to, an overloaded
gateway or a gateway that needs to shut down. This requires changes gateway or a gateway that needs to shut down. This requires changes
to IKEv2. to IKEv2.
Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config, IPv6 Configuration in 4.2.4.3. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config, IPv6 Configuration in
IKEv2 (S) IKEv2 (E)
In IKEv2, a VPN gateway can assign an internal network address to a In IKEv2, a VPN gateway can assign an internal network address to a
remote VPN client. This is accomplished through the use of remote VPN client. This is accomplished through the use of
configuration payloads. For an IPv6 client, the assignment of a configuration payloads. For an IPv6 client, the assignment of a
single address is not sufficient to enable full-fledged IPv6 single address is not sufficient to enable full-fledged IPv6
communications. [psecme-2] proposes several solutions that might communications. [ipsecme-2] proposes several solutions that might
remove this limitation. remove this limitation.
Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config: Requirements levels for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
5. Cryptographic Algorithms and Suites 5. Cryptographic Algorithms and Suites
Two basic requirements must be met for an algorithm to be used within Two basic requirements must be met for an algorithm to be used within
IKE and/or IPsec: assignment of one or more IANA values and an RFC IKE and/or IPsec: assignment of one or more IANA values and an RFC
that describes how to use the algorithm within the relevant protocol, that describes how to use the algorithm within the relevant protocol,
packet formats, special considerations, etc. For each RFC that packet formats, special considerations, etc. For each RFC that
describes a cryptographic algorithm, this document will classify its describes a cryptographic algorithm, this document will classify its
Requirements Level for each protocol, as either MUST, SHALL or MAY Requirements Level for each protocol, as either MUST, SHALL or MAY
[RFC2119]; optional; not defined; or N/A (not applicable). Optional [RFC2119]; optional; undefined; or N/A (not applicable). Optional
means that the algorithm meets the two basic requirements, but its means that the algorithm meets the two basic requirements, but its
use is not specifically recommended for that protocol. Not defined use is not specifically recommended for that protocol. Undefined
means that one of the basic requirements is not met: either there is means that one of the basic requirements is not met: either there is
no relevant IANA number for the algorithm, or there is no RFC no relevant IANA number for the algorithm, or there is no RFC
specifying how it should be used within that specific protocol. N/A specifying how it should be used within that specific protocol. N/A
means that use of the algorithm is inappropriate in the context means that use of the algorithm is inappropriate in the context
(e.g., NULL encryption for IKE, which always requires encryption; or (e.g., NULL encryption for IKE, which always requires encryption; or
combined mode algorithms, a new feature in IPsec-v3, for use with combined mode algorithms, a new feature in IPsec-v3, for use with
IPsec-v2). IPsec-v2).
This document categorizes the requirements level of each algorithm This document categorizes the requirements level of each algorithm
for IKEv1, IKEv2, IPsec-v2 and IPsec-v3. If an algorithm is for IKEv1, IKEv2, IPsec-v2 and IPsec-v3. If an algorithm is
skipping to change at page 21, line 48 skipping to change at page 23, line 4
groups, Pseudo-Random Functions or PRFs). If an algorithm is groups, Pseudo-Random Functions or PRFs). If an algorithm is
recommended for use within IPsec, it is used to protect the recommended for use within IPsec, it is used to protect the
IPsec/child SA's traffic, and IKE is capable of negotiating its use IPsec/child SA's traffic, and IKE is capable of negotiating its use
for that purpose. These requirements are summarized in Appendix B. for that purpose. These requirements are summarized in Appendix B.
5.1. Algorithm Requirements 5.1. Algorithm Requirements
Specifying a core set of mandatory algorithms for each protocol Specifying a core set of mandatory algorithms for each protocol
facilitates interoperability. Defining those algorithms in an RFC facilitates interoperability. Defining those algorithms in an RFC
separate from the base protocol RFC enhances algorithm agility. separate from the base protocol RFC enhances algorithm agility.
IPsec-v3 and IKEv2 each have an RFC that specifies their IPsec-v3 and IKEv2 each have an RFC that specifies their
mandatory-to-implement (MUST), recommended (SHOULD), optional (MAY), mandatory-to-implement (MUST), recommended (SHOULD), optional (MAY),
and deprecated (SHOULD NOT) algorithms. For IPsec-v2, this is and deprecated (SHOULD NOT) algorithms. For IPsec-v2, this is
included in the base protocol RFC. That was originally the case for included in the base protocol RFC. That was originally the case for
IKEv1, but IKEv1's algorithm requirements were updated in [RFC4109]. IKEv1, but IKEv1's algorithm requirements were updated in [RFC4109].
o RFC 4835, Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements 5.1.1. RFC 4835, Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements
for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header
Header (AH) (S, Apr. 2007) (AH) (S, Apr. 2007)
[RFC4835] specifies the encryption and integrity-protection [RFC4835] specifies the encryption and integrity-protection
algorithms for IPsec (both versions). Algorithms for IPsec-v2 were algorithms for IPsec (both versions). Algorithms for IPsec-v2 were
originally defined in [RFC2402] and [RFC2406]. [RFC4305] obsoleted originally defined in [RFC2402] and [RFC2406]. [RFC4305] obsoleted
those requirements, and was in turn obsoleted by [RFC4835]. those requirements, and was in turn obsoleted by [RFC4835].
Therefore, [RFC4835] applies to IPsec-v2 as well as IPsec-v3. Therefore, [RFC4835] applies to IPsec-v2 as well as IPsec-v3.
Combined mode algorithms are mentioned, but not assigned a Combined mode algorithms are mentioned, but not assigned a
requirement level. requirement level.
Requirements levels for RFC4835: Requirements levels for RFC4835:
IPsec-v2 - MUST IPsec-v2 - MUST
IPsec-v3 - MUST IPsec-v3 - MUST
o RFC 4307, Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key 5.1.2. RFC 4307, Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key
Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) (S, Dec. 2005) Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) (S, Dec. 2005)
[RFC4307] specifies the encryption and integrity-protection [RFC4307] specifies the encryption and integrity-protection
algorithms used by IKEv2 to protect its own traffic; the algorithms used by IKEv2 to protect its own traffic; the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups used within IKEv2; and the pseudo-random Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups used within IKEv2; and the pseudo-random
functions used by IKEv2 to generate keys, nonces and other random functions used by IKEv2 to generate keys, nonces and other random
values. It also specifies the encryption and integrity-protection values. It also specifies the encryption and integrity-protection
algorithms that IKEv2 negotiates for use within IPsec. algorithms that IKEv2 negotiates for use within IPsec.
Requirements levels for RFC4307: Requirements levels for RFC4307:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - MUST IKEv2 - MUST
o RFC 4109, Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1) 5.1.3. RFC 4109, Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)
(S, May 2005) (S, May 2005)
[RFC4109] updates IKEv1's algorithm specifications, which were [RFC4109] updates IKEv1's algorithm specifications, which were
originally defined in [RFC2409]. It specifies the encryption and originally defined in [RFC2409]. It specifies the encryption and
integrity-protection algorithms used by IKEv1 to protect its own integrity-protection algorithms used by IKEv1 to protect its own
traffic; the Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups used within IKEv1; the hash traffic; the Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups used within IKEv1; the hash
and pseudo-random functions used by IKEv1 to generate keys, nonces and pseudo-random functions used by IKEv1 to generate keys, nonces
and other random values; and the authentication methods and and other random values; and the authentication methods and
algorithms used by IKEv1 for peer authentication. algorithms used by IKEv1 for peer authentication.
Requirements levels for RFC4109: Requirements levels for RFC4109:
skipping to change at page 23, line 27 skipping to change at page 24, line 30
When any encryption algorithm is used to provide confidentiality, the When any encryption algorithm is used to provide confidentiality, the
use of integrity-protection is strongly recommended. If the use of integrity-protection is strongly recommended. If the
encryption algorithm is a stream cipher, omitting encryption algorithm is a stream cipher, omitting
integrity-protection seriously compromises the security properties of integrity-protection seriously compromises the security properties of
the algorithm. the algorithm.
DES, as described in [RFC2405], was originally a required algorithm DES, as described in [RFC2405], was originally a required algorithm
for IKEv1 and ESP-v2. Since the use of DES is now deprecated, this for IKEv1 and ESP-v2. Since the use of DES is now deprecated, this
roadmap does not include [RFC2405]. roadmap does not include [RFC2405].
o RFC 2410, The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec 5.2.1. RFC 2410, The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec
(S, Nov. 1998) (S, Nov. 1998)
[RFC2410] is a tongue-in-cheek description of the no-op encryption [RFC2410] is a tongue-in-cheek description of the no-op encryption
algorithm (i.e. using ESP without encryption). In order for IKE to algorithm (i.e. using ESP without encryption). In order for IKE to
negotiate the selection of the NULL encryption algorithm for use in negotiate the selection of the NULL encryption algorithm for use in
an ESP SA, an identifying IANA number is needed. This number (the an ESP SA, an identifying IANA number is needed. This number (the
value 11 for ESP_NULL) is found on the IANA registries for both IKEv1 value 11 for ESP_NULL) is found on the IANA registries for both IKEv1
and IKEv2, but it is not mentioned in this RFC. and IKEv2, but it is not mentioned in this RFC.
Requirements levels for ESP-NULL: Requirements levels for ESP-NULL:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - N/A IKEv2 - N/A
ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835] ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835]
ESP-v3 - MUST [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - MUST [RFC4835]
o RFC 2451, The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms (S, Nov. 1998) 5.2.2. RFC 2451, The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms (S, Nov. 1998)
[RFC2451] describes how to use encryption algorithms in cipher block [RFC2451] describes how to use encryption algorithms in cipher block
chaining (CBC) mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. It specifically chaining (CBC) mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. It specifically
mentions Blowfish, CAST-128, Triple DES (3DES), IDEA and RC5, but it mentions Blowfish, CAST-128, Triple DES (3DES), IDEA and RC5, but it
is applicable to any block cipher algorithm used in CBC mode. The is applicable to any block cipher algorithm used in CBC mode. The
algorithms mentioned in the RFC all have a 64-bit blocksize and a algorithms mentioned in the RFC all have a 64-bit blocksize and a
64-bit random IV that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted 64-bit random IV that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted
data. data.
Requirements levels for 3DES-CBC: Requirements levels for 3DES-CBC:
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ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835] ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835]
ESP-v3 - MUST- [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - MUST- [RFC4835]
Requirements levels for other CBC algorithms (Blowfish, CAST, IDEA, Requirements levels for other CBC algorithms (Blowfish, CAST, IDEA,
RC5): RC5):
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
ESP-v2 - optional ESP-v2 - optional
ESP-v3 - optional ESP-v3 - optional
o RFC 3602, The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec 5.2.3. RFC 3602, The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec
(S, Sep. 2003) (S, Sep. 2003)
[RFC3602] describes how to use AES in cipher block chaining (CBC) [RFC3602] describes how to use AES in cipher block chaining (CBC)
mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. AES is the successor to DES. mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. AES is the successor to DES.
AES-CBC is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV AES-CBC is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV
that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; and that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; and
keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other
sizes are MAY. [RFC3602] includes IANA values for use in IKEv1 and sizes are MAY. [RFC3602] includes IANA values for use in IKEv1 and
ESP-v2. A single IANA value is defined for AES-CBC, so IKE ESP-v2. A single IANA value is defined for AES-CBC, so IKE
negotiations need to specify the keysize. negotiations need to specify the keysize.
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IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307] IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307]
ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835] ESP-v2 - MUST [RFC4835]
ESP-v3 - MUST [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - MUST [RFC4835]
Requirements levels for AES-CBC with 192- or 256-bit keys: Requirements levels for AES-CBC with 192- or 256-bit keys:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
ESP-v2 - optional ESP-v2 - optional
ESP-v3 - optional ESP-v3 - optional
o RFC 3686, Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode 5.2.4. RFC 3686, Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode
With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Jan. 2004) With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Jan. 2004)
[RFC3686] describes how to use AES in counter (CTR) mode to encrypt [RFC3686] describes how to use AES in counter (CTR) mode to encrypt
ESP traffic. AES-CTR is a stream cipher with a 32-bit random nonce ESP traffic. AES-CTR is a stream cipher with a 32-bit random nonce
(1/SA) and a 64-bit IV, both of which are sent in the packet along (1/SA) and a 64-bit IV. 128-bit keys are MUST; 192- and 256-byte
with the encrypted data. 128-bit keys are MUST; 192- and 256-byte
keys are MAY. Reuse of the IV with the same key and nonce keys are MAY. Reuse of the IV with the same key and nonce
compromises the data's security; thus, AES-CTR should not be used compromises the data's security; thus, AES-CTR should not be used
with manual keying. AES-CTR can be pipelined and parallelized; it with manual keying. AES-CTR can be pipelined and parallelized; it
uses only the AES encryption operations for both encryption and uses only the AES encryption operations for both encryption and
decryption. decryption.
