draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-09.txt   draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-10.txt 
Homenet D. Migault Homenet D. Migault
Internet-Draft Ericsson Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Informational R. Weber Intended status: Informational R. Weber
Expires: May 20, 2020 Nominum Expires: September 10, 2020 Nominum
M. Richardson M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works Sandelman Software Works
R. Hunter R. Hunter
Globis Consulting BV Globis Consulting BV
C. Griffiths C. Griffiths
W. Cloetens W. Cloetens
SoftAtHome SoftAtHome
November 17, 2019 March 09, 2020
Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service Outsourcing Home Network Authoritative Naming Service
draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-09 draft-ietf-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation-10
Abstract Abstract
The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices within The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices within
the home network accessible by name within the home network as well the home network accessible by name within the home network as well
as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). The names of as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). The names of
the devices accessible from the Internet are stored in the Public the devices accessible from the Internet are stored in the Public
Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server. It is unlikely Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server. It is unlikely
that home networks will contain sufficiently robust platforms that home networks will contain sufficiently robust platforms
designed to host a service such as the DNS on the Internet and as designed to host a service such as the DNS on the Internet and as
skipping to change at page 2, line 4 skipping to change at page 2, line 4
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 20, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Alternative solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Architecture Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels . . . . . . . 10 4. Control Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Control Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . . 11
5.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. . . . . . . 11 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. . . . . . 12
5.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. . . . . . 12 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel, . . . . . 12
5.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel, . . . . . 12 4.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.4. Deleting the delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Messages Exchange Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 13
5.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. . 13 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 14
5.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust . 14 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 14
5.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 14 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 15
5.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation . . . . . . . 15 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . 15
5.6. Securing the Control Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . 15 4.7. Implementation Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.7. Implementation Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 17
6. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . . . . . . . . 17 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 18
6.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM . 18 6. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. DM Distribution Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. HNA Security Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Homenet Reverse Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Homenet Reverse Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. Hidden Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.2. Distribution Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.2. Distribution Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected
12. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected
resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.1. HNA DM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 23
14.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 23
14.4. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . . 24
14.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM . . . . . . . . . . 25
14.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
14.8. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
14.9. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
16. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
17. Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
17.1. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
17.1.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
17.1.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
17.2. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
17.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . . . 31
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1. Requirements notation 12. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
13.1. HNA DM channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses . . . . . . . . 24
13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses . . . . . . . 24
13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary . . . . . 25
13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM . . . . . . . . . . 26
13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative
Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.8. Flooding Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
13.9. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
15. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
16. Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.1. Envisioned deployment scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.1.1. CPE Vendor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.1.2. Agnostic CPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
16.2. Example: Homenet Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
16.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing . . . 32
17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 1. Introduction
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction The Homenet Naming authority is responsible for making devices within
the home network accessible by name within the home network as well
as from outside the home network (e.g. the Internet). IPv6
connectivity provides the possibility of global end to end IP
connectivity. End users will be able to transparently make use of
this connectivity if they can use names to access the services they
want from their home network.
IPv6 provides global end to end IP connectivity. End users prefer to The use of a DNS zone for each home network is a reasonable and
use names instead of long and complex IPv6 addresses when accessing scalable way to make the set of public names visible. There are a
services hosted in the home network. number of ways to populate such a zone. This specification proposes
a way to do with based upon a number of assumptions about typical
home networks.
[RFC7368] recommends that home networks be resilient to connectivity 1. The names of the devices accessible from the Internet are stored
disruption from the ISP. The public names should be resolvable in the Public Homenet Zone, served by a DNS authoritative server.
within the home network and on the Internet, even when there are
disruptions. This could be achieved by a device inside the home 2. It is unlikely that home networks will contain sufficiently
network that builds, publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone, robust platforms designed to host a service such as the DNS on
thus providing bindings between public names, IP addresses, and other the Internet and as such would expose the home network to DDoS
RR types. attacks.
3. [RFC7368] emphazes that the home network is subject to
connectivity disruptions with the ISP. But, names used within
the home MUST be resilient against such disruption.
So a goal of this specification is to make the public names
resolvable within both the home network and on the Internet, even
when there are disruptions.
This is achieved by having a device inside the home network that
builds, publishes, and manages a Public Homenet Zone, thus providing
bindings between public names, IP addresses, and other RR types.
The management of the names can be a role that the Customer Premises The management of the names can be a role that the Customer Premises
Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could Equipment (CPE) does. Other devices in the home network could
fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this fulfill this role e.g. a NAS server, but for simplicity, this
document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices. document assumes the function is located on one of the CPE devices.
A home network may have multiple CPEs. Since management of the The homenet architecture [RFC7368] makes it clear that a home network
Public Homenet Zone involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be may have multiple CPEs. The management of the Public Homenet Zone
distributed over multiple servers (primary server), when multiple involves DNS specific mechanisms that cannot be distributed over
nodes can potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node multiple servers (primary server), when multiple nodes can
needs to be selected per outsourced zone. This selected node is potentially manage the Public Homenet Zone, a single node needs to be
designated as providing the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) function. selected per outsourced zone. This selected node is designated as
providing the Homenet Naming Authority (HNA) function.
