draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-03.txt   draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.txt 
HTTP A. Backman, Ed. HTTP A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track J. Richer Intended status: Standards Track J. Richer
Expires: 9 October 2021 Bespoke Engineering Expires: 23 October 2021 Bespoke Engineering
M. Sporny M. Sporny
Digital Bazaar Digital Bazaar
7 April 2021 21 April 2021
Signing HTTP Messages Signing HTTP Messages
draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-03 draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and
verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over
content within an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases content within an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases
where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer, and where where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer, and where
the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before
reaching the verifier. reaching the verifier.
skipping to change at page 2, line 10 skipping to change at page 2, line 10
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 October 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 October 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. HTTP Message Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. HTTP Message Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Safe Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Safe Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Application of HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . 7 1.5. Application of HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . 8
2. HTTP Message Signature Covered Content . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. HTTP Message Signature Covered Content . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1. HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.1. Canonicalized Structured HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.1. Canonicalized Structured HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.2. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.2. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. List Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3. List Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Specialty Content Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.4. Specialty Content Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1. Request Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.4.1. Request Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.2. Signature Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4.2. Signature Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5. Creating the Signature Input String . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5. Creating the Signature Input String . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3. HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1. Creating a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1. Creating a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2. Verifying a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3.2. Verifying a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.1. Enforcing Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . 21 3.2.1. Enforcing Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3. Signature Algorithm Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3. Signature Algorithm Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.1. RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3.1. RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.3.2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.3. HMAC using SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.3.3. HMAC using SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.4. ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256 . . . . . . . 23 3.3.4. ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256 . . . . . . . 24
3.3.5. JSON Web Signature (JWS) algorithms . . . . . . . . . 24 3.3.5. JSON Web Signature (JWS) algorithms . . . . . . . . . 24
4. Including a Message Signature in a Message . . . . . . . . . 24 4. Including a Message Signature in a Message . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4.3. Multiple Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.1.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry . . . . . . . 28 5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry . . . . . . . 29
5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.2.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3. HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers Registry . . 29 5.3. HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers Registry . . 30
5.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Detecting HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix A. Detecting HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B.1. Example Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 B.1. Example Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B.1.1. Example Key RSA test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 B.1.1. Example Key RSA test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
B.2. Example keyid Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 B.1.2. Example Key RSA PSS test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B.3. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 B.2. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B.3.1. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 B.2.1. Minimal Signature Header using rsa-pss-sha512 . . . . 36
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B.2.2. Header Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B.2.3. Full Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Message integrity and authenticity are important security properties Message integrity and authenticity are important security properties
that are critical to the secure operation of many HTTP applications. that are critical to the secure operation of many HTTP applications.
Application developers typically rely on the transport layer to Application developers typically rely on the transport layer to
provide these properties, by operating their application over [TLS]. provide these properties, by operating their application over [TLS].
However, TLS only guarantees these properties over a single TLS However, TLS only guarantees these properties over a single TLS
connection, and the path between client and application may be connection, and the path between client and application may be
composed of multiple independent TLS connections (for example, if the composed of multiple independent TLS connections (for example, if the
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Signer: Signer:
The entity that is generating or has generated an HTTP Message The entity that is generating or has generated an HTTP Message
Signature. Signature.
Verifier: Verifier:
An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message
Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message
Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different
entities. entities.
The term "Unix time" is defined by [POSIX.1] section 4.16 Covered Content:
An ordered list of content identifiers for headers (Section 2.1)
and specialty content (Section 2.4) that indicates the metadata
and message content that is covered by the signature, not
including the "@signature-params" specialty field itself.
HTTP Signature Algorithm:
A cryptographic algorithm that describes the signing and
verification process for the signature. When expressed
explicitly, the value maps to a string defined in the HTTP
Signature Algorithms Registry defined in this document.
Key Material:
The key material required to create or verify the signature. The
key material is often identified with an explicit key identifier,
allowing the signer to indicate to the verifier which key was
used.
Creation Time:
A timestamp representing the point in time that the signature was
generated, as asserted by the signer.
Expiration Time:
A timestamp representing the point in time at which the signature
expires, as asserted by the signer. A signature's expiration time
could be undefined, indicating that the signature does not expire
from the perspective of the signer.
The term "Unix time" is defined by [POSIX.1], Section 4.16
(http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/ (http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16). V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16).
This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete
HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split HTTP messages. Some examples use a single trailing backslash '' to
into multiple lines, using the "obs-fold" syntax. This syntax is indicate line wrapping for long values, as per [RFC8792]. The "\"
deprecated in [MESSAGING], and senders MUST NOT generate messages character and leading spaces on wrapped lines are not part of the
that include it. value.
Additionally, some examples use '\' line wrapping for long values
that contain no whitespace, as per [RFC8792].
1.5. Application of HTTP Message Signatures 1.5. Application of HTTP Message Signatures
HTTP Message Signatures are designed to be a general-purpose security HTTP Message Signatures are designed to be a general-purpose security
mechanism applicable in a wide variety of circumstances and mechanism applicable in a wide variety of circumstances and
applications. In order to properly and safely apply HTTP Message applications. In order to properly and safely apply HTTP Message
Signatures, an application or profile of this specification MUST Signatures, an application or profile of this specification MUST
specify all of the following items: specify all of the following items:
* The set of content identifiers (Section 2) that are expected and * The set of content identifiers (Section 2) that are expected and
required. For example, an authorization protocol could mandate required. For example, an authorization protocol could mandate
that the "Authorization" header be covered to protect the that the "Authorization" header be covered to protect the
authorization credentials and mandate the signature parameters authorization credentials and mandate the signature parameters
contain a "created" parameter, while an API expecting HTTP message contain a "created" parameter, while an API expecting HTTP message
bodies could require the "Digest" header to be present and bodies could require the "Digest" header to be present and
covered. covered.
* A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the * A means of retrieving the key material used to verify the
signature. An application will usually use the "keyid" parameter signature. An application will usually use the "keyid" parameter
of the signature parameters Section 2.4.2 and define rules for of the signature parameters (Section 2.4.2) and define rules for
resolving a key from there, though the appropriate key could be resolving a key from there, though the appropriate key could be
known from other means. known from other means.
* A means of determining the signature algorithm used to verify the * A means of determining the signature algorithm used to verify the
signature content is appropriate for the key material. For signature content is appropriate for the key material. For
example, the process could use the "alg" parameter of the example, the process could use the "alg" parameter of the
signature parameters Section 2.4.2 to state the algorithm signature parameters (Section 2.4.2) to state the algorithm
explicitly, derive the algorithm from the key material, or use explicitly, derive the algorithm from the key material, or use
some pre-configured algorithm agreed upon by the signer and some pre-configured algorithm agreed upon by the signer and
verifier. verifier.
* A means of determining that a given key and algorithm presented in * A means of determining that a given key and algorithm presented in
the request are appropriate for the request being made. For the request are appropriate for the request being made. For
example, a server expecting only ECDSA signatures should know to example, a server expecting only ECDSA signatures should know to
reject any RSA signatures, or a server expecting asymmetric reject any RSA signatures, or a server expecting asymmetric
cryptography should know to reject any symmetric cryptography. cryptography should know to reject any symmetric cryptography.
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Some content within HTTP messages can undergo transformations that Some content within HTTP messages can undergo transformations that
change the bitwise value without altering meaning of the content (for change the bitwise value without altering meaning of the content (for
example, the merging together of header fields with the same name). example, the merging together of header fields with the same name).
Message content must therefore be canonicalized before it is signed, Message content must therefore be canonicalized before it is signed,
to ensure that a signature can be verified despite such intermediary to ensure that a signature can be verified despite such intermediary
transformations. This document defines rules for each content transformations. This document defines rules for each content
identifier that transform the identifier's associated content into identifier that transform the identifier's associated content into
such a canonical form. such a canonical form.
Content identifiers are defined using production grammar defined by Content identifiers are defined using production grammar defined by
[RFC8941] section 4. The content identifier is an "sf-string" value. RFC8941, Section 4 [RFC8941]. The content identifier is an "sf-
The content identifier type MAY define parameters which are included string" value. The content identifier type MAY define parameters
using the "parameters" rule. which are included using the "parameters" rule.
content-identifier = sf-string parameters content-identifier = sf-string parameters
Note that this means the value of the identifier itself is encased in Note that this means the value of the identifier itself is encased in
double quotes, with parameters following as a semicolon-separated double quotes, with parameters following as a semicolon-separated
list, such as ""cache-control"", ""date"", or ""@signature-params"". list, such as ""cache-control"", ""date"", or ""@signature-params"".
The following sections define content identifier types, their The following sections define content identifier types, their
parameters, their associated content, and their canonicalization parameters, their associated content, and their canonicalization
rules. The method for combining content identifiers into the rules. The method for combining content identifiers into the
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2. Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list. 2. Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list.
3. Concatenate the list items together, with a comma "," and space " 3. Concatenate the list items together, with a comma "," and space "
" between each item. " between each item.
The resulting string is the canonicalized value. The resulting string is the canonicalized value.
2.1.1. Canonicalized Structured HTTP Headers 2.1.1. Canonicalized Structured HTTP Headers
If value of the the HTTP header in question is a structured field If value of the the HTTP header in question is a structured field
[RFC8941], the content identifier MAY include the "sf" parameter. If ([RFC8941]), the content identifier MAY include the "sf" parameter.
this parameter is included, the HTTP header value MUST be If this parameter is included, the HTTP header value MUST be
canonicalized using the rules specified in [RFC8941] section 4. Note canonicalized using the rules specified in Section 4 of RFC8941
that this process will replace any optional whitespace with a single [RFC8941]. Note that this process will replace any optional
space. whitespace with a single space.