Requirements levels for AES-CTR: Requirements levels for AES-CTR:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - not defined (no RFC) IKEv2 - optional [draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2]
ESP-v2 - SHOULD [RFC4835] ESP-v2 - SHOULD [RFC4835]
ESP-v3 - SHOULD [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - SHOULD [RFC4835]
o RFC 4312, The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec 5.2.5. draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2, Using Advanced Encryption
(S, Dec. 2005) Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IKEv2 (S)
[ipsecme-7] extends [RFC3686] to enable the use of AES-CTR to provide
encryption and integrity-protection for IKEv2 messages.
5.2.6. RFC 4312, The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec
(S, Dec. 2005)
[RFC4312] describes how to use Camellia in cipher block chaining [RFC4312] describes how to use Camellia in cipher block chaining
(CBC) mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. Camellia-CBC is a (CBC) mode to encrypt IKE and ESP traffic. Camellia-CBC is a
block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV that is sent block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV that is sent
in the packet along with the encrypted data; and keysizes of 128, 192 in the packet along with the encrypted data; and keysizes of 128, 192
and 256 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes are MAY. and 256 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes are MAY.
[RFC4312] includes IANA values for use in IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. A [RFC4312] includes IANA values for use in IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. A
single IANA value is defined for Camellia-CBC, so IKEv1 negotiations single IANA value is defined for Camellia-CBC, so IKEv1 negotiations
need to specify the keysize. need to specify the keysize.
o RFC 5529, Modes of Operation for Camellia for Use with IPsec (S, 5.2.7. RFC 5529, Modes of Operation for Camellia for Use with IPsec (S,
Apr. 2009) Apr. 2009)
[RFC5529] describes the use of the Camellia block cipher algorithm in [RFC5529] describes the use of the Camellia block cipher algorithm in
conjunction with several different modes of operation. It describes conjunction with several different modes of operation. It describes
the use of Camellia in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode and Counter the use of Camellia in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode and Counter
(CTR) mode as an encryption algorithm within ESP. It also describes (CTR) mode as an encryption algorithm within ESP. It also describes
the use of Camellia in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode as a the use of Camellia in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode as a combined
combined-mode algorithm in ESP. This document defines how to use mode algorithm in ESP. This document defines how to use IKEv2 to
IKEv2 to generate keying material for a Camellia ESP SA; it does not generate keying material for a Camellia ESP SA; it does not define
define how to use Camellia within IKEv2 to protect an IKEv2 SA's how to use Camellia within IKEv2 to protect an IKEv2 SA's traffic.
traffic. All three modes can use keys of length 128-bits, 192-bits All three modes can use keys of length 128-bits, 192-bits or
or 256-bits. [RFC5529] includes IANA values for use in IKEv2 and 256-bits. [RFC5529] includes IANA values for use in IKEv2 and
IPsec-v3. A single IANA value is defined for each Camellia mode, so IPsec-v3. A single IANA value is defined for each Camellia mode, so
IKEv2 negotiations need to specify the keysize. IKEv2 negotiations need to specify the keysize.
Requirements levels for Camellia-CBC: Requirements levels for Camellia-CBC:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - not defined (no RFC) IKEv2 - undefined (no RFC)
ESP-v2 - optional ESP-v2 - optional
ESP-v3 - optional ESP-v3 - optional
Requirements levels for Camellia-CTR: Requirements levels for Camellia-CTR:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - not defined (no RFC) IKEv2 - undefined (no RFC)
ESP-v2 - not defined (no IANA #) ESP-v2 - undefined (no IANA #)
ESP-v3 - optional ESP-v3 - optional
Requirements levels for Camellia-CCM: Requirements levels for Camellia-CCM:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - not defined (no RFC) IKEv2 - undefined (no RFC)
ESP-v2 - N/A ESP-v2 - N/A
ESP-v3 - optional ESP-v3 - optional
o RFC 4196, The SEED Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec (S, 5.2.8. RFC 4196, The SEED Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec (S,
Oct. 2005) Oct. 2005)
[RFC4196] describes how to use SEED in cipher block chaining (CBC) [RFC4196] describes how to use SEED in cipher block chaining (CBC)
mode to encrypt ESP traffic. It describes how to use IKEv1 to mode to encrypt ESP traffic. It describes how to use IKEv1 to
negotiate a SEED ESP SA, but does not define the use of SEED to negotiate a SEED ESP SA, but does not define the use of SEED to
protect IKEv1 traffic. SEED-CBC is a block-mode cipher with a protect IKEv1 traffic. SEED-CBC is a block-mode cipher with a
128-bit blocksize; a random IV that is sent in the packet along with 128-bit blocksize; a random IV that is sent in the packet along with
the encrypted data; and a keysizes of 128 bits. [RFC4196] includes the encrypted data; and a keysizes of 128 bits. [RFC4196] includes
IANA values for use in IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. [RFC4196] includes test IANA values for use in IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. [RFC4196] includes test
data. data.
Requirements levels for SEED-CBC: Requirements levels for SEED-CBC:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv2 - undefined (no IANA #)
ESP-v2 - optional ESP-v2 - optional
ESP-v3 - not defined (no IANA #) ESP-v3 - undefined (no IANA #)
5.3. Integrity-Protection (Authentication) Algorithms 5.3. Integrity-Protection (Authentication) Algorithms
The integrity-protection algorithm RFCs describe how to use these The integrity-protection algorithm RFCs describe how to use these
algorithms to authenticate IKE and/or IPsec traffic, providing algorithms to authenticate IKE and/or IPsec traffic, providing
integrity protection to the traffic. This protection is provided by integrity protection to the traffic. This protection is provided by
computing an Integrity Check Value (ICV), which is sent in the computing an Integrity Check Value (ICV), which is sent in the
packet. The RFCs describe any special constraints, requirements, or packet. The RFCs describe any special constraints, requirements, or
changes to packet format appropriate for the specific algorithm. In changes to packet format appropriate for the specific algorithm. In
general, they do not describe the detailed algorithmic computations; general, they do not describe the detailed algorithmic computations;
the reference section of each RFC includes pointers to documents that the reference section of each RFC includes pointers to documents that
define the inner workings of the algorithm. Some of the RFCs include define the inner workings of the algorithm. Some of the RFCs include
sample test data, to enable implementors to compare their results sample test data, to enable implementors to compare their results
with standardized output. with standardized output.
o RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH (S, Nov. 5.3.1. RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH (S, Nov.
1998)
1998)
[RFC2404] describes HMAC-SHA-1, an integrity-protection algorithm [RFC2404] describes HMAC-SHA-1, an integrity-protection algorithm
with a 512-bit blocksize, and a 160-bit key and Integrity Check Value with a 512-bit blocksize, and a 160-bit key and Integrity Check Value
(ICV). For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. This (ICV). For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. This
is currently the most commonly-used integrity-protection algorithm. is currently the most commonly-used integrity-protection algorithm.
Requirements levels for HMAC-SHA-1: Requirements levels for HMAC-SHA-1:
IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - MUST [RFC4307] IKEv2 - MUST [RFC4307]
IPsec-v2 - MUST [RFC4835] IPsec-v2 - MUST [RFC4835]
IPsec-v3 - MUST [RFC4835] IPsec-v3 - MUST [RFC4835]
o RFC 3566, The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec 5.3.2. RFC 3566, The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec
(S, Sep. 2003) (S, Sep. 2003)
[RFC3566] describes AES-XCBC-MAC, a variant of CBC-MAC which is [RFC3566] describes AES-XCBC-MAC, a variant of CBC-MAC which is
secure for messages of varying lengths (unlike classic CBC-MAC). It secure for messages of varying lengths (unlike classic CBC-MAC). It
is an integrity-protection algorithm with a 128-bit blocksize, and a is an integrity-protection algorithm with a 128-bit blocksize, and a
128-bit key and ICV. For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 128-bit key and ICV. For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to
96 bits. [RFC3566] includes test data. 96 bits. [RFC3566] includes test data.
Requirements levels for AES-XCBC-MAC: Requirements levels for AES-XCBC-MAC:
IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109] IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
IPsec-v2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4835] IPsec-v2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4835]
IPsec-v3 - SHOULD+ [RFC4835] IPsec-v3 - SHOULD+ [RFC4835]
o RFC 4868, Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 5.3.3. RFC 4868, Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
with IPsec (S, May 2007) with IPsec (S, May 2007)
[RFC4868] describes a family of algorithms, successors to HMAC-SHA-1. [RFC4868] describes a family of algorithms, successors to HMAC-SHA-1.
HMAC-SHA-256 has a 512-bit blocksize, and a 256-bit key and ICV. HMAC-SHA-256 has a 512-bit blocksize, and a 256-bit key and ICV.
HMAC-SHA-384 has a 1024-bit blocksize, and a 384-bit key and ICV. HMAC-SHA-384 has a 1024-bit blocksize, and a 384-bit key and ICV.
HMAC-SHA-512 has a 1024-bit blocksize, and a 512-bit key and ICV. HMAC-SHA-512 has a 1024-bit blocksize, and a 512-bit key and ICV.
For use within IKE and IPsec, the ICV is truncated to half its For use within IKE and IPsec, the ICV is truncated to half its
original size (128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits). Each of the three original size (128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits). Each of the three
algorithms has its own IANA value, so IKE does not have to negotiate algorithms has its own IANA value, so IKE does not have to negotiate
the keysize. the keysize.
Requirements levels for HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMC-SHA-512: Requirements levels for HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 4543, The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) 5.3.4. RFC 4543, The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC)
in IPsec ESP and AH (S, May 2006) in IPsec ESP and AH (S, May 2006)
[RFC4543] is the variant of AES-GCM [RFC4106] that provides [RFC4543] is the variant of AES-GCM [RFC4106] that provides
integrity-protection without encryption. It has two versions: an integrity-protection without encryption. It has two versions: an
integrity-protection algorithm for use within AH-v3, and a integrity-protection algorithm for use within AH-v3, and a combined
combined-mode algorithm with null encryption for use within ESP-v3. mode algorithm with null encryption for use within ESP-v3. It can
It can use a key of 128-, 192-, or 256-bits; the ICV is always 128 use a key of 128-, 192-, or 256-bits; the ICV is always 128 bits, and
bits, and is not truncated. AES-GMAC uses a nonce, consisting of a is not truncated. AES-GMAC uses a nonce, consisting of a 64-bit IV
64-bit IV and a 32-bit salt (1/SA). The salt value is generated by and a 32-bit salt (1/SA). The salt value is generated by IKEv2
IKEv2 during the key generation process. Reuse of the salt value during the key generation process. Reuse of the salt value with the
with the same key compromises the data's security; thus, AES-GMAC same key compromises the data's security; thus, AES-GMAC should not
should not be used with manual keying. For use within AH-v3, each be used with manual keying. For use within AH-v3, each keysize has
keysize has its own IANA value, so IKE does not have to negotiate the its own IANA value, so IKEv2 does not have to negotiate the keysize.
keysize. For use within ESP-v3, there is only one IANA value, so IKE For use within ESP-v3, there is only one IANA value, so IKEv2
negotiations must specify the keysize. negotiations must specify the keysize.
Requirements levels for AES-GMAC: Requirements levels for AES-GMAC:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
IPsec-v2 - not defined (no IANA #) IPsec-v2 - undefined (no IANA #)
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH (S, Nov. 5.3.5. RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH (S, Nov.
1998) 1998)
[RFC2403] describes HMAC-MD5, an integrity-protection algorithm with [RFC2403] describes HMAC-MD5, an integrity-protection algorithm with
a 512-bit blocksize, and a 128-bit key and Integrity Check Value a 512-bit blocksize, and a 128-bit key and Integrity Check Value
(ICV). For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. It (ICV). For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. It
was a required algorithm for IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. The use of plain was a required algorithm for IKEv1 and IPsec-v2. The use of plain
MD5 is now deprecated, but [RFC4835] states: "Weaknesses have become MD5 is now deprecated, but [RFC4835] states: "Weaknesses have become
apparent in MD5; however, these should not affect the use of MD5 with apparent in MD5; however, these should not affect the use of MD5 with
HMAC." HMAC."
Requirements levels for HMAC-MD5: Requirements levels for HMAC-MD5:
IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - optional [RFC4307] IKEv2 - optional [RFC4307]
IPsec-v2 - MAY [RFC4835] IPsec-v2 - MAY [RFC4835]
IPsec-v3 - MAY [RFC4835] IPsec-v3 - MAY [RFC4835]
o RFC 4494, The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec (S, 5.3.6. RFC 4494, The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec (S,
Jun. 2006) Jun. 2006)
[RFC4494] describes AES-CMAC, another variant of CBC-MAC which is [RFC4494] describes AES-CMAC, another variant of CBC-MAC which is
secure for messages of varying lengths. It is an secure for messages of varying lengths. It is an
integrity-protection algorithm with a 128-bit blocksize, and 128-bit integrity-protection algorithm with a 128-bit blocksize, and 128-bit
key and ICV. For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. key and ICV. For use within IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits.
