draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-10.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-11.txt
	Network Working Group Y. Nir		Network Working Group Y. Nir
	Internet-Draft Check Point		Internet-Draft Check Point
	Intended status: Standards Track June 14, 2015		Intended status: Standards Track July 7, 2015
	Expires: December 16, 2015		Expires: January 8, 2016
	ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec		ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-10		draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-11
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along		This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along
	with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for		with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for
	the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.		the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on December 16, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 13		skipping to change at page 2, line 13
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the		The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the
	gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, wide		gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, wide
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	describes the IPsec-specific things.		describes the IPsec-specific things.
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP		2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP
	AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a combined mode algorithm, or AEAD. The		AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ([RFC7539]) is a combined mode algorithm, or
	construction follows the AEAD construction in section 2.8 of		AEAD. Usage follows the AEAD construction in section 2.8 of RFC
	[RFC7539]:		7539:
	o The Initialization Vector (IV) is 64-bit, and is used as part of		o The Initialization Vector (IV) is 64-bit, and is used as part of
	the nonce. The IV MUST be unique for each invocation for a		the nonce. The IV MUST be unique for each invocation for a
	particular SA but does not need to be unpredictable. The use of a		particular SA but does not need to be unpredictable. The use of a
	counter or a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is RECOMMENDED.		counter or a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is RECOMMENDED.
	o A 32-bit Salt is prepended to the 64-bit IV to form the 96-bit		o A 32-bit Salt is prepended to the 64-bit IV to form the 96-bit
	nonce. The salt is fixed per SA and it is not transmitted as part		nonce. The salt is fixed per SA and it is not transmitted as part
	of the ESP packet.		of the ESP packet.
	o The encryption key is 256-bit.		o The encryption key is 256-bit.
	o The Internet Key Exchange protocol generates a bitstring called		o The Internet Key Exchange protocol generates a bitstring called
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	o Zero octet padding that rounds the total length up to an integral		o Zero octet padding that rounds the total length up to an integral
	multiple of 16 octets.		multiple of 16 octets.
	o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets		o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets
	(as a 64-bit integer encoded in little-endian byte order).		(as a 64-bit integer encoded in little-endian byte order).
	o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit integer		o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit integer
	encoded in little-endian byte order).		encoded in little-endian byte order).
	The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 octets are		The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 octets are
	included in the packet.		included in the packet.
	The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm
	in IKE is ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (number is TBA by IANA).
	The figure below is copied from RFC 4303:		The figure below is copied from RFC 4303:
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Security Parameters Index (SPI) |		| Security Parameters Index (SPI) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Sequence Number |		| Sequence Number |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---
	| IV (optional) | ^ p		| IV (optional) | ^ p
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	explicitly in the Encrypted payload.		explicitly in the Encrypted payload.
	o The sender SHOULD include no padding and set the Pad Length field		o The sender SHOULD include no padding and set the Pad Length field
	to zero. The receiver MUST accept any length of padding.		to zero. The receiver MUST accept any length of padding.
	o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it is 32		o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it is 32
	octets (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 octets for the encrypted		octets (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 octets for the encrypted
	payload header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.		payload header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.
	4. Negotiation in IKEv2		4. Negotiation in IKEv2
	When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or		When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or
	IPsec, the value xxx (TBA by IANA) should be used in the transform		IPsec, the value ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (28) should be used in the
	substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1) transform ID. As		transform substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1)
	with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3) transform substructures		transform ID. As with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3)
	MUST NOT be specified or just one INTEG transform MAY be included		transform substructures MUST NOT be specified or just one INTEG
	with value NONE (0).		transform MAY be included with value NONE (0).
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security.		The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security.
	The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages		The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages
	are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-octet		are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-octet
	message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is SUF-		message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is SUF-
	CMA in the terminology of [AE].		CMA in the terminology of [AE].
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	The Salt value in used nonce construction in ESP and IKEv2 is derived		The Salt value in used nonce construction in ESP and IKEv2 is derived
	from the keystream, same as the encryption key. It is never		from the keystream, same as the encryption key. It is never
	transmitted on the wire, but the security of the algorithm does not		transmitted on the wire, but the security of the algorithm does not
	depend on its secrecy. Thus implementations that keep keys and other		depend on its secrecy. Thus implementations that keep keys and other
	secret material within some security boundary MAY export the Salt		secret material within some security boundary MAY export the Salt
	from the security boundary. This may be useful if the API provided		from the security boundary. This may be useful if the API provided
	by the library accepts the nonce as parameter rather than the IV.		by the library accepts the nonce as parameter rather than the IV.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type		IANA has assigned the value 28 as a transform identifier for the
	1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name		algorithm described in this document in the "Transform Type 1 -
	ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP		Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry with name
			ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 and this document as reference for both ESP
	and IKEv2.		and IKEv2.
	7. Acknowledgements		7. Acknowledgements
	All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J.		All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J.
	Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The		Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The
	author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as		author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as
	Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks		Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks
	also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final		also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final
	version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero		version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero
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