draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.txt   draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-01.txt 
HTTPbis Working Group A. Backman, Ed. HTTP A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track J. Richer Intended status: Standards Track J. Richer
Expires: 12 October 2020 Bespoke Engineering Expires: 21 May 2021 Bespoke Engineering
M. Sporny M. Sporny
Digital Bazaar Digital Bazaar
10 April 2020 17 November 2020
Signing HTTP Messages Signing HTTP Messages
draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00 draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-01
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and
verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over
content within an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases content within an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases
where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer, and where where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer, and where
the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before
reaching the verifier. reaching the verifier.
Note Note to Readers
This draft is based on draft-cavage-http-signatures-12. The _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
community (https://github.com/w3c-dvcg/http-signatures/
issues?page=2&q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen) and the authors have identified
several issues with the current text. Additionally, the authors have
identified a number of features that are required in order to support
additional use cases. In order to preserve continuity with the
effort that has been put into draft-cavage-http-signatures-12, this
draft maintains normative compatibility with it, and thus does not
address these issues or include these features, as doing so requires
making backwards-incompatible changes to normative requirements.
While such changes are inevitable, the editor recommends that they be
driven by working group discussion following adoption of the draft
(see Topics for Working Group Discussion). The editor requests that
the working group recognize the intent of this initial draft and this
recommendation when considering adoption of this draft.
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. This work was originally based on draft-cavage-http-signatures-12,
but has since diverged from it, to reflect discussion since adoption
by the HTTP Working Group. In particular, it addresses issues that
have been identified, and adds features to support new use cases. It
is a work-in-progress and not yet suitable for deployment.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 October 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. HTTP Message Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. HTTP Message Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Safe Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Safe Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Identifying and Canonicalizing Content . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Identifying and Canonicalizing Content . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. HTTP Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Signature Creation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.1.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Signature Expiration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Target Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3. List Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Signature Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Creating a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.4. Signature Creation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.1. Choose and Set Signature Metadata Properties . . . . 11 2.5. Signature Expiration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Create the Signature Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.6. Target Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Sign the Signature Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.6.1. Canonicalization Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Verifying a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. HTTP Message Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.1. Enforcing Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. Signature Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. The 'Signature' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.2. Creating a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Signature Header Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2.1. Choose and Set Signature Metadata Properties . . . . 14
4.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.2. Create the Signature Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2.3. Sign the Signature Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.3. Verifying a Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.3.1. Enforcing Application Requirements . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4. Including a Message Signature in a Message . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. HTTP Signature Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.1. Metadata Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.1. Example Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry . . . . . . . 24
A.1.1. "rsa-test" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.2. Example "keyId" Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2.2. Initial Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.3. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.3.1. Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.3.2. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Topics for Working Group Discussion . . . . . . . . 30 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 A.1. Example Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.1.1. Example Key RSA test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.2. Example keyId Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.3.1. Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.3.2. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix B. Topics for Working Group Discussion . . . . . . . . 34
B.1. Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
B.1.1. Confusing guidance on algorithm and key
identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B.1.2. Lack of definition of keyId hurts interoperability . 35
B.1.3. Algorithm Registry duplicates work of JWA . . . . . . 35
B.1.4. Algorithm Registry should not be initialized with
deprecated entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.1.5. No percent-encoding normalization of path/query . . . 36
B.1.6. Misleading name for headers parameter . . . . . . . . 36
B.1.7. Changes to whitespace in header field values break
verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
B.1.8. Multiple Set-Cookie headers are not well supported . 36
B.1.9. Covered Content list is not signed . . . . . . . . . 37
B.1.10. Algorithm is not signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.1.11. Verification key identifier is not signed . . . . . . 37
B.1.12. Max values, precision for Integer String and Decimal
String not defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.1.13. keyId parameter value could break list syntax . . . . 37
B.1.14. Creation Time and Expiration Time do not allow for
clock skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.1.15. Should require lowercased header field names as
identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
B.1.16. Reconcile Date header and Creation Time . . . . . . . 38
B.1.17. Remove algorithm-specific rules for content
identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B.1.18. Add guidance for signing compressed headers . . . . . 38
B.1.19. Transformations to Via header field value break
verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B.1.20. Case changes to case-insensitive header field values
break verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
B.1.21. Need more examples for Signature header . . . . . . . 38
B.1.22. Expiration not needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B.2. Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B.2.1. Define more content identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B.2.2. Multiple signature support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
B.2.3. Support for incremental signing of header field value
list items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
B.2.4. Support expected authority changes . . . . . . . . . 40
B.2.5. Support for signing specific cookies . . . . . . . . 40
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Message integrity and authenticity are important security properties Message integrity and authenticity are important security properties
that are critical to the secure operation of many [HTTP] that are critical to the secure operation of many HTTP applications.
applications. Application developers typically rely on the transport Application developers typically rely on the transport layer to
layer to provide these properties, by operating their application provide these properties, by operating their application over [TLS].
over TLS [RFC8446]. However, TLS only guarantees these properties However, TLS only guarantees these properties over a single TLS
over a single TLS connection, and the path between client and connection, and the path between client and application may be
application may be composed of multiple independent TLS connections composed of multiple independent TLS connections (for example, if the
(for example, if the application is hosted behind a TLS-terminating application is hosted behind a TLS-terminating gateway or if the
gateway or if the client is behind a TLS Inspection appliance). In client is behind a TLS Inspection appliance). In such cases, TLS
such cases, TLS cannot guarantee end-to-end message integrity or cannot guarantee end-to-end message integrity or authenticity between
authenticity between the client and application. Additionally, some the client and application. Additionally, some operating
operating environments present obstacles that make it impractical to environments present obstacles that make it impractical to use TLS,
use TLS, or to use features necessary to provide message or to use features necessary to provide message authenticity.
authenticity. Furthermore, some applications require the binding of Furthermore, some applications require the binding of an application-
an application-level key to the HTTP message, separate from any TLS level key to the HTTP message, separate from any TLS certificates in
certificates in use. Consequently, while TLS can meet message use. Consequently, while TLS can meet message integrity and
integrity and authenticity needs for many HTTP-based applications, it authenticity needs for many HTTP-based applications, it is not a
is not a universal solution. universal solution.
This document defines a mechanism for providing end-to-end integrity This document defines a mechanism for providing end-to-end integrity
and authenticity for content within an HTTP message. The mechanism and authenticity for content within an HTTP message. The mechanism
allows applications to create digital signatures or message allows applications to create digital signatures or message
authentication codes (MACs) over only that content within the message authentication codes (MACs) over only that content within the message
that is meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict that is meaningful and appropriate for the application. Strict
canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the canonicalization rules ensure that the verifier can verify the
signature even if the message has been transformed in any of the many signature even if the message has been transformed in any of the many
ways permitted by HTTP. ways permitted by HTTP.
skipping to change at page 4, line 38 skipping to change at page 5, line 29
and verifier to have the exact same signed content. Since the raw and verifier to have the exact same signed content. Since the raw
bytes of the message cannot be relied upon as signed content, the bytes of the message cannot be relied upon as signed content, the
signer and verifier must derive the signed content from their signer and verifier must derive the signed content from their
respective versions of the message, via a mechanism that is resilient respective versions of the message, via a mechanism that is resilient
to safe changes that do not alter the meaning of the message. to safe changes that do not alter the meaning of the message.
For a variety of reasons, it is impractical to strictly define what For a variety of reasons, it is impractical to strictly define what
constitutes a safe change versus an unsafe one. Applications use constitutes a safe change versus an unsafe one. Applications use
HTTP in a wide variety of ways, and may disagree on whether a HTTP in a wide variety of ways, and may disagree on whether a
particular piece of information in a message (e.g., the body, or the particular piece of information in a message (e.g., the body, or the
Date header field) is relevant. Thus a general purpose solution must "Date" header field) is relevant. Thus a general purpose solution
provide signers with some degree of control over which message must provide signers with some degree of control over which message
content is signed. content is signed.
HTTP applications may be running in environments that do not provide HTTP applications may be running in environments that do not provide
complete access to or control over HTTP messages (such as a web complete access to or control over HTTP messages (such as a web
browser's JavaScript environment), or may be using libraries that browser's JavaScript environment), or may be using libraries that
abstract away the details of the protocol (such as the Java abstract away the details of the protocol (such as the Java
HTTPClient library (https://openjdk.java.net/groups/net/httpclient/ HTTPClient library (https://openjdk.java.net/groups/net/httpclient/
intro.html)). These applications need to be able to generate and intro.html)). These applications need to be able to generate and
verify signatures despite incomplete knowledge of the HTTP message. verify signatures despite incomplete knowledge of the HTTP message.
1.2. HTTP Message Transformations 1.2. HTTP Message Transformations
As mentioned earlier, HTTP explicitly permits and in some cases As mentioned earlier, HTTP explicitly permits and in some cases
requires implementations to transform messages in a variety of ways. requires implementations to transform messages in a variety of ways.
Implementations are required to tolerate many of these Implementations are required to tolerate many of these
transformations. What follows is a non-normative and non-exhaustive transformations. What follows is a non-normative and non-exhaustive
list of transformations that may occur under HTTP, provided as list of transformations that may occur under HTTP, provided as
context: context:
* Re-ordering of header fields with different header field names * Re-ordering of header fields with different header field names
([HTTP], Section 3.2.2). ([MESSAGING], Section 3.2.2).
* Combination of header fields with the same field name ([HTTP], * Combination of header fields with the same field name
Section 3.2.2). ([MESSAGING], Section 3.2.2).
* Removal of header fields listed in the "Connection" header field * Removal of header fields listed in the "Connection" header field
([HTTP], Section 6.1). ([MESSAGING], Section 6.1).
* Addition of header fields that indicate control options ([HTTP], * Addition of header fields that indicate control options
Section 6.1). ([MESSAGING], Section 6.1).
* Addition or removal of a transfer coding ([HTTP], Section 5.7.2). * Addition or removal of a transfer coding ([MESSAGING],
Section 5.7.2).
* Addition of header fields such as "Via" ([HTTP], Section 5.7.1) * Addition of header fields such as "Via" ([MESSAGING],
and "Forwarded" ([RFC7239], Section 4). Section 5.7.1) and "Forwarded" ([RFC7239], Section 4).
1.3. Safe Transformations 1.3. Safe Transformations
Based on the definition of HTTP and the requirements described above, Based on the definition of HTTP and the requirements described above,
we can identify certain types of transformations that should not we can identify certain types of transformations that should not
prevent signature verification, even when performed on content prevent signature verification, even when performed on content
covered by the signature. The following list describes those covered by the signature. The following list describes those
transformations: transformations:
* Combination of header fields with the same field name. * Combination of header fields with the same field name.
* Reordering of header fields with different names. * Reordering of header fields with different names.
* Conversion between HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2, or vice-versa. * Conversion between different versions of the HTTP protocol (e.g.,
HTTP/1.x to HTTP/2, or vice-versa).
* Changes in casing (e.g., "Origin" to "origin") of any case- * Changes in casing (e.g., "Origin" to "origin") of any case-
insensitive content such as header field names, request URI insensitive content such as header field names, request URI
scheme, or host. scheme, or host.
* Addition or removal of leading or trailing whitespace to a header * Addition or removal of leading or trailing whitespace to a header
field value. field value.
* Addition or removal of "obs-fold"s. * Addition or removal of "obs-folds".
* Changes to the request-target and Host header field that when * Changes to the "request-target" and "Host" header field that when
applied together do not result in a change to the message's applied together do not result in a change to the message's
effective request URI, as defined in Section 5.5 of [HTTP]. effective request URI, as defined in Section 5.5 of [MESSAGING].
Additionally, all changes to content not covered by the signature are Additionally, all changes to content not covered by the signature are
considered safe. considered safe.
1.4. Conventions and Terminology 1.4. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
The terms "HTTP message", "HTTP method", "HTTP request", "HTTP The terms "HTTP message", "HTTP request", "HTTP response", "absolute-
response", "absolute-form", "absolute-path", "effective request URI", form", "absolute-path", "effective request URI", "gateway", "header
"gateway", "header field", "intermediary", "request-target", field", "intermediary", "request-target", "sender", and "recipient"
"sender", and "recipient" are used as defined in [HTTP]. are used as defined in [MESSAGING].
The term "method" is to be interpreted as defined in Section 4 of
[SEMANTICS].