[RFC4494] includes test data. [RFC4494] includes test data.
Requirements levels for AES-CMAC: Requirements levels for AES-CMAC:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
IPsec-v2 - not defined (no IANA #) IPsec-v2 - undefined (no IANA #)
IPsec-v3 - optional IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 2857, The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH (S, 5.3.7. RFC 2857, The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH (S,
Jun. 2000) Jun. 2000)
[RFC2857] describes HMAC-RIPEMD, an integrity-protection algorithm [RFC2857] describes HMAC-RIPEMD, an integrity-protection algorithm
with a 512-bit blocksize, and a 160-bit key and ICV. For use within with a 512-bit blocksize, and a 160-bit key and ICV. For use within
IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits. IPsec, the ICV is truncated to 96 bits.
Requirements levels for HMAC-RIPEMD: Requirements levels for HMAC-RIPEMD:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv2 - undefined (no IANA #)
IPsec-v2 - optional IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - not defined (no IANA #) IPsec-v3 - undefined (no IANA #)
5.3.1. General Considerations
o RFC 4894, Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 5.3.8. RFC 4894, Use of Hash Algorithms in Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
and IPsec (I, May 2007) and IPsec (I, May 2007)
In light of recent attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, [RFC4894] examines In light of recent attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, [RFC4894] examines
whether it is necessary to replace the hash functions currently used whether it is necessary to replace the hash functions currently used
by IKE and IPsec for key generation, integrity-protection, digital by IKE and IPsec for key generation, integrity-protection, digital
signatures, or PKIX certificates. It concludes that the algorithms signatures, or PKIX certificates. It concludes that the algorithms
recommended for IKEv2 [RFC4307] and IPsec-v3 [RFC4305] are not recommended for IKEv2 [RFC4307] and IPsec-v3 [RFC4305] are not
currently susceptible to any known attacks. Nonetheless, it suggests currently susceptible to any known attacks. Nonetheless, it suggests
that implementors add support for AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [RFC3566], that implementors add support for AES-XCBC-MAC-96 [RFC3566],
AES-XCBC-PRF-128 [RFC4434] and HMAC-SHA-256, -384, and -512 [RFC4868] AES-XCBC-PRF-128 [RFC4434] and HMAC-SHA-256, -384, and -512 [RFC4868]
for future use. It also suggests that IKEv2 implementors add support for future use. It also suggests that IKEv2 implementors add support
skipping to change at page 29, line 44 skipping to change at page 30, line 48
integrity-protection, and IKEv1 can negotiate different combinations integrity-protection, and IKEv1 can negotiate different combinations
of algorithms for different SAs. In ESP-v3, a new class of of algorithms for different SAs. In ESP-v3, a new class of
algorithms was introduced, in which a single algorithm can provide algorithms was introduced, in which a single algorithm can provide
both encryption and integrity-protection. [RFC4306] describes how both encryption and integrity-protection. [RFC4306] describes how
IKEv2 can negotiate combined mode algorithms to be used in ESP-v3 IKEv2 can negotiate combined mode algorithms to be used in ESP-v3
SAs. [RFC5282] adds that capability to IKEv2, enabling IKEv2 to SAs. [RFC5282] adds that capability to IKEv2, enabling IKEv2 to
negotiate and use combined mode algorithms for its own traffic. When negotiate and use combined mode algorithms for its own traffic. When
properly designed, these algorithms can provide increased efficiency properly designed, these algorithms can provide increased efficiency
in both implementation and execution. in both implementation and execution.
o RFC 4309, Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with 5.4.1. RFC 4309, Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Dec. 2005) IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Dec. 2005)
[RFC4309] describes how to use AES in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [RFC4309] describes how to use AES in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)
mode, a combined alorithm, to encrypt and integrity-protect ESP-v3 mode, a combined alorithm, to encrypt and integrity-protect ESP-v3
traffic. AES-CCM is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a traffic. AES-CCM is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a
random IV that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; a random IV that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; a
24-bit salt value (1/SA); keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and ICV 24-bit salt value (1/SA); keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits, and ICV
sizes of 64, 96 and 128 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes sizes of 64, 96 and 128 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes
are MAY. ICV sizes of 64 and 128 bit are MUST; 96 bits is MAY. The are MAY. ICV sizes of 64 and 128 bit are MUST; 96 bits is MAY. The
salt value is generated by IKEv2 during the key generation process. salt value is generated by IKEv2 during the key generation process.
Reuse of the IV with the same key compromises the data's security; Reuse of the IV with the same key compromises the data's security;
skipping to change at page 30, line 24 skipping to change at page 31, line 29
ESP-v3 SA. [RFC5282] extends this to the use of AES-CCM to protect ESP-v3 SA. [RFC5282] extends this to the use of AES-CCM to protect
an IKEv2 SA. an IKEv2 SA.
Requirements levels for AES-CCM: Requirements levels for AES-CCM:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
ESP-v2 - N/A ESP-v2 - N/A
ESP-v3 - optional [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - optional [RFC4835]
NOTE: The IPsec-v2 IANA registry includes values for AES-CCM, but NOTE: The IPsec-v2 IANA registry includes values for AES-CCM, but
combined-mode algorithms are not a feature of IPsec-v2. combined mode algorithms are not a feature of IPsec-v2.
o RFC 4106, The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec 5.4.2. RFC 4106, The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Jun. 2005) Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (S, Jun. 2005)
[RFC4106] describes how to use AES in Galois/Counter (GCM) mode, a [RFC4106] describes how to use AES in Galois/Counter (GCM) mode, a
combined alorithm, to encrypt and integrity-protect ESP-v3 traffic. combined alorithm, to encrypt and integrity-protect ESP-v3 traffic.
AES-GCM is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV AES-GCM is a block-mode cipher with a 128-bit blocksize; a random IV
that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; a 32-bit that is sent in the packet along with the encrypted data; a 32-bit
salt value (1/SA); keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits; and ICV sizes salt value (1/SA); keysizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits; and ICV sizes
of 64, 96 and 128 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes are of 64, 96 and 128 bits. 128-bit keys are MUST; the other sizes are
MAY. An ICV size of 128 bits is a MUST; 64 and 96 bits are MAY. The MAY. An ICV size of 128 bits is a MUST; 64 and 96 bits are MAY. The
salt value is generated by IKEv2 during the key generation process. salt value is generated by IKEv2 during the key generation process.
Reuse of the IV with the same key compromises the data's security; Reuse of the IV with the same key compromises the data's security;
skipping to change at page 31, line 6 skipping to change at page 32, line 9
ESP-v3 SA. [RFC5282] extends this to the use of AES-GCM to protect ESP-v3 SA. [RFC5282] extends this to the use of AES-GCM to protect
an IKEv2 SA. an IKEv2 SA.
Requirements levels for AES-GCM: Requirements levels for AES-GCM:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
ESP-v2 - N/A ESP-v2 - N/A
ESP-v3 - optional [RFC4835] ESP-v3 - optional [RFC4835]
NOTE: The IPsec-v2 IANA registry includes values for AES-GCM, but NOTE: The IPsec-v2 IANA registry includes values for AES-GCM, but
combined-mode algorithms are not a feature of IPsec-v2. combined mode algorithms are not a feature of IPsec-v2.
5.4.1. General Considerations
o RFC 5282, Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the 5.4.3. RFC 5282, Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the
Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2)
Protocol (S, Aug. 2008) Protocol (S, Aug. 2008)
[RFC5282] extends [RFC4309] and [RFC4106] to enable the use of [RFC5282] extends [RFC4309] and [RFC4106] to enable the use of
AES-CCM and AES-GCM to provide encryption and integrity-protection AES-CCM and AES-GCM to provide encryption and integrity-protection
for IKEv2 messages. for IKEv2 messages.
Requirements levels for RFC5282: Requirements levels for RFC5282:
IKEv1 - N/A IKEv1 - N/A
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
5.5. Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) 5.5. Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs)
skipping to change at page 31, line 42 skipping to change at page 32, line 43
Requirements levels for PRF-HMAC-SHA1: Requirements levels for PRF-HMAC-SHA1:
IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - MUST [RFC4307] IKEv2 - MUST [RFC4307]
Requirements levels for PRF-HMAC-SHA-256, PRF-HMAC-SHA-384, Requirements levels for PRF-HMAC-SHA-256, PRF-HMAC-SHA-384,
PRF-HMAC-SHA-512: PRF-HMAC-SHA-512:
IKEv1 - optional [RFC4868] IKEv1 - optional [RFC4868]
IKEv2 - optional [RFC4868] IKEv2 - optional [RFC4868]
o RFC 4434, The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key 5.5.1. RFC 4434, The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key
Exchange Protocol (IKE) (S, Feb. 2006) Exchange Protocol (IKE) (S, Feb. 2006)
[RFC3566] defines AES-XCBC-MAC-96, which is used for integrity [RFC3566] defines AES-XCBC-MAC-96, which is used for integrity
protection within IKE and IPsec. [RFC4434] enables the use of protection within IKE and IPsec. [RFC4434] enables the use of
AES-XCBC-MAC as a PRF within IKE. The PRF differs from the AES-XCBC-MAC as a PRF within IKE. The PRF differs from the
integrity-protection algorithm in two ways: its 128-bit output is not integrity-protection algorithm in two ways: its 128-bit output is not
truncated to 96 bits; and it accepts a variable-length key, which is truncated to 96 bits; and it accepts a variable-length key, which is
modified (lengthened via padding or shortened through application of modified (lengthened via padding or shortened through application of
AES-XCBC) to a 128-bit key. [RFC4434] includes test data. AES-XCBC) to a 128-bit key. [RFC4434] includes test data.
Requirements levels for AES-XCBC-PRF: Requirements levels for AES-XCBC-PRF:
IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109] IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307] IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307]
o RFC 4615, The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message 5.5.2. RFC 4615, The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message
Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128)
(AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) (S, Aug. 2006)
Protocol (IKE) (S, Aug. 2006)
[RFC4615] extends [RFC4494] to enable the use of AES-CMAC as a PRF [RFC4615] extends [RFC4494] to enable the use of AES-CMAC as a PRF
within IKEv2, in a manner analogous to that used by [RFC4434] for within IKEv2, in a manner analogous to that used by [RFC4434] for
AES-XCBC. AES-XCBC.
Requirements levels for AES-CMAC-PRF: Requirements levels for AES-CMAC-PRF:
IKEv1 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv1 - undefined (no IANA #)
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
5.6. Cryptographic Suites 5.6. Cryptographic Suites
o RFC 4308, Cryptographic Suites for IPsec (S, Dec. 2005) 5.6.1. RFC 4308, Cryptographic Suites for IPsec (S, Dec. 2005)
An IKE negotiation consists of multiple cryptographic attributes, An IKE negotiation consists of multiple cryptographic attributes,
both for the IKE SA and for the IPsec SA. The number of possible both for the IKE SA and for the IPsec SA. The number of possible
combinations can pose a challenge to peers trying to find a common combinations can pose a challenge to peers trying to find a common
policy. To enhance interoperability, [RFC4308] defines two policy. To enhance interoperability, [RFC4308] defines two
pre-defined suites, consisting of combinations of algorithms that pre-defined suites, consisting of combinations of algorithms that
comprise typical security policies. IKE/ESP suite "VPN-A" includes comprise typical security policies. IKE/ESP suite "VPN-A" includes
use of 3DES, HMAC-SHA-1, and 1024-bit MODP Diffie-Hellman (DH); use of 3DES, HMAC-SHA-1, and 1024-bit MODP Diffie-Hellman (DH);
IKE/ESP suite "VPN-B" includes AES-CBC, AES-XCBC-MAC, and 2048-bit IKE/ESP suite "VPN-B" includes AES-CBC, AES-XCBC-MAC, and 2048-bit
MODP DH. These suites are intended to be named "single-button" MODP DH. These suites are intended to be named "single-button"
choices in the administrative interface, but do not prevent the use choices in the administrative interface, but do not prevent the use
of alternative combinations. of alternative combinations.