The resulting string is used as the field value input in Section 2.1. The resulting string is used as the field value input in Section 2.1.
2.1.2. Canonicalization Examples 2.1.2. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for header fields, given the following example HTTP message: for header fields, given the following example HTTP message:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: www.example.com Server: www.example.com
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
X-OWS-Header: Leading and trailing whitespace. X-OWS-Header: Leading and trailing whitespace.
X-Obs-Fold-Header: Obsolete X-Obs-Fold-Header: Obsolete
line folding. line folding.
X-Empty-Header: X-Empty-Header:
Cache-Control: max-age=60 Cache-Control: max-age=60
Cache-Control: must-revalidate Cache-Control: must-revalidate
The following table shows example canonicalized values for header The following table shows example canonicalized values for header
fields, given that message: fields, given that message:
+=====================+==================================+ +=====================+==================================+
| Header Field | Canonicalized Value | | Header Field | Canonicalized Value |
+=====================+==================================+ +=====================+==================================+
| "cache-control" | max-age=60, must-revalidate | | "cache-control" | max-age=60, must-revalidate |
+---------------------+----------------------------------+ +---------------------+----------------------------------+
| "date" | Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT | | "date" | Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT |
+---------------------+----------------------------------+ +---------------------+----------------------------------+
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2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members 2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members
An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is
identified by using the parameter "key" on the content identifier for identified by using the parameter "key" on the content identifier for
the header. The value of this parameter is a the key being the header. The value of this parameter is a the key being
identified, without any parameters present on that key in the identified, without any parameters present on that key in the
original dictionary. original dictionary.
An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is
canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in canonicalized by applying the serialization algorithm described in
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8941] on a Dictionary containing only that Section 4.1.2 of RFC8941 [RFC8941] on a Dictionary containing only
member. that member.
2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples 2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for Dictionary Structured Field Members given the following example for Dictionary Structured Field Members given the following example
header field, whose value is assumed to be a Dictionary: header field, whose value is assumed to be a Dictionary:
X-Dictionary: a=1, b=2;x=1;y=2, c=(a b c) X-Dictionary: a=1, b=2;x=1;y=2, c=(a b c)
The following table shows example canonicalized values for different The following table shows example canonicalized values for different
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Dictionary member canonicalization. Dictionary member canonicalization.
2.3. List Prefixes 2.3. List Prefixes
A prefix of a List Structured Field consisting of the first N members A prefix of a List Structured Field consisting of the first N members
in the field's value (where N is an integer greater than 0 and less in the field's value (where N is an integer greater than 0 and less
than or equal to the number of members in the List) is identified by than or equal to the number of members in the List) is identified by
the parameter "prefix" with the value of N as an integer. the parameter "prefix" with the value of N as an integer.
A list prefix value is canonicalized by applying the serialization A list prefix value is canonicalized by applying the serialization
algorithm described in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8941] on a List algorithm described in Section 4.1.1 of RFC8941 [RFC8941] on a List
containing only the first N members as specified in the list prefix, containing only the first N members as specified in the list prefix,
in the order they appear in the original List. in the order they appear in the original List.
2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples 2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for list prefixes given the following example header fields, whose for list prefixes given the following example header fields, whose
values are assumed to be Dictionaries: values are assumed to be Dictionaries:
X-List-A: (a b c d e f) X-List-A: (a b c d e f)
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Content not found in an HTTP header can be included in the signature Content not found in an HTTP header can be included in the signature
base string by defining a content identifier and the canonicalization base string by defining a content identifier and the canonicalization
method for its content. method for its content.
To differentiate specialty content identifiers from HTTP headers, To differentiate specialty content identifiers from HTTP headers,
specialty content identifiers MUST start with the "at" "@" character. specialty content identifiers MUST start with the "at" "@" character.
This specification defines the following specialty content This specification defines the following specialty content
identifiers: identifiers:
@request-target The target request endpoint. Section 2.4.1 @request-target The target request endpoint. (Section 2.4.1)
@signature-params The signature metadata parameters for this @signature-params The signature metadata parameters for this
signature. Section 2.4.2 signature. (Section 2.4.2)
Additional specialty content identifiers MAY be defined and Additional specialty content identifiers MAY be defined and
registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier registered in the HTTP Signatures Specialty Content Identifier
Registry. Section 5.3 Registry. (Section 5.3)
2.4.1. Request Target 2.4.1. Request Target
The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the
path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the
"@request-target" identifier. "@request-target" identifier.
Its value is canonicalized as follows: Its value is canonicalized as follows:
1. Take the lowercased HTTP method of the message. 1. Take the lowercased HTTP method of the message.
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information regarding the signature's generation and/or verification. information regarding the signature's generation and/or verification.
The signature parameters special content is identified by the The signature parameters special content is identified by the
"@signature-params" identifier. "@signature-params" identifier.
Its canonicalized value is the serialization of the signature Its canonicalized value is the serialization of the signature
parameters for this signature, including the covered content list parameters for this signature, including the covered content list
with all associated parameters. The following metadata properties with all associated parameters. The following metadata properties
are defined: are defined:
Covered Content: The signature parameters are serialized using the rules in Section 4
of RFC8941 [RFC8941] as follows:
An ordered list of content identifiers for headers Section 2.1 and
specialty content Section 2.4 that indicates the metadata and
message content that is covered by the signature. This list MUST
NOT include the "@signature-params" specialty content identifier
itself.
Algorithm:
An HTTP Signature Algorithm defined in the HTTP Signature
Algorithms Registry defined in this document, represented as a
string. It describes the signing and verification algorithms for
the signature.
Key Material: 1. Let the output be an empty string.
The key material required to create or verify the signature.
Creation Time: 2. Determine an order for the content identifiers of the covered
A timestamp representing the point in time that the signature was content. Once this order is chosen, it cannot be changed.
generated, represented as an integer. Sub-second precision is not
supported. A signature's Creation Time MAY be undefined,
indicating that it is unknown.
Expiration Time: 3. Serialize the content identifiers of the covered content as an
A timestamp representing the point in time at which the signature ordered "inner-list" according to Section 4.1.1.1 of RFC8941
expires, represented as an integer. An expired signature always [RFC8941] and append this to the output.
fails verification. A signature's Expiration Time MAY be
undefined, indicating that the signature does not expire.
The signature parameters are serialized using the rules in [RFC8941] 4. Determine an order for signature metadata parameters. Once this
section 4 as follows: order is chosen, it cannot be changed.
1. Let the output be an empty string. 5. Append the signature metadata as parameters according to
Section 4.1.1.2 of RFC8941 [RFC8941] in the chosen order,
skipping fields that are not available or not used for this
signature:
2. Serialize the content identifiers of the covered content as an * "alg": The HTTP message signature algorithm from the HTTP
ordered "inner-list" according to [RFC8941] section 4.1.1.1 and Message Signature Algorithm Registry, as an "sf-string" value.
append this to the output.
3. Append the signature metadata as parameters according to * "keyid": The identifier for the key material as an "sf-string"
[RFC8941] section 4.1.1.2 in the any order, skipping fields that value.
are not available:
* "alg": Algorithm as an "sf-string" value. * "created": Creation time as an "sf-integer" UNIX timestamp
value. Sub-second precision is not supported.
* "keyid": Identifier for the key material as an "sf-string" * "expires": Expiration time as an "sf-integer" UNIX timestamp
value. value. Sub-second precision is not supported.
* "created": Creation time as an "sf-integer" timestamp value. * "nonce": A random unique value generated for this signature.
* "expires": Expiration time as an "sf-integer" timestamp value. 6. The output contains the signature parameters value.
Note that the "inner-list" serialization is used for the covered Note that the "inner-list" serialization is used for the covered
content instead of the "sf-list" serialization in order to facilitate content value instead of the "sf-list" serialization in order to
this value's additional inclusion in the "Signature-Input" header's facilitate this value's additional inclusion in the "Signature-Input"
dictionary, as discussed in Section 4.1. header's dictionary, as discussed in Section 4.1.
This example shows a canonicalized value for the parameters of a This example shows a canonicalized value for the parameters of a
given signature: given signature:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" "x-empty-header" \
("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" "x-empty-header" "x-example");keyid="test-key-rsa-pss";alg="rsa-pss-sha512";\
"x-example"); keyid="test-key-a"; alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; \ created=1618884475;expires=1618884775
created=1402170695; expires=1402170995
Note that an HTTP message could contain multiple signatures, but only Note that an HTTP message could contain multiple signatures, but only
the signature parameters used for the current signature are included. the signature parameters used for the current signature are included
in this field.
2.4.2.1. Canonicalization Examples
Given the following signature parameters:
+==============+=========================================+
| Property | Value |
+==============+=========================================+
| Algorithm | rsa-pss-sha512 |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Covered | "@request-target", "host", "date", |
| Content | "cache-control", "x-emptyheader", |
| | "x-example", "x-dictionary;key=b", |
| | "x-dictionary;key=a", "x-list;prefix=3" |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Creation | 1402174295 |
| Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Expiration | 1402174595 |
| Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key provided in |
| Key Material | Appendix B.1.1 and identified by the |
| | "keyid" value "test-key-a". |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 5
The signature parameter value is defined as:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
"@signature-params": ("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" \
"x-empty-header" "x-example" "x-dictionary";key=b \
"x-dictionary";key=a "x-list";prefix=3); keyid="test-key-a"; \
alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; created=1402170695; expires=1402170995
2.5. Creating the Signature Input String 2.5. Creating the Signature Input String
The signature input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that The signature input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that
is covered by the signature. To create the signature input string, is covered by the signature. To create the signature input string,
the signer or verifier concatenates together entries for each the signer or verifier concatenates together entries for each
identifier in the signature's covered content and parameters using identifier in the signature's covered content and parameters using
the following algorithm: the following algorithm:
1. Let the output be an empty string. 1. Let the output be an empty string.
skipping to change at page 16, line 32 skipping to change at page 16, line 26
order): order):
1. Append the identifier for the covered content serialized 1. Append the identifier for the covered content serialized
according to the "content-identifier" rule. according to the "content-identifier" rule.