The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in The process by which a single HNA is selected per zone is not in
scope for this document. scope for this document. It is envisioned that a future document
will describe an HNCP mechanism to elect the single HNA.
CPEs, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network CPEs, which may host the HNA function, as well as home network
devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating devices, are usually low powered devices not designed for terminating
heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service heavy traffic. As a result, hosting an authoritative DNS service
visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource visible to the Internet may expose the home network to resource
exhaustion and other attacks. Additionally, the names could become exhaustion and other attacks. On the other hand, if the only copy of
unavailable during disruptions of the upstream Internet connectivity. the public zone is on the Internet, then Internet connectivity
disruptions would make the names unavailable inside the homenet.
In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this In order to avoid resource exhaustion and other attacks, this
document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative document describes an architecture that outsources the authoritative
naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA naming service of the home network. More specifically, the HNA
builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an Outsourcing builds the Public Homenet Zone and outsources it to an Outsourcing
Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM). The Outsourcing Infrastructure via a Distribution Master (DM). The Outsourcing
Infrastructure is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public Infrastructure is in charge of publishing the corresponding Public
Homenet Zone on the Internet. The transfer of DNS zone information Homenet Zone on the Internet. The transfer of DNS zone information
is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and is achieved using standard DNS mechanisms involving primary and
secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth secondary DNS servers, with the HNA hosted primary being a stealth
primary, and the Distribution Master a secondary. primary, and the Distribution Master a secondary.
Section 4.1 provides an architecture description that describes the Section 3.1 provides an architecture description that describes the
relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. In order relation between the HNA and the Outsourcing Architecture. In order
to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 6 describes how to keep the Public Homenet Zone up-to-date Section 5 describes how
the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure synchronizes the Pubic
Homenet Zone. Homenet Zone.
The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to enable fully
functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be functional DNSSEC, and the Public Homenet Zone is expected to be
signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone signed with a secure delegation. DNSSEC key management and zone
signing is handled by the HNA. signing is handled by the HNA.
Section 10 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. Section 9 discusses management of one or more reverse zones. It
Section 11 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, shows that management of the reverse zones can be entirely automated
Section 13 and Section 14 respectively discuss privacy and security and benefit from a pre-established relation between the ISP and the
home network. Note that such scenarios may also be met for the
Public Homenet Zone, but not necessarily.
Section 10 discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally,
Section 12 and Section 13 respectively discuss privacy and security
considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone. considerations when outsourcing the Public Homenet Zone.
The Public Homenet Zone is expected to contain public information The Public Homenet Zone is expected to contain public information
only in a single universal view. This document does not define how only in a single universal view. This document does not define how
the information required to construct this view is derived. the information required to construct this view is derived.
It is also not in the scope of this document to define names for It is also not in the scope of this document to define names for
exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network. exclusive use within the boundaries of the local home network.
Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the
home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD home network using local scope naming services. mDNS [RFC6762] DNS-SD
[RFC6763] are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is [RFC6763] are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is
limited to a single link network. However, future protocols and limited to a single link network. However, future protocols and
architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to architectures [I-D.ietf-homenet-simple-naming] are expected to
leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558]. leverage this constraint as pointed out in [RFC7558].
2.1. Alternative solutions 1.1. Alternative solutions
An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is to have a single zone, An alternative existing solution in IPv4 is to have a single zone,
where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name where a host uses a RESTful HTTP service to register a single name
into a common public zone. This is often called "Dynamic DNS", and into a common public zone. This is often called "Dynamic DNS", and
there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc. there are a number of commercial providers, including Dyn, Gandi etc.
These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE to make These solutions were typically used by a host behind the CPE to make
it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming it's CPE IPv4 address visible, usually in order to enable incoming
connections. connections.
For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system For a small number (one to three) of hosts, use of such a system
skipping to change at page 6, line 17 skipping to change at page 6, line 38
o The RESTful services do not always support all RR types. The o The RESTful services do not always support all RR types. The
homenet user is dependent on the service provider supporting new homenet user is dependent on the service provider supporting new
types. By providing full DNS delegation, this document enables types. By providing full DNS delegation, this document enables
all RR types and also future extensions. all RR types and also future extensions.
There is no technical reason why a RESTful cloud service could not There is no technical reason why a RESTful cloud service could not
provide solutions to many of these problems, but this document provide solutions to many of these problems, but this document
describes a DNS based solution. describes a DNS based solution.
3. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
o Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing o Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing
connectivity to the home network. connectivity to the home network.
o Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the o Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone for use within the boundaries of the
home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]). This zone is not home network: home.arpa, see [RFC8375]). This zone is not
considered public and is out of scope for this document. considered public and is out of scope for this document.
o Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the o Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated with the
home network. home network.
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at page 8, line 5
o Homenet DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC o Homenet DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC
resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution on the home network for the Public Homenet Zone. The
resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative resolution is performed requesting the Homenet Authoritative
Servers. Servers.
o DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on o DNSSEC Resolver: a resolver that performs a DNSSEC resolution on
the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is the Internet for the Public Homenet Zone. The resolution is
performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers. performed requesting the Public Authoritative Servers.
