draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-09.txt   draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-10.txt 
IDR Working Group E. Jasinska IDR Working Group E. Jasinska
Internet-Draft BigWave IT Internet-Draft BigWave IT
Intended status: Standards Track N. Hilliard Intended status: Standards Track N. Hilliard
Expires: April 21, 2016 INEX Expires: October 31, 2016 INEX
R. Raszuk R. Raszuk
Mirantis Inc. Bloomberg LP
N. Bakker N. Bakker
Akamai Technologies B.V. Akamai Technologies B.V.
October 19, 2015 April 29, 2016
Internet Exchange BGP Route Server Internet Exchange BGP Route Server
draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-09 draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-10
Abstract Abstract
This document outlines a specification for multilateral This document outlines a specification for multilateral
interconnections at Internet exchange points (IXPs). Multilateral interconnections at Internet exchange points (IXPs). Multilateral
interconnection is a method of exchanging routing information between interconnection is a method of exchanging routing information between
three or more exterior BGP speakers using a single intermediate three or more external BGP speakers using a single intermediate
broker system, referred to as a route server. Route servers are broker system, referred to as a route server. Route servers are
typically used on shared access media networks, such as Internet typically used on shared access media networks, such as Internet
exchange points (IXPs), to facilitate simplified interconnection exchange points (IXPs), to facilitate simplified interconnection
between multiple Internet routers. between multiple Internet routers.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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skipping to change at page 2, line 24 skipping to change at page 2, line 24
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Technical Considerations for Route Server Implementations . . 3 2. Technical Considerations for Route Server Implementations . . 3
2.1. Client UPDATE Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Client UPDATE Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Attribute Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Attribute Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. NEXT_HOP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2.1. NEXT_HOP Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.2. AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2.2. AS_PATH Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.3. MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2.3. MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.4. Communities Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2.4. Communities Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection 5 2.3. Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection 5
2.3.1. Path Hiding on a Route Server . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3.1. Path Hiding on a Route Server . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Mitigation of Path Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3.2. Mitigation of Path Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2.1. Multiple Route Server RIBs . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3.2.1. Multiple Route Server RIBs . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2.2. Advertising Multiple Paths . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3.2.2. Advertising Multiple Paths . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Implementation Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3.3. Implementation Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection 1. Introduction to Multilateral Interconnection
Internet exchange points (IXPs) provide IP data interconnection Internet exchange points (IXPs) provide IP data interconnection
facilities for their participants, typically using shared Layer-2 facilities for their participants, typically using shared Layer-2
networking media such as Ethernet. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) networking media such as Ethernet. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
[RFC4271], an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol, is commonly [RFC4271], an inter-Autonomous System routing protocol, is commonly
used to facilitate exchange of network reachability information over used to facilitate exchange of network reachability information over
such media. such media.
While bilateral exterior BGP sessions between exchange participants While bilateral external BGP sessions between exchange participants
were previously the most common means of exchanging reachability were previously the most common means of exchanging reachability
information, the overhead associated with dense interconnection can information, the overhead associated with dense interconnection can
cause substantial operational scaling problems for partipants of cause substantial operational scaling problems for partipants of
larger Internet exchange points. larger Internet exchange points.
Multilateral interconnection is a method of interconnecting BGP Multilateral interconnection is a method of interconnecting BGP
speaking routers using a third party brokering system, commonly speaking routers using a third party brokering system, commonly
referred to as a route server and typically managed by the IXP referred to as a route server and typically managed by the IXP
operator. Each of the multilateral interconnection participants operator. Each of the multilateral interconnection participants
(usually referred to as route server clients) announces network (usually referred to as route server clients) announces network
reachability information to the route server using exterior BGP, and reachability information to the route server using external BGP, and
the route server in turn forwards this information to each other the route server in turn forwards this information to each other
route server client connected to it, according to its configuration. route server client connected to it, according to its configuration.
Although a route server uses BGP to exchange reachability information Although a route server uses BGP to exchange reachability information
with each of its clients, it does not forward traffic itself and is with each of its clients, it does not forward traffic itself and is
therefore not a router. therefore not a router.
A route server can be viewed as similar in function to an [RFC4456] A route server can be viewed as similar in function to an [RFC4456]
route reflector, except that it operates using EBGP instead of iBGP. route reflector, except that it operates using EBGP instead of iBGP.