2. Append a single colon "":"" 2. Append a single colon "":""
3. Append a single space "" "" 3. Append a single space "" ""
4. Append the covered content's canonicalized value, as defined 4. Append the covered content's canonicalized value, as defined
by the covered content type. Section 2.1 and Section 2.4 by the covered content type. (Section 2.1 and Section 2.4)
5. Append a single newline ""\\n"" 5. Append a single newline ""\\n""
3. Append the signature parameters Section 2.4.2 as follows: 3. Append the signature parameters (Section 2.4.2) as follows:
1. Append the identifier for the signature parameters serialized 1. Append the identifier for the signature parameters serialized
according to the "content-identifier" rule, ""@signature- according to the "content-identifier" rule, ""@signature-
params"" params""
2. Append a single colon "":"" 2. Append a single colon "":""
3. Append a single space "" "" 3. Append a single space "" ""
4. Append the signature parameters' canonicalized value as 4. Append the signature parameters' canonicalized value as
defined in Section 2.4.2 defined in Section 2.4.2
4. Return the output string. 4. Return the output string.
If covered content references an identifier that cannot be resolved If covered content references an identifier that cannot be resolved
to a value in the message, the implementation MUST produce an error. to a value in the message, the implementation MUST produce an error.
Such situations are included but not limited to: * The signer or Such situations are included but not limited to:
verifier does not understand the content identifier. * The identifier
identifies a header field that is not present in the message or whose
value is malformed. * The identifier is a Dictionary member
identifier that references a header field that is not present in the
message, is not a Dictionary Structured Field, or whose value is
malformed. * The identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that
references a header field that is not present in the message, is not
a List Structured Field, or whose value is malformed. * The
identifier is a Dictionary member identifier that references a member
that is not present in the header field value, or whose value is
malformed. E.g., the identifier is ""x-dictionary";key=c" and the
value of the "x-dictionary" header field is "a=1, b=2" * The
identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that specifies more
List members than are present the header field. E.g., the identifier
is ""x-list";prefix=3" and the value of the "x-list" header field is
"(1, 2)".
For the non-normative example Signature metadata in Table 6, the * The signer or verifier does not understand the content identifier.
corresponding Signature Input is:
* The identifier identifies a header field that is not present in
the message or whose value is malformed.
* The identifier is a Dictionary member identifier that references a
header field that is not present in the message, is not a
Dictionary Structured Field, or whose value is malformed.
* The identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that references
a header field that is not present in the message, is not a List
Structured Field, or whose value is malformed.
* The identifier is a Dictionary member identifier that references a
member that is not present in the header field value, or whose
value is malformed. E.g., the identifier is
""x-dictionary";key=c" and the value of the "x-dictionary" header
field is "a=1, b=2"
* The identifier is a List Prefix member identifier that specifies
more List members than are present the header field. E.g., the
identifier is ""x-list";prefix=3" and the value of the "x-list"
header field is "(1, 2)".
In the following non-normative example, the HTTP message being signed
is the following request:
GET /foo HTTP/1.1
Host: example.org
Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT
X-Example: Example header
with some whitespace.
X-Empty-Header:
Cache-Control: max-age=60
Cache-Control: must-revalidate
The covered content consists of the "@request-target" speciality
header followed by the "Host", "Date", "Cache-Control", "X-Empty-
Header", "X-Example" HTTP headers, in order. The signature creation
timestamp is "1618884475" and the key identifier is "test-key-rsa-
pss". The signature input string for this message with these
parameters is:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792
"@request-target": get /foo "@request-target": get /foo
"host": example.org "host": example.org
"date": Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT "date": Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT
"cache-control": max-age=60, must-revalidate "cache-control": max-age=60, must-revalidate
"x-emptyheader": "x-empty-header":
"x-example": Example header with some whitespace. "x-example": Example header with some whitespace.
"x-dictionary";key=b: 2
"x-dictionary";key=a: 1
"x-list";prefix=3: (a, b, c)
"@signature-params": ("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" \ "@signature-params": ("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" \
"x-empty-header" "x-example" "x-dictionary";key=b \ "x-empty-header" "x-example");created=1618884475;\
"x-dictionary";key=a "x-list";prefix=3); keyid="test-key-a"; \ keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
created=1402170695; expires=1402170995
Figure 1: Non-normative example Signature Input Figure 1: Non-normative example Signature Input
3. HTTP Message Signatures 3. HTTP Message Signatures
An HTTP Message Signature is a signature over a string generated from An HTTP Message Signature is a signature over a string generated from
a subset of the content in an HTTP message and metadata about the a subset of the content in an HTTP message and metadata about the
signature itself. When successfully verified against an HTTP signature itself. When successfully verified against an HTTP
message, it provides cryptographic proof that with respect to the message, it provides cryptographic proof that with respect to the
subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically
equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated. equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated.
3.1. Creating a Signature 3.1. Creating a Signature
In order to create a signature, a signer completes the following In order to create a signature, a signer MUST follow the following
process: algorithm:
1. The signer chooses an HTTP signature algorithm and key material 1. The signer chooses an HTTP signature algorithm and key material
for signing. The signer MUST choose key material that is for signing. The signer MUST choose key material that is
appropriate for the signature's algorithm, and that conforms to appropriate for the signature's algorithm, and that conforms to
any requirements defined by the algorithm, such as key size or any requirements defined by the algorithm, such as key size or
format. The mechanism by which the signer chooses the algorithm format. The mechanism by which the signer chooses the algorithm
and key material is out of scope for this document. and key material is out of scope for this document.
2. The signer sets the signature's creation time to the current 2. The signer sets the signature's creation time to the current
time. time.
3. If applicable, the signer sets the signature's expiration time 3. If applicable, the signer sets the signature's expiration time
property to the time at which the signature is to expire. property to the time at which the signature is to expire.
4. The signer creates an ordered list of content identifiers 4. The signer creates an ordered list of content identifiers
representing the message content and signature metadata to be representing the message content and signature metadata to be
covered by the signature, and assigns this list as the covered by the signature, and assigns this list as the
signature's Covered Content. signature's Covered Content.
* Each covered content identifier MUST reference either an HTTP * Once an order of covered content is chosen, the order MUST NOT
header or a specialty content field listed in Section 2.4 or change for the life of the signature.
its associated registry.
* Each covered content identifier MUST either reference an HTTP
header in the request message Section 2.1 or reference a
specialty content field listed in Section 2.4 or its
associated registry.
* Signers SHOULD include "@request-target" in the covered * Signers SHOULD include "@request-target" in the covered
content list list. content list list.
* Signers SHOULD include a date stamp in some form, such as * Signers SHOULD include a date stamp in some form, such as
using the "date" header. Alternatively, the "created" using the "date" header. Alternatively, the "created"
signature metadata parameter can fulfil this role. signature metadata parameter can fulfil this role.
* Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what * Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what
order is out of scope for this document. However, note that order is out of scope for this document. However, note that
the list order is significant and once established for a given the list order is significant and once established for a given
signature it MUST be preserved for that signature. signature it MUST be preserved for that signature.
* Note that the "@signature-params" specialty identifier is not * Note that the "@signature-params" specialty identifier is not
explicitly listed in the list of covered content identifiers, explicitly listed in the list of covered content identifiers,
because it is required to always be present as the last line because it is required to always be present as the last line
in the signature input. This ensures that a signature always in the signature input. This ensures that a signature always
covers its own metadata. covers its own metadata.
5. The signer creates the signature input string. Section 2.5 5. The signer creates the signature input string. (Section 2.5)
6. The signer signs the signature input with the chosen signing 6. The signer signs the signature input with the chosen signing
algorithm using the key material chosen by the signer. Several algorithm using the key material chosen by the signer. Several
signing algorithms are defined in in Section 3.3. signing algorithms are defined in in Section 3.3.
7. The signer then encodes the result of that operation as a 7. The byte array output of the signature function is the HTTP
Base64-encoded string [RFC4648]. This string is the signature message signature output value to be included in the "Signature"
output value. header as defined in Section 4.2.
For example, given the following HTTP message: For example, given the HTTP message and signature parameters in the
example in Section 2.5, the example signature input string when
signed with the "test-key-rsa-pss" key in Appendix B.1.2 gives the
following message signature output value, encoded in Base64:
GET /foo HTTP/1.1 :H00a6KdNCRWgOWBMvuRtxh6c/wrVxwt2p5KyqBJqmtPbNTd980hWwkUE6H4NWiTs5f2Ef0\
Host: example.org qJ3iypXT2bR9Pc+PVU9U2gAzTcZKK8MDJLjYKfaE835zg/9sOdGR+tlRJ1cbCoWMVoCgEPi\
Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT 4t6QewbI0xgdx8AmP5ItTunYmhe8G0JR42lfvz60+szb8SpwJEmkMPr5dBOz6DLEeM3IgKN\
X-Example: Example header oBlJPp94WSJkgvwTM64rXw049ZkYenl9jwKlcXEmA1a4MNWoUElr6eh5k20djMZftCYTPUU\
with some whitespace. PMxZUavcQy+cp6lfKonz6HIDe3+n3VOTOo8uu1aSVfKQQzR+ZEwSaZQBrdQ==:
X-EmptyHeader:
X-Dictionary: a=1, b=2
X-List: (a b c d)
Cache-Control: max-age=60
Cache-Control: must-revalidate
The following table presents a non-normative example of metadata Figure 2: Non-normative example signature value
values that a signer may choose:
+==============+=========================================+ 3.2. Verifying a Signature
| Property | Value |
+==============+=========================================+
| Covered | "@request-target", "host", "date", |
| Content | "cache-control", "x-emptyheader", |
| | "x-example", "x-dictionary;key=b", |
| | "x-dictionary;key=a", "x-list;prefix=3" |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Creation | 1402174295 |
| Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Expiration | 1402174595 |
| Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key provided in |
| Key Material | Appendix B.1.1 and identified by the |
| | "keyid" value "test-key-a". |
+--------------+-----------------------------------------+
Table 6: Non-normative example metadata values A verifier processes a signature and its associated signature input
parameters in concert with each other.