For brevity, the term "signature" on its own is used in this document For brevity, the term "signature" on its own is used in this document
to refer to both digital signatures and keyed MACs. Similarly, the to refer to both digital signatures and keyed MACs. Similarly, the
verb "sign" refers to the generation of either a digital signature or verb "sign" refers to the generation of either a digital signature or
keyed MAC over a given input string. The qualified term "digital keyed MAC over a given input string. The qualified term "digital
signature" refers specifically to the output of an asymmetric signature" refers specifically to the output of an asymmetric
cryptographic signing operation. cryptographic signing operation.
In addition to those listed above, this document uses the following In addition to those listed above, this document uses the following
terms: terms:
Decimal String Decimal String
An Integer String optionally concatenated with a period "".""
An Integer String optionally concatenated with a period "."
followed by a second Integer String, representing a positive real followed by a second Integer String, representing a positive real
number expressed in base 10. The first Integer String represents number expressed in base 10. The first Integer String represents
the integral portion of the number, while the optional second the integral portion of the number, while the optional second
Integer String represents the fractional portion of the number. [[ Integer String represents the fractional portion of the number.
Editor's note: There's got to be a definition for this that we can (( Editor's note: There's got to be a definition for this that we
reference. ]] can reference. ))
Integer String Integer String
A US-ASCII string of one or more digits ""0-9"", representing a
positive integer in base 10. [[ Editor's note: There's got to be a A US-ASCII string of one or more digits "0-9", representing a
definition for this that we can reference. ]] positive integer in base 10. (( Editor's note: There's got to be a
definition for this that we can reference. ))
Signer Signer
The entity that is generating or has generated an HTTP Message The entity that is generating or has generated an HTTP Message
Signature. Signature.
Verifier Verifier
An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message
Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message
Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different
entities. entities.
This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete
skipping to change at page 7, line 14 skipping to change at page 8, line 12
Verifier Verifier
An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message An entity that is verifying or has verified an HTTP Message
Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message Signature against an HTTP Message. Note that an HTTP Message
Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different Signature may be verified multiple times, potentially by different
entities. entities.
This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete
HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split HTTP messages. To improve readability, header fields may be split
into multiple lines, using the "obs-fold" syntax. This syntax is into multiple lines, using the "obs-fold" syntax. This syntax is
deprecated in [HTTP], and senders MUST NOT generate messages that deprecated in [MESSAGING], and senders MUST NOT generate messages
include it. that include it.
2. Identifying and Canonicalizing Content 2. Identifying and Canonicalizing Content
In order to allow signers and verifiers to establish which content is In order to allow signers and verifiers to establish which content is
covered by a signature, this document defines content identifiers for covered by a signature, this document defines content identifiers for
signature metadata and discrete pieces of message content that may be signature metadata and discrete pieces of message content that may be
covered by an HTTP Message Signature. covered by an HTTP Message Signature.
Some content within HTTP messages may undergo transformations that Some content within HTTP messages may undergo transformations that
change the bitwise value without altering meaning of the content (for change the bitwise value without altering meaning of the content (for
skipping to change at page 7, line 38 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
to ensure that a signature can be verified despite such innocuous to ensure that a signature can be verified despite such innocuous
transformations. This document defines rules for each content transformations. This document defines rules for each content
identifier that transform the identifier's associated content into identifier that transform the identifier's associated content into
such a canonical form. such a canonical form.
The following sections define content identifiers, their associated The following sections define content identifiers, their associated
content, and their canonicalization rules. content, and their canonicalization rules.
2.1. HTTP Header Fields 2.1. HTTP Header Fields
An HTTP header field value is identified by its header field name. An HTTP header field is identified by its header field name. While
While HTTP header field names are case-insensitive, implementations HTTP header field names are case-insensitive, implementations MUST
SHOULD use lowercased field names (e.g., "content-type", "date", use lowercased field names (e.g., "content-type", "date", "etag")
"etag") when using them as content identifiers. when using them as content identifiers.
An HTTP header field value is canonicalized as follows: An HTTP header field value is canonicalized as follows:
1. Create an ordered list of the field values of each instance of 1. Create an ordered list of the field values of each instance of
the header field in the message, in the order that they occur (or the header field in the message, in the order that they occur (or
will occur) in the message. will occur) in the message.
2. Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list. 2. Strip leading and trailing whitespace from each item in the list.
3. Concatenate the list items together, with a comma "","" and space 3. Concatenate the list items together, with a comma "," and space "
"" "" between each item. The resulting string is the " between each item. The resulting string is the canonicalized
canonicalized value. value.
2.1.1. Canonicalization Examples 2.1.1. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for header fields, given the following example HTTP message: for header fields, given the following example HTTP message:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: www.example.com Server: www.example.com
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
X-OWS-Header: Leading and trailing whitespace. X-OWS-Header: Leading and trailing whitespace.
X-Obs-Fold-Header: Obsolete X-Obs-Fold-Header: Obsolete
line folding. line folding.
X-Empty-Header: X-Empty-Header:
Cache-Control: max-age=60 Cache-Control: max-age=60
Cache-Control: must-revalidate Cache-Control: must-revalidate
The following table shows example canonicalized values for header The following table shows example canonicalized values for header
fields, given that message: fields, given that message:
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +===================+==================================+
| Header Field | Canonicalized Value | | Header Field | Canonicalized Value |
+=====================+====================================+ +===================+==================================+
| "cache-control" | "max-age=60, must-revalidate" | | cache-control | max-age=60, must-revalidate |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
| "date" | "Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT" | | date | Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
| "server" | "www.example.com" | | server | www.example.com |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
| "x-empty-header" | "" | | x-empty-header | |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
| "x-obs-fold-header" | "Obsolete line folding." | | x-obs-fold-header | Obsolete line folding. |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
| "x-ows-header" | "Leading and trailing whitespace." | | x-ows-header | Leading and trailing whitespace. |
+---------------------+------------------------------------+ +-------------------+----------------------------------+
Table 1: Non-normative examples of header field Table 1: Non-normative examples of header field
canonicalization. canonicalization.
2.2. Signature Creation Time 2.2. Dictionary Structured Field Members
An individual member in the value of a Dictionary Structured Field is
identified by the lowercased field name, followed by a semicolon
"":"", followed by the member name. An individual member in the
value of a Dictionary Structured Field is canonicalized by applying
the serialization algorithm described in Section 4.1.2 of
[StructuredFields] on a Dictionary containing only that member.
2.2.1. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for Dictionary Structured Field Members given the following example
header field, whose value is assumed to be a Dictionary:
X-Dictionary: a=1, b=2;x=1;y=2, c=(a, b, c)
The following table shows example canonicalized values for different
content identifiers, given that field:
+====================+=====================+
| Content Identifier | Canonicalized Value |
+====================+=====================+
| x-dictionary:a | 1 |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-dictionary:b | 2;x=1;y=2 |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-dictionary:c | (a, b, c) |
+--------------------+---------------------+
Table 2: Non-normative examples of
Dictionary member canonicalization.
2.3. List Prefixes
A prefix of a List Structured Field consisting of the first N members
in the field's value (where N is an integer greater than 0 and less
than or equal to the number of members in the List) is identified by
the lowercased field name, followed by a semicolon "":"", followed by
N expressed as an Integer String. A list prefix is canonicalized by
applying the serialization algorithm described in Section 4.1.1 of
[StructuredFields] on a List containing only the first N members as
specified in the list prefix, in the order they appear in the
original List.
2.3.1. Canonicalization Examples
This section contains non-normative examples of canonicalized values
for list prefixes given the following example header fields, whose
values are assumed to be Dictionaries:
X-List-A: (a, b, c, d, e, f)
X-List-B: ()
The following table shows example canonicalized values for different
content identifiers, given those fields:
+====================+=====================+
| Content Identifier | Canonicalized Value |
+====================+=====================+
| x-list-a:0 | () |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-list-a:1 | (a) |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-list-a:3 | (a, b, c) |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-list-a:6 | (a, b, c, d, e, f) |
+--------------------+---------------------+
| x-list-b:0 | () |
+--------------------+---------------------+
Table 3: Non-normative examples of list
prefix canonicalization.
2.4. Signature Creation Time
The signature's Creation Time (Section 3.1) is identified by the The signature's Creation Time (Section 3.1) is identified by the
"(created)" identifier. "*created" identifier.
Its canonicalized value is an Integer String containing the Its canonicalized value is an Integer String containing the
signature's Creation Time expressed as the number of seconds since signature's Creation Time expressed as the number of seconds since
the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16 the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16
(https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/ (https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16) of [POSIX.1]. V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16) of [POSIX.1].
| The use of seconds since the Epoch to canonicalize a timestamp The use of seconds since the Epoch to canonicalize a timestamp
| simplifies processing and avoids timezone management required simplifies processing and avoids timezone management required by
| by specifications such as [RFC3339]. specifications such as [RFC3339].
2.3. Signature Expiration Time 2.5. Signature Expiration Time
The signature's Expiration Time (Section 3.1) is identified by the The signature's Expiration Time (Section 3.1) is identified by the
"(expired)" identifier. "*expires" identifier.
Its canonicalized value is a Decimal String containing the Its canonicalized value is a Decimal String containing the
signature's Expiration Time expressed as the number of seconds since signature's Expiration Time expressed as the number of seconds since
the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16 the Epoch, as defined in Section 4.16
(https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/ (https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16) of [POSIX.1]. V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16) of [POSIX.1].
2.4. Target Endpoint 2.6. Target Endpoint
The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the The request target endpoint, consisting of the request method and the
path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the path and query of the effective request URI, is identified by the
"(request-target)" identifier. "*request-target" identifier.
Its value is canonicalized as follows: Its value is canonicalized as follows:
1. Take the lowercased HTTP method of the message. 1. Take the lowercased HTTP method of the message.
2. Append a space "" "". 2. Append a space " ".
3. Append the path and query of the request target of the message, 3. Append the path and query of the request target of the message,
formatted according to the rules defined for the ":path" pseudo- formatted according to the rules defined for the :path pseudo-
header in [HTTP2], Section 8.1.2.3. The resulting string is the header in [HTTP2], Section 8.1.2.3. The resulting string is the
canonicalized value. canonicalized value.
2.4.1. Canonicalization Examples 2.6.1. Canonicalization Examples
The following table contains non-normative example HTTP messages and The following table contains non-normative example HTTP messages and
their canonicalized "(request-target)" values. their canonicalized "*request-target" values.
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +=========================+=================+
| HTTP Message | "(request-target)" | |HTTP Message | *request-target |
+=========================+====================+ +=========================+=================+
| POST /?param=value HTTP/1.1| "post | | POST /?param=value HTTP/1.1| post |
| Host: www.example.com | /?param=value" | | Host: www.example.com | /?param=value |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
| POST /a/b HTTP/1.1 | "post /a/b" | | POST /a/b HTTP/1.1 | post /a/b |
| Host: www.example.com | | | Host: www.example.com | |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
| GET http://www.example.com/a/ HTTP/1.1| "get /a/" | | GET http://www.example.com/a/ HTTP/1.1| get /a/ |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
| GET http://www.example.com HTTP/1.1| "get /" | | GET http://www.example.com HTTP/1.1| get / |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
| CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1| "connect /" | | CONNECT server.example.com:80 HTTP/1.1| connect / |
| Host: server.example.com| | | Host: server.example.com| |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
| OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1 | "options *" | | OPTIONS * HTTP/1.1 | options * |
| Host: server.example.com| | | Host: server.example.com| |
+-------------------------+--------------------+ +-------------------------+-----------------+
Table 2: Non-normative examples of "(request-target)" Table 4: Non-normative examples of "*request-target"
canonicalization. canonicalization.
3. HTTP Message Signatures 3. HTTP Message Signatures
An HTTP Message Signature is a signature over a string generated from An HTTP Message Signature is a signature over a string generated from
a subset of the content in an HTTP message and metadata about the a subset of the content in an HTTP message and metadata about the
signature itself. When successfully verified against an HTTP signature itself. When successfully verified against an HTTP
message, it provides cryptographic proof that with respect to the message, it provides cryptographic proof that with respect to the
subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically
equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated. equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated.
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subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically subset of content that was signed, the message is semantically
equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated. equivalent to the message for which the signature was generated.
3.1. Signature Metadata 3.1. Signature Metadata
HTTP Message Signatures have metadata properties that provide HTTP Message Signatures have metadata properties that provide
information regarding the signature's generation and/or verification. information regarding the signature's generation and/or verification.
