draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-04.txt   draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-05.txt 
IPPM WG K. Pentikousis, Ed. IPPM WG K. Pentikousis, Ed.
Internet-Draft EICT Internet-Draft EICT
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Cui Intended status: Standards Track E. Zhang
Expires: January 23, 2015 E. Zhang Expires: March 23, 2015 Y. Cui
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
July 22, 2014 September 19, 2014
IKEv2-based Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP IKEv2-based Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP
draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-04 draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-05
Abstract Abstract
The O/TWAMP security mechanism requires that both the client and The O/TWAMP security mechanism requires that both the client and
server endpoints possess a shared secret. Since the currently- server endpoints possess a shared secret. Since the currently-
standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism only supports a pre-shared standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism only supports a pre-shared
key mode, large scale deployment of O/TWAMP is hindered key mode, large scale deployment of O/TWAMP is hindered
significantly. At the same time, recent trends point to wider IKEv2 significantly. At the same time, recent trends point to wider IKEv2
deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms and methods that deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms and methods that
enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to measure one-way and enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to measure one-way and
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 23, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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3.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the
Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to
measure network performance parameters, such as latency, bandwidth, measure network performance parameters, such as latency, bandwidth,
and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their
experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of
network measurement results, security aspects must be considered. network measurement results, security aspects must be considered.
Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement
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cellular networks, such as UMTS and GSM, IPsec use penetration is cellular networks, such as UMTS and GSM, IPsec use penetration is
lower, but still quite significant. If the shared key can be derived lower, but still quite significant. If the shared key can be derived
from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support cert-based key exchange and from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support cert-based key exchange and
make it more flexible in practice and more efficient. The use of make it more flexible in practice and more efficient. The use of
IKEv2 also makes it easier to extend automatic key management. In IKEv2 also makes it easier to extend automatic key management. In
general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the
IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted
outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy
and is orthogonal to the mechanism described in this document. and is orthogonal to the mechanism described in this document.
We note that protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP traffic using IPsec When IPsec is deployed, protecting O/TWAMP traffic in unauthenticated
security services is sufficient in many cases. That said, protecting mode using IPsec is one option. Another option is to protect O/TWAMP
traffic using O/TWAMP layer security established using the PSK
derived from IKEv2 but bypassing the IPsec tunnel. Protecting
unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via AH or ESP unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via AH or ESP
cannot provide various security modes and cannot authenticate part of cannot provide various security options, e.g. it cannot authenticate
a O/TWAMP packet as mentioned in [RFC4656]. In real-world part of a O/TWAMP packet as mentioned in [RFC4656]. For measuring
deployments this may hinder timestamp accuracy. This document latency, timestamp is carried in O/TWAMP traffic. The sender has to
describes how to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA and fetch the timestamp, encrypt it, and send it. In this case, the
employ the security service at the O/TWAMP layer. This method SHOULD middle step can be skipped, potentially improving accuracy as the
be used when O/TWAMP traffic is bypassing IPsec protection and is sequence number can be encrypted and authenticated before the
running over an external network exactly between two IKEv2 systems. timestamp is fetched. It is the same case for the receiver since it
can obtain the timstamp by skipping the decryption step. In such
cases, protecting O/TWAMP traffic using O/TWAMP layer security but
bypassing IPsec tunnel has its advantages. This document describes
how to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA and employ the
security service at the O/TWAMP layer. This method SHOULD be used
when O/TWAMP traffic is bypassing IPsec protection and is running
over an external network exactly between two IKEv2 systems.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 3 The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 3
summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security. summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security.
Section 4 presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network Section 4 presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network
measurements between the client and the server which both support measurements between the client and the server which both support
IKEv2. Finally, Section 5 discusses the security considerations IKEv2. Finally, Section 5 discusses the security considerations
arising from the proposed mechanisms. arising from the proposed mechanisms.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
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derived using IKEv2 [RFC5996]. derived using IKEv2 [RFC5996].