Certain adaptions to [RFC4271] are required to enable an EBGP router Certain adaptions to [RFC4271] are required to enable an EBGP router
to operate as a route server; these are outlined in Section 2 of this to operate as a route server; these are outlined in Section 2 of this
document. document. Route server functionality is not mandatory in BGP
implementations.``
The term "route server" is often in a different context used to The term "route server" is often in a different context used to
describe a BGP node whose purpose is to accept BGP feeds from describe a BGP node whose purpose is to accept BGP feeds from
multiple clients for the purpose of operational analysis and multiple clients for the purpose of operational analysis and
troubleshooting. A system of this form may alternatively be known as troubleshooting. A system of this form may alternatively be known as
a "route collector" or a "route-views server". This document uses a "route collector" or a "route-views server". This document uses
the term "route server" exclusively to describe multilateral peering the term "route server" exclusively to describe multilateral peering
brokerage systems. brokerage systems.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
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A route server MUST accept all UPDATE messages received from each of A route server MUST accept all UPDATE messages received from each of
its clients for inclusion in its Adj-RIB-In. These UPDATE messages its clients for inclusion in its Adj-RIB-In. These UPDATE messages
MAY be omitted from the route server's Loc-RIB or Loc-RIBs, due to MAY be omitted from the route server's Loc-RIB or Loc-RIBs, due to
filters configured for the purposes of implementing routing policy. filters configured for the purposes of implementing routing policy.
The route server SHOULD perform one or more BGP Decision Processes to The route server SHOULD perform one or more BGP Decision Processes to
select routes for subsequent advertisement to its clients, taking select routes for subsequent advertisement to its clients, taking
into account possible configuration to provide multiple NLRI paths to into account possible configuration to provide multiple NLRI paths to
a particular client as described in Section 2.3.2.2 or multiple Loc- a particular client as described in Section 2.3.2.2 or multiple Loc-
RIBs as described in Section 2.3.2.1. The route server SHOULD RIBs as described in Section 2.3.2.1. The route server SHOULD
forward UPDATE messages where appropriate from its Loc-RIB or Loc- forward UPDATE messages from its Loc-RIB or Loc-RIBs to its clients
RIBs to its clients. as determined by local policy.
2.2. Attribute Transparency 2.2. Attribute Transparency
As a route server primarily performs a brokering service, As a route server primarily performs a brokering service,
modification of attributes could cause route server clients to alter modification of attributes could cause route server clients to alter
their BGP best path selection process for received prefix their BGP Decision Process for received prefix reachability
reachability information, thereby changing the intended routing information, thereby changing the intended routing policies of
policies of exchange participants. Therefore, contrary to what is exchange participants. Therefore, contrary to what is specified in
specified in section 5. of [RFC4271], route servers SHOULD NOT by section 5. of [RFC4271], route servers SHOULD NOT by default (unless
default (unless explicitly configured) update well-known BGP explicitly configured) update well-known BGP attributes received from
attributes received from route server clients before redistributing route server clients before redistributing them to their other route
them to their other route server clients. Optional recognized and server clients. Optional recognized and unrecognized BGP attributes,
unrecognized BGP attributes, whether transitive or non-transitive, whether transitive or non-transitive, SHOULD NOT be updated by the
SHOULD NOT be updated by the route server (unless enforced by local route server (unless enforced by local IXP operator configuration)
IX operator configuration) and SHOULD be passed on to other route and SHOULD be passed on to other route server clients.
server clients.
2.2.1. NEXT_HOP Attribute 2.2.1. NEXT_HOP Attribute
The NEXT_HOP is a well-known mandatory BGP attribute which defines The NEXT_HOP is a well-known mandatory BGP attribute which defines
the IP address of the router used as the next hop to the destinations the IP address of the router used as the next hop to the destinations
listed in the Network Layer Reachability Information field of the listed in the Network Layer Reachability Information field of the
UPDATE message. As the route server does not participate in the UPDATE message. As the route server does not participate in the
actual routing of traffic, the NEXT_HOP attribute MUST be passed actual routing of traffic, the NEXT_HOP attribute MUST be passed
unmodified to the route server clients, similar to the "third party" unmodified to the route server clients, similar to the "third party"
next hop feature described in section 5.1.3. of [RFC4271]. next hop feature described in section 5.1.3. of [RFC4271].
2.2.2. AS_PATH Attribute 2.2.2. AS_PATH Attribute
AS_PATH is a well-known mandatory attribute which identifies the AS_PATH is a well-known mandatory attribute which identifies the
autonomous systems through which routing information carried in the autonomous systems through which routing information carried in the
UPDATE message has passed. UPDATE message has passed.