Requirements levels for RFC4308: Requirements levels for RFC4308:
IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
IPsec-v2 - optional
IPsec-v3 - optional
o RFC 4869, Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec (I, May 2007) 5.6.2. RFC 4869, Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPsec (I, May 2007)
[RFC4869] adds 4 pre-defined suites, based upon "Suite B" algorithms, [RFC4869] adds 4 pre-defined suites, based upon the United States
to those specified in [RFC4308]. IKE/ESP-v3 suites "Suite-B-GCM-128" National Security Agency's "Suite B" specifications, to those
and "Suite-B-GCM-256" include use of AES-CBC, AES-GCM, HMAC-SHA-256 specified in [RFC4308]. IKE/ESP-v3 suites "Suite-B-GCM-128" and
or HMAC-SHA-384, and 256-bit or 384-bit elliptic curve (EC) DH "Suite-B-GCM-256" include use of AES-CBC, AES-GCM, HMAC-SHA-256 or
groups. IKE/AH-v3 suites "Suite-B-GMAC-128" and "Suite-B-GMAC-256" HMAC-SHA-384, and 256-bit or 384-bit elliptic curve (EC) DH groups.
include use of AES-CBC, AES-GMAC, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384, and
256-bit or 384-bit EC DH groups. IKE/AH-v3 suites "Suite-B-GMAC-128" and "Suite-B-GMAC-256" include
use of AES-CBC, AES-GMAC, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384, and 256-bit
or 384-bit EC DH groups. While [RFC4308] does not specify a peer
authentication method, [RFC4869] mandates pre-shared key
authentication for IKEv1; public key authentication using ECDSA is
recommended for IKEv1 and required for IKEv2.
Requirements levels for RFC4869: Requirements levels for RFC4869:
ESP-v2 - N/A
ESP-v3 - optional
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
ESP-v2 - N/A
ESP-v3 - optional
5.7. Diffie-Hellman Algorithms 5.7. Diffie-Hellman Algorithms
IKE negotiations include a Diffie-Hellman exchange, which establishes IKE negotiations include a Diffie-Hellman exchange, which establishes
a shared secret, to which both parties contributed. This value is a shared secret, to which both parties contributed. This value is
used to generate keying material to protect both the IKE SA and the used to generate keying material to protect both the IKE SA and the
IPsec SA. IPsec SA.
IKEv1 [RFC2409] contains definitions of 2 DH MODP groups and 2 IKEv1 [RFC2409] contains definitions of 2 DH MODP groups and 2
elliptic curve (EC) groups; IKEv2 [RFC4306] only references the MODP elliptic curve (EC) groups; IKEv2 [RFC4306] only references the MODP
skipping to change at page 33, line 33 skipping to change at page 34, line 39
Requirements levels for DH MODP group 1: Requirements levels for DH MODP group 1:
IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
Requirements levels for DH MODP group 2: Requirements levels for DH MODP group 2:
IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MUST [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - MUST- [RFC4307] IKEv2 - MUST- [RFC4307]
Requirements levels for EC groups 3-4: Requirements levels for EC groups 3-4:
IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109] IKEv1 - MAY [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - not defined (no IANA #) IKEv2 - undefined (no IANA #)
o RFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups 5.7.1. RFC 3526, More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups
for Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (S, May 2003) for Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (S, May 2003)
[RFC2409] and [RFC4306] define 2 MODP DH groups (groups 1 and 2) for [RFC2409] and [RFC4306] define 2 MODP DH groups (groups 1 and 2) for
use within IKE. [RFC3526] adds six more groups (groups 5 and 14-18). use within IKE. [RFC3526] adds six more groups (groups 5 and 14-18).
Group 14 is a 2048-bit group that is strongly recommended for use in Group 14 is a 2048-bit group that is strongly recommended for use in
IKE. IKE.
Requirements levels for DH MODP group 14: Requirements levels for DH MODP group 14:
IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109] IKEv1 - SHOULD [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307] IKEv2 - SHOULD+ [RFC4307]
Requirements levels for DH MODP groups 5, 15-18: Requirements levels for DH MODP groups 5, 15-18:
IKEv1 - optional [RFC4109] IKEv1 - optional [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o RFC 4753, ECP Groups For IKE and IKEv2 (I, Jan. 2007) 5.7.2. RFC 4753, ECP Groups For IKE and IKEv2 (I, Jan. 2007)
[RFC4753] defines 3 EC DH groups (groups 19-21) for use within IKE. [RFC4753] defines 3 EC DH groups (groups 19-21) for use within IKE.
The document includes test data. The document includes test data.
Requirements levels for DH EC groups 19-21: Requirements levels for DH EC groups 19-21:
IKEv1 - optional [RFC4109] IKEv1 - optional [RFC4109]
IKEv2 - optional IKEv2 - optional
o draft-ietf-solinas-rfc4753bis, ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 5.7.3. draft-ietf-solinas-rfc4753bis, ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2 (I)
[ecp-ike1] obsoletes RFC4753, fixing an inconsistency in the DH [ecp-ike1] obsoletes RFC4753, fixing an inconsistency in the DH
shared secret value. shared secret value.
o RFC 5114, Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF 5.7.4. RFC 5114, Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF
Standards (I, Jan. 2008) Standards (I, Jan. 2008)
[RFC5114] defines 5 additional DH groups (MODP groups 22-24 and EC [RFC5114] defines 5 additional DH groups (MODP groups 22-24 and EC
groups 25-26) for use in IKE. It also includes 3 EC DH groups groups 25-26) for use in IKE. It also includes 3 EC DH groups
(groups 19-21) that were previously defined in [RFC4753]. The IANA (groups 19-21) that were previously defined in [RFC4753]. The IANA
group numbers are specific to IKE, but the DH groups are intended for group numbers are specific to IKE, but the DH groups are intended for
use in multiple IETF protocols, including TLS/SSL, S/MIME, and X.509 use in multiple IETF protocols, including TLS/SSL, S/MIME, and X.509
Certificates. Certificates.
Requirements levels for DH MODP groups 22-24, EC groups 25-26: Requirements levels for DH MODP groups 22-24, EC groups 25-26:
IKEv1 - optional IKEv1 - optional
skipping to change at page 34, line 48 skipping to change at page 36, line 5
is not applicable when the SA is one-to-many or many-to-many, the is not applicable when the SA is one-to-many or many-to-many, the
case for multicast. The Multicast Security (msec) Working Group has case for multicast. The Multicast Security (msec) Working Group has
defined alternatives to IKE and extensions to IPsec for use with defined alternatives to IKE and extensions to IPsec for use with
multicast traffic. Different multicast groups have differing multicast traffic. Different multicast groups have differing
characteristics and requirements: number of senders (one-to-many or characteristics and requirements: number of senders (one-to-many or
many-to-many), number of members (few, moderate, very large), many-to-many), number of members (few, moderate, very large),
volatility of membership, real-time delivery, etc. Their security volatility of membership, real-time delivery, etc. Their security
requirements vary as well. Each solution defined by msec applies to requirements vary as well. Each solution defined by msec applies to
a subset of the large variety of possible multicast groups. a subset of the large variety of possible multicast groups.
o RFC 3740, The Multicast Group Security Architecture (I, Mar. 6.1. RFC 3740, The Multicast Group Security Architecture (I, Mar. 2004)
2004)
[RFC3740] defines the multicast security architecture, which is used [RFC3740] defines the multicast security architecture, which is used
to provide security for packets exchanged by large multicast groups. to provide security for packets exchanged by large multicast groups.
It defines the components of the architectural framework; discusses It defines the components of the architectural framework; discusses
Group Security Associations (GSAs), key management, data handling and Group Security Associations (GSAs), key management, data handling and
security policies. Several existing protocols, including GDOI security policies. Several existing protocols, including GDOI
[RFC3547], GSAKMP [RFC4535] and MIKEY [RFC3830], satisfy the group [RFC3547], GSAKMP [RFC4535] and MIKEY [RFC3830], satisfy the group
key management requirements defined in this document. key management requirements defined in this document.
o RFC 5374, Multicast Extensions to the Security Architecture for 6.2. RFC 5374, Multicast Extensions to the Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol (S, Nov. 2008) the Internet Protocol (S, Nov. 2008)
[RFC5374] extends the security architecture defined in [RFC4301] to [RFC5374] extends the security architecture defined in [RFC4301] to
apply to multicast traffic. It defines a new class of SAs (GSAs - apply to multicast traffic. It defines a new class of SAs (GSAs -
Group Security Associations) and additional databases used to apply Group Security Associations) and additional databases used to apply
IPsec protection to multicast traffic. It also describes revisions IPsec protection to multicast traffic. It also describes revisions
and additions to the processing algorithms in [RFC4301]. and additions to the processing algorithms in [RFC4301].
o RFC 3547, The Group Domain of Interpretation (S, Jul. 2003) 6.3. RFC 3547, The Group Domain of Interpretation (S, Jul. 2003)
GDOI [RFC3547] extends IKEv1 so that it can be used to establish SAs GDOI [RFC3547] extends IKEv1 so that it can be used to establish SAs
to protect multicast traffic. This document defines additional to protect multicast traffic. This document defines additional
exchanges and payloads to be used for that purpose. exchanges and payloads to be used for that purpose.
o RFC 4046, Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management 6.4. RFC 4046, Multicast Security (MSEC) Group Key Management
Architecture (I, Apr. 2005) Architecture (I, Apr. 2005)
[RFC4046] sets out the general requirements and design principles for [RFC4046] sets out the general requirements and design principles for
protocols that are used for multicast key management. It does not go protocols that are used for multicast key management. It does not go
into the specifics of an individual protocol that can be used for into the specifics of an individual protocol that can be used for
that purposel that purposel
o RFC 4535, GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Key Management 6.5. RFC 4535, GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Key Management Protocol
Protocol (S, Jun. 2006) (S, Jun. 2006)
[RFC4535] defines a protocol that can be used to generate, distribute [RFC4535] defines a protocol that can be used to generate, distribute
and manage keys to be used for secure group communications. GSAKMP and manage keys to be used for secure group communications. GSAKMP
is also used to distribute and enforce group security policies. It is also used to distribute and enforce group security policies. It
can be used to facilitate many-to-many communications and distributed can be used to facilitate many-to-many communications and distributed
architectures. architectures.
o RFC 4534, Group Security Policy Token v1 (S, Jun. 2006) 6.6. RFC 4534, Group Security Policy Token v1 (S, Jun. 2006)
[RFC4534] specifies the structure of the Group Security Policy Token, [RFC4534] specifies the structure of the Group Security Policy Token,
"a structure used to specify the security policy and configurable "a structure used to specify the security policy and configurable
parameters for a cryptographic group, such as a secure multicast parameters for a cryptographic group, such as a secure multicast
group." This token can be used within GSAKMP to define and enforce group." This token can be used within GSAKMP to define and enforce
group polices such as secure access control. group polices such as secure access control.
o RFC 3830, MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing (S, Aug. 2004) 6.7. RFC 3830, MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing (S, Aug. 2004)
MIKEY [RFC3830] is a key management protocol, an alternative to GDOI MIKEY [RFC3830] is a key management protocol, an alternative to GDOI
[RFC3547] and GSAKMP [RFC4535], that is well-suited for use in [RFC3547] and GSAKMP [RFC4535], that is well-suited for use in
real-time, low-latency secure multimedia scenarios. real-time, low-latency secure multimedia scenarios.
o RFC 4738, MIKEY-RSA-R: An Additional Mode of Key Distribution in 6.8. RFC 4738, MIKEY-RSA-R: An Additional Mode of Key Distribution in
Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Nov. 2006) Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Nov. 2006)
[RFC4738] adds an additional key distribution method to MIKEY: [RFC4738] adds an additional key distribution method to MIKEY:
MIKEY-RSA-R, reverse-mode RSA. MIKEY-RSA-R, reverse-mode RSA.
o RFC 5197, On the Applicability of Various Multimedia Internet 6.9. RFC 5197, On the Applicability of Various Multimedia Internet
KEYing (MIKEY) Modes and Extensions (I, Jun. 2008) KEYing (MIKEY) Modes and Extensions (I, Jun. 2008)
[RFC5197] provides in in-depth, integrated description of MIKEY modes [RFC5197] provides an in-depth, integrated description of MIKEY modes
and extensions. It also includes sample real-world use cases. and extensions. It also includes sample real-world use cases.
o RFC 4563, The Key ID Information Type for the General Extension 6.10. RFC 4563, The Key ID Information Type for the General Extension
Payload in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Jun. 2006) Payload in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Jun. 2006)
[RFC4563] defines a MIKEY extension that satisfies the need for [RFC4563] defines a MIKEY extension that satisfies the need for
frequent, efficient key update in the 3GPP environment. frequent, efficient key update in the 3GPP environment.
o RFC 4359, The Use of RSA/SHA-1 Signatures within Encapsulating 6.11. RFC 4359, The Use of RSA/SHA-1 Signatures within Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) (S, Jan. Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) (S, Jan. 2006)
2006)
[RFC4359] describes the use of the RSA digital signature algorithm to [RFC4359] describes the use of the RSA digital signature algorithm to
provide integrity-protection for multicast traffic within ESP and AH. provide integrity-protection for multicast traffic within ESP and AH.
