draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-21.txt		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-22.txt
	Network Working Group A. Azimov		Network Working Group A. Azimov
	Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex		Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex
	Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov		Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov
	Expires: July 26, 2022 Qrator Labs		Expires: 14 August 2022 Qrator Labs
	R. Bush		R. Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.		Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
	K. Patel		K. Patel
	Arrcus		Arrcus
	K. Sriram		K. Sriram
	USA NIST		USA NIST
	January 22, 2022		10 February 2022
	Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN		Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN
	Messages		Messages
	draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-21		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-22
	Abstract		Abstract
	Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate		Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
	assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route		assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
	learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a		learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
	lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from		lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
	one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider.		one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider.
	These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route		These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route
	filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes).		filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes).
	skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 15 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 26, 2022.		This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 August 2022.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	publication of this document. Please review these documents		Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. BGP Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.1. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3.1. BGP Role Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3.2. Role Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Role Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate		Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate
	assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route		assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route
	learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a		learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a
	lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from		lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from
	one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider		one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider
	[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent		[RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent
	BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous		BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous
	skipping to change at page 4, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 7 ¶
	action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS		action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS
	at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration.		at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration.
	The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the		The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the
	same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be		same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be
	installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of		installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of
	route selection."		route selection."
	2.1. Peering Relationships		2.1. Peering Relationships
	The terms defined and used in this document (see below) do not		The terms for peering relationships defined and used in this document
	necessarily represent business relationships based on payment		(see below) do not necessarily represent business relationships based
	agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions on BGP		on payment agreements. These terms are used to represent
	route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model [Gao].		restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-
	The terms Provider, Customer, and Peer used here are synonymous to		Rexford model [Gao]. The terms Provider, Customer, and Peer used
	the terms "transit provider", "customer", and "lateral (i.e., non-		here are synonymous to the terms "transit provider", "customer", and
	transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908].		"lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908].
	The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the		The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the
	corresponding rules for route propagation:		corresponding rules for route propagation:
	Provider: MAY propagate any available route to a Customer.		Provider: MAY propagate any available route to a Customer.
	Customer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or		Customer: MAY propagate any route learned from a Customer, or
	locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes MUST NOT be		locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes MUST NOT be
	propagated.		propagated.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 23 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 21 ¶
	The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers		The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers
	forming a session. One of the Roles described below SHOULD be		forming a session. One of the Roles described below SHOULD be
	configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in		configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in
	Section 2) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only		Section 2) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only
	exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see Section 5).		exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see Section 5).
	BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability		BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability
	(described in Section 3.1) on each eBGP session.		(described in Section 3.1) on each eBGP session.
	Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are:		Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are:
	o Provider - the local AS is a transit Provider of the remote AS;		* Provider - the local AS is a transit Provider of the remote AS;
	o Customer - the local AS is a transit Customer of the remote AS;		* Customer - the local AS is a transit Customer of the remote AS;
	o RS - the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet		* RS - the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet
	exchange point) and the remote AS is its RS-Client;		exchange point) and the remote AS is its RS-Client;
	o RS-Client - the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the		* RS-Client - the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the
	remote AS;		remote AS;
	o Peer - the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral		* Peer - the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral
	peering relationship).		peering relationship).
	3.1. BGP Role Capability		3.1. BGP Role Capability
	The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows:		The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows:
	o Code - 9		* Code - 9
	o Length - 1 (octet)		* Length - 1 (octet)
	o Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).		* Value - integer corresponding to speaker's BGP Role (see Table 1).
	+-------+------------------------------+		+=======+==============================+
	| Value | Role name (for the local AS) |		| Value | Role name (for the local AS) |
	+-------+------------------------------+		+=======+==============================+
	| 0 | Provider |		| 0 | Provider |
			+-------+------------------------------+
	| 1 | RS |		| 1 | RS |
			+-------+------------------------------+
	| 2 | RS-Client |		| 2 | RS-Client |
			+-------+------------------------------+
	| 3 | Customer |		| 3 | Customer |
	| 4 | Peer (Lateral Peer) |		+-------+------------------------------+
			| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) |
			+-------+------------------------------+
	| 5-255 | Unassigned |		| 5-255 | Unassigned |
	+-------+------------------------------+		+-------+------------------------------+
	Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values		Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
	If BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker MUST advertise		If BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker MUST advertise
	BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker MUST		BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker MUST
	NOT advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The		NOT advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The
	error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is		error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is
	described in Section 3.2.		described in Section 3.2.