For the non-normative example signature metadata and signature input In order to verify a signature, a verifier MUST follow the following
in Figure 1, the corresponding signature value is: algorithm:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 1. Parse the "Signature" and "Signature-Input" headers and extract
K2qGT5srn2OGbOIDzQ6kYT+ruaycnDAAUpKv+ePFfD0RAxn/1BUeZx/Kdrq32DrfakQ6b\ the signatures to be verified.
PsvB9aqZqognNT6be4olHROIkeV879RrsrObury8L9SCEibeoHyqU/yCjphSmEdd7WD+z\
rchK57quskKwRefy2iEC5S2uAH0EPyOZKWlvbKmKu5q4CaB8X/I5/+HLZLGvDiezqi6/7\
p2Gngf5hwZ0lSdy39vyNMaaAT0tKo6nuVw0S1MVg1Q7MpWYZs0soHjttq0uLIA3DIbQfL\
iIvK6/l0BdWTU7+2uQj7lBkQAsFZHoA96ZZgFquQrXRlmYOh+Hx5D9fJkXcXe5tmAg==
Figure 2: Non-normative example signature value 1. If there is more than one signature value present, determine
which signature should be processed for this request. If an
appropriate signature is not found, produce an error.
3.2. Verifying a Signature 2. If the chosen "Signature" value does not have a corresponding
"Signature-Input" value, produce an error.
In order to verify a signature, a verifier MUST follow the following 2. Parse the values of the chosen "Signature-Input" header field to
algorithm: get the parameters for the signature to be verified.
1. Examine the signature's parameters to confirm that the signature 3. Parse the value of the corresponding "Signature" header field to
get the byte array value of the signature to be verified.
4. Examine the signature parameters to confirm that the signature
meets the requirements described in this document, as well as any meets the requirements described in this document, as well as any
additional requirements defined by the application such as which additional requirements defined by the application such as which
contents are required to be covered by the signature. contents are required to be covered by the signature.
Section 3.2.1 (Section 3.2.1)
2. Determine the verification key material for this signature. If 5. Determine the verification key material for this signature. If
the key material is known through external means such as static the key material is known through external means such as static
configuration or external protocol negotiation, the verifier will configuration or external protocol negotiation, the verifier will
use that. If the key is identified in the signature parameters, use that. If the key is identified in the signature parameters,
the verifier will dereference this to appropriate key material to the verifier will dereference this to appropriate key material to
use with the signature. The verifier has to determine the use with the signature. The verifier has to determine the
trustworthiness of the key material for the context in which the trustworthiness of the key material for the context in which the
signature is presented. signature is presented. If a key is identified that the verifier
does not know, does not trust for this request, or does not match
something preconfigured, the verification MUST fail.
3. Determine the algorithm to apply for verification: 6. Determine the algorithm to apply for verification:
1. If the algorithm is known through external means such as 1. If the algorithm is known through external means such as
static configuration or external protocol negotiation, the static configuration or external protocol negotiation, the
verifier will use this algorithm. verifier will use this algorithm.
2. If the algorithm is explicitly stated in the signature 2. If the algorithm is explicitly stated in the signature
parameters using a value from the HTTP Message Signatures parameters using a value from the HTTP Message Signatures
registry, the verifier will use the referenced algorithm. registry, the verifier will use the referenced algorithm.
3. If the algorithm can be determined from the keying material, 3. If the algorithm can be determined from the keying material,
such as through an algorithm field on the key value itself, such as through an algorithm field on the key value itself,
the verifier will use this algorithm. the verifier will use this algorithm.
4. Use the received HTTP message and the signature's metadata to 4. If the algorithm is specified in more that one location, such
as through static configuration and the algorithm signature
parameter, or the algorithm signature parameter and from the
key material itself, the resolved algorithms MUST be the
same. If the algorithms are not the same, the verifier MUST
vail the verification.
7. Use the received HTTP message and the signature's metadata to
recreate the signature input, using the process described in recreate the signature input, using the process described in
Section 2.5. The value of the "@signature-params" input is the Section 2.5. The value of the "@signature-params" input is the
value of the SignatureInput header field for this signature value of the SignatureInput header field for this signature
serialized according to the rules described in Section 2.4.2, not serialized according to the rules described in Section 2.4.2, not
including the signature's label from the SignatureInput header. including the signature's label from the "Signature-Input"
header.
5. If the key material is appropriate for the algorithm, apply the 8. If the key material is appropriate for the algorithm, apply the
verification algorithm to the signature, signature input, verification algorithm to the signature, recalculated signature
signature parameters, key material, and algorithm. The results input, signature parameters, key material, and algorithm.
of the verification algorithm function are the final results of Several algorithms are defined in Section 3.3.
the signature verification. Several algorithms are defined in
Section 3.3. 9. The results of the verification algorithm function are the final
results of the signature verification.
If any of the above steps fail, the signature validation fails. If any of the above steps fail, the signature validation fails.
3.2.1. Enforcing Application Requirements 3.2.1. Enforcing Application Requirements
The verification requirements specified in this document are intended The verification requirements specified in this document are intended
as a baseline set of restrictions that are generally applicable to as a baseline set of restrictions that are generally applicable to
all use cases. Applications using HTTP Message Signatures MAY impose all use cases. Applications using HTTP Message Signatures MAY impose
requirements above and beyond those specified by this document, as requirements above and beyond those specified by this document, as
appropriate for their use case. appropriate for their use case.
skipping to change at page 21, line 43 skipping to change at page 21, line 45
Authorization, Digest). Authorization, Digest).
* Enforcing a maximum signature age. * Enforcing a maximum signature age.
* Prohibiting the use of certain algorithms, or mandating the use of * Prohibiting the use of certain algorithms, or mandating the use of
an algorithm. an algorithm.
* Requiring keys to be of a certain size (e.g., 2048 bits vs. 1024 * Requiring keys to be of a certain size (e.g., 2048 bits vs. 1024
bits). bits).
* Enforcing uniqueness of a nonce value.
Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When
an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them
during the signature verification process, and signature verification during the signature verification process, and signature verification
MUST fail if the signature does not conform to the application's MUST fail if the signature does not conform to the application's
requirements. requirements.
Applications MUST enforce the requirements defined in this document. Applications MUST enforce the requirements defined in this document.
Regardless of use case, applications MUST NOT accept signatures that Regardless of use case, applications MUST NOT accept signatures that
do not conform to these requirements. do not conform to these requirements.
3.3. Signature Algorithm Methods 3.3. Signature Algorithm Methods
HTTP Message signatures MAY use any cryptographic digital signature HTTP Message signatures MAY use any cryptographic digital signature
or MAC method that allows for the signing of the signature input or MAC method that is appropriate for the key material, environment,
string. This section contains several common algorithm parameters and needs of the signer and verifier. All signatures are generated
that can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter from and verified against the byte values of the signature input
defined in Section 2.4.2, by reference to the key material, or string defined in Section 2.5.
through agreement between the signer and verifier.
Signatures are generated from and verified against the byte values of Each signature algorithm method takes as its input the signature
the signature input string defined in Section 2.5. input string as a set of byte values ("I"), the signing key material
("Ks"), and outputs the signed content as a set of byte values ("S"):
HTTP_SIGN (I, Ks) -> S
Each verification algorithm method takes as its input the
recalculated signature input string as a set of byte values ("I"),
the verification key material ("Kv"), and the presented signature to
be verified as a set of byte values ("S") and outputs the
verification result ("V") as a boolean:
HTTP_VERIFY (I, Kv, S) -> V
This section contains several common algorithm methods. The method
to use can be communicated through the algorithm signature parameter
defined in Section 2.4.2, by reference to the key material, or
through mutual agreement between the signer and verifier.
3.3.1. RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 3.3.1. RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512
To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "RSASSA-PSS-SIGN To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "RSASSA-PSS-SIGN
(K, M)" function [RFC8017] with the signer's private signing key (K, M)" function [RFC8017] with the signer's private signing key
("K") and the signature input string ("M") Section 2.5. The hash ("K") and the signature input string ("M") (Section 2.5). The hash
SHA-512 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create SHA-512 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create
the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The
resulting signed content ("S") is Base64-encoded as described in resulting signed content byte array ("S") is the HTTP message
Section 3.1. The resulting encoded value is the HTTP message signature output used in Section 3.1.
signature output.
