draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-05.txt		draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-06.txt
	Network Working Group Y. Nir		Network Working Group Y. Nir
	Internet-Draft Check Point		Internet-Draft Check Point
	Intended status: Standards Track April 27, 2015		Intended status: Standards Track April 28, 2015
	Expires: October 29, 2015		Expires: October 30, 2015
	ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec		ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec
	draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-05		draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along		This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along
	with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for		with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for
	the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.		the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 32		skipping to change at page 1, line 32
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2015.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 30, 2015.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 15		skipping to change at page 2, line 15
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the		The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the
	skipping to change at page 2, line 38		skipping to change at page 2, line 38
	many areas, including IPsec VPNs. On most modern platforms, AES is		many areas, including IPsec VPNs. On most modern platforms, AES is
	anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher,		anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher,
	3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES - [SP800-67]). 3DES also has a		3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES - [SP800-67]). 3DES also has a
	64-bit block, which means that the amount of data that can be		64-bit block, which means that the amount of data that can be
	encrypted before rekeying is required is not great. These reasons		encrypted before rekeying is required is not great. These reasons
	make AES not only the best choice, but the only choice.		make AES not only the best choice, but the only choice.
	The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a		The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a
	weakness in AES, VPN users will be in an unenviable position. With		weakness in AES, VPN users will be in an unenviable position. With
	the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it		the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it
	is not feasible to re-configure IPsec installations to use 3DES.		is not feasible to re-configure IPsec installations away from AES.
	[standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby		[standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby
	cipher in greater detail.		cipher in greater detail.
	This document proposes the ChaCha20 stream cipher as such a standby		This document proposes the fast and secure ChaCha20 stream cipher as
	cipher in an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)		such a standby cipher in an Authenticated Encryption with Associated
	construction with the Poly1305 authenticator for use with the		Data (AEAD) construction with the Poly1305 authenticator for use with
	Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP - [RFC4303]) and the Internet Key		the Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP - [RFC4303]) and the Internet
	Exchange Protocol (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]). The algorithms are described		Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]). The algorithms are
	in a separate document ([chacha_poly]). This document only describes		described in a separate document ([chacha_poly]). This document only
	the IPsec-specific things.		describes the IPsec-specific things.
	1.1. Conventions Used in This Document		1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP		2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP
	AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a combined mode algorithm, or AEAD. The		AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a combined mode algorithm, or AEAD. The
	skipping to change at page 3, line 47		skipping to change at page 3, line 47
	o The key is set as mentioned above.		o The key is set as mentioned above.
	o The 96-bit nonce is formed from a concatenation of the 32-bit Salt		o The 96-bit nonce is formed from a concatenation of the 32-bit Salt
	and the 64-bit IV, as described above.		and the 64-bit IV, as described above.
	o The Initial Block Counter is set to one (1). The reason that one		o The Initial Block Counter is set to one (1). The reason that one
	is used for the initial counter rather than zero is that zero is		is used for the initial counter rather than zero is that zero is
	reserved for generating the one-time Poly1305 key (see below)		reserved for generating the one-time Poly1305 key (see below)
	As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied directly to the		As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied directly to the
	plaintext, no padding should be necessary. However, in keeping with		plaintext, no padding should be necessary. However, in keeping with
	the specification in RFC 4303, the plaintext always has a pad length		the specification in RFC 4303, the plaintext always has a pad length
	octet and may require padding bytes so as to align the buffer to an		octet and a Next Header octet and may require padding bytes so as to
	integral multiple of 4 octets.		align the buffer to an integral multiple of 4 octets.
	The same key and nonce, along with a block counter of zero are passed		The same key and nonce, along with a block counter of zero are passed
	to the ChaCha20 block function, and the top 256 bits of the result		to the ChaCha20 block function, and the top 256 bits of the result
	are used as the Poly1305 key. The nonce passed to the block function		are used as the Poly1305 key. The nonce passed to the block function
	here is the same nonce that is used in ChaCha20, including the 32-bit		here is the same nonce that is used in ChaCha20, including the 32-bit
	Salt, and the key passed is the same as the encryption key.		Salt, and the key passed is the same as the encryption key.