	3.2. Role Correctness		3.2. Role Correctness
	Section 3.1 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship on each		Section 3.1 described how BGP Role encodes the relationship on each
	eBGP session between autonomous systems (ASes).		eBGP session between autonomous systems (ASes).
	The mere receipt of BGP Role Capability does not automatically		The mere receipt of BGP Role Capability does not automatically
	guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP		guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP
	Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the		Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the
	peer, the Roles MUST correspond to the relationships in Table 2. If		peer, the Roles MUST correspond to the relationships in Table 2. If
	the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker MUST reject the		the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker MUST reject the
	connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode		connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode
	TBD).		TBD).
	+---------------+----------------+		+===============+================+
	| Local AS Role | Remote AS Role |		| Local AS Role | Remote AS Role |
	+---------------+----------------+		+===============+================+
	| Provider | Customer |		| Provider | Customer |
			+---------------+----------------+
	| Customer | Provider |		| Customer | Provider |
			+---------------+----------------+
	| RS | RS-Client |		| RS | RS-Client |
			+---------------+----------------+
	| RS-Client | RS |		| RS-Client | RS |
			+---------------+----------------+
	| Peer | Peer |		| Peer | Peer |
	+---------------+----------------+		+---------------+----------------+
	Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role Capabilities		Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role
			Capabilities
	For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but		For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but
	one is not received, the BGP Speaker SHOULD ignore the absence of the		one is not received, the BGP Speaker SHOULD ignore the absence of the
	BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The		BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The
	locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in		locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in
	Section 4.		Section 4.
	An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt		An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt
	of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When		of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When
	operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent,		operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent,
	but one is not received, then the connection is rejected using the		but one is not received, then the connection is rejected using the
	Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). See comments in		Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD). See comments in
	Section 7.		Section 7.
	If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role		If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role
	Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker must		Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker considers
	consider it to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceed [RFC5492].		them to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceeds [RFC5492]. If
	If multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them		multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them have
	have the same value, then the BGP speaker MUST reject the connection		the same value, then the BGP speaker MUST reject the connection using
	using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD).		the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode TBD).
	The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC		The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC
	Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak		Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak
	prevention and detection procedures described in Section 4.		prevention and detection procedures described in Section 4.
	4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute		4. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute
	The Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is an optional transitive path		The Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute is an optional transitive path
	attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a		attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a
	length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that		length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that
	once a route is sent to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client, it will		once a route is sent to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client (see
	subsequently go only to Customers. The attribute value is an AS		definitions in Section 2.1), it will subsequently go only to
	number (ASN) determined by the procedures described below.		Customers. The attribute value is an AS number (ASN) determined by
			the procedures described below.
	The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC		The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
	Attribute on route receipt:		Attribute on route receipt:
	1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or		1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or
	RS-Client, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered		RS-Client, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered
	ineligible (see Section 2).		ineligible (see Section 2).
	2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer and the		2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer (i.e.,
	Attribute has a value that is not equal to the remote (i.e.,		remote AS with a Peer Role) and the Attribute has a value that is
	Peer's) AS number, then it is a route leak and MUST be considered		not equal to the remote (i.e., Peer's) AS number, then it is a
	ineligible.		route leak and MUST be considered ineligible.
	3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, and the OTC		3. If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, and the OTC
	Attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with a value		Attribute is not present, then it MUST be added with a value
	equal to the AS number of the remote AS.		equal to the AS number of the remote AS.
	The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC		The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC
	Attribute on route advertisement:		Attribute on route advertisement:
	1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client		1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, Peer, or RS-Client
	(when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present,		(when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present,
	then an OTC Attribute MUST be added with a value equal to the AS		then when advertising the route, an OTC Attribute MUST be added
	number of the local AS.		with a value equal to the AS number of the local AS.
	2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it MUST NOT be		2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it MUST NOT be
	propagated to Providers, Peers, or RS(s).		propagated to Providers, Peers, or RS(s).