The following metadata properties are defined: The following metadata properties are defined:
Algorithm Algorithm
An HTTP Signature Algorithm defined in the HTTP Signature An HTTP Signature Algorithm defined in the HTTP Signature
Algorithms Registry defined in this document. It describes the Algorithms Registry defined in this document. It describes the
signing and verification algorithms for the signature. signing and verification algorithms for the signature.
Creation Time Creation Time
A timestamp representing the point in time that the signature was A timestamp representing the point in time that the signature was
generated. Sub-second precision is not supported. A signature's generated. Sub-second precision is not supported. A signature's
Creation Time MAY be undefined, indicating that it is unknown. Creation Time MAY be undefined, indicating that it is unknown.
Covered Content Covered Content
An ordered list of content identifiers (Section 2) that indicates An ordered list of content identifiers (Section 2) that indicates
the metadata and message content that is covered by the signature. the metadata and message content that is covered by the signature.
The order of identifiers in this list affects signature generation The order of identifiers in this list affects signature generation
and verification, and therefore MUST be preserved. and verification, and therefore MUST be preserved.
Expiration Time Expiration Time
A timestamp representing the point in time at which the signature A timestamp representing the point in time at which the signature
expires. An expired signature always fails verification. A expires. An expired signature always fails verification. A
signature's Expiration Time MAY be undefined, indicating that the signature's Expiration Time MAY be undefined, indicating that the
signature does not expire. signature does not expire.
Verification Key Material Verification Key Material
The key material required to verify the signature. The key material required to verify the signature.
3.2. Creating a Signature 3.2. Creating a Signature
In order to create a signature, a signer completes the following In order to create a signature, a signer completes the following
process: process:
1. Choose key material and algorithm, and set metadata properties 1. Choose key material and algorithm, and set metadata properties
(Section 3.2.1) Section 3.2.1
2. Create the Signature Input (Section 3.2.2)
3. Sign the Signature Input (Section 3.2.3) 2. Create the Signature Input Section 3.2.2
3. Sign the Signature Input Section 3.2.3
The following sections describe each of these steps in detail. The following sections describe each of these steps in detail.
3.2.1. Choose and Set Signature Metadata Properties 3.2.1. Choose and Set Signature Metadata Properties
1. The signer chooses an HTTP Signature Algorithm from those 1. The signer chooses an HTTP Signature Algorithm from those
registered in the HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry defined by registered in the HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry defined by
this document, and sets the signature's Algorithm property to this document, and sets the signature's Algorithm property to
that value. The signer MUST NOT choose an algorithm marked that value. The signer MUST NOT choose an algorithm marked
"Deprecated". The mechanism by which the signer chooses an "Deprecated". The mechanism by which the signer chooses an
algorithm is out of scope for this document. algorithm is out of scope for this document.
skipping to change at page 12, line 15 skipping to change at page 14, line 34
3. The signer sets the signature's Creation Time property to the 3. The signer sets the signature's Creation Time property to the
current time. current time.
4. The signer sets the signature's Expiration Time property to the 4. The signer sets the signature's Expiration Time property to the
time at which the signature is to expire, or to undefined if the time at which the signature is to expire, or to undefined if the
signature will not expire. signature will not expire.
5. The signer creates an ordered list of content identifiers 5. The signer creates an ordered list of content identifiers
representing the message content and signature metadata to be representing the message content and signature metadata to be
covered by the signature, and assigns this list as the covered by the signature, and assigns this list as the
signature's Covered Content. Each identifier MUST be one of signature's Covered Content.
those defined in Section 2. This list MUST NOT be empty, as this
would result in creating a signature over the empty string.
If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with "rsa", * Each identifier MUST be one of those defined in Section 2.
"hmac", or "ecdsa", signers SHOULD include "(created)" and
"(request-target)" in the list.
If the signature's Algorithm starts with "rsa", "hmac", or * This list MUST NOT be empty, as this would result in creating
"ecdsa", signers SHOULD include "date" and "(request-target)" in a signature over the empty string.
the list.
Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what * If the signature's Algorithm name does not start with rsa,
order is out of scope for this document. However, the list order hmac, or ecdsa, signers SHOULD include "*created" and
is significant and once established for a given signature it MUST "*request-target" in the list.
be preserved for that signature.
* If the signature's Algorithm starts with rsa, hmac, or ecdsa,
signers SHOULD include "date" and "*request-target" in the
list.
* Further guidance on what to include in this list and in what
order is out of scope for this document. However, the list
order is significant and once established for a given
signature it MUST be preserved for that signature.
For example, given the following HTTP message: For example, given the following HTTP message:
GET /foo HTTP/1.1 GET /foo HTTP/1.1
Host: example.org Host: example.org
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
X-Example: Example header X-Example: Example header
with some whitespace. with some whitespace.
X-EmptyHeader: X-EmptyHeader:
X-Dictionary: a=1, b=2
X-List: (a, b, c, d)
Cache-Control: max-age=60 Cache-Control: max-age=60
Cache-Control: must-revalidate Cache-Control: must-revalidate
The following table presents a non-normative example of metadata The following table presents a non-normative example of metadata
values that a signer may choose: values that a signer may choose:
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +==============+================================================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+==============+==================================================+ +==============+================================================+
| Algorithm | "rsa-256" | | Algorithm | hs2019 |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Covered | "(request-target)", "(created)", "host", "date", | | Covered | "*request-target", "*created", "host", "date", |
| Content | "cache-contol", "x-emptyheader", "x-example" | | Content | "cache-contol", "x-emptyheader", "x-example", |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | | "x-dictionary:b", "x-dictionary:a", "x-list:3" |
| Creation | Equal to the value specified in the Date header | +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Time | field. | | Creation | 1402174295 |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | Time | |
| Expiration | Equal to the Creation Time plus five minutes. | +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Time | | | Expiration | 1402174595 |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | Time | |
| Verification | The public key provided in Appendix A.1.1 and | +--------------+------------------------------------------------+
| Key Material | identified by the "keyId" value "test-key-b". | | Verification | The public key provided in Appendix A.1.1 and |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | Key Material | identified by the "keyId" value "test-key-a". |
+--------------+------------------------------------------------+
Table 3: Non-normative example metadata values Table 5: Non-normative example metadata values
3.2.2. Create the Signature Input 3.2.2. Create the Signature Input
The Signature Input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that The Signature Input is a US-ASCII string containing the content that
will be signed. To create it, the signer concatenates together will be signed. To create it, the signer concatenates together
entries for each identifier in the signature's Covered Content in the entries for each identifier in the signature's Covered Content in the
order it occurs in the list, with each entry separated by a newline order it occurs in the list, with each entry separated by a newline
""\n"". An identifier's entry is a US-ASCII string consisting of the ""\n"". An identifier's entry is a US-ASCII string consisting of the
lowercased identifier followed with a colon "":"", a space "" "", and lowercased identifier followed with a colon "":"", a space "" "", and
the identifier's canonicalized value (described below). the identifier's canonicalized value (described below).
If Covered Content contains "(created)" and the signature's Creation If Covered Content contains "*created" and the signature's Creation
Time is undefined or the signature's Algorithm name starts with Time is undefined or the signature's Algorithm name starts with
"rsa", "hmac", or "ecdsa" an implementation MUST produce an error. "rsa", "hmac", or "ecdsa" an implementation MUST produce an error.
If Covered Content contains "(expires)" and the signature does not If Covered Content contains "*expires" and the signature does not
have an Expiration Time or the signature's Algorithm name starts with have an Expiration Time or the signature's Algorithm name starts with
"rsa", "hmac", or "ecdsa" an implementation MUST produce an error. "rsa", "hmac", or "ecdsa" an implementation MUST produce an error.
If Covered Content contains an identifier for a header field that is If Covered Content contains an identifier for a header field that is
not present or malformed in the message, the implementation MUST not present or malformed in the message, the implementation MUST
produce an error. produce an error.
For the non-normative example Signature metadata in Table 3, the If Covered Content contains an identifier for a Dictionary member
that references a header field that is not present, is malformed in
the message, or is not a Dictionary Structured Field, the
implementation MUST produce an error. If the header field value does
not contain the specified member, the implementation MUST produce an
error.
If Covered Content contains an identifier for a List Prefix that
references a header field that is not present, is malformed in the
message, or is not a List Structured Field, the implementation MUST
produce an error. If the header field value contains fewer than the
specified number of members, the implementation MUST produce an
error.
For the non-normative example Signature metadata in Table 5, the
corresponding Signature Input is: corresponding Signature Input is:
(request-target): get /foo *request-target: get /foo
(created): 1402170695 *created: 1402170695
host: example.org host: example.org
date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
cache-control: max-age=60, must-revalidate cache-control: max-age=60, must-revalidate
x-emptyheader: x-emptyheader:
x-example: Example header with some whitespace. x-example: Example header with some whitespace.
x-dictionary: b=2
x-dictionary: a=1
x-list: (a, b, c)
Figure 1: Non-normative example Signature Input Figure 1: Non-normative example Signature Input
3.2.3. Sign the Signature Input 3.2.3. Sign the Signature Input
The signer signs the Signature Input using the signing algorithm The signer signs the Signature Input using the signing algorithm
described by the signature's Algorithm property, and the key material described by the signature's Algorithm property, and the key material
chosen by the signer. The signer then encodes the result of that chosen by the signer. The signer then encodes the result of that
operation as a base 64-encoded string [RFC4648]. This string is the operation as a base 64-encoded string [RFC4648]. This string is the
signature value. signature value.
For the non-normative example Signature metadata in Section 3.2.1 and For the non-normative example Signature metadata in Section 3.2.1 and
Signature Input in Figure 1, the corresponding signature value is: Signature Input in Figure 1, the corresponding signature value is:
T1l3tWH2cSP31nfuvc3nVaHQ6IAu9YLEXg2pCeEOJETXnlWbgKtBTaXV6LNQWtf4O42V2 K2qGT5srn2OGbOIDzQ6kYT+ruaycnDAAUpKv+ePFfD0RAxn/1BUeZx/Kdrq32DrfakQ6b
DZwDZbmVZ8xW3TFW80RrfrY0+fyjD4OLN7/zV6L6d2v7uBpuWZ8QzKuHYFaRNVXgFBXN3 PsvB9aqZqognNT6be4olHROIkeV879RrsrObury8L9SCEibeoHyqU/yCjphSmEdd7WD+z
VJnsIOUjv20pqZMKO3phLCKX2/zQzJLCBQvF/5UKtnJiMp1ACNhG8LF0Q0FPWfe86YZBB rchK57quskKwRefy2iEC5S2uAH0EPyOZKWlvbKmKu5q4CaB8X/I5/+HLZLGvDiezqi6/7
xqrQr5WfjMu0LOO52ZAxi9KTWSlceJ2U361gDb7S5Deub8MaDrjUEpluphQeo8xyvHBoN p2Gngf5hwZ0lSdy39vyNMaaAT0tKo6nuVw0S1MVg1Q7MpWYZs0soHjttq0uLIA3DIbQfL
Xsqeax/WaHyRYOgaW6krxEGVaBQAfA2czYZhEA05Tb38ahq/gwDQ1bagd9rGnCHtAg== iIvK6/l0BdWTU7+2uQj7lBkQAsFZHoA96ZZgFquQrXRlmYOh+Hx5D9fJkXcXe5tmAg==
Figure 2: Non-normative example signature value Figure 2: Non-normative example signature value
3.3. Verifying a Signature 3.3. Verifying a Signature
In order to verify a signature, a verifier MUST: In order to verify a signature, a verifier MUST:
1. Examine the signature's metadata to confirm that the signature 1. Examine the signature's metadata to confirm that the signature
meets the requirements described in this document, as well as any meets the requirements described in this document, as well as any
additional requirements defined by the application such as which additional requirements defined by the application such as which
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Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When Application-specific requirements are expected and encouraged. When
an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them an application defines additional requirements, it MUST enforce them
during the signature verification process, and signature verification during the signature verification process, and signature verification
MUST fail if the signature does not conform to the application's MUST fail if the signature does not conform to the application's
requirements. requirements.
Applications MUST enforce the requirements defined in this document. Applications MUST enforce the requirements defined in this document.
Regardless of use case, applications MUST NOT accept signatures that Regardless of use case, applications MUST NOT accept signatures that
do not conform to these requirements. do not conform to these requirements.