4.1. Shared Key Derivation 4.1. Shared Key Derivation
In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret
key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note
that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2
SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA
can be created without generating any child SA is possible [RFC6023]. can be created without generating any child SA is possible [RFC6023].
When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SKEYSEED When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be
must be generated first. SKEYSEED and its derivatives MUST be generated first. SK_d MUST be computed as per [RFC5996].
computed as per [RFC5996], where prf is a pseudorandom function:
SKEYSEED = prf( Ni | Nr, g^ir )
Ni and Nr are, respectively, the initiator and responder nonces,
which are negotiated during the initial exchange (see Section 1.2 of
[RFC5996]). g^ir is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman exchange and is represented as a string of octets.
The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows: The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:
Shared secret key = PRF( SKEYSEED, "IPPM" ) Shared secret key = PRF( SK_d, "IPPM" )
Wherein the string "IPPM" comprises four ASCII characters. It is Wherein the string "IPPM" comprises four ASCII characters and prf is
recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec layer. a pseudorandom function. It is recommended that the shared secret
This way, the IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP key is derived in the IPsec layer. This way, the IPsec keying
client. Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP client. Note, however, that
IPsec layers is host-internal and implementation-specific. the interaction between the O/TWAMP and IPsec layers is host-internal
Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which and implementation-specific. Therefore, this is clearly outside the
focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server. scope of this document, which focuses on the interaction between the
That said, one possible way could be the following: at the client O/TWAMP client and server. That said, one possible way could be the
side, the IPSec layer can perform a lookup in the Security following: at the client side, the IPSec layer can perform a lookup
Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the server and in the Security Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of
thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the server side, the IPSec the server and thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the server
layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the SPIs sent side, the IPSec layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using
by the client, and therefore extract the shared secret key. In case the SPIs sent by the client, and therefore extract the shared secret
that both client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no current key. In case that both client and server do support IKEv2 but there
IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered. First, the O/ is no current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered.
TWAMP client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs this First, the O/TWAMP client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2
operation, and selects the mode which supports IKEv2. Alternatively, SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode which supports IKEv2.
the O/TWAMP client does not initiate the establishment of the IKEv2 Alternatively, the O/TWAMP client does not initiate the establishment
SA, logs an error for operational management purposes, and proceeds of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational management purposes,
with the modes defined in [RFC4656][RFC5618]. Again, although both and proceeds with the modes defined in [RFC4656][RFC5357][RFC5618].
alternatives are feasible, they are in fact implementation-specific. Again, although both alternatives are feasible, they are in fact
implementation-specific.
If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the
corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA can continue to corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA can continue to
be used until the lifetime of the shared secret key expires. be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.
4.2. Server Greeting Message Update 4.2. Server Greeting Message Update
To achieve a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2 To achieve a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2
and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, Server Greeting Message should be and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, Server Greeting Message should be
updated as in Figure 2. updated as in Figure 2.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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| | | |
| MBZ (12 octets) | | MBZ (12 octets) |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: Server Greeting format Figure 2: Server Greeting format
The Modes field in Figure 2 will need to allow for support of key The Modes field in Figure 2 will need to allow for support of key
derivation as discussed in Section 4.1. As such, the Modes value derivation as discussed in Section 4.1. As such, the Modes value
extension MUST be supported by implementations compatible with this extension MUST be supported by implementations compatible with this
document, indicating support for deriving shared key from IKEv2 SA. document, indicating support for deriving the shared key from the
Three new Modes including authenticated mode over IKEv2(IANA.TBA.O/ IKEv2 SA. The new Modes value indicating support for this
TWAMP.IKEAuth),encrypted mode over IKEv2(IANA.TBA.O/TWAMP.IKEEnc) and specification is IANA.TBA.TWAMP.IKEv2Derived (note to IANA: 128 is
mixed mode over IKEv2(IANA.TBA.TWAMP.IKEMix) are proposed. preferred, i.e. bit in position 7). Clearly, an implementation
compatible with this specification MUST support the authenticated,
Authenticated mode over IKEv2 means that the client and server encrypted and mixed modes as per [RFC4656][RFC5357][RFC5618].
