--- 1/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-14.txt 2021-01-16 08:13:14.850768701 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15.txt 2021-01-16 08:13:14.874769315 -0800 @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ Network Working Group A. Azimov Internet-Draft Qrator Labs & Yandex Intended status: Standards Track E. Bogomazov -Expires: July 5, 2021 Qrator Labs +Expires: July 20, 2021 Qrator Labs R. Bush Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc. K. Patel Arrcus K. Sriram USA NIST - January 1, 2021 + January 16, 2021 Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages - draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-14 + draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-15 Abstract Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider, passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a lateral peer. Existing approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP @@ -47,21 +47,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2021. + This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -146,21 +146,21 @@ from another RS. Peer: MAY send to a peer prefixes which the sender originates and prefixes learned from its customers. A peer MUST NOT send to a peer prefixes learned from other peers, from its providers, or from RS(s). Of course, any BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of routes they accept. Violation of the above rules may result in route - leaks and MUST not be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules + leaks and MUST NOT be allowed. Automatic enforcement of these rules should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due to manual configuration mistakes. While enforcing the above rules will address most BGP peering scenarios, their configuration is not part of BGP itself; therefore, configuration of ingress and egress prefix filters is still strongly advised. 3. BGP Role BGP Role is a new configuration option that is configured on a per- session basis. BGP Roles reflect the agreement between two BGP @@ -342,26 +342,26 @@ 9. IANA Considerations This document defines a new Capability Codes option [to be removed upon publication: https://www.iana.org/assignments/capability-codes/ capability-codes.xhtml ] [RFC5492], named "BGP Role" with an assigned value . The length of this capability is 1. The BGP Role capability includes a Value field, for which IANA is requested to create and maintain a new sub-registry called "BGP Role Value". Assignments consist of Value and corresponding Role name. - Initially this registry is to be populated with the data in Table 1. - Future assignments may be made by a standard action procedure - [RFC5226]. The allocation policy for new entries up to and including - value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC5226]. The allocation policy for - values 128 through 251 is "First Come First Served". The values from - 252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use". + Initially this registry is to be populated with the data contained in + Table 1 found in Section 4. Future assignments may be made by a + Standard Action procedure [RFC8126]. The allocation policy for new + entries up to and including value 127 is "Expert Review" [RFC8126]. + The allocation policy for values 128 through 251 is "First Come First + Served". The values from 252 through 255 are for "Experimental Use". This document defines a new subcode, "Role Mismatch" with an assigned value in the OPEN Message Error subcodes registry [to be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp- parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-6] [RFC4271]. This document defines a new optional, transitive BGP Path Attributes option, named "Only to Customer (OTC)" with an assigned value [To be removed upon publication: http://www.iana.org/assignments/bgp- parameters/bgp-parameters.xhtml#bgp-parameters-2] [RFC4271]. The @@ -409,30 +409,30 @@ Networking, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp 689-692, DOI 10.1109/90.974523, December 2001, . [I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation] Sriram, K. and A. Azimov, "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-grow-route- leak-detection-mitigation-04 (work in progress), October 2020. - [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an - IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, - DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, - . - [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June 2016, . + [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for + Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, + RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, + . + [RFC8212] Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default External BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behavior without Policies", RFC 8212, DOI 10.17487/RFC8212, July 2017, . [Streibelt] Streibelt, F., Lichtblau, F., Beverly, R., Feldmann, A., Cristel, C., Smaragdakis, G., and R. Bush, "BGP Communities: Even more Worms in the Routing Can",