The algorithms used for integrity-protection for unicast traffic The algorithms used for integrity-protection for unicast traffic
(e.g., HMAC) are not suitable for this purpose when used with (e.g., HMAC) are not suitable for this purpose when used with
multicast traffic. multicast traffic.
o RFC 4650, HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman for Multimedia 6.12. RFC 4650, HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman for Multimedia
Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Sep. 2006) Internet KEYing (MIKEY) (S, Sep. 2006)
[RFC4650] "describes a lightweight point-to-point key management [RFC4650] "describes a lightweight point-to-point key management
protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) project." protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) project."
o RFC 5410, Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) General Extension 6.13. RFC 5410, Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) General Extension
Payload for Open Mobile Alliance BCAST 1.0 (I, Jan. 2009) Payload for Open Mobile Alliance BCAST 1.0 (I, Jan. 2009)
[RFC5410] describes one use of the General Extension Payload, defined [RFC5410] describes one use of the General Extension Payload, defined
as part of the base MIKEY [RFC3830] protocol. This document as part of the base MIKEY [RFC3830] protocol. This document
specifies a payload that can be used to transport keying material or specifies a payload that can be used to transport keying material or
management data that is defined in the Open Mobile Alliance's (OMA) management data that is defined in the Open Mobile Alliance's (OMA)
Broadcast (BCAST) group's Service and Content protection Broadcast (BCAST) group's Service and Content protection
specification. specification.
o RFC 4082, Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication 6.14. RFC 4082, Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
(TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication Transform Introduction (TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication Transform Introduction (I,
(I, Jun. 2005) Jun. 2005)
TESLA [RFC4082] is a scheme that provides source authentication and TESLA [RFC4082] is a scheme that provides source authentication and
integrity-protection to receivers of multicast traffic. Symmetric integrity-protection to receivers of multicast traffic. Symmetric
algorithms cannot generally be used for this purpose with multicast algorithms cannot generally be used for this purpose with multicast
traffic; public-key algorithms, which can afford this protection, traffic; public-key algorithms, which can afford this protection,
require considerably greater overhead. TESLA leverages time require considerably greater overhead. TESLA leverages time
synchronization and delayed key disclosure to provide this protection synchronization and delayed key disclosure to provide this protection
via the more efficient symmetric key algorithms. It can be used in via the more efficient symmetric key algorithms. It can be used in
multicast groups with a very large number of receivers. multicast groups with a very large number of receivers.
o RFC 4442, Bootstrapping Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant 6.15. RFC 4442, Bootstrapping Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA) (S, Mar. 2006) Authentication (TESLA) (S, Mar. 2006)
[RFC4442] describes MIKEY payloads that can be used to specify TESLA [RFC4442] describes MIKEY payloads that can be used to specify TESLA
parameters, thus bootstrapping the use of TESLA within the Secure parameters, thus bootstrapping the use of TESLA within the Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP).
o RFC 4383, The Use of Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant 6.16. RFC 4383, The Use of Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication (TESLA) in the Secure Real-time Transport Authentication (TESLA) in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
Protocol (SRTP) (S, Feb. 2006) (SRTP) (S, Feb. 2006)
[RFC4383] describes the use of TESLA within SRTP to protect multicast [RFC4383] describes the use of TESLA within SRTP to protect multicast
and broadcast traffic. and broadcast traffic.
7. Outgrowths of IPsec/IKE 7. Outgrowths of IPsec/IKE
Operational experience with IPsec revealed additional capabilities Operational experience with IPsec revealed additional capabilities
that could make IPsec more useful in real-world scenarios. These that could make IPsec more useful in real-world scenarios. These
include support for payload compression (IPComp), extensions to include support for payload compression (IPComp), extensions to
facilitate additional peer authentication methods (Btns, Kink and facilitate additional peer authentication methods (BTNS, KINK and
IPSECKEY), and additional capabilities for VPN clients (MobIKE and IPSECKEY), and additional capabilities for VPN clients (MOBIKE and
IPSRA). IPSRA).
7.1. IPComp (Compression) 7.1. IPComp (Compression)
The IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp) is a protocol that The IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp) is a protocol that
provides losslesss compression for IP datagrams. Although IKE can be provides lossless compression for IP datagrams. Although IKE can be
used to negotiate the use of IPComp in conjunction with IPsec, IPComp used to negotiate the use of IPComp in conjunction with IPsec, IPComp
can also be used when IPsec is not applied can also be used when IPsec is not applied
o RFC 3173, IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp) (S, Sep. 7.1.1. RFC 3173, IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp) (S, Sep.
2001)
2001)
IP payload compression is especially useful when IPsec based IP payload compression is especially useful when IPsec based
encryption is applied to IP datagrams. Encrypting the IP datagram encryption is applied to IP datagrams. Encrypting the IP datagram
causes the data to be random in nature, rendering compression at causes the data to be random in nature, rendering compression at
lower protocol layers ineffective. If IKE is used to negotiate lower protocol layers ineffective. If IKE is used to negotiate
compression in conjunction with IPsec, compression can be performed compression in conjunction with IPsec, compression can be performed
prior to encryption. [RFC3173] defines the payload compression prior to encryption. [RFC3173] defines the payload compression
protocol, the IPComp packet structure, the IPComp Association (IPCA), protocol, the IPComp packet structure, the IPComp Association (IPCA),
and several methods to negotiate the IPCA. and several methods to negotiate the IPCA.
o RFC 2394, IP Payload Compression Using DEFLATE (I, Dec. 1998) 7.1.2. RFC 2394, IP Payload Compression Using DEFLATE (I, Dec. 1998)
The IPComp protocol allows the compression of IP datagrams by The IPComp protocol allows the compression of IP datagrams by
supporting different compression algorithms. [RFC2394] defines the supporting different compression algorithms. [RFC2394] defines the
application of the DEFLATE algorithm as a compression method to application of the DEFLATE algorithm as a compression method to
IPComp. IPComp.
o RFC 2395, IP Payload Compression Using LZS (I, Dec. 1998) 7.1.3. RFC 2395, IP Payload Compression Using LZS (I, Dec. 1998)
The IPComp protocol allows the compression of IP datagrams by The IPComp protocol allows the compression of IP datagrams by
supporting different compression algorithms. [RFC2395] defines the supporting different compression algorithms. [RFC2395] defines the
application of the LZS algorithm as a compression method to IPComp. application of the LZS algorithm as a compression method to IPComp.
7.2. IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MobIKE) 7.2. IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE)
The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MobIKE) protocol enables two The IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) protocol enables two
additional capabilities for IPsec VPN users: 1) moving from one additional capabilities for IPsec VPN users: 1) moving from one
address to another without re-establishing existing SAs and 2) using address to another without re-establishing existing SAs and 2) using
multiple interfaces simultaneously. These solutions are limited to multiple interfaces simultaneously. These solutions are limited to
IPsec VPNs; they are not intended to provide more general mobility or IPsec VPNs; they are not intended to provide more general mobility or
multi-homing capabilities. multi-homing capabilities.
o RFC 4621, Design of the IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) 7.2.1. RFC 4621, Design of the IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE)
Protocol (I, Aug. 2006) Protocol (I, Aug. 2006)
[RFC4621] discusses the involved network entities and the [RFC4621] discusses the involved network entities and the
relationship between IKEv2 signaling and information provided by relationship between IKEv2 signaling and information provided by
other protocols. It also records design decisions for the MOBIKE other protocols. It also records design decisions for the MOBIKE
protocol, background information, and records discussions within the protocol, background information, and records discussions within the
working group. working group.
o RFC 4555, IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) (S, 7.2.2. RFC 4555, IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) (S,
Jun. 2006) Jun. 2006)
IKEv2 assumes that an IKE SA is created implicitly between the IP IKEv2 assumes that an IKE SA is created implicitly between the IP
address pair that is used during the protocol execution when address pair that is used during the protocol execution when
establishing the IKEv2 SA. IPsec related documents had no provision establishing the IKEv2 SA. IPsec related documents had no provision
to change this pair after an IKE SA was created. [RFC4555] defines to change this pair after an IKE SA was created. [RFC4555] defines
extensions to IKEv2 that enable an efficient management of IKE and extensions to IKEv2 that enable an efficient management of IKE and
IPsec Security Associations when a host possesses multiple IP IPsec Security Associations when a host possesses multiple IP
addresses and/or where IP addresses of an IPsec host change over addresses and/or where IP addresses of an IPsec host change over
time. time.
o RFC 5266, Secure Connectivity and Mobility Using Mobile IPv4 and 7.2.3. RFC 5266, Secure Connectivity and Mobility Using Mobile IPv4 and
IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) (B, Jun. 2008) IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming (MOBIKE) (B, Jun. 2008)
[RFC5266] describes a solution using Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) and mobility [RFC5266] describes a solution using Mobile IPv4 (MIPv4) and mobility
extensions to IKEv2 (MOBIKE) to provide secure connectivity and extensions to IKEv2 (MOBIKE) to provide secure connectivity and
mobility to enterprise users when they roam into untrusted networks. mobility to enterprise users when they roam into untrusted networks.
7.3. Better-than-Nothing Security (Btns) 7.3. Better-than-Nothing Security (BTNS)
One of the major obstacles to widespread implementation of IPsec is One of the major obstacles to widespread implementation of IPsec is
the lack of pre-existing credentials that can be used for peer the lack of pre-existing credentials that can be used for peer
authentication. Better-than-Nothing Security (Btns) is an attempt to authentication. Better-than-Nothing Security (BTNS) is an attempt to
sidestep this problem by allowing IKE to negotiate unauthenticated sidestep this problem by allowing IKE to negotiate unauthenticated
(anonymous) IPsec SAs, using credentials such as self-signed (anonymous) IPsec SAs, using credentials such as self-signed
certificates or "bare" public keys (public keys that are not certificates or "bare" public keys (public keys that are not
connected to a Public Key Certificate) for peer authentication. This connected to a Public Key Certificate) for peer authentication. This
ensures that subsequent traffic protected by the SA is conducted with ensures that subsequent traffic protected by the SA is conducted with
the same peer, and protects the communications from passive attack. the same peer, and protects the communications from passive attack.
These SAs can then be cryptographically bound to a higher-level These SAs can then be cryptographically bound to a higher-level
application protocol, which performs its own peer authentication. application protocol, which performs its own peer authentication.
o draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching, IPsec Channels: Connection 7.3.1. draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching, IPsec Channels: Connection
Latching Latching (S)
[btns-1] specifies, abstractly, how to interface applications and [btns-1] specifies, abstractly, how to interface applications and
transport protocols with IPsec so as to create channels by latching transport protocols with IPsec so as to create channels by latching
connections (packet flows) to certain IPsec Security Association (SA) connections (packet flows) to certain IPsec Security Association (SA)
parameters for the lifetime of the connections. Connection latching parameters for the lifetime of the connections. Connection latching
is layered on top of IPsec and does not modify the underlying IPsec is layered on top of IPsec and does not modify the underlying IPsec
architecture. architecture.
o RFC 5386, Better-Than-Nothing-Security: An Unauthenticated Mode 7.3.2. RFC 5386, Better-Than-Nothing-Security: An Unauthenticated Mode
of IPsec (S, Nov. 2008) of IPsec (S, Nov. 2008)
[RFC5386] specifies how to use the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [RFC5386] specifies how to use IKEv2 to setup unauthenticated
protocols, such as IKEv1 and IKEv2, to setup unauthenticated security security associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating
associations (SAs) for use with the IPsec Encapsulating Security Security Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH).
Payload (ESP) and the IPsec Authentication Header (AH). This This document does not require any changes to the bits on the wire,
document does not require any changes to the bits on the wire, but but specifies extensions to the Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and
specifies extensions to the Peer Authorization Database (PAD) and
Security Policy Database (SPD). Security Policy Database (SPD).
o RFC 5387, Problem and Applicability Statement for 7.3.3. RFC 5387, Problem and Applicability Statement for
Better-Than-Nothing Security (BTNS) (I, Nov. 2008) Better-Than-Nothing Security (BTNS) (I, Nov. 2008)
[RFC5387] considers that the need to deploy authentication [RFC5387] considers that the need to deploy authentication
information and its associated identities is a significant obstacle information and its associated identities is a significant obstacle
to the use of IPsec. This document explains the rationale for to the use of IPsec. This document explains the rationale for
extending the Internet network security protocol suite to enable use extending the Internet network security protocol suite to enable use
of IPsec security services without authentication. of IPsec security services without authentication.