4. The 'Signature' HTTP Header 4. Including a Message Signature in a Message
The "Signature" HTTP header provides a mechanism to attach a Message signatures can be included within an HTTP message via the
signature to the HTTP message from which it was generated. The "Signature-Input" and "Signature" HTTP header fields, both defined
header field name is "Signature" and its value is a list of within this specification. The "Signature" HTTP header field
parameters and values, formatted according to the "signature" syntax contains signature values, while the "Signature-Input" HTTP header
defined below, using the extended Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) field identifies the Covered Content and metadata that describe how
notation used in [HTTP]. each signature was generated.
signature = #( sig-param ) 4.1. The 'Signature-Input' HTTP Header
sig-param = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string ) The "Signature-Input" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured
Header [StructuredFields] containing the metadata for zero or more
message signatures generated from content within the HTTP message.
Each member describes a single message signature. The member's name
is an identifier that uniquely identifies the message signature
within the context of the HTTP message. The member's value is the
message signature's Covered Content, expressed as a List of Tokens.
Further signature metadata is expressed in parameters on the member
value, as described below.
Each "sig-param" is the name of a parameter defined in the 4.1.1. Metadata Parameters
Section 5.2 defined in this document. The initial contents of this
registry are described in Section 4.1.
4.1. Signature Header Parameters The parameters on each "Signature-Input" member value contain
metadata about the signature. Each parameter name MUST be a
parameter name registered in the IANA HTTP Signatures Metadata
Parameters Registry defined in Section 5.2 of this document. This
document defines the following parameters, and registers them as the
initial contents of the registry:
The Signature header's parameters contain the signature value itself alg
and the signature metadata properties required to verify the
signature. Unless otherwise specified, parameters MUST NOT occur
multiple times in one header, whether with the same or different
values. The following parameters are defined:
"algorithm" RECOMMENDED. The "alg" parameter is a Token containing the name
RECOMMENDED. The "algorithm" parameter contains the name of the of the signature's Algorithm, as registered in the HTTP Signature
signature's Algorithm, as registered in the HTTP Signature
Algorithms Registry defined by this document. Verifiers MUST Algorithms Registry defined by this document. Verifiers MUST
determine the signature's Algorithm from the "keyId" parameter determine the signature's Algorithm from the "keyId" parameter
rather than from "algorithm". If "algorithm" is provided and rather than from "alg". If "alg" is provided and differs from or
differs from or is incompatible with the algorithm or key material is incompatible with the algorithm or key material identified by
identified by "keyId" (for example, "algorithm" has a value of "keyId" (for example, "alg" has a value of "rsa-sha256" but
"rsa-sha256" but "keyId" identifies an EdDSA key), then "keyId" identifies an EdDSA key), then implementations MUST
implementations MUST produce an error. Implementers should note produce an error.
that previous versions of this specification determined the
signature's Algorithm using the "algorithm" parameter only, and
thus could be utilized by attackers to expose security
vulnerabilities. The default value for this parameter is
"hs2019".
"created" created
RECOMMENDED. The "created" parameter contains the signature's
Creation Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the RECOMMENDED. The "created" parameter is a Decimal containing the
"(created)" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If not signature's Creation Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of
specified, the signature's Creation Time is undefined. This the "*created" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If
not specified, the signature's Creation Time is undefined. This
parameter is useful when signers are not capable of controlling parameter is useful when signers are not capable of controlling
the "Date" HTTP Header such as when operating in certain web the Date HTTP Header such as when operating in certain web browser
browser environments. environments.
"expires" expires
OPTIONAL. The "expires" parameter contains the signature's
Expiration Time, expressed as the canonicalized value of the
"(expires)" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If the
signature does not have an Expiration Time, this parameter "MUST"
be omitted. If not specified, the signature's Expiration Time is
undefined.
"headers" OPTIONAL. The "expires" parameter is a Decimal containing the
OPTIONAL. The "headers" parameter contains the signature's signature's Expiration Time, expressed as the canonicalized value
Covered Content, expressed as a string containing a quoted list of of the "*expires" content identifier, as defined in Section 2. If
the identifiers in the list, in the order they occur in the list, the signature does not have an Expiration Time, this parameter
with a space "" "" between each identifier. If specified, MUST be omitted. If not specified, the signature's Expiration
identifiers for header fields SHOULD be lowercased and all others Time is undefined.
MUST be lowercased. The default value for this parameter is
"(created)".
"keyId" keyId
REQUIRED. The "keyId" parameter is a US-ASCII string whose value
can be used by a verifier to identify and/or obtain the
signature's "Verification Key Material". The format and semantics
of this value are out of scope for this document.
"signature" REQUIRED. The "keyId" parameter is a String whose value can be
REQUIRED. The "signature" parameter contains the signature value, used by a verifier to identify and/or obtain the signature's
as described in Section 3.2.3. Verification Key Material. Further format and semantics of this
value are out of scope for this document.
4.2. Example 4.2. The 'Signature' HTTP Header
The following is a non-normative example Signature header field The "Signature" HTTP header field is a Dictionary Structured Header
representing the signature in Figure 2: [StructuredFields] containing zero or more message signatures
generated from content within the HTTP message. Each member's name
is a signature identifier that is present as a member name in the
"Signature-Input" Structured Header within the HTTP message. Each
member's value is a Byte Sequence containing the signature value for
the message signature identified by the member name. Any member in
the "Signature" HTTP header field that does not have a corresponding
member in the HTTP message's "Signature-Input" HTTP header field MUST
be ignored.
Signature: keyId="test-key-b", algorithm="rsa-sha256", 4.3. Examples
created=1402170695, expires=1402170995,
headers="(request-target) (created) host date cache-control The following is a non-normative example of "Signature-Input" and
x-emptyheader x-example", "Signature" HTTP header fields representing the signature in
signature="T1l3tWH2cSP31nfuvc3nVaHQ6IAu9YLEXg2pCeEOJETXnlWbgKtBTa Figure 2:
XV6LNQWtf4O42V2DZwDZbmVZ8xW3TFW80RrfrY0+fyjD4OLN7/zV6L6d2v7uB
puWZ8QzKuHYFaRNVXgFBXN3VJnsIOUjv20pqZMKO3phLCKX2/zQzJLCBQvF/5 Signature-Input: sig1=(*request-target, *created, host, date,
UKtnJiMp1ACNhG8LF0Q0FPWfe86YZBBxqrQr5WfjMu0LOO52ZAxi9KTWSlceJ cache-control, x-empty-header, x-example); keyId="test-key-a";
2U361gDb7S5Deub8MaDrjUEpluphQeo8xyvHBoNXsqeax/WaHyRYOgaW6krxE alg=hs2019; created=1402170695; expires=1402170995
GVaBQAfA2czYZhEA05Tb38ahq/gwDQ1bagd9rGnCHtAg==" Signature: sig1=:K2qGT5srn2OGbOIDzQ6kYT+ruaycnDAAUpKv+ePFfD0RAxn/1BUe
Zx/Kdrq32DrfakQ6bPsvB9aqZqognNT6be4olHROIkeV879RrsrObury8L9SCEibe
oHyqU/yCjphSmEdd7WD+zrchK57quskKwRefy2iEC5S2uAH0EPyOZKWlvbKmKu5q4
CaB8X/I5/+HLZLGvDiezqi6/7p2Gngf5hwZ0lSdy39vyNMaaAT0tKo6nuVw0S1MVg
1Q7MpWYZs0soHjttq0uLIA3DIbQfLiIvK6/l0BdWTU7+2uQj7lBkQAsFZHoA96ZZg
FquQrXRlmYOh+Hx5D9fJkXcXe5tmAg==:
Since "Signature-Input" and "Signature" are both defined as
Dictionary Structured Headers, they can be used to easily include
multiple signatures within the same HTTP message. For example, a
signer may include multiple signatures signing the same content with
different keys and/or algorithms to support verifiers with different
capabilities, or a reverse proxy may include information about the
client in header fields when forwarding the request to a service
host, and may also include a signature over those fields and the
client's signature. The following is a non-normative example of
header fields a reverse proxy might add to a forwarded request that
contains the signature in the above example:
X-Forwarded-For: 192.0.2.123
Signature-Input: reverse_proxy_sig=(*created, host, date,
signature:sig1, x-forwarded-for); keyId="test-key-a";
alg=hs2019; created=1402170695; expires=1402170695.25
Signature: reverse_proxy_sig=:ON3HsnvuoTlX41xfcGWaOEVo1M3bJDRBOp0Pc/O
jAOWKQn0VMY0SvMMWXS7xG+xYVa152rRVAo6nMV7FS3rv0rR5MzXL8FCQ2A35DCEN
LOhEgj/S1IstEAEFsKmE9Bs7McBsCtJwQ3hMqdtFenkDffSoHOZOInkTYGafkoy78
l1VZvmb3Y4yf7McJwAvk2R3gwKRWiiRCw448Nt7JTWzhvEwbh7bN2swc/v3NJbg/w
JYyYVbelZx4IywuZnYFxgPl/qvqbAjeEVvaLKLgSMr11y+uzxCHoMnDUnTYhMrmOT
4O8lBLfRFOcoJPKBdoKg9U0a96U2mUug1bFOozEVYFg==:
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry 5.1. HTTP Signature Algorithms Registry
This document defines HTTP Signature Algorithms, for which IANA is This document defines HTTP Signature Algorithms, for which IANA is
asked to create and maintain a new registry titled "HTTP Signature asked to create and maintain a new registry titled "HTTP Signature
Algorithms". Initial values for this registry are given in Algorithms". Initial values for this registry are given in
Section 5.1.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing Section 5.1.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing
assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration
policy [BCP 26] and shall follow the template presented in policy [RFC8126] and shall follow the template presented in
Section 5.1.1. Section 5.1.1.
5.1.1. Registration Template 5.1.1. Registration Template
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
An identifier for the HTTP Signature Algorithm. The name MUST be An identifier for the HTTP Signature Algorithm. The name MUST be
an ASCII string consisting only of lower-case characters (""a"" - an ASCII string consisting only of lower-case characters (""a"" -
""z""), digits (""0"" - ""9""), and hyphens (""-""), and SHOULD ""z""), digits (""0"" - ""9""), and hyphens (""-""), and SHOULD
NOT exceed 20 characters in length. The identifier MUST be unique NOT exceed 20 characters in length. The identifier MUST be unique
within the context of the registry. within the context of the registry.
Status Status
A brief text description of the status of the algorithm. The A brief text description of the status of the algorithm. The
description MUST begin with one of "Active" or "Deprecated", and description MUST begin with one of "Active" or "Deprecated", and
MAY provide further context or explanation as to the reason for MAY provide further context or explanation as to the reason for
the status. the status.
Description Description
A description of the algorithm used to sign the signing string A description of the algorithm used to sign the signing string
when generating an HTTP Message Signature, or instructions on how when generating an HTTP Message Signature, or instructions on how
to determine that algorithm. When the description specifies an to determine that algorithm. When the description specifies an
algorithm, it MUST include a reference to the document or algorithm, it MUST include a reference to the document or
documents that define the algorithm. documents that define the algorithm.
5.1.2. Initial Contents 5.1.2. Initial Contents
[[ MS: The references in this section are problematic as many of the (( MS: The references in this section are problematic as many of the
specifications that they refer to are too implementation specific, specifications that they refer to are too implementation specific,
rather than just pointing to the proper signature and hashing rather than just pointing to the proper signature and hashing
specifications. A better approach might be just specifying the specifications. A better approach might be just specifying the
signature and hashing function specifications, leaving implementers signature and hashing function specifications, leaving implementers
to connect the dots (which are not that hard to connect). ]] to connect the dots (which are not that hard to connect). ))
"hs2019" 5.1.2.1. hs2019
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
"hs2019" "hs2019"
Status Status
active active
Description Description
Derived from metadata associated with "keyId". Recommend support
Derived from metadata associated with keyId. Recommend support
for: for:
* RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] using SHA-512 [RFC6234] * RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] using SHA-512 [RFC6234]
* HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-512 [RFC6234] * HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-512 [RFC6234]
* ECDSA using curve P-256 [DSS] and SHA-512 [RFC6234] * ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS [FIPS186-4] and SHA-512 [RFC6234]
* Ed25519ph, Ed25519ctx, and Ed25519 [RFC8032] * Ed25519ph, Ed25519ctx, and Ed25519 [RFC8032]
"rsa-sha1" 5.1.2.2. rsa-sha1
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
"rsa-sha1" "rsa-sha1"
Status Status
Deprecated; SHA-1 not secure. Deprecated; SHA-1 not secure.
Description Description
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] using SHA-1 [RFC6234] RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] using SHA-1 [RFC6234]
"rsa-sha256" 5.1.2.3. rsa-sha256
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
"rsa-sha256" "rsa-sha256"
Status Status
Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector. Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector.