4. Architecture Description 3. Architecture Description
This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing This section provides an overview of the architecture for outsourcing
the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the Outsourcing the authoritative naming service from the HNA to the Outsourcing
Infrastructure in Section 4.1. Section Section 17.2 and Section 17.3 Infrastructure in Section 3.1. Section Section 16.2 and Section 16.3
illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet illustrates this architecture with the example of a Public Homenet
Zone as well as necessary parameter to configure the HNA. Zone as well as necessary parameter to configure the HNA.
4.1. Architecture Overview 3.1. Architecture Overview
Figure Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources Figure Figure 1 illustrates the architecture where the HNA outsources
the publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing the publication of the Public Homenet Zone to the Outsourcing
Infrastructure. Infrastructure.
The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet The Public Homenet Zone is identified by the Registered Homenet
Domain Name - example.com. Domain Name - example.com.
".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as ".local" as well as ".home.arpa" are explicitly not considered as
Public Homenet zones. Public Homenet zones.
The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view The HNA SHOULD build the Public Homenet Zone in a single view
populated with all resource records that are expected to be published populated with all resource records that are expected to be published
on the Internet. on the Internet.
Resource records associated with services or devices that are not
expected to be resolvable from outside the home network, or resource
records bound to non-globally reachable IP addresses e.g. ULA, MUST
NOT be part of the Public Homenet Zone.
How the Public Homenet Zone is populated is out of the scope of this How the Public Homenet Zone is populated is out of the scope of this
document. The node providing the HNA function may also host or document. The node providing the HNA function may also host or
interact with multiple services to determine name-to-address interact with multiple services to determine name-to-address
mappings, such as a web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762]. These mappings, such as a web GUI, DHCP [RFC6644] or mDNS [RFC6762]. These
services may coexist and may be used to populate the Public Homenet services may coexist and may be used to populate the Public Homenet
Zone. Zone.
The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all The HNA also signs the Public Homenet Zone. The HNA handles all
operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no operations and keying material required for DNSSEC, so there is no
provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC provision made in this architecture for transferring private DNSSEC
skipping to change at page 8, line 28 skipping to change at page 8, line 50
Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to Once the Public Homenet Zone has been built, the HNA outsources it to
the Outsourcing Infrastructure as described in Figure 1. the Outsourcing Infrastructure as described in Figure 1.
The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary The HNA acts as a hidden primary while the DM behaves as a secondary
responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple responsible to distribute the Public Homenet Zone to the multiple
Public Authoritative Servers that Outsourcing Infrastructure is Public Authoritative Servers that Outsourcing Infrastructure is
responsible for. responsible for.
The DM has 3 communication channels: * a DM Control Channel (see The DM has 3 communication channels: * a DM Control Channel (see
section Section 5) to configure the HNA and the Outsourcing section Section 4) to configure the HNA and the Outsourcing
Infrastructure, * a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 6 Infrastructure, * a DM Synchronization Channel (see section Section 5
to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM. * to synchronize the Public Homenet Zone on the HNA and on the DM. *
one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 7 that one or more Distribution Channels (see section Section 6 that
distributes the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public distributes the Public Homenet Zone from the DM to the Public
Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the Internet. Authoritative Server serving the Public Homenet Zone on the Internet.
There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM. This text There MAY be multiple DM's, and multiple servers per DM. This text
assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why assumes a single DM server for simplicity, but there is no reason why
each channel need to be implemented on the same server, or indeed use each channel need to be implemented on the same server, or indeed use
the same code base. the same code base.
It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an It is important to note that while the HNA is configured as an
authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests authoritative server, it is not expected to answer to DNS requests
skipping to change at page 10, line 39 skipping to change at page 10, line 39
| | | | | | | | | |
| | name resolution | | | | name resolution | |
| v | | v | v | | v
+----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ +----------------------+ | +-----------------------+
| Homenet | | | Internet | | Homenet | | | Internet |
| DNSSEC Resolver | | | DNSSEC Resolver | | DNSSEC Resolver | | | DNSSEC Resolver |
+----------------------+ | +-----------------------+ +----------------------+ | +-----------------------+
Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution Figure 1: Homenet Naming Architecture Name Resolution
4.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels 3.2. Distribution Master Communication Channels
This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is This section details the interfaces and channels of the DM, that is
the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution the Control Channel, the Synchronization Channel and the Distribution
Channel. Channel.
The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the The Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are the
interfaces used between the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure. interfaces used between the HNA and the Outsourcing Infrastructure.
The entity within the Outsourcing Infrastructure responsible to The entity within the Outsourcing Infrastructure responsible to
handle these communications is the DM and communications between the handle these communications is the DM and communications between the
HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and mutually authenticated. While HNA and the DM SHOULD be protected and mutually authenticated. While
section Section 5.6 discusses in more depth the different security section Section 4.6 discusses in more depth the different security
protocols that could be used to secure, this specification RECOMMENDS protocols that could be used to secure, this specification RECOMMENDS
the use of TLS with mutually authentication based on certificates to the use of TLS with mutually authentication based on certificates to
secure the channel between the HNA and the DM. secure the channel between the HNA and the DM.
The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel. The Control Channel is used to set up the Synchronization Channel.