To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "RSASSA-PSS- To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "RSASSA-PSS-
VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)" function [RFC8017] using the public key VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)" function [RFC8017] using the public key
material ("(n, e)"). The verifier re-creates the signature input portion of the verification key material ("(n, e)") and the signature
string ("M") from the received message, as defined in Section 2.5. input string ("M") re-created as described in Section 3.2. The hash
The hash function SHA-512 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input function SHA-512 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string
string to create the digest content to which the verification to create the digest content to which the verification function is
function is applied. The verifier decodes the HTTP message signature applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be
from Base64 as described in Section 3.2 to give the http message verified ("S") as described in Section 3.2. The results of the
signature to be verified ("S"). The results of the verification verification function are compared to the http message signature to
function are compared to the http message signature to determine if determine if the signature presented is valid.
the signature presented is valid.
3.3.2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 3.3.2. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256
To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "RSASSA- To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "RSASSA-
PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)" function [RFC8017] to signer's private PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN (K, M)" function [RFC8017] with the signer's private
signing key ("K") and the signature input string ("M") Section 2.5. signing key ("K") and the signature input string ("M") (Section 2.5).
The hash SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string The hash SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string
to create the digest content to which the digital signature is to create the digest content to which the digital signature is
applied. The resulting signed content ("S") is Base64-encoded as applied. The resulting signed content byte array ("S") is the HTTP
described in Section 3.1. The resulting encoded value is the HTTP message signature output used in Section 3.1.
message signature output.
To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "RSASSA- To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "RSASSA-PSS-
PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)" function [RFC8017] using the public VERIFY ((n, e), M, S)" function [RFC8017] using the public key
key material ("(n, e)"). The verifier re-creates the signature input portion of the verification key material ("(n, e)") and the signature
string ("M") from the received message, as defined in Section 2.5. input string ("M") re-created as described in Section 3.2. The hash
The hash function SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input function SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string
string to create the digest content to which the verification to create the digest content to which the verification function is
function is applied. The verifier decodes the HTTP message signature applied. The verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to be
from Base64 as described in Section 3.2 to give the http message verified ("S") as described in Section 3.2. The results of the
signature to be verified ("S"). The results of the verification verification function are compared to the http message signature to
function are compared to the http message signature to determine if determine if the signature presented is valid.
the signature presented is valid.
3.3.3. HMAC using SHA-256 3.3.3. HMAC using SHA-256
To sign and verify using this algorithm, the signer applies the To sign and verify using this algorithm, the signer applies the
"HMAC" function [RFC2104] with the shared signing key ("K") and the "HMAC" function [RFC2104] with the shared signing key ("K") and the
signature input string ("text") Section 2.5. The hash function signature input string ("text") (Section 2.5). The hash function
SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create
the digest content to which the HMAC is applied, giving the signature the digest content to which the HMAC is applied, giving the signature
result. result.
For signing, the resulting signed content is Base64-encoded as For signing, the resulting value is the HTTP message signature output
described in Section 3.1. The resulting encoded value is the HTTP used in Section 3.1.
message signature output.
For verification, the verifier decodes the HTTP message signature For verification, the verifier extracts the HTTP message signature to
from Base64 as described in Section 3.2 to give the signature to be be verified ("S") as described in Section 3.2. The output of the
compared to the output of the HMAC function. The results of the HMAC function is compared to the value of the HTTP message signature,
comparison determine the validity of the signature presented. and the results of the comparison determine the validity of the
signature presented.
3.3.4. ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256 3.3.4. ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256
To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "ECDSA" To sign using this algorithm, the signer applies the "ECDSA"
algorithm [FIPS186-4] using curve P-256 with signer's private signing algorithm [FIPS186-4] using curve P-256 with the signer's private
key and the signature input string Section 2.5. The hash function signing key and the signature input string (Section 2.5). The hash
SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input string to create
the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The the digest content to which the digital signature is applied. The
resulting signed content is Base64-encoded as described in resulting signed content byte array is the HTTP message signature
Section 3.1. The resulting encoded value is the HTTP message output used in Section 3.1.
signature output.
To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "ECDSA" To verify using this algorithm, the verifier applies the "ECDSA"
algorithm [FIPS186-4] using the public key material. The verifier algorithm [FIPS186-4] using the public key portion of the
re-creates the signature input string defined in Section 2.5. The verification key material and the signature input string re-created
hash function SHA-256 [RFC6234] is applied to the signature input as described in Section 3.2. The hash function SHA-256 [RFC6234] is
string to create the digest content to which the verification applied to the signature input string to create the digest content to
function is applied. The verifier decodes the HTTP message signature which the verification function is applied. The verifier extracts
from Base64 as described in Section 3.2 to give the signature to be the HTTP message signature to be verified ("S") as described in
verified. The results of the verification function are compared to Section 3.2. The results of the verification function are compared
the http message signature to determine if the signature presented is to the http message signature to determine if the signature presented
valid. is valid.
3.3.5. JSON Web Signature (JWS) algorithms 3.3.5. JSON Web Signature (JWS) algorithms
If the signing algorithm is a JOSE signing algorithm from the JSON If the signing algorithm is a JOSE signing algorithm from the JSON
Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry established by Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry established by
[RFC7518], the JWS algorithm definition determines the signature and [RFC7518], the JWS algorithm definition determines the signature and
hashing algorithms to apply for both signing and verification. hashing algorithms to apply for both signing and verification. There
is no use of the explicit "alg" signature parameter when using JOSE
signing algorithms.
For both signing and verification, the HTTP messages signature input For both signing and verification, the HTTP messages signature input
string Section 2.5 is used as the entire "JWS Signing Input". The string (Section 2.5) is used as the entire "JWS Signing Input". The
JWS Header defined in [RFC7517] is not used, nor is the input string JOSE Header defined in [RFC7517] is not used, and the signature input
first encoded in Base64 before applying the algorithm. string is not first encoded in Base64 before applying the algorithm.
The output of the JWS signature is taken as a byte array prior to the
Base64url encoding used in JOSE.
The JWS algorithm MUST NOT be "none" and MUST NOT be any algorithm The JWS algorithm MUST NOT be "none" and MUST NOT be any algorithm
with a JOSE Implementation Requirement of "Prohibited". with a JOSE Implementation Requirement of "Prohibited".
4. Including a Message Signature in a Message 4. Including a Message Signature in a Message
Message signatures can be included within an HTTP message via the Message signatures can be included within an HTTP message via the
"Signature-Input" and "Signature" HTTP header fields, both defined "Signature-Input" and "Signature" HTTP header fields, both defined
within this specification. The "Signature" HTTP header field within this specification.
contains signature values, while the "Signature-Input" HTTP header
field identifies the Covered Content and metadata that describe how An HTTP message signature MUST use both headers: the "Signature" HTTP
each signature was generated. header field contains the signature value, while the "Signature-
Input" HTTP header field identifies the covered content and
parameters that describe how the signature was generated. The Each
header MAY contain multiple labeled values, where the labels
determine the correlation between the "Signature" and "Signature-
Input" fields.
4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header 4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header
The "Signature-Input" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured The "Signature-Input" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured
Header [RFC8941] containing the metadata for zero or more message Header [RFC8941] containing the metadata for one or more message
signatures generated from content within the HTTP message. Each signatures generated from content within the HTTP message. Each
member describes a single message signature. The member's name is an member describes a single message signature. The member's name is an
identifier that uniquely identifies the message signature within the identifier that uniquely identifies the message signature within the
context of the HTTP message. The member's value is the serialization context of the HTTP message. The member's value is the serialization
of the covered content including all signature metadata parameters, of the covered content including all signature metadata parameters,
using the serialization process defined in Section 2.4.2. using the serialization process defined in Section 2.4.2.
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" \
Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "host" "date" "x-empty-header" "x-example");created=1618884475;\
"cache-control" "x-empty-header" "x-example"); keyid="test-key-a"; keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; created=1402170695; expires=1402170995
To facilitate signature validation, the "Signature-Input" header MUST To facilitate signature validation, the "Signature-Input" header
contain the same serialization value used in generating the signature value MUST contain the same serialized value used in generating the
input. signature input string's "@signature-params" value.
4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header 4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header
The "Signature" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured Header The "Signature" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured Header
[RFC8941] containing zero or more message signatures generated from [RFC8941] containing one or more message signatures generated from
content within the HTTP message. Each member's name is a signature content within the HTTP message. Each member's name is a signature
identifier that is present as a member name in the "Signature-Input" identifier that is present as a member name in the "Signature-Input"
Structured Header within the HTTP message. Each member's value is a Structured Header within the HTTP message. Each member's value is a
Byte Sequence containing the signature value for the message Byte Sequence containing the signature value for the message
signature identified by the member name. Any member in the signature identified by the member name. Any member in the
"Signature" HTTP header field that does not have a corresponding "Signature" HTTP header field that does not have a corresponding
member in the HTTP message's "Signature-Input" HTTP header field MUST member in the HTTP message's "Signature-Input" HTTP header field MUST
be ignored. be ignored.
