draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-05.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-06.txt 
Network Working Group Y. Nir Network Working Group Y. Nir
Internet-Draft Check Point Internet-Draft Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track April 27, 2015 Intended status: Standards Track April 28, 2015
Expires: October 29, 2015 Expires: October 30, 2015
ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec ChaCha20, Poly1305 and their use in IKE & IPsec
draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-05 draft-ietf-ipsecme-chacha20-poly1305-06
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along This document describes the use of the ChaCha20 stream cipher along
with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for with the Poly1305 authenticator, combined into an AEAD algorithm for
the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec. the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) and for IPsec.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 30, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. AAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Use in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Negotiation in IKEv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. ESP Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix B. IKEv2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES - [FIPS-197]) has become the
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many areas, including IPsec VPNs. On most modern platforms, AES is many areas, including IPsec VPNs. On most modern platforms, AES is
anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher, anywhere from 4x to 10x as fast as the previous most-used cipher,
3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES - [SP800-67]). 3DES also has a 3-key Data Encryption Standard (3DES - [SP800-67]). 3DES also has a
64-bit block, which means that the amount of data that can be 64-bit block, which means that the amount of data that can be
encrypted before rekeying is required is not great. These reasons encrypted before rekeying is required is not great. These reasons
make AES not only the best choice, but the only choice. make AES not only the best choice, but the only choice.
The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a The problem is that if future advances in cryptanalysis reveal a
weakness in AES, VPN users will be in an unenviable position. With weakness in AES, VPN users will be in an unenviable position. With
the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it the only other widely supported cipher being the much slower 3DES, it
is not feasible to re-configure IPsec installations to use 3DES. is not feasible to re-configure IPsec installations away from AES.
[standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby [standby-cipher] describes this issue and the need for a standby
cipher in greater detail. cipher in greater detail.
This document proposes the ChaCha20 stream cipher as such a standby This document proposes the fast and secure ChaCha20 stream cipher as
cipher in an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) such a standby cipher in an Authenticated Encryption with Associated
construction with the Poly1305 authenticator for use with the Data (AEAD) construction with the Poly1305 authenticator for use with
Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP - [RFC4303]) and the Internet Key the Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP - [RFC4303]) and the Internet
Exchange Protocol (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]). The algorithms are described Key Exchange Protocol (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]). The algorithms are
in a separate document ([chacha_poly]). This document only describes described in a separate document ([chacha_poly]). This document only
the IPsec-specific things. describes the IPsec-specific things.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP 2. ChaCha20 & Poly1305 for ESP
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a combined mode algorithm, or AEAD. The AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is a combined mode algorithm, or AEAD. The
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o The key is set as mentioned above. o The key is set as mentioned above.
o The 96-bit nonce is formed from a concatenation of the 32-bit Salt o The 96-bit nonce is formed from a concatenation of the 32-bit Salt
and the 64-bit IV, as described above. and the 64-bit IV, as described above.
o The Initial Block Counter is set to one (1). The reason that one o The Initial Block Counter is set to one (1). The reason that one
is used for the initial counter rather than zero is that zero is is used for the initial counter rather than zero is that zero is
reserved for generating the one-time Poly1305 key (see below) reserved for generating the one-time Poly1305 key (see below)
As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied directly to the As the ChaCha20 block function is not applied directly to the
plaintext, no padding should be necessary. However, in keeping with plaintext, no padding should be necessary. However, in keeping with
the specification in RFC 4303, the plaintext always has a pad length the specification in RFC 4303, the plaintext always has a pad length
octet and may require padding bytes so as to align the buffer to an octet and a Next Header octet and may require padding bytes so as to
integral multiple of 4 octets. align the buffer to an integral multiple of 4 octets.
The same key and nonce, along with a block counter of zero are passed The same key and nonce, along with a block counter of zero are passed
to the ChaCha20 block function, and the top 256 bits of the result to the ChaCha20 block function, and the top 256 bits of the result
are used as the Poly1305 key. The nonce passed to the block function are used as the Poly1305 key. The nonce passed to the block function
here is the same nonce that is used in ChaCha20, including the 32-bit here is the same nonce that is used in ChaCha20, including the 32-bit
Salt, and the key passed is the same as the encryption key. Salt, and the key passed is the same as the encryption key.