7.4. Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (Kink) 7.4. Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK)
Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (Kink) is another attempt to Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK) is an attempt to
provide an alternative to IKE for IPsec peer authentication. It uses provide an alternative to IKE for IPsec peer authentication. It uses
Kerberos, instead of IKE, to establish IPsec SAs. For enterprises Kerberos, instead of IKE, to establish IPsec SAs. For enterprises
that already deploy the Kerberos centralized key management system, that already deploy the Kerberos centralized key management system,
IPsec can then be implemented without the need for additional peer IPsec can then be implemented without the need for additional peer
credentials. credentials.
o RFC 3129, Requirements for Kerberized Internet Negotiation of 7.4.1. RFC 3129, Requirements for Kerberized Internet Negotiation of
Keys (I, Jun. 2001) Keys (I, Jun. 2001)
[RFC3129] considers that peer to peer authentication and keying [RFC3129] considers that peer to peer authentication and keying
mechanisms have inherent drawbacks such as computational complexity mechanisms have inherent drawbacks such as computational complexity
and difficulty in enforcing security policies. This document and difficulty in enforcing security policies. This document
specifies the requirements for using basic features of Kerberos and specifies the requirements for using basic features of Kerberos and
uses them to its advantage to create a protocol which can establish uses them to its advantage to create a protocol which can establish
and maintain IPsec security associations ([RFC2401]). and maintain IPsec security associations ([RFC2401]).
o RFC 4430, Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK) (S, 7.4.2. RFC 4430, Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK) (S,
Mar. 2006) Mar. 2006)
[RFC4430] defines a low-latency, computationally inexpensive, easily [RFC4430] defines a low-latency, computationally inexpensive, easily
managed, and cryptographically sound protocol to establish and managed, and cryptographically sound protocol to establish and
maintain security associations using the Kerberos authentication maintain security associations using the Kerberos authentication
system. This document reuses the Quick Mode payloads of IKEv1 in system. This document reuses the Quick Mode payloads of IKEv1 in
order to foster substantial reuse of IKEv1 implementations. This RFC order to foster substantial reuse of IKEv1 implementations. This RFC
has not been widely adopted. has not been widely adopted.
7.5. IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA) 7.5. IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA)
IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA) was an attempt to extend IPsec IPsec Secure Remote Access (IPSRA) was an attempt to extend IPsec
protection to "road warriors," allowing IKE to authenticate not only protection to "road warriors," allowing IKE to authenticate not only
the user's device but also the user. The working group defined the user's device but also the user, without changing IKEv1. The
generic requirements of different IPsec remote access scenarios. An working group defined generic requirements of different IPsec remote
attempt was made to define an IKE-like protocol that would use legacy access scenarios. An attempt was made to define an IKE-like protocol
authentication mechanisms to create a temporary or short-lived user that would use legacy authentication mechanisms to create a temporary
credential that could be used for peer authentication within IKE. or short-lived user credential that could be used for peer
This protocol proved to be more cumbersome than standard Public Key authentication within IKE. This protocol proved to be more
protocols, and was abandoned. cumbersome than standard Public Key protocols, and was abandoned.
This led to the development of IKEv2, which incorporates the use of
EAP for user authentication.
o RFC 3457, Requirements for IPsec Remote Access Scenarios (I, 7.5.1. RFC 3457, Requirements for IPsec Remote Access Scenarios (I,
Jan. 2003) Jan. 2003)
[RFC3457] explores and enumerates the requirements of various IPsec [RFC3457] explores and enumerates the requirements of various IPsec
remote access scenarios, without suggesting particular solutions for remote access scenarios, without suggesting particular solutions for
them. them.
o RFC 3456, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) 7.5.2. RFC 3456, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4)
Configuration of IPsec Tunnel Mode (S, Jan. 2003) Configuration of IPsec Tunnel Mode (S, Jan. 2003)
[RFC3456] explores the requirements for host configuration in IPsec [RFC3456] explores the requirements for host configuration in IPsec
tunnel mode, and describes how the Dynamic Host Configuration tunnel mode, and describes how the Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCPv4) may be used for providing such configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) may be used for providing such configuration
information. This RFC has not been widely adopted. information. This RFC has not been widely adopted.
7.6. IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY) 7.6. IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY)
The IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY) enables the The IPsec Keying Information Resource Record (IPSECKEY) enables the
storage of public keys and other information that can be used to storage of public keys and other information that can be used to
facilitate opportunistic IPsec in a new type of DNS resource record. facilitate opportunistic IPsec in a new type of DNS resource record.
o RFC 4025, A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS (S, 7.6.1. RFC 4025, A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS (S,
Feb. 2005) Feb. 2005)
[RFC4025] describes a method of storing IPsec keying material in the [RFC4025] describes a method of storing IPsec keying material in the
DNS using a new type of resource record. This document describes how DNS using a new type of resource record. This document describes how
to store the public key of the target node in this resource record. to store the public key of the target node in this resource record.
This RFC has not been widely adopted. This RFC has not been widely adopted.
8. Other Protocols that use IPsec/IKE 8. Other Protocols that use IPsec/IKE
IPsec and IKE were designed to provide IP-layer security protection IPsec and IKE were designed to provide IP-layer security protection
to other Internet protocols' traffic as well as generic to other Internet protocols' traffic as well as generic
communications. Since IPsec is a general-purpose protocol, in some communications. Since IPsec is a general-purpose protocol, in some
cases its features do not provide the granularity or distinctive cases its features do not provide the granularity or distinctive
features required by another protocol; in some cases, its overhead or features required by another protocol; in some cases, its overhead or
pre-requisites do not match another protocol's requirements. pre-requisites do not match another protocol's requirements.
However, a number of other protocols do use IKE and/or IPsec to However, a number of other protocols do use IKE and/or IPsec to
protect some or all of their communications. protect some or all of their communications.
8.1. Mobile IP (MIPv4 and MIPv6) 8.1. Mobile IP (MIPv4 and MIPv6)
o RFC 4093, Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual 8.1.1. RFC 4093, Problem Statement: Mobile IPv4 Traversal of Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Gateways (I, Aug. 2005) Private Network (VPN) Gateways (I, Aug. 2005)
[RFC4093] describes the issues with deploying Mobile IPv4 across [RFC4093] describes the issues with deploying Mobile IPv4 across
virtual private networks (VPNs). IPsec is one of the VPN virtual private networks (VPNs). IPsec is one of the VPN
technologies covered by this document. It identifes and describes technologies covered by this document. It identifes and describes
practical deployment scenarios for Mobile IPv4 running alongside practical deployment scenarios for Mobile IPv4 running alongside
IPsec in enterprise and operator environments. It also specifies a IPsec in enterprise and operator environments. It also specifies a
set of framework guidelines to evaluate proposed solutions for set of framework guidelines to evaluate proposed solutions for
supporting multi-vendor seamless IPv4 mobility across IPsec-based VPN supporting multi-vendor seamless IPv4 mobility across IPsec-based VPN
gateways. gateways.
o RFC 5265, Mobile IPv4 Traversal across IPsec-Based VPN Gateways 8.1.2. RFC 5265, Mobile IPv4 Traversal across IPsec-Based VPN Gateways
(S, Jun. 2008) (S, Jun. 2008)
[RFC5265] describes a basic solution that uses Mobile IPv4 and IPsec [RFC5265] describes a basic solution that uses Mobile IPv4 and IPsec
to provide session mobility between enterprise intranets and external to provide session mobility between enterprise intranets and external
networks. The proposed solution minimizes changes to existing networks. The proposed solution minimizes changes to existing
firewall/VPN/DMZ deployments and does not require any changes to firewall/VPN/DMZ deployments and does not require any changes to
IPsec or key exchange protocols. It also proposes a mechanism to IPsec or key exchange protocols. It also proposes a mechanism to
minimize IPsec renegotiation when the mobile node moves. minimize IPsec renegotiation when the mobile node moves.
o RFC 3776, Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between 8.1.3. RFC 3776, Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between
Mobile Nodes and Home Agents (S, Jun. 2004) Mobile Nodes and Home Agents (S, Jun. 2004)
This document illustrates the use of IPsec in securing Mobile IPv6 This document illustrates the use of IPsec in securing Mobile IPv6
traffic between mobile nodes and home agents. It specifies the traffic between mobile nodes and home agents. It specifies the
required wire formats for the protected packets and illustrates required wire formats for the protected packets and illustrates
examples of Security Policy Database and Security Association examples of Security Policy Database and Security Association
Database entries that can be used to protect Mobile IPv6 signaling Database entries that can be used to protect Mobile IPv6 signaling
messages. It also describes how to configure either manually keyed messages. It also describes how to configure either manually keyed
IPsec security associations or how to configure IKEv1 to establish IPsec security associations or how to configure IKEv1 to establish
the SAs automatically. the SAs automatically.
o RFC 4877, Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec 8.1.4. RFC 4877, Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec
Architecture (S, Apr. 2007) Architecture (S, Apr. 2007)
This document updates [RFC3776] in order to work with the revised This document updates [RFC3776] in order to work with the revised
IPsec architecture [RFC4301]. Since the revised IPsec architecture IPsec architecture [RFC4301]. Since the revised IPsec architecture
expands the list of selectors to include the Mobility Header message expands the list of selectors to include the Mobility Header message
type, it becomes much easier to differentiate between different type, it becomes much easier to differentiate between different
mobility header messages. Since the ICMP message type and code are mobility header messages. Since the ICMP message type and code are
also newly added as selectors, this document uses them to protect also newly added as selectors, this document uses them to protect
Mobile Prefix Discovery messages. Finally, this document describes Mobile Prefix Discovery messages. Finally, this document describes
the use of IKEv2 in order to set up the SAs for Mobile IPv6. the use of IKEv2 in order to set up the SAs for Mobile IPv6.
o draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec, Using IPsec between Mobile and 8.1.5. draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec, Using IPsec between Mobile and
Correspondent IPv6 Nodes Correspondent IPv6 Nodes (S)
The Mobile IPv6 protocol contains a mode called "route optimization" The Mobile IPv6 protocol contains a mode called "route optimization"
(RO) mode that enables the mobile node to communicate with a (RO) mode that enables the mobile node to communicate with a
corresponding node using the most direct path between them instead of corresponding node using the most direct path between them instead of
passing through the home agent. It also defines a mechanism called passing through the home agent. It also defines a mechanism called
the return routability procedure in order to secure the RO signaling. the return routability procedure in order to secure the RO signaling.
[mip6-1] defines an alternative mechanism for Mobile IPv6 route [mip6-1] defines an alternative mechanism for Mobile IPv6 route
optimization based on strong authentication and IPsec. It specifies optimization based on strong authentication and IPsec. It specifies
which IPsec configurations can be useful in a Mobile IPv6 context and which IPsec configurations can be useful in a Mobile IPv6 context and
how they can validate Home Address Options and protect mobility how they can validate Home Address Options and protect mobility
signaling. It also provides detailed IKEv1 and IKEv2 configuration signaling. It also provides detailed IKEv1 and IKEv2 configuration
guidelines for common usage scenarios. guidelines for common usage scenarios.
o RFC 5213, Proxy Mobile IPv6 (S, Aug. 2008) 8.1.6. RFC 5213, Proxy Mobile IPv6 (S, Aug. 2008)
[RFC5213] describes a network-based mobility management protocol that [RFC5213] describes a network-based mobility management protocol that
is used to provide mobility services hosts without requiring their is used to provide mobility services hosts without requiring their
participation in any mobility-related signaling. It uses IPsec to participation in any mobility-related signaling. It uses IPsec to
protect the mobility signaling messages between the two network protect the mobility signaling messages between the two network
entities called the mobile access gateway (MAG) and the local entities called the mobile access gateway (MAG) and the local
mobility anchor (LMA). It also uses IKEv2 in order to set up the mobility anchor (LMA). It also uses IKEv2 in order to set up the
security associations between the MAG and the LMA. security associations between the MAG and the LMA.
o RFC 5268, Mobile IPv6 Fast Handovers (S, Jun. 2008) 8.1.7. RFC 5268, Mobile IPv6 Fast Handovers (S, Jun. 2008)
When Mobile IPv6 is used for a handover, there is a period during When Mobile IPv6 is used for a handover, there is a period during
which the Mobile Node is unable to send or receive packets because of which the Mobile Node is unable to send or receive packets because of
link switching delay and IP protocol operations. [RFC5268] specifies link switching delay and IP protocol operations. [RFC5268] specifies
a protocol between the Previous Access Router (PAR) and the New a protocol between the Previous Access Router (PAR) and the New
Access Router (NAR) to improve handover latency due to Mobile IPv6 Access Router (NAR) to improve handover latency due to Mobile IPv6
procedures. It uses IPsec ESP in transport mode with integrity procedures. It uses IPsec ESP in transport mode with integrity
protection for protecting the signaling messages between the PAR and protection for protecting the signaling messages between the PAR and
the NAR. It also describes the SPD entries and the PAD entries when the NAR. It also describes the SPD entries and the PAD entries when
IKEv2 is used for setting up the required SAs. IKEv2 is used for setting up the required SAs.
o RFC 5380, Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) Mobility Management 8.1.8. RFC 5380, Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) Mobility Management
(S, Oct. 2008) (S, Oct. 2008)
[RFC5380] describes extensions to Mobile IPv6 and IPv6 Neighbour [RFC5380] describes extensions to Mobile IPv6 and IPv6 Neighbour
Discovery to allow for local mobility handling in order to reduce the Discovery to allow for local mobility handling in order to reduce the
amount of signalling between the mobile node, its correspondent amount of signalling between the mobile node, its correspondent
nodes, and its home agent. It also improves handover speed of Mobile nodes, and its home agent. It also improves handover speed of Mobile
IPv6. It uses IPsec for protecting the signaling between the mobile IPv6. It uses IPsec for protecting the signaling between the mobile
node and a local mobility management entity called the Mobility node and a local mobility management entity called the Mobility
Anchor Point (MAP). The MAP also uses IPsec Peer Authorization Anchor Point (MAP). The MAP also uses IPsec Peer Authorization
Database (PAD) entries and configuration payloads described in Database (PAD) entries and configuration payloads described in
[RFC4877] in order to allocate a Regional Care-of Address (RCoA) for [RFC4877] in order to allocate a Regional Care-of Address (RCoA) for
mobile nodes. mobile nodes.
