draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-21.txt   draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-22.txt 
Network Working Group A. Azimov Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
Expires: July 26, 2022 Qrator Labs Expires: 14 August 2022 Qrator Labs
R. Bush R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
K. Patel K. Patel
Arrcus Arrcus
K. Sriram K. Sriram
USA NIST USA NIST
January 22, 2022 10 February 2022
Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN
Messages Messages
draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-21 draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-22
Abstract Abstract
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider. one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider.
These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route
filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes). filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes).
skipping to change at page 2, line 20 skipping to change at page 2, line 15
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 August 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Role Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Role Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider
[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent [RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent
BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous
skipping to change at page 4, line 9 skipping to change at page 4, line 7
action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS
at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration. at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration.
The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the
same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be
installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of
route selection." route selection."
2.1. Peering Relationships 2.1. Peering Relationships
The terms defined and used in this document (see below) do not The terms for peering relationships defined and used in this document
necessarily represent business relationships based on payment (see below) do not necessarily represent business relationships based
agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions on BGP on payment agreements. These terms are used to represent
route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model [Gao]. restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-
The terms Provider, Customer, and Peer used here are synonymous to Rexford model [Gao]. The terms Provider, Customer, and Peer used
the terms "transit provider", "customer", and "lateral (i.e., non- here are synonymous to the terms "transit provider", "customer", and
transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908]. "lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908].
The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the
corresponding rules for route propagation: corresponding rules for route propagation:
Provider: MAY propagate any available route to a Customer. Provider: MAY propagate any available route to a Customer.
Customer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or Customer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or
locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes MUST NOT be locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes MUST NOT be
propagated. propagated.
skipping to change at page 5, line 23 skipping to change at page 5, line 21
The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers
forming a session. One of the Roles described below SHOULD be forming a session. One of the Roles described below SHOULD be
configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in
Section 2) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only Section 2) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only
exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see Section 5). exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see Section 5).
BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability
(described in Section 3.1) on each eBGP session. (described in Section 3.1) on each eBGP session.
Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are: Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are:
o Provider - the local AS is a transit Provider of the remote AS; * Provider - the local AS is a transit Provider of the remote AS;
o Customer - the local AS is a transit Customer of the remote AS; * Customer - the local AS is a transit Customer of the remote AS;
o RS - the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet * RS - the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet
exchange point) and the remote AS is its RS-Client; exchange point) and the remote AS is its RS-Client;
o RS-Client - the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the * RS-Client - the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the
remote AS; remote AS;
o Peer - the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral * Peer - the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral
peering relationship). peering relationship).
3.1. BGP Role Capability 3.1. BGP Role Capability
The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows: The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows:
o Code - 9 * Code - 9
o Length - 1 (octet) * Length - 1 (octet)
o Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1). * Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).
+-------+------------------------------+ +=======+==============================+
| Value | Role name (for the local AS) | | Value | Role name (for the local AS) |
+-------+------------------------------+ +=======+==============================+
| 0 | Provider | | 0 | Provider |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 1 | RS | | 1 | RS |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 2 | RS-Client | | 2 | RS-Client |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 3 | Customer | | 3 | Customer |
| 4 | Peer (Lateral Peer) | +-------+------------------------------+
| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) |
+-------+------------------------------+
| 5-255 | Unassigned | | 5-255 | Unassigned |
+-------+------------------------------+ +-------+------------------------------+
Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
If BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker MUST advertise If BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker MUST advertise
BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker MUST BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker MUST
NOT advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The NOT advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The
error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is
described in Section 3.2. described in Section 3.2.
3.2. Role Correctness 3.2. Role Correctness
Section 3.1 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship on each Section 3.1 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship on each
eBGP session between autonomous systems (ASes). eBGP session between autonomous systems (ASes).
The mere receipt of BGP Role Capability does not automatically The mere receipt of BGP Role Capability does not automatically
guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP
Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the
peer, the Roles MUST correspond to the relationships in Table 2. If peer, the Roles MUST correspond to the relationships in Table 2. If
the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker MUST reject the the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker MUST reject the
connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode
TBD). TBD).
+---------------+----------------+ +===============+================+
| Local AS Role | Remote AS Role | | Local AS Role | Remote AS Role |
+---------------+----------------+ +===============+================+
| Provider | Customer | | Provider | Customer |
+---------------+----------------+
| Customer | Provider | | Customer | Provider |
+---------------+----------------+
| RS | RS-Client | | RS | RS-Client |
+---------------+----------------+
| RS-Client | RS | | RS-Client | RS |
+---------------+----------------+
| Peer | Peer | | Peer | Peer |
+---------------+----------------+ +---------------+----------------+
Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role Capabilities Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role
Capabilities
For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but
one is not received, the BGP Speaker SHOULD ignore the absence of the one is not received, the BGP Speaker SHOULD ignore the absence of the
BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The
locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in
Section 4. Section 4.