Finally, the Poly1305 function is run on the data to be Finally, the Poly1305 function is run on the data to be
authenticated, which is, as specified in section 2.8 of [chacha_poly] authenticated, which is, as specified in section 2.8 of [chacha_poly]
a concatenation of the following in the below order: a concatenation of the following in the below order:
o The Authenticated Additional Data (AAD) - see Section 2.1. o The Authenticated Additional Data (AAD) - see Section 2.1.
o Padding that rounds the length up to 16 bytes. This is 4 or 8 o Zero-octet padding that rounds the length up to 16 bytes. This is
bytes depending on whether extended sequence numbers (ESN) is set 4 or 8 bytes depending on the length of the AAD.
for the SA. The padding is all zeros.
o The ciphertext o The ciphertext
o Padding that rounds the total length up to an integral multiple of o Zero octet padding that rounds the total length up to an integral
16 bytes. This padding is also all zeros. multiple of 16 bytes.
o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets o The length of the additional authenticated data (AAD) in octets
(as a 64-bit little-endian integer). (as a 64-bit little-endian integer).
o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian o The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-endian
integer). integer).
The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 bytes are The 128-bit output of Poly1305 is used as the tag. All 16 bytes are
included in the packet. included in the packet.
The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm The encryption algorithm transform ID for negotiating this algorithm
in IKE is TBA by IANA. in IKE is TBA by IANA.
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For SAs with ESN the AAD is 12 bytes: 4-byte SPI followed by an For SAs with ESN the AAD is 12 bytes: 4-byte SPI followed by an
8-byte sequence number as a 64-bit network order integer. 8-byte sequence number as a 64-bit network order integer.
3. Use in IKEv2 3. Use in IKEv2
AEAD algorithms can be used in IKE, as described in [RFC5282]. More AEAD algorithms can be used in IKE, as described in [RFC5282]. More
specifically: specifically:
o The Encrypted Payload is as described in section 3 of that o The Encrypted Payload is as described in section 3 of that
document. document.
o The ChaCha20-Poly1305 keying material is derived from KEYMAT as o The ChaCha20-Poly1305 keying material is derived similar to ESP:
for ESP: 36 octets are requested, of which the first 32 form the 36 octets are requested for each of SK_ei and SK_er, of which the
key and the last 4 form the salt. first 32 form the key and the last 4 form the salt. No octets are
o The IV is 64 bits, as described in Section 2. requested for SK_ai and SK_ar.
o The IV is 64 bits, as described in Section 2, and is included
explicitly in the Encrypted payload.
o The sender SHOULD include no padding and set the Pad Length field
to zero. The receiver MUST accept any length of padding.
o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it's 32 o The AAD is as described in section 5.1 of RFC 5282, so it's 32
bytes (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 bytes for the encrypted payload bytes (28 for the IKEv2 header + 4 bytes for the encrypted payload
header) assuming no unencrypted payloads. header) assuming no unencrypted payloads.
4. Negotiation in IKEv2 4. Negotiation in IKEv2
When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or When negotiating the ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm for use in IKE or
IPsec, the value xxx (TBA by IANA) should be used in the transform IPsec, the value xxx (TBA by IANA) should be used in the transform
substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1) transform ID. As substructure of the SA payload as the ENCR (type 1) transform ID. As
with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3) transform substructures with other AEAD algorithms, INTEG (type 3) transform substructures
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is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. The nonce should be is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. The nonce should be
selected uniquely for a particular key, but unpredictability of the selected uniquely for a particular key, but unpredictability of the
nonce is not required. Counters and LFSRs are both acceptable ways nonce is not required. Counters and LFSRs are both acceptable ways
of generating unique nonces. of generating unique nonces.
Another issue with implementing these algorithms is avoiding side Another issue with implementing these algorithms is avoiding side
channels. This is trivial for ChaCha20, but requires some care for channels. This is trivial for ChaCha20, but requires some care for
Poly1305. Considerations for implementations of these algorithms are Poly1305. Considerations for implementations of these algorithms are
in the [chacha_poly] document. in the [chacha_poly] document.
The Salt value in used nonce construction in ESP and IKEv2 is derived
from the keystream, same as the encryption key. It is never
transmitted on the wire, but the security of the algorithm does not
depend on its secrecy. Thus implementations that keep keys and other
secret material within some security boundary MAY export the Salt
from the security boundary. This may be useful if the API provided
by the library accepts the nonce as parameter rather than the IV.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type IANA is requested to assign one value from the IKEv2 "Transform Type
1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs" registry, with name
ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, and this document as reference for both ESP
and IKEv2. and IKEv2.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J. All of the algorithms in this document were designed by D. J.
Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The Bernstein. The AEAD construction was designed by Adam Langley. The
author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as author would also like to thank Adam for helpful comments, as well as
Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks Yaron Sheffer for telling me to write the algorithms draft. Thanks
also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final also to Martin Willi for pointing out the discrepancy with the final
version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero version of the algorithm document, and to Valery Smyslov and Tero
Kivinen for helpful comments on this draft. Kivinen for helpful comments on this draft. Thanks to Steve Doyle
and Martin Willi for pointing out mistakes in my examples.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
4303, December 2005. 4303, December 2005.