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 Signature: sig1=:H00a6KdNCRWgOWBMvuRtxh6c/wrVxwt2p5KyqBJqmtPbNTd980hWwk\
Signature: sig1=:K2qGT5srn2OGbOIDzQ6kYT+ruaycnDAAUpKv+ePFfD0RAxn/1BUe\ UE6H4NWiTs5f2Ef0qJ3iypXT2bR9Pc+PVU9U2gAzTcZKK8MDJLjYKfaE835zg/9sOdGR+\
Zx/Kdrq32DrfakQ6bPsvB9aqZqognNT6be4olHROIkeV879RrsrObury8L9SCEibe\ tlRJ1cbCoWMVoCgEPi4t6QewbI0xgdx8AmP5ItTunYmhe8G0JR42lfvz60+szb8SpwJEm\
oHyqU/yCjphSmEdd7WD+zrchK57quskKwRefy2iEC5S2uAH0EPyOZKWlvbKmKu5q4\ kMPr5dBOz6DLEeM3IgKNoBlJPp94WSJkgvwTM64rXw049ZkYenl9jwKlcXEmA1a4MNWoU\
CaB8X/I5/+HLZLGvDiezqi6/7p2Gngf5hwZ0lSdy39vyNMaaAT0tKo6nuVw0S1MVg\ Elr6eh5k20djMZftCYTPUUPMxZUavcQy+cp6lfKonz6HIDe3+n3VOTOo8uu1aSVfKQQzR\
1Q7MpWYZs0soHjttq0uLIA3DIbQfLiIvK6/l0BdWTU7+2uQj7lBkQAsFZHoA96ZZg\ +ZEwSaZQBrdQ==:
FquQrXRlmYOh+Hx5D9fJkXcXe5tmAg==:
4.3. Examples 4.3. Multiple Signatures
The following is a non-normative example of "Signature-Input" and Since "Signature-Input" and "Signature" are both defined as
"Signature" HTTP header fields representing the signature in Dictionary Structured Headers, they can be used to include multiple
Figure 2: signatures within the same HTTP message. For example, a signer may
include multiple signatures signing the same content with different
keys or algorithms to support verifiers with different capabilities,
or a reverse proxy may include information about the client in header
fields when forwarding the request to a service host, including a
signature over those fields and the client's original signature.
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 The following is a non-normative example of header fields a reverse
proxy in addition to the examples in the previous sections. The
original signature is included under the identifier "sig1", and the
reverse proxy's signature is included under "proxy_sig". The proxy
uses the key "rsa-test-key" to create its signature using the "rsa-
v1_5-sha256" signature value. This results in a signature input
string of:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "host" "date" "signature";key="sig1": :H00a6KdNCRWgOWBMvuRtxh6c/wrVxwt2p5KyqBJqmtPbNT\
"cache-control" "x-empty-header" "x-example"); keyid="test-key-a"; d980hWwkUE6H4NWiTs5f2Ef0qJ3iypXT2bR9Pc+PVU9U2gAzTcZKK8MDJLjYKfaE835zg\
alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; created=1402170695; expires=1402170995 /9sOdGR+tlRJ1cbCoWMVoCgEPi4t6QewbI0xgdx8AmP5ItTunYmhe8G0JR42lfvz60+sz\
Signature: sig1=:K2qGT5srn2OGbOIDzQ6kYT+ruaycnDAAUpKv+ePFfD0RAxn/1BUe\ b8SpwJEmkMPr5dBOz6DLEeM3IgKNoBlJPp94WSJkgvwTM64rXw049ZkYenl9jwKlcXEmA\
Zx/Kdrq32DrfakQ6bPsvB9aqZqognNT6be4olHROIkeV879RrsrObury8L9SCEibe\ 1a4MNWoUElr6eh5k20djMZftCYTPUUPMxZUavcQy+cp6lfKonz6HIDe3+n3VOTOo8uu1a\
oHyqU/yCjphSmEdd7WD+zrchK57quskKwRefy2iEC5S2uAH0EPyOZKWlvbKmKu5q4\ SVfKQQzR+ZEwSaZQBrdQ==:
CaB8X/I5/+HLZLGvDiezqi6/7p2Gngf5hwZ0lSdy39vyNMaaAT0tKo6nuVw0S1MVg\ x-forwarded-for: 192.0.2.123
1Q7MpWYZs0soHjttq0uLIA3DIbQfLiIvK6/l0BdWTU7+2uQj7lBkQAsFZHoA96ZZg\ "@signature-params": ("signature";key="sig1" x-forwarded-for)\
FquQrXRlmYOh+Hx5D9fJkXcXe5tmAg==: ;created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-rsa";alg="rsa-v1_5-sha256"
Since "Signature-Input" and "Signature" are both defined as And a signature output value of:
Dictionary Structured Headers, they can be used to easily include
multiple signatures within the same HTTP message. For example, a
signer may include multiple signatures signing the same content with
different keys and/or algorithms to support verifiers with different
capabilities, or a reverse proxy may include information about the
client in header fields when forwarding the request to a service
host, and may also include a signature over those fields and the
client's signature. The following is a non-normative example of
header fields a reverse proxy might add to a forwarded request that
contains the signature in the above example:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 :NgQsRJwOL/EgoRXdcmHMOLZM+KWqLDsO76CrqoiLH279VJs9Fj6bn4V+perAEUbHBEMFCb\
l6tucEVgKrU+5IIyDMBI85FExQeuBrNPALczjCdxne6LUoBcWBAk8NoRyjfd++DXIAjAZcf\
/hBUXLll+5veI0ynzBRFTZ4v8AbluYODjJlSprYEwUb2ndbFr12vzgIpy0uTQCslN+3rUUZ\
+lQWlrILvbR0CIvtGwk2+hE0dTRAG0R3wmlR24mhSqiE5RADyoSWQVjVxntp98XHAB6MZE9\
2bbu2a8Uo951Hvah03XHWEk/WiYdq+mt3hwXVPLXlBU9DWCo2AaYD/rkXtQ==:
These values are added to the HTTP request message by the proxy. The
different signature values are wrapped onto separate lines to
increase human-readability of the result.
X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.123 X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.123
Signature-Input: reverse_proxy_sig=("host" "date" Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "host" "date" "cache-control" \
"signature";key=sig1 "x-forwarded-for"); keyid="test-key-a"; "x-empty-header" "x-example");created=1618884475\
alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; created=1402170695; expires=1402170695 ;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss", \
Signature: reverse_proxy_sig=:ON3HsnvuoTlX41xfcGWaOEVo1M3bJDRBOp0Pc/O\ proxy_sig=("signature";key="sig1" x-forwarded-for);created=1618884480\
jAOWKQn0VMY0SvMMWXS7xG+xYVa152rRVAo6nMV7FS3rv0rR5MzXL8FCQ2A35DCEN\ ;keyid="test-key-rsa";alg="rsa-v1_5-sha256"
LOhEgj/S1IstEAEFsKmE9Bs7McBsCtJwQ3hMqdtFenkDffSoHOZOInkTYGafkoy78\ Signature: sig1=:H00a6KdNCRWgOWBMvuRtxh6c/wrVxwt2p5KyqBJqmtPbNTd980hWwk\
l1VZvmb3Y4yf7McJwAvk2R3gwKRWiiRCw448Nt7JTWzhvEwbh7bN2swc/v3NJbg/w\ UE6H4NWiTs5f2Ef0qJ3iypXT2bR9Pc+PVU9U2gAzTcZKK8MDJLjYKfaE835zg/9sOdG\
JYyYVbelZx4IywuZnYFxgPl/qvqbAjeEVvaLKLgSMr11y+uzxCHoMnDUnTYhMrmOT\ R+tlRJ1cbCoWMVoCgEPi4t6QewbI0xgdx8AmP5ItTunYmhe8G0JR42lfvz60+szb8Sp\
4O8lBLfRFOcoJPKBdoKg9U0a96U2mUug1bFOozEVYFg==: wJEmkMPr5dBOz6DLEeM3IgKNoBlJPp94WSJkgvwTM64rXw049ZkYenl9jwKlcXEmA1a\
4MNWoUElr6eh5k20djMZftCYTPUUPMxZUavcQy+cp6lfKonz6HIDe3+n3VOTOo8uu1a\
SVfKQQzR+ZEwSaZQBrdQ==:, \
proxy_sig=:NgQsRJwOL/EgoRXdcmHMOLZM+KWqLDsO76CrqoiLH279VJs9Fj6bn4V+pe\
rAEUbHBEMFCbl6tucEVgKrU+5IIyDMBI85FExQeuBrNPALczjCdxne6LUoBcWBAk8No\
Ryjfd++DXIAjAZcf/hBUXLll+5veI0ynzBRFTZ4v8AbluYODjJlSprYEwUb2ndbFr12\
vzgIpy0uTQCslN+3rUUZ+lQWlrILvbR0CIvtGwk2+hE0dTRAG0R3wmlR24mhSqiE5RA\
DyoSWQVjVxntp98XHAB6MZE92bbu2a8Uo951Hvah03XHWEk/WiYdq+mt3hwXVPLXlBU\
9DWCo2AaYD/rkXtQ==:
The proxy's signature and the client's original signature can be
verified independently for the same message, depending on the needs
of the application.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry 5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry
This document defines HTTP Signature Algorithms, for which IANA is This document defines HTTP Signature Algorithms, for which IANA is
asked to create and maintain a new registry titled "HTTP Signature asked to create and maintain a new registry titled "HTTP Signature
Algorithms". Initial values for this registry are given in Algorithms". Initial values for this registry are given in
Section 5.1.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing Section 5.1.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing
assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration
skipping to change at page 27, line 34 skipping to change at page 28, line 34
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
"rsa-pss-sha512" "rsa-pss-sha512"
Status: Status:
Active Active
Definition: Definition:
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256
Specification document(s): Specification document(s):
[[This document]] Section 3.3.1 [[This document]], Section 3.3.1
5.1.2.2. rsa-v1_5-sha256 5.1.2.2. rsa-v1_5-sha256
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
"rsa-v1_5-sha256" "rsa-v1_5-sha256"
Status: Status:
Active Active
Description: Description:
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 using SHA-256
Specification document(s): Specification document(s):
[[This document]] Section 3.3.2 [[This document]], Section 3.3.2
5.1.2.3. hmac-sha256 5.1.2.3. hmac-sha256
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
"hmac-sha256" "hmac-sha256"
Status: Status:
Active Active
Description: Description:
HMAC using SHA-256 HMAC using SHA-256
Specification document(s): Specification document(s):
[[This document]] Section 3.3.3 [[This document]], Section 3.3.3
5.1.2.4. ecdsa-p256-sha256 5.1.2.4. ecdsa-p256-sha256
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
"ecdsa-p256-sha256" "ecdsa-p256-sha256"
Status: Status:
Active Active
Description: Description:
ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256 ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS and SHA-256
Specification document(s): Specification document(s):
[[This document]] Section 3.3.4 [[This document]], Section 3.3.4
5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry 5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry
This document defines the "Signature-Input" Structured Header, whose This document defines the "Signature-Input" Structured Header, whose
member values may have parameters containing metadata about a message member values may have parameters containing metadata about a message
signature. IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry signature. IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry
titled "HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters" to record and maintain titled "HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters" to record and maintain
the set of parameters defined for use with member values in the the set of parameters defined for use with member values in the
"Signature-Input" Structured Header. Initial values for this "Signature-Input" Structured Header. Initial values for this
registry are given in Section 5.2.2. Future assignments and registry are given in Section 5.2.2. Future assignments and
skipping to change at page 29, line 16 skipping to change at page 30, line 16
| Name | Status | Reference(s) | | Name | Status | Reference(s) |
+=========+========+================================+ +=========+========+================================+
| alg | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document | | alg | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+---------+--------+--------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| created | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document | | created | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+---------+--------+--------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| expires | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document | | expires | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+---------+--------+--------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| keyid | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document | | keyid | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+---------+--------+--------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| nonce | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+---------+--------+--------------------------------+
Table 7: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature Table 5: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature
Metadata Parameters Registry. Metadata Parameters Registry.