We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with We assume that the HNA initiates the Control Channel connection with
the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509 the DM and as such has a prior knowledge of the DM identity (X509
certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set certificate), the IP address and port to use and protocol to set
secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity secure session. We also assume the DM has knowledge of the identity
of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet of the HNA (X509 certificate) as well as the Registered Homenet
skipping to change at page 11, line 35 skipping to change at page 11, line 35
desireable. desireable.
This specification also assumes the same transport protocol and ports This specification also assumes the same transport protocol and ports
used by the DM to serve the Control Channel and by the HNA to serve used by the DM to serve the Control Channel and by the HNA to serve
the Synchronization Channel are the same. the Synchronization Channel are the same.
The Distribution Channel is internal to the Outsourcing The Distribution Channel is internal to the Outsourcing
Infrastructure and as such is not the primary concern of this Infrastructure and as such is not the primary concern of this
specification. specification.
5. Control Channel between HNA and DM 4. Control Channel between HNA and DM
The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the Outsourcing The DM Control Channel is used by the HNA and the Outsourcing
Infrastructure to exchange information related to the configuration Infrastructure to exchange information related to the configuration
of the delegation which includes: of the delegation which includes:
5.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone. 4.1. Information to build the Public Homenet Zone.
More specifically, the Public Homenet Zone contains information that More specifically, the Public Homenet Zone contains information that
is related to the infrastructure serving the zone. In our case, the is related to the infrastructure serving the zone. In our case, the
infrastructure serving the Public Homenet Zone is the Outsourcing infrastructure serving the Public Homenet Zone is the Outsourcing
Infrastructure, so this information MUST reflect that Outsourcing Infrastructure, so this information MUST reflect that Outsourcing
Infrastructure and MUST be provided to the HNA. Infrastructure and MUST be provided to the HNA.
The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the The information includes at least names and IP addresses of the
Public Authoritative Servers. In term of RRset information this Public Authoritative Servers. In term of RRset information this
corresponds, for the Registered Homenet Domain the MNAME of the SOA, corresponds, for the Registered Homenet Domain the MNAME of the SOA,
the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets. Optionally the Outsourcing the NS and associated A and AAA RRsets. Optionally the Outsourcing
Infrastructure MAY also provide operational parameters such as other Infrastructure MAY also provide operational parameters such as other
fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM). fields of SOA (SERIAL, RNAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM).
As the information is necessary for the HNA to proceed and the As the information is necessary for the HNA to proceed and the
information is associated to the Outsourcing Infrastructure, this information is associated to the Outsourcing Infrastructure, this
information exchange is mandatory. information exchange is mandatory.
5.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust. 4.2. Information to build the DNSSEC chain of trust.
The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that The HNA SHOULD provide the hash of the KSK (DS RRset), so the that
Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this value to the parent zone. A Outsourcing Infrastructure provides this value to the parent zone. A
common deployment use case is that the Outsourcing Infrastructure is common deployment use case is that the Outsourcing Infrastructure is
the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and as such, its the registrar of the Registered Homenet Domain, and as such, its
relationship with the registry of the parent zone enables it to relationship with the registry of the parent zone enables it to
update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the HNA should be update the parent zone. When such relation exists, the HNA should be
able to request the Outsourcing Infrastructure to update the DS RRset able to request the Outsourcing Infrastructure to update the DS RRset
in the parent zone. A direct update is especially necessary to in the parent zone. A direct update is especially necessary to
initialize the chain of trust. initialize the chain of trust.
skipping to change at page 12, line 35 skipping to change at page 12, line 35
such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] are used for key roll overs. such as CDS and CDNSKEY [RFC7344] are used for key roll overs.
As some deployment may not provide an Outsourcing Infrastructure that As some deployment may not provide an Outsourcing Infrastructure that
will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this information will be able to update the DS in the parent zone, this information
exchange is OPTIONAL. exchange is OPTIONAL.
By accepting the DS, the DM commits in taking care of advertising the By accepting the DS, the DM commits in taking care of advertising the
DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM MUST clearly indicate DS to the parent zone. Upon refusal, the DM MUST clearly indicate
the DM does not have the capacity to proceed to the update. the DM does not have the capacity to proceed to the update.
5.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel, 4.3. Information to set the Synchronization Channel,
That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA That information sets the primary/secondary relation between the HNA
and the DM. The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and and the DM. The HNA works as a primary authoritative DNS server, and
MUST provide the corresponding IP address. MUST provide the corresponding IP address.
The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP The specified IP address on the HNA side and the currently used IP
address of the DM defines the IP addresses involved in the address of the DM defines the IP addresses involved in the
Synchronization Channel. Ports and transport protocol are the same Synchronization Channel. Ports and transport protocol are the same
as those used by the Control Channel. By default, the same IP as those used by the Control Channel. By default, the same IP
address used by the HNA is considered by the DM. Exchange of this address used by the HNA is considered by the DM. Exchange of this
information is OPTIONAL. information is OPTIONAL.
5.4. Deleting the delegation 4.4. Deleting the delegation
The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in The purpose of the previous sections were to exchange information in
order to set a delegation. The HNA MUST also be able to delete a order to set a delegation. The HNA MUST also be able to delete a
delegation with a specific DM. Upon an instruction of deleting the delegation with a specific DM. Upon an instruction of deleting the
delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone. delegation, the DM MUST stop serving the Public Homenet Zone.