As a route server does not participate in the process of forwarding As a route server does not participate in the process of forwarding
data between client routers, and because modification of the AS_PATH data between client routers, and because modification of the AS_PATH
attribute could affect route server client best path calculations, attribute could affect route server client BGP Decision Process, the
the route server SHOULD NOT prepend its own AS number to the AS_PATH route server SHOULD NOT prepend its own AS number to the AS_PATH
segment nor modify the AS_PATH segment in any other way. segment nor modify the AS_PATH segment in any other way. This
differs from the behaviour specified in section 5.1.2 of [RFC4271],
which requires that the BGP speaker prepends its own AS number as the
last element of the AS_PATH segment.
In contrast to what is recommended in section 6.3 of [RFC4271], route
server clients need to be able to accept UPDATE messages where the
leftmost AS in the AS_PATH attribute is not equal to the AS number of
the route server that sent the UPDATE message. If the route server
client BGP system has implemented a check for this, the BGP
implementation MUST allow this check to be disabled and SHOULD allow
the check to be disabled on a per-peer basis.
2.2.3. MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute 2.2.3. MULTI_EXIT_DISC Attribute
MULTI_EXIT_DISC is an optional non-transitive attribute intended to MULTI_EXIT_DISC is an optional non-transitive attribute intended to
be used on external (inter-AS) links to discriminate among multiple be used on external (inter-AS) links to discriminate among multiple
exit or entry points to the same neighboring AS. Contrary to section exit or entry points to the same neighboring AS. Contrary to section
5.1.4 of [RFC4271], if applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a route 5.1.4 of [RFC4271], if applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a route
server, this attribute SHOULD be propagated to other route server server, this attribute SHOULD be propagated to other route server
clients and the route server SHOULD NOT modify its value. clients and the route server SHOULD NOT modify its value.
2.2.4. Communities Attributes 2.2.4. Communities Attributes
The BGP COMMUNITIES ([RFC1997]) and Extended Communities ([RFC4360]) The BGP COMMUNITIES ([RFC1997]) and Extended Communities ([RFC4360])
attributes are attributes intended for labeling information carried attributes are attributes intended for labeling information carried
in BGP UPDATE messages. Transitive as well as non-transitive in BGP UPDATE messages. Transitive as well as non-transitive
Communities attributes applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a route Communities attributes applied to an NLRI UPDATE sent to a route
server SHOULD NOT be modified, processed or removed. However, if server SHOULD NOT be modified, processed or removed, except as
such an attribute is intended for processing by the route server defined by local policy. If a Communities Attribute is intended for
itself, it MAY be modified or removed. processing by the route server itself, as determined by local policy,
it MAY be modified or removed.
2.3. Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection 2.3. Per-Client Policy Control in Multilateral Interconnection
While IXP participants often use route servers with the intention of While IXP participants often use route servers with the intention of
interconnecting with as many other route server participants as interconnecting with as many other route server participants as
possible, there are circumstances where control of path distribution possible, there are circumstances where control of path distribution
on a per-client basis is important to ensure that desired on a per-client basis is important to ensure that desired
interconnection policies are met. interconnection policies are met.
The control of path distribution on a per-client basis can lead to a The control of path distribution on a per-client basis can lead to a
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In the traditional bilateral interconnection model, per-client policy In the traditional bilateral interconnection model, per-client policy
control to a third party exchange participant is accomplished either control to a third party exchange participant is accomplished either
by not engaging in a bilateral interconnection with that participant by not engaging in a bilateral interconnection with that participant
or else by implementing outbound filtering on the BGP session towards or else by implementing outbound filtering on the BGP session towards
that participant. However, in a multilateral interconnection that participant. However, in a multilateral interconnection
environment, only the route server can perform outbound filtering in environment, only the route server can perform outbound filtering in
the direction of the route server client; route server clients depend the direction of the route server client; route server clients depend
on the route server to perform their outbound filtering for them. on the route server to perform their outbound filtering for them.
Assuming a traditional best path selection, when the same prefix is Assuming the [RFC4271] BGP Decision Process is used, when the same
advertised to a route server from multiple route server clients, the prefix is advertised to a route server from multiple route server
route server will select a single best path for propagation to all clients, the route server will select a single path for propagation
connected clients. If, however, the route server has been configured to all connected clients. If, however, the route server has been
to filter the calculated best path from reaching a particular route configured to filter the calculated best path from reaching a
server client, then that client will not receive a path for that particular route server client, then that client will not receive a
prefix, although alternate paths received by the route server might path for that prefix, although alternate paths received by the route
have been policy compliant for that client. This phenomenon is server might have been policy compliant for that client. This
referred to as "path hiding". phenomenon is referred to as "path hiding".
