draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-05.txt
	IPsecME Working Group Y. Nir, Ed.		IPsecME Working Group Y. Nir, Ed.
	Internet-Draft Check Point		Internet-Draft Check Point
	Intended status: Standards Track D. Wierbowski		Intended status: Standards Track D. Wierbowski
	Expires: August 15, 2011 IBM		Expires: August 22, 2011 IBM
	F. Detienne		F. Detienne
	P. Sethi		P. Sethi
	Cisco		Cisco
	February 11, 2011		February 18, 2011
	A Quick Crash Detection Method for IKE		A Quick Crash Detection Method for IKE
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04		draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that		This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that
	allows for faster detection of SA desynchronization using a saved		allows for faster detection of SA desynchronization using a saved
	token.		token.
	When an IPsec tunnel between two IKEv2 peers is disconnected due to a		When an IPsec tunnel between two IKEv2 peers is disconnected due to a
	restart of one peer, it can take as much as several minutes for the		restart of one peer, it can take as much as several minutes for the
	other peer to discover that the reboot has occurred, thus delaying		other peer to discover that the reboot has occurred, thus delaying
	skipping to change at page 1, line 42		skipping to change at page 1, line 42
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2011.		This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
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	5.2. A Stateless Method with IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . 12		5.2. A Stateless Method with IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . 12
	5.3. Token Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		5.3. Token Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6. Backup Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		6. Backup Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	7. Interaction with Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7. Interaction with Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	8.1. Who should implement this specification . . . . . . . . . 14		8.1. Who should implement this specification . . . . . . . . . 14
	8.2. Response to unknown child SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		8.2. Response to unknown child SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	9.1. QCD Token Generation and Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		9.1. QCD Token Generation and Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	9.2. QCD Token Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		9.2. QCD Token Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	9.3. QCD Token Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		9.3. QCD Token Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03 . . 19		12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04 . . 18
	12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02 . . 19		12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03 . . 19
	12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01 . . 19		12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02 . . 19
	12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00 . . 19		12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01 . . 19
	12.5. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		12.5. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00 . . 19
	12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04 . . . . . . . . 20		12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04 . . . . . . . . 20
	12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	12.10. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		12.10. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
			12.11. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Appendix A. The Path Not Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		Appendix A. The Path Not Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	A.1. Initiating a new IKE SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		A.1. Initiating a new IKE SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	A.2. SIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		A.2. SIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	A.3. Birth Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		A.3. Birth Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	A.4. Reducing Liveness Check Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		A.4. Reducing Liveness Check Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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	A message like that is subject to modification, deletion and replay		A message like that is subject to modification, deletion and replay
	by an attacker. However, these attacks will not compromise the		by an attacker. However, these attacks will not compromise the
	security of either side. Modification is meaningless because a		security of either side. Modification is meaningless because a
	modified token is simply an invalid token. Deletion will only cause		modified token is simply an invalid token. Deletion will only cause
	the protocol not to work, resulting in a delay in tunnel re-		the protocol not to work, resulting in a delay in tunnel re-
	establishment as described in Section 2. Replay is also meaningless,		establishment as described in Section 2. Replay is also meaningless,
	because the IKE SA has been deleted after the first transmission.		because the IKE SA has been deleted after the first transmission.
	9.2. QCD Token Transmission		9.2. QCD Token Transmission
	A token maker MUST NOT send a valid QCD token in an		A token maker MUST NOT send a valid QCD token in an unprotected
	unprotectedmessage for an existing IKE SA.		message for an existing IKE SA.
	This requirement is obvious and easy in the case of a single gateway.		This requirement is obvious and easy in the case of a single gateway.
	However, some implementations use a load balancer to divide the load		However, some implementations use a load balancer to divide the load
	between several physical gateways. It MUST NOT be possible even in		between several physical gateways. It MUST NOT be possible even in
	such a configuration to trick one gateway into sending a valid QCD		such a configuration to trick one gateway into sending a valid QCD
	token for an IKE SA which is valid on another gateway. This is true		token for an IKE SA which is valid on another gateway. This is true
	whether the attempt to trick the gateway uses the token taker's IP		whether the attempt to trick the gateway uses the token taker's IP
	address or a different IP address.		address or a different IP address.