Description Description
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] using SHA-256 [RFC6234] RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] using SHA-256 [RFC6234]
"hmac-sha256" 5.1.2.4. hmac-sha256
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
"hmac-sha256" "hmac-sha256"
Status Status
Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector. Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector.
Description Description
HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-256 [RFC6234] HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-256 [RFC6234]
"ecdsa-sha256" 5.1.2.5. ecdsa-sha256
Algorithm Name Algorithm Name
"ecdsa-sha256" "ecdsa-sha256"
Status Status
Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector. Deprecated; specifying signature algorithm enables attack vector.
Description Description
ECDSA using curve P-256 [DSS] and SHA-256 [RFC6234]
5.2. HTTP Signature Parameters Registry ECDSA using curve P-256 DSS [FIPS186-4] and SHA-256 [RFC6234]
This document defines the Signature header field, whose value
contains a list of named parameters. IANA is asked to create and
maintain a new registry titled "HTTP Signature Parameters" to record
and maintain the set of named parameters defined for use within the
Signature header field. Initial values for this registry are given
in Section 5.2.2. Future assignments and modifications to existing
assignment are to be made through the Expert Review registration
policy [BCP 26] and shall follow the template presented in
Section 5.2.1.
5.2.1. Registration Template
Name 5.2. HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters Registry
An identifier for the parameter. The name MUST be an ASCII string
consisting only of lower-case characters (""a"" - ""z""), digits
(""0"" - ""9""), and hyphens (""-""), and SHOULD NOT exceed 20
characters in length. The identifier MUST be unique within the
context of the registry.
Status This document defines the "Signature-Input" Structured Header, whose
A value indicating the status of the parameter definition. member values may have parameters containing metadata about a message
Allowed values are "Active" and "Deprecated". Active parameter signature. IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry
definitions are available for general use. Deprecated parameter titled "HTTP Signature Metadata Parameters" to record and maintain
definitions may be in use by existing implementations, but SHOULD the set of parameters defined for use with member values in the
NOT be used by new implementations. "Signature-Input" Structured Header. Initial values for this
registry are given in Section 5.2.2. Future assignments and
modifications to existing assignments are to be made through the
Expert Review registration policy [RFC8126] and shall follow the
template presented in Section 5.2.1.
Reference(s) 5.2.1. Registration Template
A reference or list of references to the documents that define the
purpose, content, and usage of the parameter. The parameter
definition MUST define the format of the parameter's value using
the extended ABNF notation used in [HTTP], or by referencing one
or more standard formats such as base 64 or URI. The parameter
definition MUST also specify the normative requirements for when
and how the parameter may be used. Value formats MUST NOT allow
values that would break the parameter list syntax used by the
Signature header.
5.2.2. Initial Contents 5.2.2. Initial Contents
The table below contains the initial contents of the HTTP Signature The table below contains the initial contents of the HTTP Signature
Parameters Registry. Each row in the table represents a distinct Metadata Parameters Registry. Each row in the table represents a
entry in the registry. distinct entry in the registry.
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+ +=========+========+================================+
| Name | Status | Reference(s) | | Name | Status | Reference(s) |
+=============+========+==============================+ +=========+========+================================+
| "algorithm" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document | | alg | Active | Section 4.1.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| "created" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document | | created | Active | Section 4.1.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| "expires" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document | | expires | Active | Section 4.1.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| "headers" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document | | keyId | Active | Section 4.1.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+ +---------+--------+--------------------------------+
| "keyId" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+
| "signature" | Active | Section 4.1 of this document |
+-------------+--------+------------------------------+
Table 4: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature Table 6: Initial contents of the HTTP Signature
Parameters Registry. Metadata Parameters Registry.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
[[ TODO: need to dive deeper on this section; not sure how much of (( TODO: need to dive deeper on this section; not sure how much of
what's referenced below is actually applicable, or if it covers what's referenced below is actually applicable, or if it covers
everything we need to worry about. ]] everything we need to worry about. ))
[[ TODO: Should provide some recommendations on how to determine what (( TODO: Should provide some recommendations on how to determine what
content needs to be signed for a given use case. ]] content needs to be signed for a given use case. ))
There are a number of security considerations to take into account There are a number of security considerations to take into account
when implementing or utilizing this specification. A thorough when implementing or utilizing this specification. A thorough
security analysis of this protocol, including its strengths and security analysis of this protocol, including its strengths and
weaknesses, can be found in Security Considerations for HTTP weaknesses, can be found in [WP-HTTP-Sig-Audit].
Signatures [WP-HTTP-Sig-Audit].
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[BCP 26] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [FIPS186-4]
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", 2013,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[DSS] NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/4/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/4/
final>. final>.
[HTTP] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[HTTP2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [HTTP2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[POSIX.1] IEEE and The Open Group, "The Open Group Base [MESSAGING]
Specifications Issue 7, 2018 edition", IEEE Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Std 1003.1-2017, 2018, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[POSIX.1] "The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, 2018
edition", 2018,
<https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/>. <https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SEMANTICS]
Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[StructuredFields]
"Structured Field Vaues for HTTP", 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-
header-structure>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC3230] Mogul, J. and A. Van Hoff, "Instance Digests in HTTP",
RFC 3230, DOI 10.17487/RFC3230, January 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3230>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC7239] Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension", [RFC7239] Petersson, A. and M. Nilsson, "Forwarded HTTP Extension",
RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014, RFC 7239, DOI 10.17487/RFC7239, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7239>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7239>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[TLS] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[WP-HTTP-Sig-Audit] [WP-HTTP-Sig-Audit]
Sporny, M., "Security Considerations for HTTP Signatures", "Security Considerations for HTTP Signatures", 2013,
June 2013, <https://web-payments.org/specs/source/http- <https://web-payments.org/specs/source/http-signatures-
signatures-audit/>. audit/>.
Appendix A. Examples Appendix A. Examples
A.1. Example Keys A.1. Example Keys
This section provides cryptographic keys that are referenced in This section provides cryptographic keys that are referenced in
example signatures throughout this document. These keys MUST NOT be example signatures throughout this document. These keys MUST NOT be
used for any purpose other than testing. used for any purpose other than testing.
A.1.1. "rsa-test" A.1.1. Example Key RSA test
The following key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair: The following key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair:
-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
MIIBCgKCAQEAhAKYdtoeoy8zcAcR874L8cnZxKzAGwd7v36APp7Pv6Q2jdsPBRrw MIIBCgKCAQEAhAKYdtoeoy8zcAcR874L8cnZxKzAGwd7v36APp7Pv6Q2jdsPBRrw
WEBnez6d0UDKDwGbc6nxfEXAy5mbhgajzrw3MOEt8uA5txSKobBpKDeBLOsdJKFq WEBnez6d0UDKDwGbc6nxfEXAy5mbhgajzrw3MOEt8uA5txSKobBpKDeBLOsdJKFq
MGmXCQvEG7YemcxDTRPxAleIAgYYRjTSd/QBwVW9OwNFhekro3RtlinV0a75jfZg MGmXCQvEG7YemcxDTRPxAleIAgYYRjTSd/QBwVW9OwNFhekro3RtlinV0a75jfZg
kne/YiktSvLG34lw2zqXBDTC5NHROUqGTlML4PlNZS5Ri2U4aCNx2rUPRcKIlE0P kne/YiktSvLG34lw2zqXBDTC5NHROUqGTlML4PlNZS5Ri2U4aCNx2rUPRcKIlE0P
uKxI4T+HIaFpv8+rdV6eUgOrB2xeI1dSFFn/nnv5OoZJEIB+VmuKn3DCUcCZSFlQ uKxI4T+HIaFpv8+rdV6eUgOrB2xeI1dSFFn/nnv5OoZJEIB+VmuKn3DCUcCZSFlQ
PSXSfBDiUGhwOw76WuSSsf1D4b/vLoJ10wIDAQAB PSXSfBDiUGhwOw76WuSSsf1D4b/vLoJ10wIDAQAB
skipping to change at page 24, line 42 skipping to change at page 28, line 42
9C+celgZd2PW7aGYLCHq7nPbmfDV0yHcWjOhXZ8jRMjmANVR/eLQ2EfsRLdW69bn 9C+celgZd2PW7aGYLCHq7nPbmfDV0yHcWjOhXZ8jRMjmANVR/eLQ2EfsRLdW69bn
f3ZD7JS1fwGnO3exGmHO3HZG+6AvberKYVYNHahNFEw5TsAcQWDLRpkGybBcxqZo f3ZD7JS1fwGnO3exGmHO3HZG+6AvberKYVYNHahNFEw5TsAcQWDLRpkGybBcxqZo
81YCqlqidwfeO5YtlO7etx1xLyqa2NsCeG9A86UjG+aeNnXEIDk1PDK+EuiThIUa 81YCqlqidwfeO5YtlO7etx1xLyqa2NsCeG9A86UjG+aeNnXEIDk1PDK+EuiThIUa
/2IxKzJKWl1BKr2d4xAfR0ZnEYuRrbeDQYgTImOlfW6/GuYIxKYgEKCFHFqJATAG /2IxKzJKWl1BKr2d4xAfR0ZnEYuRrbeDQYgTImOlfW6/GuYIxKYgEKCFHFqJATAG
IxHrq1PDOiSwXd2GmVVYyEmhZnbcp8CxaEMQoevxAta0ssMK3w6UsDtvUvYvF22m IxHrq1PDOiSwXd2GmVVYyEmhZnbcp8CxaEMQoevxAta0ssMK3w6UsDtvUvYvF22m
qQKBiD5GwESzsFPy3Ga0MvZpn3D6EJQLgsnrtUPZx+z2Ep2x0xc5orneB5fGyF1P qQKBiD5GwESzsFPy3Ga0MvZpn3D6EJQLgsnrtUPZx+z2Ep2x0xc5orneB5fGyF1P
WtP+fG5Q6Dpdz3LRfm+KwBCWFKQjg7uTxcjerhBWEYPmEMKYwTJF5PBG9/ddvHLQ WtP+fG5Q6Dpdz3LRfm+KwBCWFKQjg7uTxcjerhBWEYPmEMKYwTJF5PBG9/ddvHLQ
EQeNC8fHGg4UXU8mhHnSBt3EA10qQJfRDs15M38eG2cYwB1PZpDHScDnDA0= EQeNC8fHGg4UXU8mhHnSBt3EA10qQJfRDs15M38eG2cYwB1PZpDHScDnDA0=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. Example "keyId" Values A.2. Example keyId Values
The table below maps example "keyId" values to associated algorithms The table below maps example "keyId" values to associated algorithms
and/or keys. These are example mappings that are valid only within and/or keys. These are example mappings that are valid only within
the context of examples in examples within this and future documents the context of examples in examples within this and future documents
that reference this section. Unless otherwise specified, within the that reference this section. Unless otherwise specified, within the
context of examples it should be assumed that the signer and verifier context of examples it should be assumed that the signer and verifier
understand these "keyId" mappings. These "keyId" values are not understand these "keyId" mappings. These "keyId" values are not
reserved, and deployments are free to use them, with these reserved, and deployments are free to use them, with these
associations or others. associations or others.