	Finally, the Poly1305 function is run on the data to be		Finally, the Poly1305 function is run on the data to be
	authenticated, which is, as specified in section 2.8 of [chacha_poly]		authenticated, which is, as specified in section 2.8 of [chacha_poly]
	a concatenation of the following in the below order:		a concatenation of the following in the below order:
	o The Authenticated Additional Data (AAD) - see Section 2.1.		o The Authenticated Additional Data (AAD) - see Section 2.1.
	o Padding that rounds the length up to 16 bytes. This is 4 or 8		o Zero-octet padding that rounds the length up to 16 bytes. This is
	bytes depending on whether extended sequence numbers (ESN) is set		4 or 8 bytes depending on the length of the AAD.
	for the SA. The padding is all zeros.
	o The ciphertext		o The ciphertext
	o Padding that rounds the total length up to an integral multiple of		o Zero octet padding that rounds the total length up to an integral
	16 bytes. This padding is also all zeros.		multiple of 16 bytes.
	o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets		o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets
	(as a 64-bit little-endian integer).		(as a 64-bit little-endian integer).
	o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian		o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian
	integer).		integer).
	The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 bytes are		The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 bytes are
	included in the packet.		included in the packet.
	The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm		The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm
	in IKE is TBA by IANA.		in IKE is TBA by IANA.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 45		skipping to change at page 4, line 44
	For SAs with ESN the AAD is 12 bytes: 4-byte SPI followed by an		For SAs with ESN the AAD is 12 bytes: 4-byte SPI followed by an
	8-byte sequence number as a 64-bit network order integer.		8-byte sequence number as a 64-bit network order integer.
	3. Use in IKEv2		3. Use in IKEv2
	AEAD algorithms can be used in IKE, as described in [RFC5282]. More		AEAD algorithms can be used in IKE, as described in [RFC5282]. More
	specifically:		specifically:
	o The Encrypted Payload is as described in section 3 of that		o The Encrypted Payload is as described in section 3 of that
	document.		document.
	o The ChaCha20-Poly1305 keying material is derived from KEYMAT as		o The ChaCha20-Poly1305 keying material is derived similar to ESP:
	for ESP: 36 octets are requested, of which the first 32 form the		36 octets are requested for each of SK_ei and SK_er, of which the
	key and the last 4 form the salt.		first 32 form the key and the last 4 form the salt. No octets are
	o The IV is 64 bits, as described in Section 2.		requested for SK_ai and SK_ar.
			o The IV is 64 bits, as described in Section 2, and is included
			explicitly in the Encrypted payload.
			o The sender SHOULD include no padding and set the Pad Length field
			to zero. The receiver MUST accept any length of padding.
	o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it's 32		o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it's 32
	bytes (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 bytes for the encrypted payload		bytes (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 bytes for the encrypted payload
	header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.		header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.
	4. Negotiation in IKEv2		4. Negotiation in IKEv2
	When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or		When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or
	IPsec, the value xxx (TBA by IANA) should be used in the transform		IPsec, the value xxx (TBA by IANA) should be used in the transform
	substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1) transform ID. As		substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1) transform ID. As
	with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3) transform substructures		with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3) transform substructures
	skipping to change at page 5, line 34		skipping to change at page 5, line 38
	is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. The nonce should be		is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. The nonce should be
	selected uniquely for a particular key, but unpredictability of the		selected uniquely for a particular key, but unpredictability of the
	nonce is not required. Counters and LFSRs are both acceptable ways		nonce is not required. Counters and LFSRs are both acceptable ways
	of generating unique nonces.		of generating unique nonces.
	Another issue with implementing these algorithms is avoiding side		Another issue with implementing these algorithms is avoiding side
	channels. This is trivial for ChaCha20, but requires some care for		channels. This is trivial for ChaCha20, but requires some care for
	Poly1305. Considerations for implementations of these algorithms are		Poly1305. Considerations for implementations of these algorithms are
	in the [chacha_poly] document.		in the [chacha_poly] document.
			The Salt value in used nonce construction in ESP and IKEv2 is derived
			from the keystream, same as the encryption key. It is never
			transmitted on the wire, but the security of the algorithm does not
			depend on its secrecy. Thus implementations that keep keys and other
			secret material within some security boundary MAY export the Salt
			from the security boundary. This may be useful if the API provided
			by the library accepts the nonce as parameter rather than the IV.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type		IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type
	1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name		1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name
	ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP		ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP
	and IKEv2.		and IKEv2.
	7. Acknowledgements		7. Acknowledgements
	All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J.		All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J.
	Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The		Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The
	author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as		author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as
	Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks		Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks
	also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final		also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final
	version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero		version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero
	Kivinen for helpful comments on this draft.		Kivinen for helpful comments on this draft. Thanks to Steve Doyle
			and Martin Willi for pointing out mistakes in my examples.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC		[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
	4303, December 2005.		4303, December 2005.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 14		skipping to change at page 8, line 24
	The plaintext to encrypt consists of the source IP packet plus the		The plaintext to encrypt consists of the source IP packet plus the
	padding:		padding:
	Plaintext (includes padding and pad length):		Plaintext (includes padding and pad length):
	000 45 00 00 54 a6 f2 00 00 40 01 e7 78 c6 33 64 05 E..T....@..x.3d.		000 45 00 00 54 a6 f2 00 00 40 01 e7 78 c6 33 64 05 E..T....@..x.3d.
	016 c0 00 02 05 08 00 5b 7a 3a 08 00 00 55 3b ec 10 ......[z:...U;..		016 c0 00 02 05 08 00 5b 7a 3a 08 00 00 55 3b ec 10 ......[z:...U;..
	032 00 07 36 27 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 ..6'............		032 00 07 36 27 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 ..6'............
	048 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 ............ !"#		048 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 ............ !"#
	064 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 $%&'()*+,-./0123		064 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 $%&'()*+,-./0123
	080 34 35 36 37 01 02 03 03 4567....		080 34 35 36 37 01 02 02 04 4567....
	With the key, nonce and plaintext available, we can call the ChaCha20		With the key, nonce and plaintext available, we can call the ChaCha20
	function and encrypt the packet, producing the ciphertext:		function and encrypt the packet, producing the ciphertext:
	Ciphertext:		Ciphertext:
	000 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{		000 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{
	016 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..		016 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..
	032 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..		032 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..
	048 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..		048 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..
	064 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.		064 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.
	080 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 .e.().@.		080 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 .e.().A.
	To calculate the tag, we need a one-time Poly1305 key, which we		To calculate the tag, we need a one-time Poly1305 key, which we
	calculate by calling the ChaCha20 function again with the same key		calculate by calling the ChaCha20 function again with the same key
	and nonce, but a block count of zero.		and nonce, but a block count of zero.
	Poly1305 one-time key:		Poly1305 one-time key:
	000 af 1f 41 2c c1 15 ad ce 5e 4d 0e 29 d5 c1 30 bf ..A,....^M.)..0.		000 af 1f 41 2c c1 15 ad ce 5e 4d 0e 29 d5 c1 30 bf ..A,....^M.)..0.
	016 46 31 21 0e 0f ef 74 31 c0 45 4f e7 0f d7 c2 d1 F1!...t1.EO.....		016 46 31 21 0e 0f ef 74 31 c0 45 4f e7 0f d7 c2 d1 F1!...t1.EO.....
	The AAD is constructed by concatenating the SPI to the sequence		The AAD is constructed by concatenating the SPI to the sequence
	skipping to change at page 8, line 50		skipping to change at page 9, line 12
	The input to the Poly1305 function is constructed by concatenating		The input to the Poly1305 function is constructed by concatenating
	and padding the AAD and ciphertext:		and padding the AAD and ciphertext:
	Poly1305 Input:		Poly1305 Input:
	000 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................		000 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
	016 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{		016 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{
	032 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..		032 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..
	048 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..		048 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..
	064 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..		064 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..
	080 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.		080 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.
	096 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .e.().@.........		096 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .e.().A.........
	112 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........X.......		112 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........X.......
	The resulting tag is:		The resulting tag is:
	Tag:		Tag:
	000 f0 5f ff a1 a0 cc cd de 88 a3 e8 9a 21 2b 18 ba ._..........!+..		000 76 aa a8 26 6b 7f b0 f7 b1 1b 36 99 07 e1 ad 43 v..&k.....6....C
	Putting it all together, the resulting packet is as follows:		Putting it all together, the resulting packet is as follows:
	ESP packet:		ESP packet:
	000 45 00 00 8c 23 45 00 00 40 32 de 5b cb 00 71 99 E...#E..@2.[..q.		000 45 00 00 8c 23 45 00 00 40 32 de 5b cb 00 71 99 E...#E..@2.[..q.
	016 cb 00 71 05 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 10 11 12 13 ..q.............		016 cb 00 71 05 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 10 11 12 13 ..q.............