	The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the		The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the
	local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In		local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In
	the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC		the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC
	Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned		Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned
	from a Peer, Provider, or RS, and it can be advertised only to the		from a Peer, Provider, or RS, and it can be advertised only to the
	customers. The same OTC Attribute which is set locally also provides		customers. The same OTC Attribute which is set locally also provides
	skipping to change at page 8, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 25 ¶
	receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute)		receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute)
	that the route is a leak.		that the route is a leak.
	The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at		The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at
	the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant		the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant
	with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC		with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC
	Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be		Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be
	the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early		the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early
	adopters.		adopters.
	If an UPDATE is received with an OTC Attribute with a length		If an eBGP speaker receives an UPDATE with an OTC Attribute with a
	different from 4 octets, then the UPDATE SHALL be considered		length different from 4 octets, then the UPDATE SHALL be considered
	malformed. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using		malformed. If malformed, the UPDATE message SHALL be handled using
	the approach of "treat-as-withdraw" [RFC7606].		the approach of treat-as-withdraw [RFC7606].
	The procedures specified in this document are NOT RECOMMENDED to be		If an UPDATE with an OTC Attribute is received in iBGP, then the
	used between autonomous systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If		Attribute or UPDATE SHALL NOT be considered malformed based on the
	an OTC Attribute is added on egress from the AS Confederation, its		specified length. This avoids treat-as-withdraw error handling and
	value MUST equal the AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress		prevents the possibility of long-lived forwarding loops in iBGP
	from the AS Confederation, an UPDATE MUST NOT contain an OTC		(Section 6 in [RFC7606]). It also avoids Attribute-discard error
	Attribute with a value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other		handling [RFC7606] and hence route leak detection capability is not
	than the AS Confederation Identifier.		compromised in case the route is propagated to eBGP neighbors.
			The BGP Role negotiation and OTC Attribute based procedures specified
			in this document are NOT RECOMMENDED to be used between autonomous
			systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If an OTC Attribute is
			added on egress from the AS Confederation, its value MUST equal the
			AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress from the AS
			Confederation, an UPDATE MUST NOT contain an OTC Attribute with a
			value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other than the AS
			Confederation Identifier.
	The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use		The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use
	private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data center		private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data center
	network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are		network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are
	outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet-		outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet-
	facing AS, the OTC Attribute MUST NOT contain a value other than the		facing AS, the OTC Attribute MUST NOT contain a value other than the
	Internet-facing ASN.		Internet-facing ASN.
	Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged		Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it MUST be preserved unchanged
	(this also applies to an AS Confederation).		(this also applies to an AS Confederation).
	The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for		The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for
	unicast IPv4 and IPv6 address families and MUST NOT be applied to		the address families AFI 1 (IPv4) and AFI 2 (IPv6) with SAFI 1
	other address families by default. The operator MUST NOT have the		(unicast) in both cases and MUST NOT be applied to other address
	ability to modify the procedures defined in this section.		families by default. The operator MUST NOT have the ability to
			modify the procedures defined in this section.
	5. Additional Considerations		5. Additional Considerations
	Roles MUST NOT be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex		Roles MUST NOT be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex
	peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the		peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the
	Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering		Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering
	relationships, BGP Roles SHOULD be used on each of the resulting eBGP		relationships, BGP Roles SHOULD be used on each of the resulting eBGP
	sessions.		sessions.
	An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring		An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring
	policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering		policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering
	relations as described in Section 2.1. However, in this case, there		relations as described in Section 2.1. However, in this case, there
	are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix		are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix
	peering configuration.		peering configuration.
	The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect		The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect
	prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any		prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any
	special handling of incorrect AS numbers in the OTC Attribute.		special handling of an incorrect AS number in the OTC Attribute.
	In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent		In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent
	itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a		itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a
	problem since the egress procedures in Section 4 specify that the OTC		problem since the egress procedures in Section 4 specify that the OTC
	Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission.		Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission.
	Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN		Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN
	it is currently representing itself as.		it is currently representing itself as.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	skipping to change at page 10, line 4 ¶		skipping to change at page 11, line 10 ¶
	description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned		description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned
	the value 9 [to be removed upon publication:		the value 9 [to be removed upon publication:
	https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/capability-		https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/capability-
	codes.xhtml]. This document is the reference for the new capability.		codes.xhtml]. This document is the reference for the new capability.