	Because it includes the token taker's IP address in the token		IPsec Failure Detection is not applicable to deployments where the
	generation, the method in Section 5.2 prevents revealing the QCD		QCD secret is shared by multiple gateways and the gateways cannot
	token for an existing pair of IKE SPIs to an attacker who is using a		assess whether the token can be legitimately sent in the clear while
	different IP address. Note that the use of this method causes the		another gateway may actually still own the SA's. Load balancer
	tokens to be invalidated whenever the token taker's address changes.		configurations typically fall in this category. In order for a load
	It is also important to note that this method does not prevent		balancing configuration of IPsec gateways to support this
	revealing the QCD token to a man-in-the-middle attacker who is
	spoofing the token taker's IP address, if that attacker is able to
	direct messages to a cluster member other than the member responsible
	for the IKE SA.
	This document does not specify how a load-sharing configuration of
	IPsec gateways would work, but in order to support this
	specification, all members MUST be able to tell whether a particular		specification, all members MUST be able to tell whether a particular
	IKE SA is active anywhere in the cluster. One way to do it is to		IKE SA is active anywhere in the cluster. One way to do it is to
	synchronize a list of active IKE SPIs among all the cluster members.		synchronize a list of active IKE SPIs among all the cluster members.
	If an attacker can somehow access a QCD token while the SA's are		Because it includes the token taker's IP address in the token
	still active, this attacker will be able to tear down the sessions at		generation, the method in Section 5.2 can (under certain conditions)
	will. In particular, avoiding false positives is critical to the		prevent revealing the QCD token for an existing pair of IKE SPIs to
	security of the proposal and a token maker MUST NOT send a QCD token		an attacker who is using a different IP address, even in a load-
	in an unprotected message for an existing IKE SA. IPsec Failure		sharing cluster without state synchronization. This method does not
	Detection is thus not applicable to deployments where the QCD token		prevent revealing the QCD token to an active attacker who is spoofing
	is shared by multiple gateways and the gateways can not assess		the token taker's IP address. Such an attacker may attempt to direct
	whether the token can be legitimately sent in the clear while another		messages to a cluster member other than the member responsible for
	gateway may actually still own the SA's. Load balancer designs		the IKE SA in an attempt to trick that gateway into sending a QCD
	typically fall in this category.		token for a valid IKE SA. This method should not be used unless the
			load balancer guarantees that IKE packets from the same source IP
			address always go to the same cluster member.
	9.3. QCD Token Enumeration		9.3. QCD Token Enumeration
	An attacker may try to attack QCD if the generation algorithm		An attacker may try to attack QCD if the generation algorithm
	described in Section 5.1 is used. The attacker will send several		described in Section 5.1 is used. The attacker will send several
	fake IKE requests to the gateway under attack, receiving and		fake IKE requests to the gateway under attack, receiving and
	recording the QCD Tokens in the responses. This will allow the		recording the QCD Tokens in the responses. This will allow the
	attacker to create a dictionary of IKE SPIs to QCD Tokens, which can		attacker to create a dictionary of IKE SPIs to QCD Tokens, which can
	later be used to tear down any IKE SA.		later be used to tear down any IKE SA.
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	Others who have contributed valuable comments are, in alphabetical		Others who have contributed valuable comments are, in alphabetical
	order, Lakshminath Dondeti, Paul Hoffman, Tero Kivinen, Scott C		order, Lakshminath Dondeti, Paul Hoffman, Tero Kivinen, Scott C
	Moonen, and Keith Welter.		Moonen, and Keith Welter.
	12. Change Log		12. Change Log
	This section lists all changes in this document		This section lists all changes in this document
	NOTE TO RFC EDITOR : Please remove this section in the final RFC		NOTE TO RFC EDITOR : Please remove this section in the final RFC
	12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03		12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04
			o Some more rephrasing of section 9.2 based on suggestions by Tero
			Kivinen and Dave Wierbowski.
			12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03
	o Merged section 9.4 into section 9.2.		o Merged section 9.4 into section 9.2.
	o Multiple typos discovered by Scott Moonen, Keith Welter and Yaron.		o Multiple typos discovered by Scott Moonen, Keith Welter and Yaron.
	12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02		12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02
	o Moved section 7 to Appendix A. Also changed some wording.		o Moved section 7 to Appendix A. Also changed some wording.
	o Fixed some language in the "interaction with session resumption"		o Fixed some language in the "interaction with session resumption"
	section to say that although liveness check MUST be done, there		section to say that although liveness check MUST be done, there
	are no time limits to how long an implementation takes before		are no time limits to how long an implementation takes before
	starting liveness check, or ending it.		starting liveness check, or ending it.