operate in authenticated mode with the shared secret key derived from
IKEv2 SA. Encrypted mode over IKEv2 means that the client and server
operate in encrypted mode with the shared secret key derived from
IKEv2 SA. Mixed mode over IKEv2 means that the client and server
operate in encrypted mode for the O/TWAMP-Control protocol while
operating in unauthenticated mode for the O/TWAMP-Test protocol with
shared secret key derived from IKEv2 SA.
The choice of this set of Modes values poses the least backwards The choice of this set of Modes values poses no backwards
compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients. Robust client compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients. Robust legacy
implementations of [RFC4656] would disregard the fact that the first client implementations would disregard the fact that the
29 Modes bits in the Server Greeting is set. If the server supports IANA.TBA.TWAMP.IKEv2Derived Modes bit in the Server Greeting is set.
other Modes, as one would assume, the client would then indicate any On the other hand, a client compatible with this specification can
of the Modes defined in [RFC4656] and effectively indicate that it easily identify that the O/TWAMP server contacted does not support
does not support key derivation from IKEv2. At this point, the this specification. If the server supports other Modes, as one could
Server would need to use the Modes defined in [RFC4656] only. assume, the client would then decide which Mode to use and indicate
such accordingly as per [RFC4656][RFC5357]. A client compatible with
this specification which decides not to employ IKEv2 derivation, can
simply behave as a purely [RFC4656]/[RFC5357] compatible client.
4.3. Set-Up-Response Update 4.3. Set-Up-Response Update
The Set-Up-Response Message should be updated as in Figure 3. The Set-Up-Response Message should be updated as in Figure 3. When a
O/TWAMP client compatible with this specification receives a Server
Greeting indicating support for Mode IANA.TBA.TWAMP.IKEv2Derived it
SHOULD reply to the O/TWAMP server with a Set-Up response that
indicates so. For example, a compatible O/TWAMP client choosing the
authenticated mode with IKEv2 shared secret key derivation should set
Mode to 130, i.e. set the bits in positions 1 and 7 (TBD IANA) to
one.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Mode | | Mode |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| Key ID (80 octets) | | Key ID (80 octets) |
| | | |
| | | |
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| Client-IV (12 octets) | | Client-IV (12 octets) |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message
The Security Parameter Index (SPI)(see [RFC4301] [RFC5996]) can The Security Parameter Index (SPI)(see [RFC4301] [RFC5996]) can
uniquely identify the Security Association (SA). If the client uniquely identify the Security Association (SA). If the client
supports the derivation of shared secret key from IKEv2 SA, it will supports the derivation of shared secret key from IKEv2 SA, it will
choose the corresponding mode value and carry SPIi and SPIr in the choose the corresponding mode value and carry SPIi and SPIr in the
Key ID field. SPIi and SPIr are included in the Key ID field of Set- Key ID field. SPIi and SPIr MUST be included in the Key ID field of
Up- Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the O/TWAMP Set-Up-Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the O/
shared secret key derived from. The length of SPI is 4 octets. TWAMP shared secret key derived from. The length of SPI is 4 octets.
Therefore, the first 4 octets of Key ID field carry SPIi and the Therefore, the first 4 octets of Key ID field MUST carry SPIi and the
second 4 octets carry SPIr. The remaining bits of the Key ID field second 4 octets MUST carry SPIr. The remaining bits of the Key ID
are set to zero. field MUST set to zero.