5.5. Messages Exchange Description 4.5. Messages Exchange Description
There are multiple ways these information could be exchanged between There are multiple ways these information could be exchanged between
the HNA and the DM. This specification defines a mechanism that re- the HNA and the DM. This specification defines a mechanism that re-
use the DNS exchanges format. The intention is to reuse standard use the DNS exchanges format. The intention is to reuse standard
libraries especially to check the format of the exchanged fields as libraries especially to check the format of the exchanged fields as
well as to minimize the additional libraries needed for the HNA. The well as to minimize the additional libraries needed for the HNA. The
re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals. Note that while re-use of DNS exchanges achieves these goals. Note that while
information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged information is provided using DNS exchanges, the exchanged
information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this information is not expected to be set in any zone file, instead this
information is expected to be processed appropriately. information is expected to be processed appropriately.
skipping to change at page 13, line 35 skipping to change at page 13, line 35
a predefined timer the Control Channel is expected to be terminated. a predefined timer the Control Channel is expected to be terminated.
The Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later. The Control Channel MAY Be re-opened at any time later.
The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the The provisioning process SHOULD provide a method of securing the
control channel, so that the content of messages can be control channel, so that the content of messages can be
authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for authenticated. This authentication MAY be based on certificates for
both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial both the DM and each HNA. The DM may also create the initial
configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the configuration for the delegation zone in the parent zone during the
provisioning process. provisioning process.
5.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone. 4.5.1. Retrieving information for the Public Homenet Zone.
The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA The information provided by the DM to the HNA is retrieved by the HNA
with a AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to with a AXFR exchange. The AXFR message enables the response to
contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the contain any type of RRsets. The response might be extended in the
future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the future if additional information will be needed. Alternatively, the
information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a information provided by the HNA to the DM is pushed by the HNA via a
DNS update exchange. DNS update exchange.
To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet To retrieve the necessary information to build the Public Homenet
Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the Zone, the HNA MUST send an DNS request of type AXFR associated to the
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 14, line 26
indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The HNA SHOULD indicated by the SOA provided by the AXFR response. The HNA SHOULD
set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM of the SOA set the value of NAME, REFRESH, RETRY, EXPIRE and MINIMUM of the SOA
to those provided by the AXFR response. The HNA MUST insert the NS to those provided by the AXFR response. The HNA MUST insert the NS
and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet Zone. The and corresponding A or AAAA RRset in its Public Homenet Zone. The
HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is returned by the HNA MUST ignore other RRsets. If an error message is returned by the
DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution. Error messages DM, the HNA MUST proceed as a regular DNS resolution. Error messages
SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the resolution does not SHOULD be logged for further analysis. If the resolution does not
succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and the HNA MUST close succeed, the outsourcing operation is aborted and the HNA MUST close
the Control Channel. the Control Channel.
5.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust 4.5.2. Providing information for the DNSSEC chain of trust
To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the To provide the DS RRset to initialize the DNSSEC chain of trust the
HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message. The NAME in the SOA HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE [RFC2136] message. The NAME in the SOA
MUST be set to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain - MUST be set to the parent zone of the Registered Homenet Domain -
that is where the DS records should be inserted. The DS RRset MUST that is where the DS records should be inserted. The DS RRset MUST
be placed in the Update section of the UPDATE query, and the NAME be placed in the Update section of the UPDATE query, and the NAME
SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet Domain. The rdata of the DS SHOULD be set to the Registered Homenet Domain. The rdata of the DS
RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be inserted in the parent RR SHOULD correspond to the DS record to be inserted in the parent
zone. zone.
A NOERROR response from the MD is a commitment to update the parent A NOERROR response from the MD is a commitment to update the parent
zone with the provided DS. An error indicates the MD will not update zone with the provided DS. An error indicates the MD will not update
the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA. the DS, and other method should be used by the HNA.
5.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel 4.5.3. Providing information for the Synchronization Channel
To provide the IP address of the primary, the HNA MAY send a DNS To provide the IP address of the primary, the HNA MAY send a DNS
UPDATE message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the UPDATE message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the
Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of
Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered
Domain Name. The RDATA MUST be a FQDN that designates the IP Domain Name. The RDATA MUST be a FQDN that designates the IP
addresses associated to the primary. There may be multiple IP addresses associated to the primary. There may be multiple IP
addresses. These IP addresses MUST be provided in the additional addresses. These IP addresses MUST be provided in the additional
section. The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT section. The reason to provide these IP addresses is that it is NOT
RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not RECOMMENDED to publish these IP addresses. As a result, it is not
skipping to change at page 15, line 22 skipping to change at page 15, line 22
The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an The regular DNS error message SHOULD be returned to the HNA when an
error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format error occurs. In particular a FORMERR is returned when a format
error is found, this error includes when unexpected RRSets are added error is found, this error includes when unexpected RRSets are added
or when RRsets are missing. A SERVFAIL error is returned when a or when RRsets are missing. A SERVFAIL error is returned when a
internal error is encountered. a NOTZONE error is returned when internal error is encountered. a NOTZONE error is returned when
update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is update and Zone sections are not coherent, a NOTAUTH error is
returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section. A returned when the DM is not authoritative for the Zone section. A
REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the REFUSED error is returned when the DM refuses to proceed to the
configuration and the requested action. configuration and the requested action.