+--------------+---------------------------------+-----------------+ +============+=================================+================+
| "keyId" | Algorithm | Verification | | keyId | Algorithm | Verification |
| | | Key | | | | Key |
+==============+=================================+=================+ +============+=================================+================+
| "test-key-a" | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS | The public key | | test-key-a | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS | The public key |
| | [RFC8017] and SHA-512 [RFC6234] | specified in | | | [RFC8017] and SHA-512 [RFC6234] | specified in |
| | | Appendix A.1.1. | | | | Appendix A.1.1 |
+--------------+---------------------------------+-----------------+ +------------+---------------------------------+----------------+
| "test-key-b" | "rsa-256" | The public key | | test-key-b | rsa-sha256 | The public key |
| | | specified in | | | | specified in |
| | | Appendix A.1.1. | | | | Appendix A.1.1 |
+--------------+---------------------------------+-----------------+ +------------+---------------------------------+----------------+
Table 5 Table 7
A.3. Test Cases A.3. Test Cases
This section provides non-normative examples that may be used as test This section provides non-normative examples that may be used as test
cases to validate implementation correctness. These examples are cases to validate implementation correctness. These examples are
based on the following HTTP message: based on the following HTTP message:
POST /foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1 POST /foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com Host: example.com
Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE= Digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=
Content-Length: 18 Content-Length: 18
{"hello": "world"} {"hello": "world"}
A.3.1. Signature Generation A.3.1. Signature Generation
A.3.1.1. "hs2019" signature over minimal recommended content A.3.1.1. hs2019 signature over minimal recommended content
This presents metadata for a Signature using "hs2019", over minimum This presents metadata for a Signature using "hs2019", over minimum
recommended data to sign: recommended data to sign:
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +==============+===================================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+==============+===================================+ +==============+===================================+
| Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS | | Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS |
| | [RFC8017] using SHA-512 [RFC6234] | | | [RFC8017] using SHA-512 [RFC6234] |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Covered | "(created) (request-target)" | | Covered | *created, *request-target |
| Content | | | Content | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 | | Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 |
| Time | | | Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Expiration | Undefined | | Expiration | Undefined |
| Time | | | Time | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key specified in | | Verification | The public key specified in |
| Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. | | Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +--------------+-----------------------------------+
Table 6 Table 8
The Signature Input is: The Signature Input is:
(created): 1402170695 *created: 1402170695
(request-target): post /foo?param=value&pet=dog *request-target: post /foo?param=value&pet=dog
The signature value is: The signature value is:
e3y37nxAoeuXw2KbaIxE2d9jpE7Z9okgizg6QbD2Z7fUVUvog+ZTKKLRBnhNglVIY6fAa QaVaWYfF2da6tG66Xtd0GrVFChJ0fOWUe/C6kaYESPiYYwnMH9egOgyKqgLLY9NQJFk7b
YlHwx7ZAXXdBVF8gjWBPL6U9zRrB4PFzjoLSxHaqsvS0ZK9FRxpenptgukaVQ1aeva3PE QY834sHEUwjS5ByEBaO3QNwIvqEY1qAAU/2MX14tc9Yn7ELBnaaNHaHkV3xVO9KIuLT7V
1aD6zZ93df2lFIFXGDefYCQ+M/SrDGQOFvaVykEkte5mO6zQZ/HpokjMKvilfSMJS+vbv 6e4OUuGb1axfbXpMgPEql6CEFrn6K95CLuuKP5/gOEcBtmJp5L58gN4VvZrk2OVA6U971
C1GJItQpjs636Db+7zB2W1BurkGxtQdCLDXuIDg4S8pPSDihkch/dUzL2BpML3PXGKVXw YiEDNuDa4CwMcQMvcGssbc/L3OULTUffD/1VcPtdGImP2uvVQntpT8b2lBeBpfh8MuaV2
HOUkVG6Q2ge07IYdzya6N1fIVA9eKI1Y47HT35QliVAxZgE0EZLo8mxq19ReIVvuFg== vtzidyBYFtAUoYhRWO8+ntqA1q2OK4LMjM2XgDScSVWvGdVd459A0wI9lRlnPap3zg==
A possible Signature header for this signature is: A possible "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header containing this
signature is:
Signature: keyId="test-key-a", created=1402170695, Signature-Input: sig1=(*created, *request-target);
headers="(created) (request-target)", keyId="test-key-a"; created=1402170695
signature="e3y37nxAoeuXw2KbaIxE2d9jpE7Z9okgizg6QbD2Z7fUVUvog+ZTKK Signature: sig1=:QaVaWYfF2da6tG66Xtd0GrVFChJ0fOWUe/C6kaYESPiYYwnMH9eg
LRBnhNglVIY6fAaYlHwx7ZAXXdBVF8gjWBPL6U9zRrB4PFzjoLSxHaqsvS0ZK OgyKqgLLY9NQJFk7bQY834sHEUwjS5ByEBaO3QNwIvqEY1qAAU/2MX14tc9Yn7ELB
9FRxpenptgukaVQ1aeva3PE1aD6zZ93df2lFIFXGDefYCQ+M/SrDGQOFvaVyk naaNHaHkV3xVO9KIuLT7V6e4OUuGb1axfbXpMgPEql6CEFrn6K95CLuuKP5/gOEcB
Ekte5mO6zQZ/HpokjMKvilfSMJS+vbvC1GJItQpjs636Db+7zB2W1BurkGxtQ tmJp5L58gN4VvZrk2OVA6U971YiEDNuDa4CwMcQMvcGssbc/L3OULTUffD/1VcPtd
dCLDXuIDg4S8pPSDihkch/dUzL2BpML3PXGKVXwHOUkVG6Q2ge07IYdzya6N1 GImP2uvVQntpT8b2lBeBpfh8MuaV2vtzidyBYFtAUoYhRWO8+ntqA1q2OK4LMjM2X
fIVA9eKI1Y47HT35QliVAxZgE0EZLo8mxq19ReIVvuFg==" gDScSVWvGdVd459A0wI9lRlnPap3zg==:
A.3.1.2. "hs2019" signature covering all header fields A.3.1.2. hs2019 signature covering all header fields
This presents metadata for a Signature using "hs2019" that covers all This presents metadata for a Signature using "hs2019" that covers all
header fields in the request: header fields in the request:
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +==============+========================================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+==============+==================================================+ +==============+========================================+
| Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] using | | Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] |
| | SHA-512 [RFC6234] | | | using SHA-512 [RFC6234] |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+----------------------------------------+
| Covered | "(created)", "(request-target)", "host", "date", | | Covered | *created, *request-target, host, date, |
| Content | "content-type", "digest", "content-length" | | Content | content-type, digest, content-length |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+----------------------------------------+
| Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 | | Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 |
| Time | | | Time | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+----------------------------------------+
| Expiration | Undefined | | Expiration | Undefined |
| Time | | | Time | |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+----------------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key specified in Appendix A.1.1. | | Verification | The public key specified in |
| Key Material | | | Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
+--------------+--------------------------------------------------+ +--------------+----------------------------------------+
Table 7 Table 9
The Signature Input is: The Signature Input is:
(created): 1402170695 *created: 1402170695
(request-target): post /foo?param=value&pet=dog *request-target: post /foo?param=value&pet=dog
host: example.com host: example.com
date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
content-type: application/json content-type: application/json
digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE= digest: SHA-256=X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=
content-length: 18 content-length: 18
The signature value is: The signature value is:
KXUj1H3ZOhv3Nk4xlRLTn4bOMlMOmFiud3VXrMa9MaLCxnVmrqOX5BulRvB65YW/wQp0o B24UG4FaiE2kSXBNKV4DA91J+mElAhS3mncrgyteAye1GKMpmzt8jkHNjoudtqw3GngGY
T/nNQpXgOYeY8ovmHlpkRyz5buNDqoOpRsCpLGxsIJ9cX8XVsM9jy+Q1+RIlD9wfWoPHh 3n0mmwjdfn1eA6nAjgeHwl0WXced5tONcCPNzLswqPOiobGeA5y4WE8iBveel30OKYVel
qhoXt35ZkasuIDPF/AETuObs9QydlsqONwbK+TdQguDK/8Va1Pocl6wK1uLwqcXlxhPEb 0lZ1OnXOmN5TIEIIPo9LrE+LzZis6A0HA1FRMtKgKGhT3N965pkqfhKbq/V48kpJKT8+c
55EmdYB9pddDyHTADING7K4qMwof2mC3t8Pb0yoLZoZX5a4Or4FrCCKK/9BHAhq/RsVk0 Zs0TOn4HFMG+OIy6c9ofSBrXD68yxP6QYTz6xH0GMWawLyPLYR52j3I05fK1ylAb6K0ox
dTENMbTB4i7cHvKQu+o9xuYWuxyvBa0Z6NdOb0di70cdrSDEsL5Gz7LBY5J2N9KdGg== PxzQ5nwrLD+mUVPZ9rDs1En6fmOX9xfkZTblG/5D+s1fHHs9dDXCOVkT5dLS8DjdIA==
A possible Signature header for this signature is: A possible "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header containing this
signature is:
Signature: keyId="test-key-a", algorithm="hs2019", Signature-Input: sig1=(*request-target, *created, host, date,
created=1402170695, content-type, digest, content-length); keyId="test-key-a";
headers="(request-target) (created) host date content-type digest alg=hs2019; created=1402170695
content-length", Signature: sig1=:B24UG4FaiE2kSXBNKV4DA91J+mElAhS3mncrgyteAye1GKMpmzt8
signature="KXUj1H3ZOhv3Nk4xlRLTn4bOMlMOmFiud3VXrMa9MaLCxnVmrqOX5B jkHNjoudtqw3GngGY3n0mmwjdfn1eA6nAjgeHwl0WXced5tONcCPNzLswqPOiobGe
ulRvB65YW/wQp0oT/nNQpXgOYeY8ovmHlpkRyz5buNDqoOpRsCpLGxsIJ9cX8 A5y4WE8iBveel30OKYVel0lZ1OnXOmN5TIEIIPo9LrE+LzZis6A0HA1FRMtKgKGhT
XVsM9jy+Q1+RIlD9wfWoPHhqhoXt35ZkasuIDPF/AETuObs9QydlsqONwbK+T 3N965pkqfhKbq/V48kpJKT8+cZs0TOn4HFMG+OIy6c9ofSBrXD68yxP6QYTz6xH0G
dQguDK/8Va1Pocl6wK1uLwqcXlxhPEb55EmdYB9pddDyHTADING7K4qMwof2m MWawLyPLYR52j3I05fK1ylAb6K0oxPxzQ5nwrLD+mUVPZ9rDs1En6fmOX9xfkZTbl
C3t8Pb0yoLZoZX5a4Or4FrCCKK/9BHAhq/RsVk0dTENMbTB4i7cHvKQu+o9xu G/5D+s1fHHs9dDXCOVkT5dLS8DjdIA==:
YWuxyvBa0Z6NdOb0di70cdrSDEsL5Gz7LBY5J2N9KdGg=="
A.3.2. Signature Verification A.3.2. Signature Verification
A.3.2.1. Minimal Required Signature Header A.3.2.1. Minimal Required Signature Header
This presents a Signature header containing only the minimal required This presents a "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header containing
parameters: only the minimal required parameters:
Signature: keyId="test-key-a", (created): 1402170695, Signature-Input: sig1=(); keyId="test-key-a"; created=1402170695
signature="V3SijFpJOvDUT8t1/EnYli/4TbF2AGqwBGiGUGrgClCkiOAIlOxxY7 Signature: sig1=:cxieW5ZKV9R9A70+Ua1A/1FCvVayuE6Z77wDGNVFSiluSzR9TYFV
2Mr13DccFkYzg3gX1jIOpKXzH70C5bru4b71SBG+ShiJLu34gHCG33iw44NLG vwUjeU6CTYUdbOByGMCee5q1eWWUOM8BIH04Si6VndEHjQVdHqshAtNJk2Quzs6WC
UvT5+F+LCKbbHberyk8eyYsZ+TLwtZAYKafxfNOWQXF4o3QaWslDMm8Tcgrd8 2DkV0vysOhBSvFZuLZvtCmXRQfYGTGhZqGwq/AAmFbt5WNLQtDrEe0ErveEKBfaz+
onM45ayFyR4nXRlcGad4PISYGz8PmO4Y+K8RYOyDkgsmRxKtftFQUYG41anyE IJ35zhaj+dun71YZ82b/CRfO6fSSt8VXeJuvdqUuVPWqjgJD4n9mgZpZFGBaDdPiw
lccNLfEfLBKsyV6kxr36U1Q7FdUopLv8kqluQySrWD6kesvFxNvbEOi+1uZqT pfbVZHzcHrumFJeFHWXH64a+c5GN+TWlP8NPg2zFdEc/joMymBiRelq236WGm5VvV
uFlK8ZldITQiqtNYaabRjQFZio63gma2y+UAaTGLdM9A==" 9a22RW2/yLmaU/uwf9v40yGR/I1NRA==:
The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field
is: is:
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +=================+==========================================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+==============+===================================+ +=================+==========================================+
| Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS | | Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 |
| | [RFC8017] using SHA-256 [RFC6234] | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ | Covered Content | *created |
| Covered | "(created)" | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| Content | | | Creation Time | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 | | Expiration Time | Undefined |
| Time | | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ | Verification | The public key specified in |
| Expiration | Undefined | | Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
| Time | | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key specified in |
| Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+
Table 8 Table 10
The corresponding Signature Input is: The corresponding Signature Input is:
(created): 1402170695 *created: 1402170695
A.3.2.2. Minimal Recommended Signature Header A.3.2.2. Minimal Recommended Signature Header
This presents a Signature header containing only the minimal required This presents a "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header containing
and recommended parameters: only the minimal required and recommended parameters:
Signature: algorithm="hs2019", keyId="test-key-a", Signature-Input: sig1=(); alg=hs2019; keyId="test-key-a";
(created): 1402170695, created=1402170695
signature="V3SijFpJOvDUT8t1/EnYli/4TbF2AGqwBGiGUGrgClCkiOAIlOxxY7 Signature: sig1=:cxieW5ZKV9R9A70+Ua1A/1FCvVayuE6Z77wDGNVFSiluSzR9TYFV
2Mr13DccFkYzg3gX1jIOpKXzH70C5bru4b71SBG+ShiJLu34gHCG33iw44NLG vwUjeU6CTYUdbOByGMCee5q1eWWUOM8BIH04Si6VndEHjQVdHqshAtNJk2Quzs6WC
UvT5+F+LCKbbHberyk8eyYsZ+TLwtZAYKafxfNOWQXF4o3QaWslDMm8Tcgrd8 2DkV0vysOhBSvFZuLZvtCmXRQfYGTGhZqGwq/AAmFbt5WNLQtDrEe0ErveEKBfaz+
onM45ayFyR4nXRlcGad4PISYGz8PmO4Y+K8RYOyDkgsmRxKtftFQUYG41anyE IJ35zhaj+dun71YZ82b/CRfO6fSSt8VXeJuvdqUuVPWqjgJD4n9mgZpZFGBaDdPiw
lccNLfEfLBKsyV6kxr36U1Q7FdUopLv8kqluQySrWD6kesvFxNvbEOi+1uZqT pfbVZHzcHrumFJeFHWXH64a+c5GN+TWlP8NPg2zFdEc/joMymBiRelq236WGm5VvV
uFlK8ZldITQiqtNYaabRjQFZio63gma2y+UAaTGLdM9A==" 9a22RW2/yLmaU/uwf9v40yGR/I1NRA==:
The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field