	The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is		The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is
	requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role		requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role
	Value" in the Capability Codes registry. Assignments consist of a		Value" in the Capability Codes registry. Assignments consist of a
	Value and a corresponding Role name. Initially, this registry is to		Value and a corresponding Role name. Initially, this registry is to
	be populated with the data contained in Table 1 found in Section 3.1.		be populated with the data contained in Table 1 found in Section 3.1.
	Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined		Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined
	in [RFC8126]. The registry is as shown in Table 3.		in [RFC8126]. The registry is as shown in Table 3.
	+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+		+=======+===============================+===============+
	| Value | Role name (for the local AS) | Reference |		| Value | Role name (for the local AS) | Reference |
	+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+		+=======+===============================+===============+
	| 0 | Provider | This document |		| 0 | Provider | This document |
	| 1 | RS | This document |		+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
	| 2 | RS-Client | This document |		| 1 | RS | This document |
	| 3 | Customer | This document |		+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
	| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) | This document |		| 2 | RS-Client | This document |
	| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review |		+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
	+-------+--------------------------------+---------------+		| 3 | Customer | This document |
			+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
			| 4 | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer) | This document |
			+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
			| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review | |
			+-------+-------------------------------+---------------+
	Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role		Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role
	IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named the "Role		IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named the "Role
	Mismatch" (see Section 3.2) in the OPEN Message Error subcodes		Mismatch" (see Section 3.2) in the OPEN Message Error subcodes
	registry. IANA has assigned the value TBD [to be removed upon		registry. IANA has assigned the value TBD [to be removed upon
	publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-		publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp-parameters/bgp-
	parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6]. This document is the reference		parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6]. This document is the reference
	for the new subcode.		for the new subcode.
	skipping to change at page 13, line 7 ¶		skipping to change at page 14, line 16 ¶
	BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers", RFC 7938,		BGP for Routing in Large-Scale Data Centers", RFC 7938,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7938, August 2016,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7938, August 2016,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7938>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7938>.
	[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol		[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
	Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September		Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
	2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.		2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
	Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
	The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel		The authors wish to thank Alvaro Retana, Bruno Decraene, Ben
	Ginsburg, Jeff Haas, Ruediger Volk, Pavel Lunin, Gyan Mishra, Ignas		Maddison, Andrei Robachevsky, Daniel Ginsburg, Jeff Haas, Ruediger
	Bagdonas, Sue Hares, and John Scudder for comments, suggestions, and		Volk, Pavel Lunin, Gyan Mishra, Ignas Bagdonas, Sue Hares, and John
	critique.		Scudder for review, comments, and suggestions during the course of
			this work. Thanks are also due to many IESG reviewers whose comments
			greatly helped improve the clarity, accuracy, and presentation in the
			document.
	Contributors		Contributors
	Brian Dickson		Brian Dickson
	Independent		Independent
	Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com		Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
	Doug Montgomery		Doug Montgomery
	USA National Institute of Standards and Technology		USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
	Email: dougm@nist.gov		Email: dougm@nist.gov
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Alexander Azimov		Alexander Azimov
	Qrator Labs & Yandex		Qrator Labs & Yandex
	Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16		Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
	Moscow 119021		Moscow
			119021
	Russian Federation		Russian Federation
	Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com		Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
	Eugene Bogomazov		Eugene Bogomazov
	Qrator Labs		Qrator Labs
	1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A		1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
	Moscow 123290		Moscow
			123290
	Russian Federation		Russian Federation
	Email: eb@qrator.net		Email: eb@qrator.net
	Randy Bush		Randy Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.		Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
	5147 Crystal Springs		5147 Crystal Springs
	Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110		Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
	United States of America		United States of America
	Email: randy@psg.com		Email: randy@psg.com
	Keyur Patel		Keyur Patel
	Arrcus		Arrcus
	2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400		2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400
	San Jose, CA 95119		San Jose, CA 95119
	US		United States of America
	Email: keyur@arrcus.com		Email: keyur@arrcus.com
	Kotikalapudi Sriram		Kotikalapudi Sriram
	USA National Institute of Standards and Technology		USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
	100 Bureau Drive		100 Bureau Drive
	Gaithersburg, MD 20899		Gaithersburg, MD 20899
	United States of America		United States of America
	Email: ksriram@nist.gov		Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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