A O/TWAMP server which supports the specification of this document, A O/TWAMP server which supports the specification of this document,
can obtain the SPIi and SPIr from the first 8 octets and ignore the MUST obtain the SPIi and SPIr from the first 8 octets and ignore the
rest octets of the Key ID field. Then, the client and the server can remaining octets of the Key ID field. Then, the client and the
derive the shared secret key based on the mode value and SPI. If the server can derive the shared secret key based on the mode value and
O/TWAMP server cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to the SPIi and SPI. If the O/TWAMP server cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to
SPIr received, it MUST log the event for operational management the SPIi and SPIr received, it MUST log the event for operational
purposes. In addition, the O/TWAMP server SHOULD set the Accept management purposes. In addition, the O/TWAMP server SHOULD set the
field of the Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate that Accept field of the Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate
server is not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/ that server is not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/
TWAMP-Control session since it can not find the corresponding IKEv2 TWAMP-Control session since it can not find the corresponding IKEv2
SA. SA.
4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel 4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel
IPsec AH [RFC4302] and ESP [RFC4303] provide confidentiality and IPsec AH [RFC4302] and ESP [RFC4303] provide confidentiality and
data integrity to IP datagrams. Thus and IPsec tunnel can be used to data integrity to IP datagrams. Thus an IPsec tunnel can be used to
provide the protection needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets, provide the protection needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets,
even if the peers choose the unauthenticated mode of operation. If even if the peers choose the unauthenticated mode of operation. If
the two endpoints are already connected through an IPSec tunnel it is the two endpoints are already connected through an IPSec tunnel it is
RECOMMENDED that the O/TWAMP measurement packets are forwarded over RECOMMENDED that the O/TWAMP measurement packets are forwarded over
the IPSec tunnel if the peers choose the unauthenticated mode in the IPSec tunnel if the peers choose the unauthenticated mode in
order to ensure authenticity and security. order to ensure authenticity and security.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key
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attacks are as defined in [RFC5996]. attacks are as defined in [RFC5996].
As a more general note, the IPPM community may want to revisit the As a more general note, the IPPM community may want to revisit the
arguments listed in [RFC4656], Sec. 6.6. Other widely-used Internet arguments listed in [RFC4656], Sec. 6.6. Other widely-used Internet
security mechanisms, such as TLS and DTLS, may also be considered for security mechanisms, such as TLS and DTLS, may also be considered for
future use over and above of what is already specified in [RFC4656] future use over and above of what is already specified in [RFC4656]
[RFC5357]. [RFC5357].
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
IANA will need to allocate additional values for the Modes options IANA is requested to allocate the IANA.TBA.TWAMP.IKEv2Derived Modes
presented in this document. value in the TWAMP-Modes registry.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Emily Bi contributed to an earlier version of this document. We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, Emily Bi, John
Mattsson, and Steve Baillargeon for their comments and text
We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, John Mattsson, and suggestions. Al Morton deserves a special mention for his text
Steve Baillargeon for their comments and text suggestions, and Al contributions and the good discussion and pointers to earlier related
Morton for the good discussion and pointers to earlier related work work in IPPM WG.
in IPPM WG.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December
2005. 2005.
skipping to change at page 12, line 4 skipping to change at page 12, line 11
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC6023] Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A [RFC6023] Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A
Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version
2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023, October 2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023, October
2010. 2010.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Kostas Pentikousis (editor) Kostas Pentikousis (editor)
EICT GmbH EICT GmbH
EUREF-Campus Haus 13 EUREF-Campus Haus 13
Torgauer Strasse 12-15 Torgauer Strasse 12-15
10829 Berlin 10829 Berlin
Germany Germany
Email: k.pentikousis@eict.de Email: k.pentikousis@eict.de
Yang Cui
Huawei Technologies
Otemachi First Square 1-5-1 Otemachi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004
Japan
Email: cuiyang@huawei.com
Emma Zhang Emma Zhang
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
Huawei Building, Q20, No.156, Rd. BeiQing Huawei Building, Q20, No.156, Rd. BeiQing
Haidian District , Beijing 100095 Haidian District , Beijing 100095
P. R. China P. R. China
Email: emma.zhanglijia@huawei.com Email: emma.zhanglijia@huawei.com
Yang Cui
Huawei Technologies
Otemachi First Square 1-5-1 Otemachi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004
Japan
Email: cuiyang@huawei.com
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