8.2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) 8.2. Open Shortest Path First (OSPF)
8.2.1. RFC 4552, Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3 (S, Jun.
o RFC 4552, Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3 (S, Jun. 2006)
2006)
OSPF is a link-state routing protocol that is designed to be run OSPF is a link-state routing protocol that is designed to be run
inside a single Autonomous System. OSPFv2 provided its own inside a single Autonomous System. OSPFv2 provided its own
authentication mechanisms using the AuType and Authentication authentication mechanisms using the AuType and Authentication
protocol header fields but OSPFv3 removed these fields and uses IPsec protocol header fields but OSPFv3 removed these fields and uses IPsec
instead. [RFC4552] describes how to use IPsec ESP and AH in order to instead. [RFC4552] describes how to use IPsec ESP and AH in order to
protect OSPFv3 signaling between two routers. It also enumerates the protect OSPFv3 signaling between two routers. It also enumerates the
IPsec capabilities the routers require in order to support this IPsec capabilities the routers require in order to support this
specification. Finally, it also describes the operation of OSPFv3 specification. Finally, it also describes the operation of OSPFv3
with IPsec over virtual links where the other endpoint is not known with IPsec over virtual links where the other endpoint is not known
at configuration time. at configuration time. Since OSPFv3 exchanges multicast packets as
well as unicast ones, the use of IKE within OSPFv3 is not
appropriate. Therefore, this document mandates the use of manual
keys.
8.3. Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 8.3. Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
o RFC 5201, Host Identity Protocol (E, Apr. 2008) 8.3.1. RFC 5201, Host Identity Protocol (E, Apr. 2008)
This document specifies a protocol that allows consenting hosts to IP addresses perform two distinct functions: host identifier and
securely establish and maintain shared IP-layer state, allowing locator. This document specifies a protocol that allows consenting
separation of the identifier and locator roles of IP addresses. This hosts to securely establish and maintain shared IP-layer state,
enables continuity of communications across IP address (locator) allowing separation of the identifier and locator roles of IP
changes. It uses the HMAC-SHA-1-96 and the AES-CBC algorithms with addresses. This enables continuity of communications across IP
IPsec ESP and AH for protecting its signaling messages. address (locator) changes. It uses public key identifiers from a new
Host Identity (HI) namespace for peer authentication. It uses the
HMAC-SHA-1-96 and the AES-CBC algorithms with IPsec ESP and AH for
protecting its signaling messages.
o RFC 5202, Using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) 8.3.2. RFC 5202, Using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Transport Format with the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) (E, Apr. Transport Format with the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) (E, Apr. 2008)
2008)
The HIP base exchange specification [RFC5201] does not describe any The HIP base exchange specification [RFC5201] does not describe any
transport formats or methods for for describing how ESP is used to transport formats or methods for describing how ESP is used to
protect user data to be used during the actual communication. protect user data to be used during the actual communication.
[RFC5202] specifies a set of HIP protocol extensions for creating a [RFC5202] specifies a set of HIP protocol extensions for creating a
pair of ESP Security Associations (SAs) between the hosts during the pair of ESP Security Associations (SAs) between the hosts during the
base exchange. After the HIP association and required ESP SAs have base exchange. After the HIP association and required ESP SAs have
been established between the hosts, the user data communication is been established between the hosts, the user data communication is
protected using ESP. In addition, this document specifies how to use protected using ESP. In addition, this document specifies how to use
the ESP Security Parameter Index (SPI) is used to indicate the right the ESP Security Parameter Index (SPI) is used to indicate the right
host context(host identity) and methods to update an existing ESP host context(host identity) and methods to update an existing ESP
Security Association. Security Association.
o RFC 5206, End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host 8.3.3. RFC 5206, End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host
Identity (E, Apr. 2008) Identity (E, Apr. 2008)
When a host uses HIP, the overlying protocol sublayers (e.g., When a host uses HIP, the overlying protocol sublayers (e.g.,
transport layer sockets and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) transport layer sockets) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
Security Associations (SAs) are bound to representations of these Security Associations (SAs) are bound to representations of these
host identities, and the IP addresses are only used for packet host identities, and the IP addresses are only used for packet
forwarding. [RFC5206] defines a generalized LOCATOR parameter for forwarding. [RFC5206] defines a generalized LOCATOR parameter for
use in HIP messages that allows a HIP host to notify a peer about use in HIP messages that allows a HIP host to notify a peer about
alternate addresses at which it is reachable. It also specifies how alternate addresses at which it is reachable. It also specifies how
a host can change its IP address and continue to send packets to its a host can change its IP address and continue to send packets to its
peers without necessarily rekeying. peers without necessarily rekeying.
o RFC 5207, NAT and Firewall Traversal Issues of Host Identity 8.3.4. RFC 5207, NAT and Firewall Traversal Issues of Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) (I, Apr. 2008) Protocol (HIP) (I, Apr. 2008)
[RFC5207] discusses the problems associated with HIP communication [RFC5207] discusses the problems associated with HIP communication
across network paths that include network address translators and across network paths that include network address translators and
firewalls. It analyzes the impact of NATs and firewalls on the HIP firewalls. It analyzes the impact of NATs and firewalls on the HIP
base exchange and the ESP data exchange. It discusses possible base exchange and the ESP data exchange. It discusses possible
changes to HIP that attempt to improve NAT and firewall traversal and changes to HIP that attempt to improve NAT and firewall traversal and
proposes a rendezvous point for letting HIP nodes behind a NAT be proposes a rendezvous point for letting HIP nodes behind a NAT be
reachable. It also suggests mechanisms for NATs to be more aware of reachable. It also suggests mechanisms for NATs to be more aware of
the HIP messages. the HIP messages.
8.4. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Update (EMU) 8.4. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Update (EMU)
o RFC 5106, The Extensible Authentication Protocol-Internet Key 8.4.1. RFC 5106, The Extensible Authentication Protocol-Internet Key
Exchange Protocol version 2 (EAP-IKEv2) Method (E, Feb. 2008) Exchange Protocol version 2 (EAP-IKEv2) Method (E, Feb. 2008)
[RFC5106] specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC5106] specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
method that is based on the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol. method that is based on the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) protocol.
EAP-IKEv2 provides mutual authentication and session key EAP-IKEv2 provides mutual authentication and session key
establishment between an EAP peer and an EAP server. It describes establishment between an EAP peer and an EAP server. It describes
the full EAP-IKEv2 message exchange and the composition of the the full EAP-IKEv2 message exchange and the composition of the
protocol messages. protocol messages.
8.5. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) 8.5. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
o RFC 3554, On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol 8.5.1. RFC 3554, On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol
(SCTP) with IPsec (S, Jul. 2003) (SCTP) with IPsec (S, Jul. 2003)
The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a reliable The Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) is a reliable
transport protocol operating on top of a connection-less packet transport protocol operating on top of a connection-less packet
network such as IP. [RFC3554] describes functional requirements for network such as IP. [RFC3554] describes functional requirements for
IPsec and IKE to be used in securing SCTP traffic. It adds support IPsec and IKE to be used in securing SCTP traffic. It adds support
for SCTP in the form of a new ID type in IKE [RFC2409] and for SCTP in the form of a new ID type in IKE [RFC2409] and
implementation choices in the IPsec processing to account for the implementation choices in the IPsec processing to account for the
multiple source and destination addresses associated with a single multiple source and destination addresses associated with a single
SCTP association. SCTP association.
8.6. Fibre Channel 8.6. Fibre Channel
o RFC 4595, Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel Security Association 8.6.1. RFC 4595, Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel Security Association
Management Protocol (I, Jul. 2006) Management Protocol (I, Jul. 2006)
Fibre Channel (FC) is a gigabit-speed network technology used for Fibre Channel (FC) is a gigabit-speed network technology used for
Storage Area Networking. The Fibre Channel Security Protocols Storage Area Networking. The Fibre Channel Security Protocols
standard (FC-SP) has adapted the IKEv2 protocol [RFC4306] to provide standard (FC-SP) has adapted the IKEv2 protocol [RFC4306] to provide
authentication of Fibre Channel entities and setup of security authentication of Fibre Channel entities and setup of security
associations. Since IP is transported over Fibre Channel and Fibre associations. Since IP is transported over Fibre Channel and Fibre
Channel/SCSI are transported over IP, there is the potential for Channel/SCSI are transported over IP, there is the potential for
confusion when IKEv2 is used for both IP and FC traffic. [RFC4595] confusion when IKEv2 is used for both IP and FC traffic. [RFC4595]
specifies identifiers for IKEv2 over FC in a fashion that ensures specifies identifiers for IKEv2 over FC in a fashion that ensures
that any mistaken usage of IKEv2/FC over IP or IKEv2/IP over FC will that any mistaken usage of IKEv2/FC over IP or IKEv2/IP over FC will
result in a negotiation failure due to the absence of an acceptable result in a negotiation failure due to the absence of an acceptable
proposal. proposal.
8.7. Robust Header Compression (ROHC) 8.7. Robust Header Compression (ROHC)
o RFC 3095, RObust Header Compression (ROHC): Framework and four 8.7.1. RFC 3095, RObust Header Compression (ROHC): Framework and four
profiles: RTP, UDP, ESP, and uncompressed (S, July 2001) profiles: RTP, UDP, ESP, and uncompressed (S, July 2001)
ROHC is a framework for header compression, intended to be used in ROHC is a framework for header compression, intended to be used in
resource-constrained environments. [RFC3095] applies this framework resource-constrained environments. [RFC3095] applies this framework
to four protocols, including ESP. to four protocols, including ESP.
o RFC 5225, RObust Header Compression Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles 8.7.2. RFC 5225, RObust Header Compression Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles
for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP, and UDP-Lite (S, April 2008) for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP, and UDP-Lite (S, April 2008)
[RFC5225] includes an ESP profile for use with ROHC version 2. [RFC5225] defines an updated ESP/IP profile for use with ROHC version
2. It analyzes the ESP header and classifies the fields into several
classes like static, well-known, irregular etc. in order to
efficiently compress the headers.
8.7.3. draft-ietf-rohc-hcoipsec, Integration of Robust Header
Compression (ROHC) over IPsec Security Associations (I)
[rohc-1] describes a mechanism to compress inner IP headers at the
ingress point of IPsec tunnels and to decompress them at the egress
point. Since the ROHC specifications only describe operations on a
per-hop basis, this document also specifies extensions to enable ROHC
over multiple hops. This document applies only to tunnel mode SAs
and does not support transport mode SAs.
8.7.4. draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec, IKEv2 Extensions to
Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec) (S)
ROHC requires initial configuration at the compressor and
decompressor ends. Since ROHC usually operates on a per-hop basis
this configuration information is carried over link-layer protocols
such as PPP. Since [rohc-1] operates over multiple hops a different
signaling mechanism is required. [rohc-2] describes how to use IKEv2
in order to dynamically communicate the configuration parameters
between the compressor and decompressor.
8.7.5. draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec, IPsec Extensions to
Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec) (S)
[rohc-1] describes how to use ROHC with IPsec. This is not possible
without extensions to IPsec. [rohc-3] describes the extensions
needed to IPsec in order to support ROHC. Specifically, it describes
extensions needed to the IPsec SPD, SAD and to the IPsec processing
including ICV computation and integrity verification.
