draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-03.txt   draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-04.txt 
IPPM WG K. Pentikousis, Ed. IPPM WG K. Pentikousis, Ed.
Internet-Draft EICT Internet-Draft EICT
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Cui Intended status: Standards Track Y. Cui
Expires: December 7, 2014 E. Zhang Expires: January 23, 2015 E. Zhang
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
June 5, 2014 July 22, 2014
Network Performance Measurement for IPsec IKEv2-based Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP
draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-03 draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-04
Abstract Abstract
The O/TWAMP security mechanism requires that both the client and The O/TWAMP security mechanism requires that both the client and
server endpoints possess a shared secret. Since the currently- server endpoints possess a shared secret. Since the currently-
standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism only supports a pre-shared standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism only supports a pre-shared
key mode, large scale deployment of O/TWAMP is hindered key mode, large scale deployment of O/TWAMP is hindered
significantly. At the same time, recent trends point to wider IKEv2 significantly. At the same time, recent trends point to wider IKEv2
deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms and methods that deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms and methods that
enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to measure one-way and enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to measure one-way and
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. O/TWAMP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. O/TWAMP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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cellular networks, such as UMTS and GSM, IPsec use penetration is cellular networks, such as UMTS and GSM, IPsec use penetration is
lower, but still quite significant. If the shared key can be derived lower, but still quite significant. If the shared key can be derived
from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support cert-based key exchange and from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support cert-based key exchange and
make it more flexible in practice and more efficient. The use of make it more flexible in practice and more efficient. The use of
IKEv2 also makes it easier to extend automatic key management. In IKEv2 also makes it easier to extend automatic key management. In
general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the
IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted
outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy
and is orthogonal to the mechanism described in this document. and is orthogonal to the mechanism described in this document.
We note that protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP traffic using IPsec
security services is sufficient in many cases. That said, protecting
unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via AH or ESP
cannot provide various security modes and cannot authenticate part of
a O/TWAMP packet as mentioned in [RFC4656]. In real-world
deployments this may hinder timestamp accuracy. This document
describes how to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA and
employ the security service at the O/TWAMP layer. This method SHOULD
be used when O/TWAMP traffic is bypassing IPsec protection and is
running over an external network exactly between two IKEv2 systems.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 3 The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 3
summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security. summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security.
Section 4 presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network Section 4 presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network
measurements between the client and the server which both support measurements between the client and the server which both support
IKEv2. Finally, Section 5 discusses the security considerations IKEv2. Finally, Section 5 discusses the security considerations
arising from the proposed mechanisms. arising from the proposed mechanisms.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks 4. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks
This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for
network measurements between a client and a server which both support network measurements between a client and a server which both support
IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is
derived using IKEv2 [RFC5996]. derived using IKEv2 [RFC5996].
4.1. Shared Key Derivation 4.1. Shared Key Derivation
In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret
key can be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note
that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2
SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA
can be created without generating any child SA is possible [RFC6023]. can be created without generating any child SA is possible [RFC6023].
If the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SKEYSEED must When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SKEYSEED
be generated first. SKEYSEED and its derivatives MUST be computed as must be generated first. SKEYSEED and its derivatives MUST be
per [RFC5996], where prf is a pseudorandom function: computed as per [RFC5996], where prf is a pseudorandom function:
SKEYSEED = prf( Ni | Nr, g^ir ) SKEYSEED = prf( Ni | Nr, g^ir )
Ni and Nr are, respectively, the initiator and responder nonces, Ni and Nr are, respectively, the initiator and responder nonces,
which are negotiated during the initial exchange (see Section 1.2 of which are negotiated during the initial exchange (see Section 1.2 of
[RFC5996]). g^ir is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie- [RFC5996]). g^ir is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman exchange and is represented as a string of octets. Hellman exchange and is represented as a string of octets.
The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows: The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:
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6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
IANA will need to allocate additional values for the Modes options IANA will need to allocate additional values for the Modes options
presented in this document. presented in this document.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Emily Bi contributed to an earlier version of this document. Emily Bi contributed to an earlier version of this document.
We thank Eric Chen, Yakov Stein, Brian Trammell, and John Mattsson We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, John Mattsson, and
for their comments on this draft, and Al Morton for the discussion Steve Baillargeon for their comments and text suggestions, and Al
and pointers to related earlier work in IPPM WG. Morton for the good discussion and pointers to earlier related work
in IPPM WG.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December [RFC4302] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December
2005. 2005.
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