5.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation 4.5.4. HNA instructing deleting the delegation
To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE To instruct to delete the delegation the HNA MAY send a DNS UPDATE
Delete message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the Delete message. The NAME in the SOA MUST be the parent zone of the
Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of Registered Homenet Domain. The Update section MUST be a RRset of
Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered Type NS. The NAME associated to the NS RRSet MUST be the Registered
Domain Name. As indictaed by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the delete Domain Name. As indictaed by [RFC2136] section 2.5.2 the delete
instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0, the CLass to ANY, the instruction is set by setting the TTL to 0, the CLass to ANY, the
RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty. RDLENGTH to 0 and the RDATA MUST be empty.
5.6. Securing the Control Channel between HNA and DM 4.6. Securing the Control Channel between HNA and DM
The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at The control channel between the HNA and the DM MUST be secured at
both the HNA and the DM. both the HNA and the DM.
Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347]) SHOULD be used Secure protocols (like TLS [RFC5246] / DTLS [RFC6347]) SHOULD be used
to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA. to secure the transactions between the DM and the HNA.
The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed, The advantage of TLS/DTLS is that this technology is widely deployed,
and most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly and most of the devices already embed TLS/DTLS libraries, possibly
also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS/DTLS also taking advantage of hardware acceleration. Further, TLS/DTLS
skipping to change at page 16, line 33 skipping to change at page 16, line 33
protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual protocols: Authentication based on certificates implies a mutual
authentication and thus requires the HNA to manage a private key, a authentication and thus requires the HNA to manage a private key, a
public key, or certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities. public key, or certificates, as well as Certificate Authorities.
This adds complexity to the configuration especially on the HNA side. This adds complexity to the configuration especially on the HNA side.
For this reason, we RECOMMEND that the HNA MAY use PSK or certificate For this reason, we RECOMMEND that the HNA MAY use PSK or certificate
based authentication, and that the DM MUST support PSK and based authentication, and that the DM MUST support PSK and
certificate based authentication. certificate based authentication.
Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA Note also that authentication of message exchanges between the HNA
and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index and the DM SHOULD NOT use the external IP address of the HNA to index
the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 11, the IP addresses of the appropriate keys. As detailed in Section 10, the IP addresses of
the DM and the Hidden Primary are subject to change, for example the DM and the Hidden Primary are subject to change, for example
while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary while the network is being renumbered. This means that the necessary
keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP keys to authenticate transaction SHOULD NOT be indexed using the IP
address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes. address, and SHOULD be resilient to IP address changes.
5.7. Implementation Tips 4.7. Implementation Tips
The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular The Hidden Primary Server on the HNA differs from a regular
authoritative server for the home network due to: authoritative server for the home network due to:
o Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly o Interface Binding: the Hidden Primary Server will almost certainly
listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative listen on the WAN Interface, whereas a regular authoritative
server for the home network would listen on the internal home server for the home network would listen on the internal home
network interface. network interface.
o Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to o Limited exchanges: the purpose of the Hidden Primary Server is to
skipping to change at page 17, line 14 skipping to change at page 17, line 14
As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM). As a result, exchanges are performed with specific nodes (the DM).
Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges Further, exchange types are limited. The only legitimate exchanges
are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR are: NOTIFY initiated by the Hidden Primary and IXFR or AXFR
exchanges initiated by the DM. On the other hand, regular exchanges initiated by the DM. On the other hand, regular
authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any DNS query authoritative servers would respond to any hosts, and any DNS query
would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop would be processed. The HNA SHOULD filter IXFR/AXFR traffic and drop
traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP traffic not initiated by the DM. The HNA MUST listen for DNS on TCP
and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone. and UDP and MUST at least allow SOA lookups of the Homenet Zone.
6. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5. DM Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the The DM Synchronization Channel is used for communication between the
HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that HNA and the DM for synchronizing the Public Homenet Zone. Note that
the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by the Control Channel and the Synchronization Channel are by
construction different channels even though there they MAY use the construction different channels even though there they MAY use the
same IP addresses. In fact the Control Channel is set between the same IP addresses. In fact the Control Channel is set between the
HNA working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a HNA working as a client using port YYYY (a high range port) toward a
service provided by the MD at port XX (well known port). On the service provided by the MD at port XX (well known port). On the
other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the MD working other hand, the Synchronization Channel is set between the MD working
as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a service a as a client using port ZZZZ ( a high range port) toward a service a
skipping to change at page 18, line 10 skipping to change at page 18, line 10
The DM is configured as a secondary for the Homenet Domain Name. The DM is configured as a secondary for the Homenet Domain Name.
This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the This secondary configuration has been previously agreed between the
end user and the provider of the Outsourcing Infrastructure as part end user and the provider of the Outsourcing Infrastructure as part
of either the provisioning or due to receipt of UPDATE messages on of either the provisioning or due to receipt of UPDATE messages on
the DM Control Channel. the DM Control Channel.
The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE The Homenet Reverse Zone MAY also be updated either with DNS UPDATE
[RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization. [RFC2136] or using a primary / secondary synchronization.
6.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM 5.1. Securing the Synchronization Channel between HNA and DM
The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request. The Synchronization Channel used standard DNS request.