5.3. HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers Registry 5.3. HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers Registry
This document defines a method for canonicalizing HTTP message This document defines a method for canonicalizing HTTP message
content, including content that can be generated from the context of content, including content that can be generated from the context of
the HTTP message outside of the HTTP headers. This content is the HTTP message outside of the HTTP headers. This content is
identified by a unique key. IANA is asked to create and maintain a identified by a unique key. IANA is asked to create and maintain a
new registry typed "HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers" to new registry typed "HTTP Signature Specialty Content Identifiers" to
record and maintain the set of non-header content identifiers and record and maintain the set of non-header content identifiers and
skipping to change at page 29, line 49 skipping to change at page 30, line 51
Specialty Content Identifiers Registry. Specialty Content Identifiers Registry.
+===================+========+================================+ +===================+========+================================+
| Name | Status | Reference(s) | | Name | Status | Reference(s) |
+===================+========+================================+ +===================+========+================================+
| @request-target | Active | Section 2.4.1 of this document | | @request-target | Active | Section 2.4.1 of this document |
+-------------------+--------+--------------------------------+ +-------------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| @signature-params | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document | | @signature-params | Active | Section 2.4.2 of this document |
+-------------------+--------+--------------------------------+ +-------------------+--------+--------------------------------+
Table 8: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature Specialty Table 6: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature Specialty
Content Identifiers Registry. Content Identifiers Registry.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
(( TODO: need to dive deeper on this section; not sure how much of (( TODO: need to dive deeper on this section; not sure how much of
what's referenced below is actually applicable, or if it covers what's referenced below is actually applicable, or if it covers
everything we need to worry about. )) everything we need to worry about. ))
(( TODO: Should provide some recommendations on how to determine what (( TODO: Should provide some recommendations on how to determine what
content needs to be signed for a given use case. )) content needs to be signed for a given use case. ))
skipping to change at page 31, line 26 skipping to change at page 32, line 26
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8941>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8941>.
[SEMANTICS] [SEMANTICS]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6234>.
[RFC7239] Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension", [RFC7239] Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014, RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7239>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7239>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
skipping to change at page 32, line 43 skipping to change at page 33, line 38
interpreted in the context of this draft. interpreted in the context of this draft.
Appendix B. Examples Appendix B. Examples
B.1. Example Keys B.1. Example Keys
This section provides cryptographic keys that are referenced in This section provides cryptographic keys that are referenced in
example signatures throughout this document. These keys MUST NOT be example signatures throughout this document. These keys MUST NOT be
used for any purpose other than testing. used for any purpose other than testing.
The key identifiers for each key are used throughout the examples in
this specification. It is assumed for these examples that the signer
and verifier can unambiguously dereference all key identifiers used
here, and that the keys and algorithms used are appropriate for the
context in which the signature is presented.
B.1.1. Example Key RSA test B.1.1. Example Key RSA test
The following key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair: The following key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair,
referred to in this document as "test-key-rsa":
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBCgKCAQEAhAKYdtoeoy8zcAcR874L8cnZxKzAGwd7v36APp7Pv6Q2jdsPBRrw MIIBCgKCAQEAhAKYdtoeoy8zcAcR874L8cnZxKzAGwd7v36APp7Pv6Q2jdsPBRrw
WEBnez6d0UDKDwGbc6nxfEXAy5mbhgajzrw3MOEt8uA5txSKobBpKDeBLOsdJKFq WEBnez6d0UDKDwGbc6nxfEXAy5mbhgajzrw3MOEt8uA5txSKobBpKDeBLOsdJKFq
MGmXCQvEG7YemcxDTRPxAleIAgYYRjTSd/QBwVW9OwNFhekro3RtlinV0a75jfZg MGmXCQvEG7YemcxDTRPxAleIAgYYRjTSd/QBwVW9OwNFhekro3RtlinV0a75jfZg
kne/YiktSvLG34lw2zqXBDTC5NHROUqGTlML4PlNZS5Ri2U4aCNx2rUPRcKIlE0P kne/YiktSvLG34lw2zqXBDTC5NHROUqGTlML4PlNZS5Ri2U4aCNx2rUPRcKIlE0P
uKxI4T+HIaFpv8+rdV6eUgOrB2xeI1dSFFn/nnv5OoZJEIB+VmuKn3DCUcCZSFlQ uKxI4T+HIaFpv8+rdV6eUgOrB2xeI1dSFFn/nnv5OoZJEIB+VmuKn3DCUcCZSFlQ
PSXSfBDiUGhwOw76WuSSsf1D4b/vLoJ10wIDAQAB PSXSfBDiUGhwOw76WuSSsf1D4b/vLoJ10wIDAQAB
-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY----- -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
skipping to change at page 33, line 42 skipping to change at page 34, line 42
9C+celgZd2PW7aGYLCHq7nPbmfDV0yHcWjOhXZ8jRMjmANVR/eLQ2EfsRLdW69bn 9C+celgZd2PW7aGYLCHq7nPbmfDV0yHcWjOhXZ8jRMjmANVR/eLQ2EfsRLdW69bn
f3ZD7JS1fwGnO3exGmHO3HZG+6AvberKYVYNHahNFEw5TsAcQWDLRpkGybBcxqZo f3ZD7JS1fwGnO3exGmHO3HZG+6AvberKYVYNHahNFEw5TsAcQWDLRpkGybBcxqZo
81YCqlqidwfeO5YtlO7etx1xLyqa2NsCeG9A86UjG+aeNnXEIDk1PDK+EuiThIUa 81YCqlqidwfeO5YtlO7etx1xLyqa2NsCeG9A86UjG+aeNnXEIDk1PDK+EuiThIUa
/2IxKzJKWl1BKr2d4xAfR0ZnEYuRrbeDQYgTImOlfW6/GuYIxKYgEKCFHFqJATAG /2IxKzJKWl1BKr2d4xAfR0ZnEYuRrbeDQYgTImOlfW6/GuYIxKYgEKCFHFqJATAG
IxHrq1PDOiSwXd2GmVVYyEmhZnbcp8CxaEMQoevxAta0ssMK3w6UsDtvUvYvF22m IxHrq1PDOiSwXd2GmVVYyEmhZnbcp8CxaEMQoevxAta0ssMK3w6UsDtvUvYvF22m
qQKBiD5GwESzsFPy3Ga0MvZpn3D6EJQLgsnrtUPZx+z2Ep2x0xc5orneB5fGyF1P qQKBiD5GwESzsFPy3Ga0MvZpn3D6EJQLgsnrtUPZx+z2Ep2x0xc5orneB5fGyF1P
WtP+fG5Q6Dpdz3LRfm+KwBCWFKQjg7uTxcjerhBWEYPmEMKYwTJF5PBG9/ddvHLQ WtP+fG5Q6Dpdz3LRfm+KwBCWFKQjg7uTxcjerhBWEYPmEMKYwTJF5PBG9/ddvHLQ
EQeNC8fHGg4UXU8mhHnSBt3EA10qQJfRDs15M38eG2cYwB1PZpDHScDnDA0= EQeNC8fHGg4UXU8mhHnSBt3EA10qQJfRDs15M38eG2cYwB1PZpDHScDnDA0=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
B.2. Example keyid Values B.1.2. Example Key RSA PSS test
The table below maps example "keyid" values to associated algorithms The following key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair,
and/or keys. These are example mappings that are valid only within referred to in this document as "test-key-rsa-pss":
the context of examples in examples within this and future documents
that reference this section. Unless otherwise specified, within the
context of examples it should be assumed that the signer and verifier
understand these "keyid" mappings. These "keyid" values are not
reserved, and deployments are free to use them, with these
associations or others.