8.8. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 8.8. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
o RFC 5566, BGP IPsec Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute (S, June 8.8.1. RFC 5566, BGP IPsec Tunnel Encapsulation Attribute (S, June
2009) 2009)
[RFC5566] adds an additional BGP Encapsulation Subsequent Address [RFC5566] adds an additional BGP Encapsulation Subsequent Address
Family Identifier (SAFI), allowing the use of IPsec and, optionally, Family Identifier (SAFI), allowing the use of IPsec and, optionally,
of IKE to protect BGP tunnels. It defines the use of AH and ESP in of IKE to protect BGP tunnels. It defines the use of AH and ESP in
tunnel mode, and the use of AH and ESP in transport mode to protect tunnel mode, and the use of AH and ESP in transport mode to protect
IP in IP and MPLS-in-IP tunnels. IP in IP and MPLS-in-IP tunnels.
8.9. IPsec benchmarking 8.9. IPsec benchmarking
o draft-ietf-bmwg-ipsec-meth, Methodology for Benchmarking IPsec 8.9.1. draft-ietf-bmwg-ipsec-meth, Methodology for Benchmarking IPsec
Devices (S) Devices (S)
[bmwg-1] defines a set of tests that can be used to measure and [bmwg-1] defines a set of tests that can be used to measure and
report the performance characteristics of IPsec devices. It extends report the performance characteristics of IPsec devices. It extends
the methodology defined for benchmarking network interconnecting the methodology defined for benchmarking network interconnecting
devices to include IPsec gateways and adds further tests which can be devices to include IPsec gateways and adds further tests which can be
used to measure IPsec performance of end-hosts. The document used to measure IPsec performance of end-hosts. The document
focusses on establishing a performance testing methodology for IPsec focusses on establishing a performance testing methodology for IPsec
devices that support manual keying and IKEv1, but does not cover devices that support manual keying and IKEv1, but does not cover
IKEv2. IKEv2.
o draft-ietf-bmwg-ipsec-term, Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec 8.9.2. draft-ietf-bmwg-ipsec-term, Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec
Devices (I) Devices (I)
[bmwg-2] is defines the standardized performance testing terminology [bmwg-2] is defines the standardized performance testing terminology
for IPsec devices that support manual keying and IKEv1. It also for IPsec devices that support manual keying and IKEv1. It also
describes the benchmark tests that would be used to test the describes the benchmark tests that would be used to test the
performance of the IPsec devices. performance of the IPsec devices.
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Yaron Sheffer, Paul Hoffman, Yoav The authors would like to thank Yaron Sheffer, Paul Hoffman, Yoav
Nir, Rajeshwar Singh Jenwar, Alfred Hoenes, Al Morton, Gabriel Nir, Rajeshwar Singh Jenwar, Alfred Hoenes, Al Morton, Gabriel
Montenegro and Sean Turner for reviewing this document and suggesting Montenegro, Sean Turner, Julien Laganier, Grey Daley and Scott Moonen
changes. for reviewing this document and suggesting changes.
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
There are no security considerations relevant to this document. There are no security considerations relevant to this document.
11. IANA Considerations 11. IANA Considerations
No actions are required from IANA as result of the publication of No actions are required from IANA as result of the publication of
this document. this document.
skipping to change at page 48, line 13 skipping to change at page 50, line 6
draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching, Work in Progress. draft-ietf-btns-connection-latching, Work in Progress.
[ecp-ike1] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2", [ecp-ike1] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2",
Work in Progress. Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-1] Kaufman, C., P. Hoffman, Y. Nir and P. Eronen, "Internet [ipsecme-1] Kaufman, C., P. Hoffman, Y. Nir and P. Eronen, "Internet
Key Exchange Protocol: IKEv2", Key Exchange Protocol: IKEv2",
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis, Work in Progress. draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis, Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-2] Eronen, P., J. Laganier and C. Madson, [ipsecme-2] Eronen, P., J. Laganier and C. Madson,
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config, IPv6 Configuration draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-ipv6-config, "IPv6 Configuration
in IKEv2, Work in Progress. in IKEv2", Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-3] Devarapalli, V and K. Weniger, [ipsecme-3] Devarapalli, V and K. Weniger,
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect, Re-direct Mechanism for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-redirect, "Re-direct Mechanism
IKEv2, Work in Progress. for IKEv2", Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-4] Sheffer, Y., H. Tschofenig, L. Dondeti and V. Narayanan, [ipsecme-4] Sheffer, Y., H. Tschofenig, L. Dondeti and V. Narayanan,
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption, IKEv2 Session draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption, "IKEv2 Session
Resumption, Work in Progress. Resumption", Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-5] Grewal, K. and G. Montenegro, [ipsecme-5] Grewal, K. and G. Montenegro,
draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility, Wrapped ESP for draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility, "Wrapped ESP for
Traffic Visibility, Work in Progress. Traffic Visibility", Work in Progress.
[ipsecme-6] Kivinen, T. and D. McDonald, [ipsecme-6] Kivinen, T. and D. McDonald,
draft-kivinen-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics, Heuristics for draft-ietf-ipsecme-esp-null-heuristics, "Heuristics for
Detecting ESP-NULL packets, Work in Progress. Detecting ESP-NULL packets", Work in Progress.
[mip6-1] Dupont, F. and J-M. Combes, "Using IPsec between Mobile [ipsecme-7] Shen, S., Y. Mao and N.S.S. Murthy,
and Correspondent IPv6 Nodes", draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec, draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2, "Using Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode with IKEv2", Work
in Progress.
[mip6-1] Dupont, F. and J-M. Combes, "Using IPsec between Mobile and
Correspondent IPv6 Nodes", draft-ietf-mip6-cn-ipsec, Work
in Progress.
[rohc-1] Ertekin, E., R. Jasani, C. Christou and C. Bormann,
"Integration of Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over
IPsec Security Associations", draft-ietf-rohc-hcoipsec,
Work in Progress.
[rohc-2] Ertekin, E., C. Christou, R. Jasani, T. Kivinen and C.
Bormann, "IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header
Compression over IPsec (ROHCoIPsec)",
draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec, Work in
Progress.
[rohc-3] Ertekin, E., C. Christou and C. Bormann, "IPsec Extensions
to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec
(ROHCoIPsec)", draft-ietf-rohc-ipsec-extensions-hcoipsec,
Work in Progress. Work in Progress.
[RFC2394] Pereira, R., "IP Payload Compression Using DEFLATE", RFC [RFC2394] Pereira, R., "IP Payload Compression Using DEFLATE", RFC
2394, December 1998. 2394, December 1998.
[RFC2395] Friend, R. and R. Monsour, "IP Payload Compression Using [RFC2395] Friend, R. and R. Monsour, "IP Payload Compression Using
LZS", RFC 2395, December 1998. LZS", RFC 2395, December 1998.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the [RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998 (obsolete). Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998 (obsolete).
skipping to change at page 57, line 33 skipping to change at page 60, line 33
| RFC 4301 | N/A MUST | | RFC 4301 | N/A MUST |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4302 | N/A optional | | RFC 4302 | N/A optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4303 | N/A MUST | | RFC 4303 | N/A MUST |
| | | | | |
|Policy: | |Policy: |
|------ | |------ |
| RFC 3586 | optional N/A optional N/A | | RFC 3586 | optional N/A optional N/A |
| | | | | |
| RFC 3585 | undefined N/A undefined N/A | | RFC 3585 | optional N/A optional N/A |
| | | | | |
|MIBs: | |MIBs: |
|---- | |---- |
| RFC 4807 | optional N/A | | RFC 4807 | optional N/A |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
Table 1: Document Requirement Levels (continued) Table 1: Document Requirement Levels (continued)
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| DOCUMENT | REQUIREMENT LEVEL | | DOCUMENT | REQUIREMENT LEVEL |
| | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 | | | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
|Additions to IPsec: | |Additions to IPsec: |
|------------------ | |------------------ |
| RFC 3947 | optional N/A | | RFC 3947 | optional N/A |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4304 | optional N/A |
| | |
| RFC 3948 | optional optional | | RFC 3948 | optional optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4304 | optional N/A optional optional |
| | |
| RFC 4891 | optional optional | | RFC 4891 | optional optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 3884 | optional optional | | RFC 3884 | optional optional |
| | | | | |
| draft-ipsecme-traffic- | N/A optional | | draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional |
| visibility | | | traffic-visibility | |
| | | | | |
| draft-kivinen-ipsecme- | N/A optional | | draft-ietf-ipsecme- | optional optional |
| esp-null-heuristics | | | esp-null-heuristics | |
| | | | | |
|General Considerations: | |General Considerations: |
|---------------------- | |---------------------- |
| RFC 3715 | optional undefined| | RFC 3715 | optional optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 5406 | optional N/A | | RFC 5406 | optional N/A |
| | | | | |
|IKEv1: | |IKEv1: |
|----- | |----- |
| RFC 2409 | optional N/A | | RFC 2409 | optional N/A |
| | | | | |
| RFC 2408 | optional N/A | | RFC 2408 | optional N/A |
| | | | | |
| RFC 2407 | optional N/A | | RFC 2407 | optional N/A |
| | | | | |
| RFC 2412 | optional N/A | | RFC 2412 | optional N/A |
| | |
|IKEv2: |
|----- |
| RFC 4306 | N/A optional |
| | |
| RFC 4718 | N/A optional |
| | |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2bis N/A optional |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
Table 1: Document Requirement Levels (continued) Table 1: Document Requirement Levels (continued)
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| DOCUMENT | REQUIREMENT LEVEL | | DOCUMENT | REQUIREMENT LEVEL |
| | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 | | | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
|IKEv2: |
|----- |
| RFC 4306 | N/A optional |
| | |
| RFC 4718 | N/A optional |
| | |
| draft-ietf-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional |
| ikev2bis | |
| | |
|Peer Authentication Methods: | |Peer Authentication Methods: |
|--------------------------- | |--------------------------- |
| RFC 4478 | N/A optional | | RFC 4478 | N/A optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4739 | N/A optional | | RFC 4739 | N/A optional |
| | | | | |
| RFC 4754 | optional optional | | RFC 4754 | optional optional |
| | | | | |
|Certificate Contents and Management: | |Certificate Contents and Management: |
|----------------------------------- | |----------------------------------- |
skipping to change at page 59, line 49 skipping to change at page 62, line 40
|Remote Access: | |Remote Access: |
|------------- | |------------- |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional | | draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional |
| ikev2-resumption | | | ikev2-resumption | |
| | | | | |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional | | draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional |
| ikev2-redirect | | | ikev2-redirect | |
| | | | | |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional | | draft-ietf-ipsecme- | N/A optional |
| ikev2-ipv6-config | | | ikev2-ipv6-config | |
| | |
|Algorithm Requirements: |
|---------------------- |
| RFC 4835 | MUST MUST |
| | |
| RFC 4307 | N/A MUST |
| | |
| RFC 4109 | MUST N/A |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
Appendix B. Summary of Algorithm Requirement Levels Appendix B. Summary of Algorithm Requirement Levels
Table 2: Algorithm Requirement Levels Table 2: Algorithm Requirement Levels
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| ALGORITHM | REQUIREMENT LEVEL | | ALGORITHM | REQUIREMENT LEVEL |
| | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 | | | IKEv1 IKEv2 IPsec-v2 IPsec-v3 |
+--------------------------+----------------------------------------+ +--------------------------+----------------------------------------+
skipping to change at page 60, line 25 skipping to change at page 63, line 25
| ESP-NULL | N/A N/A MUST MUST | | ESP-NULL | N/A N/A MUST MUST |
| | | | | |
| 3DES-CBC | MUST MUST- MUST MUST- | | 3DES-CBC | MUST MUST- MUST MUST- |
| | | | | |
| Blowfish/CAST/IDEA/RC5 | optional optional optional optional | | Blowfish/CAST/IDEA/RC5 | optional optional optional optional |
| | | | | |
| AES-CBC 128-bit key | SHOULD SHOULD+ MUST MUST | | AES-CBC 128-bit key | SHOULD SHOULD+ MUST MUST |
| | | | | |
| AES-CBC 192/256-bit key | optional optional optional optional | | AES-CBC 192/256-bit key | optional optional optional optional |
| | | | | |
| AES-CTR | undefined undefined SHOULD SHOULD | | AES-CTR | undefined optional SHOULD SHOULD |
| | | | | |
| Camellia-CBC | optional undefined optional optional | | Camellia-CBC | optional undefined optional optional |
| | | | | |
| Camellia-CTR | undefined undefined undefined optional | | Camellia-CTR | undefined undefined undefined optional |
| | | | | |
| SEED-CBC | undefined undefined optional undefined| | SEED-CBC | undefined undefined optional undefined|
| | | | | |
|Integrity-Protection Algorihms: | |Integrity-Protection Algorihms: |
|------------------------------ | |------------------------------ |
| HMAC-SHA-1 | MUST MUST MUST MUST | | HMAC-SHA-1 | MUST MUST MUST MUST |
 End of changes. 199 change blocks. 
438 lines changed or deleted 539 lines changed or added

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