First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be First the primary notifies the secondary that the zone must be
updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when updated and eaves the secondary to proceed with the update when
possible/ convenient. possible/ convenient.
Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small Then, a NOTIFY message is sent by the primary, which is a small
packet that is less likely to load the secondary. packet that is less likely to load the secondary.
skipping to change at page 18, line 37 skipping to change at page 18, line 37
When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the When using TLS, the HNA MAY authenticate inbound connections from the
DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with DM using standard mechanisms, such as a public certificate with
baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}} baked-in root certificates on the HNA, or via DANE {!RFC6698}}
The HNA MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to The HNA MAY apply a simple IP filter on inbound AXFR requests to
ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel. In this ensure they only arrive from the DM Synchronization Channel. In this
case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the case, the HNA SHOULD regularly check (via DNS resolution) that the
address of the DM in the filter is still valid. address of the DM in the filter is still valid.
7. DM Distribution Channel 6. DM Distribution Channel
The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM The DM Distribution Channel is used for communication between the DM
and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and and the Public Authoritative Servers. The architecture and
communication used for the DM Distribution Channels is outside the communication used for the DM Distribution Channels is outside the
scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions scope of this document, and there are many existing solutions
available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy. available e.g. rsynch, DNS AXFR, REST, DB copy.
8. HNA Security Policies 7. HNA Security Policies
This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary This section details security policies related to the Hidden Primary
/ Secondary synchronization. / Secondary synchronization.
The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any The Hidden Primary, as described in this document SHOULD drop any
queries from the home network. This could be implemented via port queries from the home network. This could be implemented via port
binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out binding and/or firewall rules. The precise mechanism deployed is out
of scope of this document. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS of scope of this document. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any DNS
queries arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the queries arriving on the WAN interface that are not issued from the
DM. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than DM. The Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any outgoing packets other than
DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The DNS NOTIFY query, SOA response, IXFR response or AXFR responses. The
Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY Hidden Primary SHOULD drop any incoming packets other than DNS NOTIFY
response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query. The Hidden Primary response, SOA query, IXFR query or AXFR query. The Hidden Primary
SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how SHOULD drop any non protected IXFR or AXFR exchange,depending on how
the synchronization is secured. the synchronization is secured.
9. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture 8. DNSSEC compliant Homenet Architecture
[RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both [RFC7368] in Section 3.7.3 recommends DNSSEC to be deployed on both
the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out the authoritative server and the resolver. The resolver side is out
of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the of scope of this document, and only the authoritative part of the
server is considered. server is considered.
This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone. This document assumes the HNA signs the Public Homenet Zone.
Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in Secure delegation is achieved only if the DS RRset is properly set in
the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the the parent zone. Secure delegation is performed by the HNA or the
skipping to change at page 19, line 36 skipping to change at page 19, line 36
The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This The DS RRset can be updated manually with nsupdate for example. This
requires the HNA or the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be requires the HNA or the Outsourcing Infrastructure to be
authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public authenticated by the DNS server hosting the parent of the Public
Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent Homenet Zone. Such a trust channel between the HNA and the parent
DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier DNS server may be hard to maintain with HNAs, and thus may be easier
to establish with the Outsourcing Infrastructure. In fact, the to establish with the Outsourcing Infrastructure. In fact, the
Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation Public Authoritative Server(s) may use Automating DNSSEC Delegation
Trust Maintenance [RFC7344]. Trust Maintenance [RFC7344].
10. Homenet Reverse Zone 9. Homenet Reverse Zone
This section is focused on the Homenet Reverse Zone. The Public Homenet Zone is associated to a Registered Homenet Domain
and the ownership of that domain requires a specific registration
from the end user as well as the HNA being provisioned with some
authentication credentials . Such steps are mandatory unless the
Outsourcing Infrastructure has some other means to authenticate the
HNA. Such situation may occur, for example, when the ISP provides
the Homenet Domain as well as the Outsourcing Infrastructure. In
this case, the HNA may be authenticated by the physical link layer,
in which case the authentication of the HNA may be performed without
additional provisioning of the HNA. While this may be not so common
for the Public Homenet Zone, this situation is expected to be quite
common for the Reverse Homenet Zone.
Firstly, all considerations for the Public Homenet Zone apply to the More specifically, a common case is that the upstream ISP provides
Homenet Reverse Zone. The main difference between the Homenet the IPv6 prefix to the Homenet with a IA_PD [RFC8415] option and
Reverse Zone and the Homenet Zone is that the parent zone of the manages the Outsourcing Infrastructure of the associated reverse
Homenet Reverse Zone is most likely managed by the ISP. As the ISP zone. This leave place for setting up automatically the relation
also provides the IP prefix to the HNA, it may be able to between HNA and the Outsourcing infrastructure as described in
authenticate the HNA using mechanisms outside the scope of this [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options].
document e.g. the physical attachment point to the ISP network. If
the Reverse DM is managed by the ISP, credentials to authenticate the With this relation automatically configured, the synchronization
HNA for the zone synchronization may be set automatically and between the Home network and the Outsourcing infrastructure happens
transparently to the end user. similarly as for the Public Homenet Zone described earlier in this
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] describes how document.
automatic configuration may be performed.