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The plaintext to encrypt consists of the source IP packet plus the The plaintext to encrypt consists of the source IP packet plus the
padding: padding:
Plaintext (includes padding and pad length): Plaintext (includes padding and pad length):
000 45 00 00 54 a6 f2 00 00 40 01 e7 78 c6 33 64 05 E..T....@..x.3d. 000 45 00 00 54 a6 f2 00 00 40 01 e7 78 c6 33 64 05 E..T....@..x.3d.
016 c0 00 02 05 08 00 5b 7a 3a 08 00 00 55 3b ec 10 ......[z:...U;.. 016 c0 00 02 05 08 00 5b 7a 3a 08 00 00 55 3b ec 10 ......[z:...U;..
032 00 07 36 27 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 ..6'............ 032 00 07 36 27 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 ..6'............
048 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 ............ !"# 048 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 ............ !"#
064 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 $%&'()*+,-./0123 064 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 $%&'()*+,-./0123
080 34 35 36 37 01 02 03 03 4567.... 080 34 35 36 37 01 02 02 04 4567....
With the key, nonce and plaintext available, we can call the ChaCha20 With the key, nonce and plaintext available, we can call the ChaCha20
function and encrypt the packet, producing the ciphertext: function and encrypt the packet, producing the ciphertext:
Ciphertext: Ciphertext:
000 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{ 000 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{
016 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z.. 016 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..
032 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L.. 032 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..
048 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8.. 048 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..
064 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d. 064 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.
080 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 .e.().@. 080 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 .e.().A.
To calculate the tag, we need a one-time Poly1305 key, which we To calculate the tag, we need a one-time Poly1305 key, which we
calculate by calling the ChaCha20 function again with the same key calculate by calling the ChaCha20 function again with the same key
and nonce, but a block count of zero. and nonce, but a block count of zero.
Poly1305 one-time key: Poly1305 one-time key:
000 af 1f 41 2c c1 15 ad ce 5e 4d 0e 29 d5 c1 30 bf ..A,....^M.)..0. 000 af 1f 41 2c c1 15 ad ce 5e 4d 0e 29 d5 c1 30 bf ..A,....^M.)..0.
016 46 31 21 0e 0f ef 74 31 c0 45 4f e7 0f d7 c2 d1 F1!...t1.EO..... 016 46 31 21 0e 0f ef 74 31 c0 45 4f e7 0f d7 c2 d1 F1!...t1.EO.....
The AAD is constructed by concatenating the SPI to the sequence The AAD is constructed by concatenating the SPI to the sequence
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The input to the Poly1305 function is constructed by concatenating The input to the Poly1305 function is constructed by concatenating
and padding the AAD and ciphertext: and padding the AAD and ciphertext:
Poly1305 Input: Poly1305 Input:
000 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 000 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
016 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{ 016 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a 4f 05 08 7b $..(..A~<.u:O..{
032 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z.. 032 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef 40 7a e5 c6 g.R.......f.@z..
048 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L.. 048 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df ab 4c 02 f7 .....(D.a....L..
064 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8.. 064 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac c6 38 e8 f3 *..|LOd.../..8..
080 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d. 080 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb 94 e6 64 da ...?.F.P's....d.
096 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .e.().@......... 096 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .e.().A.........
112 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........X....... 112 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 58 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........X.......
The resulting tag is: The resulting tag is:
Tag: Tag:
000 f0 5f ff a1 a0 cc cd de 88 a3 e8 9a 21 2b 18 ba ._..........!+.. 000 76 aa a8 26 6b 7f b0 f7 b1 1b 36 99 07 e1 ad 43 v..&k.....6....C
Putting it all together, the resulting packet is as follows: Putting it all together, the resulting packet is as follows:
ESP packet: ESP packet:
000 45 00 00 8c 23 45 00 00 40 32 de 5b cb 00 71 99 E...#E..@2.[..q. 000 45 00 00 8c 23 45 00 00 40 32 de 5b cb 00 71 99 E...#E..@2.[..q.
016 cb 00 71 05 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 10 11 12 13 ..q............. 016 cb 00 71 05 01 02 03 04 00 00 00 05 10 11 12 13 ..q.............
032 14 15 16 17 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a ....$..(..A~<.u: 032 14 15 16 17 24 03 94 28 b9 7f 41 7e 3c 13 75 3a ....$..(..A~<.u:
048 4f 05 08 7b 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef O..{g.R.......f. 048 4f 05 08 7b 67 c3 52 e6 a7 fa b1 b9 82 d4 66 ef O..{g.R.......f.