An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt
of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When
operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent, operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent,
but one is not received, then the connection is rejected using the but one is not received, then the connection is rejected using the
Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). See comments in Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). See comments in
Section 7. Section 7.
If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role
Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker must Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker considers
consider it to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceed [RFC5492]. them to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceeds [RFC5492]. If
If multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them have
have the same value, then the BGP speaker MUST reject the connection the same value, then the BGP speaker MUST reject the connection using
using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD).
The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC
Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak
prevention and detection procedures described in Section 4. prevention and detection procedures described in Section 4.
4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute 4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute
The Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is an optional transitive path The Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is an optional transitive path
attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a
length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that
once a route is sent to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client, it will once a route is sent to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client (see
subsequently go only to Customers. The attribute value is an AS definitions in Section 2.1), it will subsequently go only to
number (ASN) determined by the procedures described below. Customers. The attribute value is an AS number (ASN) determined by
the procedures described below.
The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
Attribute on route receipt: Attribute on route receipt:
1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or 1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or
RS-Client, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered RS-Client, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered
ineligible (see Section 2). ineligible (see Section 2).
2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer and the 2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer (i.e.,
Attribute has a value that is not equal to the remote (i.e., remote AS with a Peer Role) and the Attribute has a value that is
Peer's) AS number, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered not equal to the remote (i.e., Peer's) AS number, then it is a
ineligible. route leak and MUST be considered ineligible.
3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, and the OTC 3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, and the OTC
Attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with a value Attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with a value
equal to the AS number of the remote AS. equal to the AS number of the remote AS.
The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
Attribute on route advertisement: Attribute on route advertisement:
1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client 1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client
(when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present, (when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present,
then an OTC Attribute MUST be added with a value equal to the AS then when advertising the route, an OTC Attribute MUST be added
number of the local AS. with a value equal to the AS number of the local AS.
2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it MUST NOT be 2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it MUST NOT be
propagated to Providers, Peers, or RS(s). propagated to Providers, Peers, or RS(s).
The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the
local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In
the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC
Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned
from a Peer, Provider, or RS, and it can be advertised only to the from a Peer, Provider, or RS, and it can be advertised only to the
customers. The same OTC Attribute which is set locally also provides customers. The same OTC Attribute which is set locally also provides
skipping to change at page 8, line 33 skipping to change at page 9, line 25
receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute) receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute)
that the route is a leak. that the route is a leak.
The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at
the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant
with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC
Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be
the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early
adopters. adopters.
If an UPDATE is received with an OTC Attribute with a length If an eBGP speaker receives an UPDATE with an OTC Attribute with a
different from 4 octets, then the UPDATE SHALL be considered length different from 4 octets, then the UPDATE SHALL be considered
malformed. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using malformed. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using
the approach of "treat-as-withdraw" [RFC7606]. the approach of treat-as-withdraw [RFC7606].
The procedures specified in this document are NOT RECOMMENDED to be If an UPDATE with an OTC Attribute is received in iBGP, then the
used between autonomous systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If Attribute or UPDATE SHALL NOT be considered malformed based on the
an OTC Attribute is added on egress from the AS Confederation, its specified length. This avoids treat-as-withdraw error handling and
value MUST equal the AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress prevents the possibility of long-lived forwarding loops in iBGP
from the AS Confederation, an UPDATE MUST NOT contain an OTC (Section 6 in [RFC7606]). It also avoids Attribute-discard error
Attribute with a value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other handling [RFC7606] and hence route leak detection capability is not
than the AS Confederation Identifier. compromised in case the route is propagated to eBGP neighbors.
The BGP Role negotiation and OTC Attribute based procedures specified
in this document are NOT RECOMMENDED to be used between autonomous
systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If an OTC Attribute is
added on egress from the AS Confederation, its value MUST equal the
AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress from the AS
Confederation, an UPDATE MUST NOT contain an OTC Attribute with a
value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other than the AS
Confederation Identifier.
The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use
private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data center private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data center
network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are
outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet- outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet-
facing AS, the OTC Attribute MUST NOT contain a value other than the facing AS, the OTC Attribute MUST NOT contain a value other than the
Internet-facing ASN. Internet-facing ASN.
Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged
(this also applies to an AS Confederation). (this also applies to an AS Confederation).
The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for
unicast IPv4 and IPv6 address families and MUST NOT be applied to the address families AFI 1 (IPv4) and AFI 2 (IPv6) with SAFI 1
other address families by default. The operator MUST NOT have the (unicast) in both cases and MUST NOT be applied to other address
ability to modify the procedures defined in this section. families by default. The operator MUST NOT have the ability to
modify the procedures defined in this section.
5. Additional Considerations 5. Additional Considerations
Roles MUST NOT be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex Roles MUST NOT be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex
peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the
Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering
relationships, BGP Roles SHOULD be used on each of the resulting eBGP relationships, BGP Roles SHOULD be used on each of the resulting eBGP
sessions. sessions.
An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring
policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering
relations as described in Section 2.1. However, in this case, there relations as described in Section 2.1. However, in this case, there
are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix
peering configuration. peering configuration.
The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect
prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any
special handling of incorrect AS numbers in the OTC Attribute. special handling of an incorrect AS number in the OTC Attribute.
In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent
itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a
problem since the egress procedures in Section 4 specify that the OTC problem since the egress procedures in Section 4 specify that the OTC
Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission. Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission.
Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN
it is currently representing itself as. it is currently representing itself as.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
skipping to change at page 10, line 4 skipping to change at page 11, line 10
description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned
the value 9 [to be removed upon publication: the value 9 [to be removed upon publication:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/capability- https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/capability-
codes.xhtml]. This document is the reference for the new capability. codes.xhtml]. This document is the reference for the new capability.
The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
Value" in the Capability Codes registry. Assignments consist of a Value" in the Capability Codes registry. Assignments consist of a
Value and a corresponding Role name. Initially, this registry is to Value and a corresponding Role name. Initially, this registry is to
be populated with the data contained in Table 1 found in Section 3.1. be populated with the data contained in Table 1 found in Section 3.1.
Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined
in [RFC8126]. The registry is as shown in Table 3. in [RFC8126]. The registry is as shown in Table 3.
+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+ +=======+===============================+===============+
| Value | Role name (for the local AS) | Reference | | Value | Role name (for the local AS) | Reference |
+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+ +=======+===============================+===============+
| 0 | Provider | This document | | 0 | Provider | This document |
| 1 | RS | This document | +-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 2 | RS-Client | This document | | 1 | RS | This document |
| 3 | Customer | This document | +-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) | This document | | 2 | RS-Client | This document |
| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review | +-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+ | 3 | Customer | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) | This document |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review | |
+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role
IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named the "Role IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named the "Role
Mismatch" (see Section 3.2) in the OPEN Message Error subcodes Mismatch" (see Section 3.2) in the OPEN Message Error subcodes
registry. IANA has assigned the value TBD [to be removed upon registry. IANA has assigned the value TBD [to be removed upon
publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp- publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6]. This document is the reference parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6]. This document is the reference
for the new subcode. for the new subcode.
skipping to change at page 13, line 7 skipping to change at page 14, line 16
BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers", RFC 7938, BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers", RFC 7938,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7938, August 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC7938, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7938>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7938>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>. 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Bruno Decraene, Ben
Ginsburg, Jeff Haas, Ruediger Volk, Pavel Lunin, Gyan Mishra, Ignas Maddison, Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel Ginsburg, Jeff Haas, Ruediger
Bagdonas, Sue Hares, and John Scudder for comments, suggestions, and Volk, Pavel Lunin, Gyan Mishra, Ignas Bagdonas, Sue Hares, and John
critique. Scudder for review, comments, and suggestions during the course of
this work. Thanks are also due to many IESG reviewers whose comments
greatly helped improve the clarity, accuracy, and presentation in the
document.
Contributors Contributors
Brian Dickson Brian Dickson
Independent Independent
Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
Doug Montgomery Doug Montgomery
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: dougm@nist.gov Email: dougm@nist.gov
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov Alexander Azimov
Qrator Labs & Yandex Qrator Labs & Yandex
Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16 Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
Moscow 119021 Moscow
119021
Russian Federation Russian Federation
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Bogomazov Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs Qrator Labs
1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A 1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
Moscow 123290 Moscow
123290
Russian Federation Russian Federation
Email: eb@qrator.net Email: eb@qrator.net
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc. Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Keyur Patel Keyur Patel
Arrcus Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400 2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119 San Jose, CA 95119
US United States of America
Email: keyur@arrcus.com Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Kotikalapudi Sriram Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America United States of America
Email: ksriram@nist.gov Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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