	12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01		12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01
	o Fixed the language requiring random IKE SPIs.		o Fixed the language requiring random IKE SPIs.
	o Some better explanation of the reasons to choose the methods in		o Some better explanation of the reasons to choose the methods in
	Section 5.2 and the method in Section 5.1, to close issue #193.		Section 5.2 and the method in Section 5.1, to close issue #193.
	o Added text to the beginning of Section 9 to accomodate issue #194.		o Added text to the beginning of Section 9 to accomodate issue #194.
	12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00		12.5. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00
	o Nits pointed out by Scott and Yaron.		o Nits pointed out by Scott and Yaron.
	o Pratima and Frederic are back on board.		o Pratima and Frederic are back on board.
	o Changed IKEv2bis draft reference to RFC 5996.		o Changed IKEv2bis draft reference to RFC 5996.
	o Resolved issues #189, #190, #191, and #192:		o Resolved issues #189, #190, #191, and #192:
	* Renamed section 4.5 and removed the requirement to send an		* Renamed section 4.5 and removed the requirement to send an
	acknowledgement for the unprotected message.		acknowledgement for the unprotected message.
	* Moved the QCD token from the last to the first IKE_AUTH		* Moved the QCD token from the last to the first IKE_AUTH
	request.		request.
	* Added a MUST to Section 9.3 to require that IKE SPIs be		* Added a MUST to Section 9.3 to require that IKE SPIs be
	randomly generated.		randomly generated.
	* Changed the language in Section 8.1, to not use RFC 2119		* Changed the language in Section 8.1, to not use RFC 2119
	terminology.		terminology.
	* Moved the section describing why one would want the method		* Moved the section describing why one would want the method
	dependant on IP addresses (in Section 5.2 from operational		dependant on IP addresses (in Section 5.2 from operational
	considerations to security considerations.		considerations to security considerations.
	12.5. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07		12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07
	o First WG version.		o First WG version.
	o Addressed Scott C Moonen's concern about collisions of QCD tokens.		o Addressed Scott C Moonen's concern about collisions of QCD tokens.
	o Updated references to point to IKEv2bis instead of RFC 4306 and		o Updated references to point to IKEv2bis instead of RFC 4306 and
	4718. Also converted draft reference for resumption to RFC 5723.		4718. Also converted draft reference for resumption to RFC 5723.
	o Added Dave Wiebrowski as author, and removed Pratima and Frederic.		o Added Dave Wiebrowski as author, and removed Pratima and Frederic.
	12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04		12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04
	Mostly editorial changes and cleaning up.		Mostly editorial changes and cleaning up.
	12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02		12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02
	o Described QCD token enumeration, following a question by		o Described QCD token enumeration, following a question by
	Lakshminath Dondeti.		Lakshminath Dondeti.
	o Added the ability to replace the QCD token for an existing IKE SA.		o Added the ability to replace the QCD token for an existing IKE SA.
	o Added tokens dependent on peer IP address and their interaction		o Added tokens dependent on peer IP address and their interaction
	with MOBIKE.		with MOBIKE.
	12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01		12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01
	o Removed stateless method.		o Removed stateless method.
	o Added discussion of rekeying and resumption.		o Added discussion of rekeying and resumption.
	o Added discussion of non-synchronized load-balanced clusters of		o Added discussion of non-synchronized load-balanced clusters of
	gateways in the security considerations.		gateways in the security considerations.
	o Other wording fixes.		o Other wording fixes.
	12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00		12.10. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00
	o Merged proposal with draft-detienne-ikev2-recovery		o Merged proposal with draft-detienne-ikev2-recovery
	o Changed the protocol so that the rebooted peer generates the		o Changed the protocol so that the rebooted peer generates the
	token. This has the effect, that the need for persistent storage		token. This has the effect, that the need for persistent storage
	is eliminated.		is eliminated.
	o Added discussion of birth certificates.		o Added discussion of birth certificates.
	12.10. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00		12.11. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00
	o Changed name to reflect that this relates to IKE. Also changed		o Changed name to reflect that this relates to IKE. Also changed
	from quick crash recovery to quick crash detection to avoid		from quick crash recovery to quick crash detection to avoid
	confusion with IFARE.		confusion with IFARE.
	o Added more operational considerations.		o Added more operational considerations.
	o Added interaction with IFARE.		o Added interaction with IFARE.
	o Added discussion of backup gateways.		o Added discussion of backup gateways.
	13. References		13. References
End of changes. 19 change blocks.
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