064 40 7a e5 c6 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df @z.......(D.a... 064 40 7a e5 c6 14 ee 80 99 d5 28 44 eb 61 aa 95 df @z.......(D.a...
080 ab 4c 02 f7 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac .L..*..|LOd.../. 080 ab 4c 02 f7 2a a7 1e 7c 4c 4f 64 c9 be fe 2f ac .L..*..|LOd.../.
096 c6 38 e8 f3 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb .8.....?.F.P's.. 096 c6 38 e8 f3 cb ec 16 3f ac 46 9b 50 27 73 f6 fb .8.....?.F.P's..
112 94 e6 64 da 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 40 e7 f0 5f ff a1 ..d..e.().@.._.. 112 94 e6 64 da 91 65 b8 28 29 f6 41 e0 76 aa a8 26 ..d..e.().A.v..&
128 a0 cc cd de 88 a3 e8 9a 21 2b 18 ba ........!+.. 128 6b 7f b0 f7 b1 1b 36 99 07 e1 ad 43 k.....6....C
Appendix B. IKEv2 Example Appendix B. IKEv2 Example
For the IKEv2 example, we'll use the following: For the IKEv2 example, we'll use the following:
o The key is 0x80..0x9f, the same as in Appendix A. o The key is 0x80..0x9f, the same as in Appendix A.
o The Salt is 0xa0 0xa1 0xa2 0xa3. o The Salt is 0xa0 0xa1 0xa2 0xa3.
o The IV will also be the same as in the previous example. The fact o The IV will also be the same as in the previous example. The fact
that the IV and Salt are both the same means that the nonce is that the IV and Salt are both the same means that the nonce is
also the same. also the same.
skipping to change at page 9, line 44 skipping to change at page 10, line 5
o The packet with be an Informational request carrying a single o The packet with be an Informational request carrying a single
payload: A Notify payload with type SET_WINDOW_SIZE, setting the payload: A Notify payload with type SET_WINDOW_SIZE, setting the
window size to 10. window size to 10.
o iSPI = 0xc0 0xc1 0xc2 0xc3 0xc4 0xc5 0xc6 0xc7. o iSPI = 0xc0 0xc1 0xc2 0xc3 0xc4 0xc5 0xc6 0xc7.
o rSPI = 0xd0 0xd1 0xd2 0xd3 0xd4 0xd5 0xd6 0xd7. o rSPI = 0xd0 0xd1 0xd2 0xd3 0xd4 0xd5 0xd6 0xd7.
o Message ID shall be 9. o Message ID shall be 9.
The Notify Payload: The Notify Payload:
000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a ......@..... 000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a ......@.....
Padding as required by RFC 7296 is 4 bytes long. Plaintext (with no padding and a zero pad length):
000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a 00 ......@......
Plaintext (includes padding and pad length): Ciphertext:
000 00 00 00 0c 00 00 40 01 00 00 00 0a 01 02 03 03 ......@......... 000 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 a..p....|..H.
Ciphertext:
000 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d a..p....|..H.4o}
The AAD is constructed by appending the IKE header to the encrypted The AAD is constructed by appending the IKE header to the encrypted
payload header. Note that the length field in the IKE header and the payload header. Note that the length field in the IKE header and the
length field in the encrypted payload header have to be calculated length field in the encrypted payload header have to be calculated
before constructing the AAD: before constructing the AAD:
AAD: AAD:
000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................ 000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H..., 016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
In this case, the length of the AAD is an integral multiple of 16, so In this case, the length of the AAD is an integral multiple of 16, so
when constructing the input to Poly1305 there was no need for when constructing the input to Poly1305 there was no need for
padding. The ciphertext is also 16 octets long, so the construction padding. The ciphertext is also 16 octets long, so the construction
has no padding at all. Just 32 octets of AAD, 16 octets of has no padding at all. Just 32 octets of AAD, 16 octets of
ciphertext, and two 8-octet length fields in little-endian encoding. ciphertext, and two 8-octet length fields in little-endian encoding.
Poly1305 Input: Poly1305 Input:
000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................ 000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H..., 016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
032 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d a..p....|..H.4o} 032 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 00 00 00 a..p....|..H....
048 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... 048 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
Tag: Tag:
000 92 7a e2 94 79 59 24 93 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 .z..yY$......... 000 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef d7 cd c6 70 66 90 63 15 b2 kq..R6....pf.c..