+============+=================+==========================+ -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
| keyid | Algorithm | Verification Key | MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAr4tmm3r20Wd/PbqvP1s2
+============+=================+==========================+ +QEtvpuRaV8Yq40gjUR8y2Rjxa6dpG2GXHbPfvMs8ct+Lh1GH45x28Rw3Ry53mm+
| test-key-a | rsa-pss-sha512 | The public key specified | oAXjyQ86OnDkZ5N8lYbggD4O3w6M6pAvLkhk95AndTrifbIFPNU8PPMO7OyrFAHq
| | | in Appendix B.1.1 | gDsznjPFmTOtCEcN2Z1FpWgchwuYLPL+Wokqltd11nqqzi+bJ9cvSKADYdUAAN5W
+------------+-----------------+--------------------------+ Utzdpiy6LbTgSxP7ociU4Tn0g5I6aDZJ7A8Lzo0KSyZYoA485mqcO0GVAdVw9lq4
| test-key-b | rsa-v1_5-sha256 | The public key specified | aOT9v6d+nb4bnNkQVklLQ3fVAvJm+xdDOp9LCNCN48V2pnDOkFV6+U9nV5oyc6XI
| | | in Appendix B.1.1 | 2wIDAQAB
+------------+-----------------+--------------------------+ -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Table 9 -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
B.3. Test Cases B.2. Test Cases
This section provides non-normative examples that may be used as test This section provides non-normative examples that may be used as test
cases to validate implementation correctness. These examples are cases to validate implementation correctness. These examples are
based on the following HTTP message: based on the following HTTP message:
POST /foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1 POST /foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com Host: example.com
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE= Digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=
Content-Length: 18 Content-Length: 18
{"hello": "world"} {"hello": "world"}
B.3.1. Signature Verification B.2.1. Minimal Signature Header using rsa-pss-sha512
B.3.1.1. Minimal Signature Header using rsa-pss-sha512 This example presents a minimal "Signature-Input" and "Signature"
header for a signature using the "rsa-pss-sha512" algorithm, covering
none of the content of the HTTP message request but providing a
timestamped signature proof of possession of the key.
This presents a minimal "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header for The corresponding signature input is:
a signature using the "rsa-pss-sha512" algorithm:
# NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 "@signature-params": ();created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"\
;alg="rsa-pss-sha512"
Signature: sig1=("date"); alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; keyid="test-key-b" This results in the following "Signature-Input" and "Signature"
Signature: sig1=:HtXycCl97RBVkZi66ADKnC9c5eSSlb57GnQ4KFqNZplOpNfxqk62\ headers being added to the message:
JzZ484jXgLvoOTRaKfR4hwyxlcyb+BWkVasApQovBSdit9Ml/YmN2IvJDPncrlhPD\
VDv36Z9/DiSO+RNHD7iLXugdXo1+MGRimW1RmYdenl/ITeb7rjfLZ4b9VNnLFtVWw\
rjhAiwIqeLjodVImzVc5srrk19HMZNuUejK6I3/MyN3+3U8tIRW4LWzx6ZgGZUaEE\
P0aBlBkt7Fj0Tt5/P5HNW/Sa/m8smxbOHnwzAJDa10PyjzdIbywlnWIIWtZKPPsoV\
oKVopUWEU3TNhpWmaVhFrUL/O6SN3w==:
The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field Signature-Input: sig1=();created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"\
is: ;alg="rsa-pss-sha512"
Signature: sig1=:qGKjr1213+iZCU1MCV8w2NTr/HvMGWYDzpqAWx7SrPE1y6gOkIQ3k2\
GlZDu9KnKnLN6LKX0JRa2M5vU9v/b0GjV0WSInMMKQJExJ/e9Y9K8q2eE0G9saGebEaWd\
R3Ao47odxLh95hBtejKIdiUBmQcQSAzAkoQ4aOZgvrHgkmvQDZQL0w30+8lMz3VglmN73\
CKp/ijZemO1iPdNwrdhAtDvj9OdFVJ/wiUECfU78aQWkQocvwrZXTmHCX9BMVUHGneXMY\
NQ0Y8umEHjxpnnLLvxUbw2KZrflp+l6m7WlhwXGJ15eAt1+mImanxUCtaKQJvEfcnOQ0S\
2jHysSRLheTA==:
+===========================+==========================+ B.2.2. Header Coverage
| Property | Value |
+===========================+==========================+
| Algorithm | rsa-pss-sha512 |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Covered Content | date |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Creation Time | Undefined |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Expiration Time | Undefined |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Verification Key Material | The public key specified |
| | in Appendix B.1.1. |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 10 This example covers all the specified headers in the example message.
The corresponding Signature Input is: The corresponding signature input is:
"date": Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT "host": example.com
"@signature-params": ("date"); alg="rsa-pss-sha512"; keyid="test-key-b" "date": Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT
"content-type": application/json
"@signature-params": ("host" "date" "content-type");created=1618884475\
;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
This results in the following "Signature-Input" and "Signature"
headers being added to the message:
Signature-Input: sig1=("host" "date" "content-type");created=1618884475\
;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
Signature: sig1=:NtIKWuXjr4SBEXj97gbick4O95ff378I0CZOa2VnIeEXZ1itzAdqTp\
SvG91XYrq5CfxCmk8zz1Zg7ZGYD+ngJyVn805r73rh2eFCPO+ZXDs45Is/Ex8srzGC9sf\
VZfqeEfApRFFe5yXDmANVUwzFWCEnGM6+SJVmWl1/jyEn45qA6Hw+ZDHbrbp6qvD4N0S9\
2jlPyVVEh/SmCwnkeNiBgnbt+E0K5wCFNHPbo4X1Tj406W+bTtnKzaoKxBWKW8aIQ7rg9\
2zqE1oqBRjqtRi5/Q6P5ZYYGGINKzNyV3UjZtxeZNnNJ+MAnWS0mofFqcZHVgSU/1wUzP\
7MhzOKLca1Yg==:
B.2.3. Full Coverage
This example covers all headers in the example message plus the
request target and message body digest.
The corresponding signature input is:
"@request-target": post /foo?param=value&pet=dog
"host": example.com
"date": Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT
"content-type": application/json
"digest": SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=
"content-length": 18
"@signature-params": ("@request-target" "host" "date" "content-type" \
"digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\
;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
This results in the following "Signature-Input" and "Signature"
headers being added to the message:
Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "host" "date" "content-type" \
"digest" "content-length");created=1618884475\
;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss"
Signature: sig1=:QNPZtqAGWN1YMtsLJ1oyQMLg9TuIwjsIBESTo1/YXUsG+6Sl1uKUdT\
e9xswwrc3Ui3gUd4/tLv48NGih2TRDc1AWbEQDuy6pjroxSPtFjquubqzbszxit1arPNh\
ONnyR/8yuIh3bOXfc/NYJ3KLNaWR6MKrGinCYKTNwrX/0V67EMdSgd5HHnW5xHFgKfRCj\
rG3ncV+jbaeSPJ8e96RZgr8slcdwmqXdiwiIBCQDKRIQ3U2muJWvxyjV/IYhCTwAXJaUz\
sQPKzR5QWelXEVdHyv4WIB2lKaYh7mAsz0/ANxFYRRSp2Joms0OAnIAFX9kKCSp4p15/Q\
8L9vSIGNpQtw==:
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
This specification was initially based on the draft-cavage-http- This specification was initially based on the draft-cavage-http-
signatures internet draft. The editors would like to thank the signatures internet draft. The editors would like to thank the
authors of that draft, Mark Cavage and Manu Sporny, for their work on authors of that draft, Mark Cavage and Manu Sporny, for their work on
that draft and their continuing contributions. that draft and their continuing contributions.
The editor would also like to thank the following individuals for The editors would also like to thank the following individuals for
feedback on and implementations of the draft-cavage-http-signatures feedback, insight, and implementation of this draft and its
draft (in alphabetical order): Mark Adamcin, Mark Allen, Paul predecessors (in alphabetical order): Mark Adamcin, Mark Allen, Paul
Annesley, Karl Boehlmark, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Sarven Capadisli, Liam Annesley, Karl Boehlmark, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Sarven Capadisli, Liam
Dennehy, ductm54, Stephen Farrell, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Eric Holmes, Dennehy, ductm54, Stephen Farrell, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Eric Holmes,
Andrey Kislyuk, Adam Knight, Dave Lehn, Dave Longley, James H. Andrey Kislyuk, Adam Knight, Dave Lehn, Dave Longley, Ilari
Manger, Ilari Liusvaara, Mark Nottingham, Yoav Nir, Adrian Palmer, Liusvaara, James H. Manger, Kathleen Moriarty, Mark Nottingham, Yoav
Lucas Pardue, Roberto Polli, Julian Reschke, Michael Richardson, Nir, Adrian Palmer, Lucas Pardue, Roberto Polli, Julian Reschke,
Wojciech Rygielski, Adam Scarr, Cory J. Slep, Dirk Stein, Henry Michael Richardson, Wojciech Rygielski, Adam Scarr, Cory J. Slep,
Story, Lukasz Szewc, Chris Webber, and Jeffrey Yasskin Dirk Stein, Henry Story, Lukasz Szewc, Chris Webber, and Jeffrey
Yasskin.
Document History Document History
_RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_ _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
* draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures * draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures
- -04
o Moved signature component definitions up to intro.
o Created formal function definitions for algorithms to
fulfill.
o Updated all examples.
o Added nonce parameter field.
- -03 - -03
o Clarified signing and verification processes. o Clarified signing and verification processes.
o Updated algorithm and key selection method. o Updated algorithm and key selection method.
o Clearly defined core algorithm set. o Clearly defined core algorithm set.
o Defined JOSE signature mapping process. o Defined JOSE signature mapping process.
o Removed legacy signature methods. o Removed legacy signature methods.
 End of changes. 132 change blocks. 
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