is: is:
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +=================+==========================================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+==============+===================================+ +=================+==========================================+
| Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS | | Algorithm | "hs2019", using RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 |
| | [RFC8017] using SHA-512 [RFC6234] | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ | Covered Content | *created |
| Covered | "(created)" | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| Content | | | Creation Time | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
| Creation | 8:51:35 PM GMT, June 7th, 2014 | | Expiration Time | Undefined |
| Time | | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+ | Verification | The public key specified in |
| Expiration | Undefined | | Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
| Time | | +-----------------+------------------------------------------+
+--------------+-----------------------------------+
| Verification | The public key specified in |
| Key Material | Appendix A.1.1. |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+
Table 9 Table 11
The corresponding Signature Input is: The corresponding Signature Input is:
(created): 1402170695 *created: 1402170695
A.3.2.3. Minimal Signature Header using "rsa-256" A.3.2.3. Minimal Signature Header using rsa-sha256
This presents a minimal Signature header for a signature using the This presents a minimal "Signature-Input" and "Signature" header for
"rsa-256" algorithm: a signature using the "rsa-sha256" algorithm:
Signature: algorithm="rsa-256", keyId="test-key-b", Signature: sig1=(date); alg=rsa-sha256; keyId="test-key-b"
headers="date", Signature: sig1=:HtXycCl97RBVkZi66ADKnC9c5eSSlb57GnQ4KFqNZplOpNfxqk62
signature="HtXycCl97RBVkZi66ADKnC9c5eSSlb57GnQ4KFqNZplOpNfxqk62Jz JzZ484jXgLvoOTRaKfR4hwyxlcyb+BWkVasApQovBSdit9Ml/YmN2IvJDPncrlhPD
Z484jXgLvoOTRaKfR4hwyxlcyb+BWkVasApQovBSdit9Ml/YmN2IvJDPncrlh VDv36Z9/DiSO+RNHD7iLXugdXo1+MGRimW1RmYdenl/ITeb7rjfLZ4b9VNnLFtVWw
PDVDv36Z9/DiSO+RNHD7iLXugdXo1+MGRimW1RmYdenl/ITeb7rjfLZ4b9VNn rjhAiwIqeLjodVImzVc5srrk19HMZNuUejK6I3/MyN3+3U8tIRW4LWzx6ZgGZUaEE
LFtVWwrjhAiwIqeLjodVImzVc5srrk19HMZNuUejK6I3/MyN3+3U8tIRW4LWz P0aBlBkt7Fj0Tt5/P5HNW/Sa/m8smxbOHnwzAJDa10PyjzdIbywlnWIIWtZKPPsoV
x6ZgGZUaEEP0aBlBkt7Fj0Tt5/P5HNW/Sa/m8smxbOHnwzAJDa10PyjzdIbyw oKVopUWEU3TNhpWmaVhFrUL/O6SN3w==:
lnWIIWtZKPPsoVoKVopUWEU3TNhpWmaVhFrUL/O6SN3w=="
The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field The corresponding signature metadata derived from this header field
is: is:
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +===========================+==========================+
| Property | Value | | Property | Value |
+===========================+==========================+ +===========================+==========================+
| Algorithm | "rsa-256" | | Algorithm | rsa-sha256 |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Covered Content | "date" | | Covered Content | date |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Creation Time | Undefined | | Creation Time | Undefined |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Expiration Time | Undefined | | Expiration Time | Undefined |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------------------------+
| Verification Key Material | The public key specified | | Verification Key Material | The public key specified |
| | in Appendix A.1.1. | | | in Appendix A.1.1. |
+---------------------------+--------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 10 Table 12
The corresponding Signature Input is: The corresponding Signature Input is:
date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT date: Tue, 07 Jun 2014 20:51:35 GMT
Appendix B. Topics for Working Group Discussion Appendix B. Topics for Working Group Discussion
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
The goal of this draft document is to provide a starting point at The draft has known issues that will need to be addressed during
feature parity and compatible with the cavage-12 draft. The draft development, and these issues have been enumerated but not addressed
has known issues that will need to be addressed during development, in this version. Topics are not listed in any particular order.
and in the spirit of keeping compatibility, these issues have been
enumerated but not addressed in this version. The editor recommends
the working group discuss the issues and features described in this
section after adoption of the document by the working group. Topics
are not listed in any particular order.
B.1. Issues B.1. Issues
B.1.1. Confusing guidance on algorithm and key identification B.1.1. Confusing guidance on algorithm and key identification
The current draft encourages determining the Algorithm metadata The current draft encourages determining the Algorithm metadata
property from the "keyId" field, both in the guidance for the use of property from the "keyId" field, both in the guidance for the use of
"algorithm" and "keyId", and the definition for the "hs2019" "algorithm" and "keyId", and the definition for the "hs2019"
algorithm and deprecation of the other algorithms in the registry. algorithm and deprecation of the other algorithms in the registry.
The current state arose from concern that a malicious party could The current state arose from concern that a malicious party could
change the value of the "algorithm" parameter, potentially tricking change the value of the "algorithm" parameter, potentially tricking
skipping to change at page 31, line 24 skipping to change at page 35, line 24
Punting algorithm identification into "keyId" hurts interoperability, Punting algorithm identification into "keyId" hurts interoperability,
since we aren't defining the syntax or semantics of "keyId". It since we aren't defining the syntax or semantics of "keyId". It
actually goes against that claim, as we are dictating that the actually goes against that claim, as we are dictating that the
signing algorithm must be specified by "keyId" or derivable from it. signing algorithm must be specified by "keyId" or derivable from it.
It also renders the algorithm registry essentially useless. Instead It also renders the algorithm registry essentially useless. Instead
of this approach, we can protect against manipulation of the of this approach, we can protect against manipulation of the
Signature header field by adding support for (and possibly mandating) Signature header field by adding support for (and possibly mandating)
including Signature metadata within the Signature Input. including Signature metadata within the Signature Input.
B.1.2. Lack of definition of "keyId" hurts interoperability B.1.2. Lack of definition of keyId hurts interoperability
The current text leaves the format and semantics of "keyId" The current text leaves the format and semantics of "keyId"
completely up to the implementation. This is primarily due to the completely up to the implementation. This is primarily due to the
fact that most implementers of Cavage have extensive investment in fact that most implementers of Cavage have extensive investment in
key distribution and management, and just need to plug an identifier key distribution and management, and just need to plug an identifier
into the header. We should support those cases, but we also need to into the header. We should support those cases, but we also need to
provide guidance for the developer that doesn't have that and just provide guidance for the developer that doesn't have that and just
wants to know how to identify a key. It may be enough to punt this wants to know how to identify a key. It may be enough to punt this
to profiling specs, but this needs to be explored more. to profiling specs, but this needs to be explored more.
B.1.3. Algorithm Registry duplicates work of JWA B.1.3. Algorithm Registry duplicates work of JWA
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518] already defines an IANA registry [RFC7518] already defines an IANA registry for cryptographic
for cryptographic algorithms. This wasn't used by Cavage out of algorithms. This wasn't used by Cavage out of concerns about
concerns about complexity of JOSE, and issues with JWE and JWS being complexity of JOSE, and issues with JWE and JWS being too flexible,
too flexible, leading to insecure combinations of options. Using leading to insecure combinations of options. Using JWA's definitions
JWA's definitions does not need to mean we're using JOSE, however. does not need to mean we're using JOSE, however. We should look at
We should look at if/how we can leverage JWA's work without if/how we can leverage JWA's work without introducing too many sharp
introducing too many sharp edges for implementers. edges for implementers.
In any use of JWS algorithms, this spec would define a way to create In any use of JWS algorithms, this spec would define a way to create
the JWS Signing Input string to be applied to the algorithm. It the JWS Signing Input string to be applied to the algorithm. It
should be noted that this is incompatible with JWS itself, which should be noted that this is incompatible with JWS itself, which
requires the inclusion of a structured header in the signature input. requires the inclusion of a structured header in the signature input.
A possible approach is to incorporate all elements of the JWA A possible approach is to incorporate all elements of the JWA
signature algorithm registry into this spec using a prefix or other signature algorithm registry into this spec using a prefix or other
marker, such as "jws-RS256" for the RSA 256 JSON Web Signature marker, such as "jws-RS256" for the RSA 256 JSON Web Signature
algorithm. algorithm.
skipping to change at page 32, line 20 skipping to change at page 36, line 23
The initial entries in this document reflect those in Cavage. The The initial entries in this document reflect those in Cavage. The
ones that are marked deprecated were done so because of the issue ones that are marked deprecated were done so because of the issue
explained in Appendix B.1.1, with the possible exception of "rsa- explained in Appendix B.1.1, with the possible exception of "rsa-
sha1". We should probably just remove that one. sha1". We should probably just remove that one.
B.1.5. No percent-encoding normalization of path/query B.1.5. No percent-encoding normalization of path/query
See: issue #26 (https://github.com/w3c-dvcg/http-signatures/ See: issue #26 (https://github.com/w3c-dvcg/http-signatures/
issues/26) issues/26)
The canonicalization rules for "(request-target)" do not perform The canonicalization rules for "*request-target" do not perform
handle minor, semantically meaningless differences in percent- handle minor, semantically meaningless differences in percent-
encoding, such that verification could fail if an intermediary encoding, such that verification could fail if an intermediary
normalizes the effective request URI prior to forwarding the message. normalizes the effective request URI prior to forwarding the message.
At a minimum, they should be case and percent-encoding normalized as At a minimum, they should be case and percent-encoding normalized as
described in sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2 of [RFC3986]. described in sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2 of [RFC3986].
B.1.6. Misleading name for "headers" parameter B.1.6. Misleading name for headers parameter
The Covered Content list contains identifiers for more than just The Covered Content list contains identifiers for more than just
headers, so the "header" parameter name is no longer appropriate. headers, so the "header" parameter name is no longer appropriate.
Some alternatives: "content", "signed-content", "covered-content". Some alternatives: "content", "signed-content", "covered-content".
B.1.7. Changes to whitespace in header field values break verification B.1.7. Changes to whitespace in header field values break verification
Some header field values contain RWS, OWS, and/or BWS. Since the Some header field values contain RWS, OWS, and/or BWS. Since the
header field value canonicalization rules do not address whitespace, header field value canonicalization rules do not address whitespace,
changes to it (e.g., removing OWS or BWS or replacing strings of RWS changes to it (e.g., removing OWS or BWS or replacing strings of RWS
skipping to change at page 33, line 25 skipping to change at page 37, line 30
B.1.12. Max values, precision for Integer String and Decimal String not B.1.12. Max values, precision for Integer String and Decimal String not
defined defined
The definitions for Integer String and Decimal String do not specify The definitions for Integer String and Decimal String do not specify
a maximum value. The definition for Decimal String (used to provide a maximum value. The definition for Decimal String (used to provide
sub-second precision for Expiration Time) does not define minimum or sub-second precision for Expiration Time) does not define minimum or
maximum precision requirements. It should set a sane requirement maximum precision requirements. It should set a sane requirement
here (e.g., MUST support up to 3 decimal places and no more). here (e.g., MUST support up to 3 decimal places and no more).