For example, in Figure 1, if the same prefix were sent to the route For example, in Figure 1, if the same prefix were sent to the route
server via AS2 and AS4, and the route via AS2 was preferred according server via AS2 and AS4, and the route via AS2 was preferred according
to BGP's traditional best path selection, but AS1's policy prevents to the BGP Decision Process on the route server, but AS2's policy
AS2's path from being accepted, then AS1 would never receive a path prevented the route server from sending the path to AS1, then AS1
to this prefix, even though the route server had previously received would never receive a path to this prefix, even though the route
a valid alternative path via AS4. This happens because the best path server had previously received a valid alternative path via AS4.
selection is performed only once on the route server for all clients. This happens because the BGP Decision Process is performed only once
on the route server for all clients.
Path hiding will only occur on route servers which employ per-client Path hiding will only occur on route servers which employ per-client
policy control; if an IXP operator deploys a route server without policy control; if an IXP operator deploys a route server without
implementing a per-client routing policy control system, then path implementing a per-client routing policy control system, then path
hiding does not occur as all paths are considered equally valid from hiding does not occur as all paths are considered equally valid from
the point of view of the route server. the point of view of the route server.
2.3.2. Mitigation of Path Hiding 2.3.2. Mitigation of Path Hiding
There are several approaches which can be taken to mitigate against There are several approaches which can be taken to mitigate against
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about the feature capabilities of the route server clients. about the feature capabilities of the route server clients.
2.3.2.2. Advertising Multiple Paths 2.3.2.2. Advertising Multiple Paths
The path distribution model described above assumes standard BGP The path distribution model described above assumes standard BGP
session encoding where the route server sends a single path to its session encoding where the route server sends a single path to its
client for any given prefix. This path is selected using the BGP client for any given prefix. This path is selected using the BGP
path selection decision process described in [RFC4271]. If, however, path selection decision process described in [RFC4271]. If, however,
it were possible for the route server to send more than a single path it were possible for the route server to send more than a single path
to a route server client, then route server clients would no longer to a route server client, then route server clients would no longer
depend on receiving a single best path to a particular prefix; depend on receiving a single path to a particular prefix;
consequently, the path hiding problem described in Section 2.3.1 consequently, the path hiding problem described in Section 2.3.1
would disappear. would disappear.
We present two methods which describe how such increased path We present two methods which describe how such increased path
diversity could be implemented. diversity could be implemented.
2.3.2.2.1. Diverse BGP Path Approach 2.3.2.2.1. Diverse BGP Path Approach
The Diverse BGP Path proposal as defined in [RFC6774] is a simple way The Diverse BGP Path proposal as defined in [RFC6774] is a simple way
to distribute multiple prefix paths from a route server to a route to distribute multiple prefix paths from a route server to a route
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policy control without "path hiding". policy control without "path hiding".
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
The path hiding problem outlined in section Section 2.3.1 can be used The path hiding problem outlined in section Section 2.3.1 can be used
in certain circumstances to proactively block third party path in certain circumstances to proactively block third party path
announcements from other route server clients. Route server announcements from other route server clients. Route server
operators should be aware that security issues may arise unless steps operators should be aware that security issues may arise unless steps
are taken to mitigate against path hiding. are taken to mitigate against path hiding.
The AS_PATH check described in Section 2.2.2 is normally enabled in
order to check for malformed AS paths. If this check is disabled,
the route server client loses the ability to check incoming UPDATE
messages for certain categories of problems. This could potentially
cause corrupted BGP UPDATE messages to be propagated where they might
not be propagated if the check were enabled. Regardless of any
problems relating to malformed UPDATE messages, this check is also
used to detect BGP loops, so removing the check could potentially
cause routing loops to be formed. Consequently, this check SHOULD
NOT be disabled by IXP participants unless it is needed to establish
BGP sessions with a route server, and if possible should only be
disabled for peers which are route servers.
Route server operators should carefully consider the security
practices discussed in [RFC7454], "BGP Operations and Security".
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
The new set of mechanisms for route servers does not require any new The new set of mechanisms for route servers does not require any new
allocations from IANA. allocations from IANA.