	032 14 15 16 17 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a ....$..(..A~<.u:		032 14 15 16 17 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a ....$..(..A~<.u:
	048 4f 05 08 7b 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef O..{g.R.......f.		048 4f 05 08 7b 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef O..{g.R.......f.
	064 40 7a e5 c6 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df @z.......(D.a...		064 40 7a e5 c6 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df @z.......(D.a...
	080 ab 4c 02 f7 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac .L..*..|LOd.../.		080 ab 4c 02 f7 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac .L..*..|LOd.../.
	096 c6 38 e8 f3 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb .8.....?.F.P's..		096 c6 38 e8 f3 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb .8.....?.F.P's..
	112 94 e6 64 da 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 f0 5f ff a1 ..d..e.().@.._..		112 94 e6 64 da 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 76 aa a8 26 ..d..e.().A.v..&
	128 a0 cc cd de 88 a3 e8 9a 21 2b 18 ba ........!+..		128 6b 7f b0 f7 b1 1b 36 99 07 e1 ad 43 k.....6....C
	Appendix B. IKEv2 Example		Appendix B. IKEv2 Example
	For the IKEv2 example, we'll use the following:		For the IKEv2 example, we'll use the following:
	o The key is 0x80..0x9f, the same as in Appendix A.		o The key is 0x80..0x9f, the same as in Appendix A.
	o The Salt is 0xa0 0xa1 0xa2 0xa3.		o The Salt is 0xa0 0xa1 0xa2 0xa3.
	o The IV will also be the same as in the previous example. The fact		o The IV will also be the same as in the previous example. The fact
	that the IV and Salt are both the same means that the nonce is		that the IV and Salt are both the same means that the nonce is
	also the same.		also the same.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 44		skipping to change at page 10, line 5
	o The packet with be an Informational request carrying a single		o The packet with be an Informational request carrying a single
	payload: A Notify payload with type SET_WINDOW_SIZE, setting the		payload: A Notify payload with type SET_WINDOW_SIZE, setting the
	window size to 10.		window size to 10.
	o iSPI = 0xc0 0xc1 0xc2 0xc3 0xc4 0xc5 0xc6 0xc7.		o iSPI = 0xc0 0xc1 0xc2 0xc3 0xc4 0xc5 0xc6 0xc7.
	o rSPI = 0xd0 0xd1 0xd2 0xd3 0xd4 0xd5 0xd6 0xd7.		o rSPI = 0xd0 0xd1 0xd2 0xd3 0xd4 0xd5 0xd6 0xd7.
	o Message ID shall be 9.		o Message ID shall be 9.
	The Notify Payload:		The Notify Payload:
	000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a ......@.....		000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a ......@.....
	Padding as required by RFC 7296 is 4 bytes long.		Plaintext (with no padding and a zero pad length):
			000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a 00 ......@......
	Plaintext (includes padding and pad length):		Ciphertext:
	000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a 01 02 03 03 ......@.........		000 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 a..p....|..H.
	Ciphertext:
	000 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d a..p....|..H.4o}
	The AAD is constructed by appending the IKE header to the encrypted		The AAD is constructed by appending the IKE header to the encrypted
	payload header. Note that the length field in the IKE header and the		payload header. Note that the length field in the IKE header and the
	length field in the encrypted payload header have to be calculated		length field in the encrypted payload header have to be calculated
	before constructing the AAD:		before constructing the AAD:
	AAD:		AAD:
	000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................		000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
	016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H...,		016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
	In this case, the length of the AAD is an integral multiple of 16, so		In this case, the length of the AAD is an integral multiple of 16, so
	when constructing the input to Poly1305 there was no need for		when constructing the input to Poly1305 there was no need for
	padding. The ciphertext is also 16 octets long, so the construction		padding. The ciphertext is also 16 octets long, so the construction
	has no padding at all. Just 32 octets of AAD, 16 octets of		has no padding at all. Just 32 octets of AAD, 16 octets of
	ciphertext, and two 8-octet length fields in little-endian encoding.		ciphertext, and two 8-octet length fields in little-endian encoding.
	Poly1305 Input:		Poly1305 Input:
	000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................		000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
	016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H...,		016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
	032 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d a..p....|..H.4o}		032 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 00 00 00 a..p....|..H....
	048 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............		048 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
	Tag:		Tag:
	000 92 7a e2 94 79 59 24 93 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 .z..yY$.........		000 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef d7 cd c6 70 66 90 63 15 b2 kq..R6....pf.c..