B.1.13. "keyId" parameter value could break list syntax B.1.13. keyId parameter value could break list syntax
The "keyId" parameter value needs to be constrained so as to not The "keyId" parameter value needs to be constrained so as to not
break list syntax (e.g., by containing a comma). break list syntax (e.g., by containing a comma).
B.1.14. Creation Time and Expiration Time do not allow for clock skew B.1.14. Creation Time and Expiration Time do not allow for clock skew
The processing instructions for Creation Time and Expiration Time The processing instructions for Creation Time and Expiration Time
imply that verifiers are not permitted to account for clock skew imply that verifiers are not permitted to account for clock skew
during signature verification. during signature verification.
skipping to change at page 34, line 15 skipping to change at page 38, line 23
B.1.17. Remove algorithm-specific rules for content identifiers B.1.17. Remove algorithm-specific rules for content identifiers
The rules that restrict when the signer can or must include certain The rules that restrict when the signer can or must include certain
identifiers appear to be related to the pseudo-revving of the Cavage identifiers appear to be related to the pseudo-revving of the Cavage
draft that happened when the "hs2019" algorithm was introduced. We draft that happened when the "hs2019" algorithm was introduced. We
should drop these rules, as it can be expected that anyone should drop these rules, as it can be expected that anyone
implementing this draft will support all content identifiers. implementing this draft will support all content identifiers.
B.1.18. Add guidance for signing compressed headers B.1.18. Add guidance for signing compressed headers
The draft should provide guidance on how to sign headers when HTTP/2 The draft should provide guidance on how to sign headers when
header compression [RFC7541] is used. This guidance might be as [RFC7541] is used. This guidance might be as simple as "sign the
simple as "sign the uncompressed header field value." uncompressed header field value."
B.1.19. Transformations to Via header field value break verification B.1.19. Transformations to Via header field value break verification
Intermediaries are permitted to strip comments from the Via header Intermediaries are permitted to strip comments from the "Via" header
field value, and consolidate related sequences of entries. The field value, and consolidate related sequences of entries. The
canonicalization rules do not account for these changes, and thus canonicalization rules do not account for these changes, and thus
they cause signature verification to fail if the Via header is they cause signature verification to fail if the "Via" header is
signed. At the very least, guidance on signing or not signing Via signed. At the very least, guidance on signing or not signing "Via"
headers needs to be included. headers needs to be included.
B.1.20. Case changes to case-insensitive header field values break B.1.20. Case changes to case-insensitive header field values break
verification verification
Some header field values are case-insensitive, in whole or in part. Some header field values are case-insensitive, in whole or in part.
The canonicalization rules do not account for this, thus a case The canonicalization rules do not account for this, thus a case
change to a covered header field value causes verification to fail. change to a covered header field value causes verification to fail.
B.1.21. Need more examples for Signature header B.1.21. Need more examples for Signature header
skipping to change at page 35, line 22 skipping to change at page 39, line 33
* The value used for the "keyId" parameter * The value used for the "keyId" parameter
* Request method * Request method
* Individual components of the effective request URI: scheme, * Individual components of the effective request URI: scheme,
authority, path, query authority, path, query
* Status code * Status code
* Request body (currently supported via Digest header) * Request body (currently supported via Digest header [RFC3230] )
B.2.2. Multiple signature support B.2.2. Multiple signature support
[[ Editor's note: I believe this use case is theoretical. Please let (( Editor's note: I believe this use case is theoretical. Please let
me know if this is a use case you have. ]] me know if this is a use case you have. ))
There may be scenarios where attaching multiple signatures to a There may be scenarios where attaching multiple signatures to a
single message is useful: single message is useful:
* A gateway attaches a signature over headers it adds (e.g., * A gateway attaches a signature over headers it adds (e.g.,
Forwarded) to messages already signed by the user agent. "Forwarded") to messages already signed by the user agent.
* A signer attaches two signatures signed by different keys, to be * A signer attaches two signatures signed by different keys, to be
verified by different entities. verified by different entities.
This could be addressed by changing the Signature header syntax to This could be addressed by changing the Signature header syntax to
accept a list of parameter sets for a single signature, e.g., by accept a list of parameter sets for a single signature, e.g., by
separating parameters with "";"" instead of "","". It may also be separating parameters with "";"" instead of "","". It may also be
necessary to include a signature identifier parameter. necessary to include a signature identifier parameter.
B.2.3. Support for incremental signing of header field value list items B.2.3. Support for incremental signing of header field value list items
[[ Editor's note: I believe this use case is theoretical. Please let (( Editor's note: I believe this use case is theoretical. Please let
me know if this is a use case you have. ]] me know if this is a use case you have. ))
Currently, signing a header field value is all-or-nothing: either the Currently, signing a header field value is all-or-nothing: either the
entire value is signed, or none of it is. For header fields that use entire value is signed, or none of it is. For header fields that use
list syntax, it would be useful to be able to specify which items in list syntax, it would be useful to be able to specify which items in
the list are signed. the list are signed.
A simple approach that allowed the signer to indicate the list size A simple approach that allowed the signer to indicate the list size
at signing time would allow a signer to sign header fields that are at signing time would allow a signer to sign header fields that are
may be appended to by intermediaries as the message makes its way to may be appended to by intermediaries as the message makes its way to
the recipient. Specifying list size in terms of number of items the recipient. Specifying list size in terms of number of items
skipping to change at page 36, line 28 skipping to change at page 40, line 38
expected to change, for example from "public-service- expected to change, for example from "public-service-
name.example.com" to "service-host-1.public-service- name.example.com" to "service-host-1.public-service-
name.example.com". This is commonly the case for services that are name.example.com". This is commonly the case for services that are
hosted behind a load-balancing gateway, where the client sends hosted behind a load-balancing gateway, where the client sends
requests to a publicly known domain name for the service, and these requests to a publicly known domain name for the service, and these
requests are transformed by the gateway into requests to specific requests are transformed by the gateway into requests to specific
hosts in the service fleet. hosts in the service fleet.
One possible way to handle this would be to special-case the Host One possible way to handle this would be to special-case the Host
header field to allow verifier to substitute a known expected value, header field to allow verifier to substitute a known expected value,
or a value provided in another header field (e.g., Via) when or a value provided in another header field (e.g., "Via") when
generating the Signature Input, provided that the verifier also generating the Signature Input, provided that the verifier also
recognizes the real value in the Host header. Alternatively, this recognizes the real value in the "Host" header. Alternatively, this
logic could apply to an "(audience)" content identifier. logic could apply to an "(audience)" content identifier.
B.2.5. Support for signing specific cookies B.2.5. Support for signing specific cookies
A signer may only wish to sign one or a few cookies, for example if A signer may only wish to sign one or a few cookies, for example if
the website requires its authentication state cookie to be signed, the website requires its authentication state cookie to be signed,
but also sets other cookies (e.g., for analytics, ad tracking, etc.) but also sets other cookies (e.g., for analytics, ad tracking, etc.)
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
This specification is based on the draft-cavage-http-signatures This specification is based on the draft-cavage-http-signatures
draft. The editor would like to thank the authors of that draft, draft. The editor would like to thank the authors of that draft,
Mark Cavage and Manu Sporny, for their work on that draft and their Mark Cavage and Manu Sporny, for their work on that draft and their
continuing contributions. continuing contributions.
The editor would also like to thank the following individuals for The editor would also like to thank the following individuals for
feedback on and implementations of the draft-cavage-http-signatures feedback on and implementations of the draft-cavage-http-signatures
draft (in alphabetical order): Mark Adamcin, Mark Allen, Paul draft (in alphabetical order): Mark Adamcin, Mark Allen, Paul
Annesley, Karl B&#246;hlmark, St&#233;phane Bortzmeyer, Sarven Annesley, Karl Boehlmark, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Sarven Capadisli, Liam
Capadisli, Liam Dennehy, ductm54, Stephen Farrell, Phillip Hallam- Dennehy, ductm54, Stephen Farrell, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Eric Holmes,
Baker, Eric Holmes, Andrey Kislyuk, Adam Knight, Dave Lehn, Dave Andrey Kislyuk, Adam Knight, Dave Lehn, Dave Longley, James H.
Longley, James H. Manger, Ilari Liusvaara, Mark Nottingham, Yoav Manger, Ilari Liusvaara, Mark Nottingham, Yoav Nir, Adrian Palmer,
Nir, Adrian Palmer, Lucas Pardue, Roberto Polli, Julian Reschke, Lucas Pardue, Roberto Polli, Julian Reschke, Michael Richardson,
Michael Richardson, Wojciech Rygielski, Adam Scarr, Cory J. Slep, Wojciech Rygielski, Adam Scarr, Cory J. Slep, Dirk Stein, Henry
Dirk Stein, Henry Story, Lukasz Szewc, Chris Webber, and Jeffrey Story, Lukasz Szewc, Chris Webber, and Jeffrey Yasskin
Yasskin
Document History Document History
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
* *draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures* * draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures
- *-00* - Since -01
o Copied from draft-richanna-http-message-signatures o Replaced unstructured "Signature" header with "Signature-
Input" and "Signature" Dictionary Structured Header Fields.
o Corrected header field content identifiers in Table 1. o Defined content identifiers for individual Dictionary
members, e.g., "x-dictionary-field:member-name".
* *draft-richanna-http-message-signatures* o Defined content identifiers for first N members of a List,
e.g., "x-list-field:4".
- *-00* o Fixed up examples.
o Updated introduction now that it's adopted.
- -01
o Strengthened requirement for content identifiers for header
fields to be lower-case (changed from SHOULD to MUST).
o Added real example values for Creation Time and Expiration
Time.
o Minor editorial corrections and readability improvements.
- -00
o Initialized from draft-richanna-http-message-signatures-00,
following adoption by the working group.
* draft-richanna-http-message-signatures
- -00
o Converted to xml2rfc v3 and reformatted to comply with RFC o Converted to xml2rfc v3 and reformatted to comply with RFC
style guides. style guides.
o Removed "Signature" auth-scheme definition and related o Removed Signature auth-scheme definition and related
content. content.
o Removed conflicting normative requirements for use of o Removed conflicting normative requirements for use of
"algorithm" parameter. Now MUST NOT be relied upon. algorithm parameter. Now MUST NOT be relied upon.
o Removed Extensions appendix. o Removed Extensions appendix.
o Rewrote abstract and introduction to explain context and o Rewrote abstract and introduction to explain context and
need, and challenges inherent in signing HTTP messages. need, and challenges inherent in signing HTTP messages.
o Rewrote and heavily expanded algorithm definition, retaining o Rewrote and heavily expanded algorithm definition, retaining
normative requirements. normative requirements.
o Added definitions for key terms, referenced RFC 7230 for o Added definitions for key terms, referenced RFC 7230 for
HTTP terms. HTTP terms.
o Added examples for canonicalization and signature generation o Added examples for canonicalization and signature generation
steps. steps.
o Rewrote Signature header definition, retaining normative o Rewrote Signature header definition, retaining normative
requirements. requirements.
o Added default values for "algorithm" and "expires" o Added default values for algorithm and expires parameters.
parameters.
o Rewrote HTTP Signature Algorithms registry definition. o Rewrote HTTP Signature Algorithms registry definition.
Added change control policy and registry template. Removed Added change control policy and registry template. Removed
suggested URI. suggested URI.
o Added IANA HTTP Signature Parameter registry. o Added IANA HTTP Signature Parameter registry.
o Added additional normative and informative references. o Added additional normative and informative references.
o Added Topics for Working Group Discussion section, to be o Added Topics for Working Group Discussion section, to be
skipping to change at page 38, line 42 skipping to change at page 43, line 28
Email: ietf@justin.richer.org Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
URI: https://bspk.io/ URI: https://bspk.io/
Manu Sporny Manu Sporny
Digital Bazaar Digital Bazaar
203 Roanoke Street W. 203 Roanoke Street W.
Blacksburg, VA 24060 Blacksburg, VA 24060
United States of America United States of America
Phone: +1 540 961 4469
Email: msporny@digitalbazaar.com Email: msporny@digitalbazaar.com
URI: https://manu.sporny.org/ URI: https://manu.sporny.org/
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