draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-01.txt		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-02.txt
	Network Working Group A. Azimov		Network Working Group A. Azimov
	Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov		Internet-Draft E. Bogomazov
	Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs		Intended status: Standards Track Qrator Labs
	Expires: January 4, 2018 R. Bush		Expires: July 5, 2018 R. Bush
	Internet Initiative Japan		Internet Initiative Japan
	K. Patel		K. Patel
	Arrcus, Inc.		Arrcus, Inc.
	K. Sriram		K. Sriram
	US NIST		US NIST
	July 3, 2017		January 1, 2018
	Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages		Route Leak Prevention using Roles in Update and Open messages
	draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-01		draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate		Route Leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes which violate
	assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route		assumptions of BGP topology relationships; e.g. passing a route
	learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,		learned from one peer to another peer or to a transit provider,
	passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit		passing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit
	provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on		provider or to a peer. Today, approaches to leak prevention rely on
	marking routes according to operator configuration options without		marking routes according to operator configuration options without
	any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP		any check that the configuration corresponds to that of the BGP
	skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 10 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 4, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 5, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 8 ¶
	o Type - <TBD1>;		o Type - <TBD1>;
	o Length - 1 (octet);		o Length - 1 (octet);
	o Value - integer corresponding to speaker' BGP Role.		o Value - integer corresponding to speaker' BGP Role.
	+--------+----------------------+		+--------+----------------------+
	| Value | Role name |		| Value | Role name |
	+--------+----------------------+		+--------+----------------------+
	| 0 | Undefined |		| 0 | Sender is Peer |
	| 1 | Sender is Peer |		| 1 | Sender is Provider |
	| 2 | Sender is Provider |		| 2 | Sender is Customer |
	| 3 | Sender is Customer |		| 3 | Sender is Internal |
	| 4 | Sender is Internal |
	+--------+----------------------+		+--------+----------------------+
	Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values		Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values
	6. Role correctness		6. Role correctness
	Section 4 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship		Section 4 described how BGP Role is a reflection of the relationship
	between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't		between two BGP speakers. But the mere presence of BGP Role doesn't
	automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.		automatically guarantee role agreement between two BGP peers.
	skipping to change at page 5, line 44 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 43 ¶
	| Sender Role | Receiver Role |		| Sender Role | Receiver Role |
	+--------------+----------------+		+--------------+----------------+
	| Peer | Peer |		| Peer | Peer |
	| Provider | Customer |		| Provider | Customer |
	| Customer | Provider |		| Customer | Provider |
	| Internal | Internal |		| Internal | Internal |
	+--------------+----------------+		+--------------+----------------+
	Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities		Table 2: Allowed Role Capabilities
	In all other cases speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch Notification		In case of any other pair of roles, speaker MUST send a Role Mismatch
	(code 2, sub-code <TBD2>).		Notification (code 2, sub-code <TBD2>).
	6.1. Strict mode		6.1. Strict mode
	A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values		A new BGP configuration option "strict mode" is defined with values
	of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to		of true or false. If set to true, then the speaker MUST refuse to
	establish a BGP session with peers which do not announce the BGP Role		establish a BGP session with peers which do not announce the BGP Role
	capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a connection,		capability in their OPEN message. If a speaker rejects a connection,
	it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]		it MUST send a Connection Rejected Notification [RFC4486]
	(Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default strict mode		(Notification with error code 6, subcode 5). By default strict mode
	SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers,		SHOULD be set to false for backward compatibility with BGP speakers,
	skipping to change at page 8, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 28 ¶
	The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei		The authors wish to thank Douglas Montgomery, Brian Dickson, Andrei
	Robachevsky and Daniel Ginsburg for their contributions to a variant		Robachevsky and Daniel Ginsburg for their contributions to a variant
	of this work.		of this work.
	14. References		14. References
	14.1. Normative References		14.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
	Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,		Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.		editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
	[RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease		[RFC4486] Chen, E. and V. Gillet, "Subcodes for BGP Cease
	Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486,		Notification Message", RFC 4486, DOI 10.17487/RFC4486,
	April 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.		April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4486>.
	[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement		[RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
	with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February		with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February
	2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.		2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
	14.2. Informative References		14.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject]		[I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-reject]
	Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default EBGP		Mauch, J., Snijders, J., and G. Hankins, "Default EBGP
	Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies", draft-ietf-		Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies", draft-ietf-
	grow-bgp-reject-08 (work in progress), May 2017.		grow-bgp-reject-08 (work in progress), May 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]		[I-D.ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition]
	Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,		Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
	skipping to change at page 9, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 24 ¶
	Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-		Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-
	mitigation-03 (work in progress), May 2016.		mitigation-03 (work in progress), May 2016.
	[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]		[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
	Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol		Lepinski, M. and K. Sriram, "BGPsec Protocol
	Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-15 (work		Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-15 (work
	in progress), March 2016.		in progress), March 2016.
	[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.		editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Alexander Azimov		Alexander Azimov
	Qrator Labs		Qrator Labs
	Email: aa@qrator.net		Email: aa@qrator.net
	Eugene Bogomazov		Eugene Bogomazov
	Qrator Labs		Qrator Labs
End of changes. 12 change blocks.
	20 lines changed or deleted		19 lines changed or added
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