	Encrypted Payload:		Encrypted Payload:
	000 00 00 00 2c 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 ...,........a..p		000 29 00 00 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 )..)........a..p
	016 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d 92 7a e2 94 ....|..H.4o}.z..		016 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef ....|..H.kq..R6.
	032 79 59 24 93 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 yY$.........		032 d7 cd c6 70 66 90 63 15 b2 ...pf.c..
	The IKE Message:		The IKE Message:
	000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................		000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
	016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H...,		016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
	032 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f ........a..p....		032 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f ........a..p....
	048 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d 92 7a e2 94 79 59 24 93 |..H.4o}.z..yY$.		048 7c 12 92 48 89 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef d7 cd c6 70 |..H.kq..R6....p
	064 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 ........		064 66 90 63 15 b2 f.c..
	The below file in the snoop format [RFC1761] contains three packets:		The below file in the snoop format [RFC1761] contains three packets:
	The first is the ICMP packet from the example in the Appendix A, the		The first is the ICMP packet from the example in the Appendix A, the
	second is the ESP packet from the same appendix, and the third is the		second is the ESP packet from the same appendix, and the third is the
	IKEv2 packet from this appendix. To convert this text back into a		IKEv2 packet from this appendix. To convert this text back into a
	file, you can use a Unix command line tools such as "openssl enc -d		file, you can use a Unix command line tools such as "openssl enc -d
	-a":		-a":
	c25vb3AAAAAAAAACAAAABAAAAGIAAABiAAAAegAAAABVPR8iAAADVdhs6fUQBHgx		c25vb3AAAAAAAAACAAAABAAAAGIAAABiAAAAegAAAABVPq8PAAADVdhs6fUQBHgx
	wbcpwggARQAAVKbyAABAAed4xjNkBcAAAgUIAFt6OggAAFU77BAABzYnCAkKCwwN		wbcpwggARQAAVKbyAABAAed4xjNkBcAAAgUIAFt6OggAAFU77BAABzYnCAkKCwwN
	Dg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3AAAAmgAA		Dg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3AAAAmgAA
	AJoAAACyAAAAAFU9HyIAAAo62Gzp9RAEeDHBtynCCABFAACMI0UAAEAy3lvLAHGZ		AJoAAACyAAAAAFU+rw8AAAo62Gzp9RAEeDHBtynCCABFAACMI0UAAEAy3lvLAHGZ
	ywBxBQECAwQAAAAFEBESExQVFhckA5QouX9BfjwTdTpPBQh7Z8NS5qf6sbmC1Gbv		ywBxBQECAwQAAAAFEBESExQVFhckA5QouX9BfjwTdTpPBQh7Z8NS5qf6sbmC1Gbv
	QHrlxhTugJnVKETrYaqV36tMAvcqpx58TE9kyb7+L6zGOOjzy+wWP6xGm1Anc/b7		QHrlxhTugJnVKETrYaqV36tMAvcqpx58TE9kyb7+L6zGOOjzy+wWP6xGm1Anc/b7
	lOZk2pFluCgp9kDn8F//oaDMzd6Io+iaISsYugAAAHIAAAByAAAAigAAAABVPR8i		lOZk2pFluCgp9kHgdqqoJmt/sPexGzaZB+GtQwAAAG8AAABvAAAAhwAAAABVPq8P
	AAARH9hs6fUQBHgxwbcpwggARQAAZCNFAABAEd6kywBxmcsAcQUB9AH0AFCQ7MDB		AAARH9hs6fUQBHgxwbcpwggARQAAYSNFAABAEd6nywBxmcsAcQUB9AH0AE0IUcDB
	wsPExcbH0NHS09TV1tcuICUAAAAACQAAAEgAAAAsEBESExQVFhdhA5RwH40Bf3wS		wsPExcbH0NHS09TV1tcuICUAAAAACQAAAEUpAAApEBESExQVFhdhA5RwH40Bf3wS
	kkiING99knrilHlZJJOpqpfWzMa1tA==		kkiJa3G/4lI279fNxnBmkGMVsg==
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Yoav Nir		Yoav Nir
	Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.		Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
	5 Hasolelim st.		5 Hasolelim st.
	Tel Aviv 6789735		Tel Aviv 6789735
	Israel		Israel
	Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com		Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com
End of changes. 29 change blocks.
	53 lines changed or deleted		65 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.42. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/