5. Acknowledgments 5. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Ryan Bickhart, Steven Bakker, Martin The authors would like to thank Ryan Bickhart, Steven Bakker, Martin
Pels, Chris Hall, Aleksi Suhonen, Bruno Decraene, Pierre Francois and Pels, Chris Hall, Aleksi Suhonen, Bruno Decraene, Pierre Francois and
Eduardo Ascenco Reis for their valuable input. Eduardo Ascenco Reis for their valuable input.
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In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the developers of In addition, the authors would like to acknowledge the developers of
BIRD, OpenBGPD, Quagga and IOS whose BGP implementations include BIRD, OpenBGPD, Quagga and IOS whose BGP implementations include
route server capabilities which are compliant with this document. route server capabilities which are compliant with this document.
Route server functionality was described in 1995 in [RFC1863] and Route server functionality was described in 1995 in [RFC1863] and
modern route server implementations are based on concepts developed modern route server implementations are based on concepts developed
in the 1990s by the Routing Arbiter Project and the Route Server Next in the 1990s by the Routing Arbiter Project and the Route Server Next
Generation Project, managed by ISI and Merit. Although the original Generation Project, managed by ISI and Merit. Although the original
RSNG code is no longer in use at any IXPs, the IXP community owes a RSNG code is no longer in use at any IXPs, the IXP community owes a
debt of gratitude to the many people who were involved in route debt of gratitude to the many people who were involved in route
server development in the 1990s. server development in the 1990s. Note that [RFC1863] was made
historical by [RFC4223].
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[RFC1997] Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities [RFC1997] Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities
Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996, Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 9, line 35 skipping to change at page 10, line 24
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>. February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-add-paths] [I-D.ietf-idr-add-paths]
Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder, Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
"Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", draft-ietf-idr- "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", draft-ietf-idr-
add-paths-11 (work in progress), October 2015. add-paths-13 (work in progress), December 2015.
[RFC1863] Haskin, D., "A BGP/IDRP Route Server alternative to a full [RFC1863] Haskin, D., "A BGP/IDRP Route Server alternative to a full
mesh routing", RFC 1863, DOI 10.17487/RFC1863, October mesh routing", RFC 1863, DOI 10.17487/RFC1863, October
1995, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1863>. 1995, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1863>.
[RFC4223] Savola, P., "Reclassification of RFC 1863 to Historic",
RFC 4223, DOI 10.17487/RFC4223, October 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4223>.
[RFC4456] Bates, T., Chen, E., and R. Chandra, "BGP Route [RFC4456] Bates, T., Chen, E., and R. Chandra, "BGP Route
Reflection: An Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP Reflection: An Alternative to Full Mesh Internal BGP
(IBGP)", RFC 4456, DOI 10.17487/RFC4456, April 2006, (IBGP)", RFC 4456, DOI 10.17487/RFC4456, April 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4456>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4456>.
[RFC6774] Raszuk, R., Ed., Fernando, R., Patel, K., McPherson, D., [RFC6774] Raszuk, R., Ed., Fernando, R., Patel, K., McPherson, D.,
and K. Kumaki, "Distribution of Diverse BGP Paths", and K. Kumaki, "Distribution of Diverse BGP Paths",
RFC 6774, DOI 10.17487/RFC6774, November 2012, RFC 6774, DOI 10.17487/RFC6774, November 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6774>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6774>.
Authors' Addresses [RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
Authors' Addresses
Elisa Jasinska Elisa Jasinska
BigWave IT BigWave IT
ul. Skawinska 27/7 ul. Skawinska 27/7
Krakow, MP 31-066 Krakow, MP 31-066
Poland Poland
Email: elisa@bigwaveit.org Email: elisa@bigwaveit.org
Nick Hilliard Nick Hilliard
INEX INEX
4027 Kingswood Road 4027 Kingswood Road
Dublin 24 Dublin 24
IE IE
Email: nick@inex.ie Email: nick@inex.ie
Robert Raszuk Robert Raszuk
Mirantis Inc. Bloomberg LP
615 National Ave. #100 731 Lexington Ave
Mt View, CA 94043 New York City, NY 10022
USA USA
Email: robert@raszuk.net Email: robert@raszuk.net
Niels Bakker Niels Bakker
Akamai Technologies B.V. Akamai Technologies B.V.
Kingsfordweg 151 Kingsfordweg 151
Amsterdam 1043 GR Amsterdam 1043 GR
NL NL
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