Encrypted Payload: Encrypted Payload:
000 00 00 00 2c 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 ...,........a..p 000 29 00 00 29 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 )..)........a..p
016 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d 92 7a e2 94 ....|..H.4o}.z.. 016 1f 8d 01 7f 7c 12 92 48 89 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef ....|..H.kq..R6.
032 79 59 24 93 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 yY$......... 032 d7 cd c6 70 66 90 63 15 b2 ...pf.c..
The IKE Message: The IKE Message:
000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................ 000 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 ................
016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 2c . %........H..., 016 2e 20 25 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 45 29 00 00 29 . %........E)..)
032 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f ........a..p.... 032 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 61 03 94 70 1f 8d 01 7f ........a..p....
048 7c 12 92 48 88 34 6f 7d 92 7a e2 94 79 59 24 93 |..H.4o}.z..yY$. 048 7c 12 92 48 89 6b 71 bf e2 52 36 ef d7 cd c6 70 |..H.kq..R6....p
064 a9 aa 97 d6 cc c6 b5 b4 ........ 064 66 90 63 15 b2 f.c..
The below file in the snoop format [RFC1761] contains three packets: The below file in the snoop format [RFC1761] contains three packets:
The first is the ICMP packet from the example in the Appendix A, the The first is the ICMP packet from the example in the Appendix A, the
second is the ESP packet from the same appendix, and the third is the second is the ESP packet from the same appendix, and the third is the
IKEv2 packet from this appendix. To convert this text back into a IKEv2 packet from this appendix. To convert this text back into a
file, you can use a Unix command line tools such as "openssl enc -d file, you can use a Unix command line tools such as "openssl enc -d
-a": -a":
c25vb3AAAAAAAAACAAAABAAAAGIAAABiAAAAegAAAABVPR8iAAADVdhs6fUQBHgx c25vb3AAAAAAAAACAAAABAAAAGIAAABiAAAAegAAAABVPq8PAAADVdhs6fUQBHgx
wbcpwggARQAAVKbyAABAAed4xjNkBcAAAgUIAFt6OggAAFU77BAABzYnCAkKCwwN wbcpwggARQAAVKbyAABAAed4xjNkBcAAAgUIAFt6OggAAFU77BAABzYnCAkKCwwN
Dg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3AAAAmgAA Dg8QERITFBUWFxgZGhscHR4fICEiIyQlJicoKSorLC0uLzAxMjM0NTY3AAAAmgAA
AJoAAACyAAAAAFU9HyIAAAo62Gzp9RAEeDHBtynCCABFAACMI0UAAEAy3lvLAHGZ AJoAAACyAAAAAFU+rw8AAAo62Gzp9RAEeDHBtynCCABFAACMI0UAAEAy3lvLAHGZ
ywBxBQECAwQAAAAFEBESExQVFhckA5QouX9BfjwTdTpPBQh7Z8NS5qf6sbmC1Gbv ywBxBQECAwQAAAAFEBESExQVFhckA5QouX9BfjwTdTpPBQh7Z8NS5qf6sbmC1Gbv
QHrlxhTugJnVKETrYaqV36tMAvcqpx58TE9kyb7+L6zGOOjzy+wWP6xGm1Anc/b7 QHrlxhTugJnVKETrYaqV36tMAvcqpx58TE9kyb7+L6zGOOjzy+wWP6xGm1Anc/b7
lOZk2pFluCgp9kDn8F//oaDMzd6Io+iaISsYugAAAHIAAAByAAAAigAAAABVPR8i lOZk2pFluCgp9kHgdqqoJmt/sPexGzaZB+GtQwAAAG8AAABvAAAAhwAAAABVPq8P
AAARH9hs6fUQBHgxwbcpwggARQAAZCNFAABAEd6kywBxmcsAcQUB9AH0AFCQ7MDB AAARH9hs6fUQBHgxwbcpwggARQAAYSNFAABAEd6nywBxmcsAcQUB9AH0AE0IUcDB
wsPExcbH0NHS09TV1tcuICUAAAAACQAAAEgAAAAsEBESExQVFhdhA5RwH40Bf3wS wsPExcbH0NHS09TV1tcuICUAAAAACQAAAEUpAAApEBESExQVFhdhA5RwH40Bf3wS
kkiING99knrilHlZJJOpqpfWzMa1tA== kkiJa3G/4lI279fNxnBmkGMVsg==
Author's Address Author's Address
Yoav Nir Yoav Nir
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
5 Hasolelim st. 5 Hasolelim st.
Tel Aviv 6789735 Tel Aviv 6789735
Israel Israel
Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com Email: ynir.ietf@gmail.com
 End of changes. 29 change blocks. 
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