Note that for home networks hosted by multiple ISPs, each ISP
provides only the Outsourcing Infrastructure of the reverse zones
associated to the delegated prefix.
It is also likely that the DNS exchanges will need to be performed on
dedicated interfaces as to be accepted by the ISP. More
specifically, the reverse zone associated to prefix 1 will not be
possible to be performs by the HNA using an IP address that belongs
to prefix 2. Such constraints does not raise major concerns either
for hot standby or load sharing configuration.
With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse With IPv6, the domain space for IP addresses is so large that reverse
zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone zone may be confronted with scalability issues. How the reverse zone
is generated is out of scope of this document. is generated is out of scope of this document.
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] provides guidance on how to address
scalability issues. scalability issues.
11. Renumbering 10. Renumbering
This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary This section details how renumbering is handled by the Hidden Primary
server or the DM. Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e. server or the DM. Both types of renumbering are discussed i.e.
"make-before-break" and "break-before-make". "make-before-break" and "break-before-make".
In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is In the make-before-break renumbering scenario, the new prefix is
advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to advertised, the network is configured to prepare the transition to
the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and the new prefix. During a period of time, the two prefixes old and
new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the new coexist, before the old prefix is completely removed. In the
break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised break-before-make renumbering scenario, the new prefix is advertised
making the old prefix obsolete. making the old prefix obsolete.
Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed Renumbering has been extensively described in [RFC4192] and analyzed
in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them in [RFC7010] and the reader is expected to be familiar with them
before reading this section. before reading this section.
11.1. Hidden Primary 10.1. Hidden Primary
In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being In a renumbering scenario, the Hidden Primary is informed it is being
renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home renumbered. In most cases, this occurs because the whole home
network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone network is being renumbered. As a result, the Public Homenet Zone
will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be will also be updated. Although the new and old IP addresses may be
stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly stored in the Public Homenet Zone, we recommend that only the newly
reachable IP addresses be published. reachable IP addresses be published.
To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information To avoid reachability disruption, IP connectivity information
provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our provided by the DNS SHOULD be coherent with the IP plane. In our
skipping to change at page 21, line 35 skipping to change at page 22, line 11
sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary using the source IP sending a SOA request to the Hidden Primary using the source IP
address of the NOTIFY. This exchange is also secured, and if an address of the NOTIFY. This exchange is also secured, and if an
authenticated response is received from the Hidden Primary with the authenticated response is received from the Hidden Primary with the
new IP address, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and new IP address, the DM SHOULD update its configuration file and
retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange. retrieve the Public Homenet Zone using an AXFR or a IXFR exchange.
Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the Note that the primary reason for providing the IP address is that the
Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden Hidden Primary is not publicly announced in the DNS. If the Hidden
Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address Primary were publicly announced in the DNS, then the IP address
update could have been performed using the DNS as described in update could have been performed using the DNS as described in
Section 11.2. Section 10.2.
11.2. Distribution Master 10.2. Distribution Master
Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP Renumbering of the Distribution Master results in it changing its IP
address. As the DM is a secondary, the destination of DNS NOTIFY address. As the DM is a secondary, the destination of DNS NOTIFY
payloads MUST be changed, and any configuration/firewalling that payloads MUST be changed, and any configuration/firewalling that
restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated. restricts DNS AXFR/IXFR operations MUST be updated.
If the DM is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file If the DM is configured in the Hidden Primary configuration file
using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed by DNS. using a FQDN, then the update of the IP address is performed by DNS.
More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary More specifically, before sending the NOTIFY, the Hidden Primary
performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address of the performs a DNS resolution to retrieve the IP address of the
secondary. secondary.
As described in Section 11.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD be As described in Section 10.1, the DM DNS information SHOULD be
coherent with the IP plane. The TTL of the Distribution Master name coherent with the IP plane. The TTL of the Distribution Master name
SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the IP address. SHOULD be adjusted appropriately prior to changing the IP address.
Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the Some DNS infrastructure uses the IP address to designate the
secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. The reason secondary, in which case, other mechanisms must be found. The reason
for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an for using IP addresses instead of names is generally to reach an
internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid internal interface that is not designated by a FQDN, and to avoid
potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out potential bootstrap problems. Such scenarios are considered as out
of scope in the case of home networks. of scope in the case of home networks.
12. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected resolution 11. Operational considerations for Offline/Disconnected resolution
This section is non-normative. It provides suggestions on This section is non-normative. It provides suggestions on
operational consideration. TBD. operational consideration. TBD.
13. Privacy Considerations 12. Privacy Considerations
Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third Outsourcing the DNS Authoritative service from the HNA to a third
party raises a few privacy related concerns. party raises a few privacy related concerns.
The Public Homenet Zone contains a full description of the services The Public Homenet Zone contains a full description of the services
hosted in the network. These services may not be expected to be hosted in the network. These services may not be expected to be
publicly shared although their names remain accessible through the publicly shared although their names remain accessible through the
Internet. Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does not Internet. Even though DNS makes information public, the DNS does not
expect to make the complete list of services public. In fact, making expect to make the complete list of services public. In fact, making
information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service information public still requires the key (or FQDN) of each service
skipping to change at page 23, line 5 skipping to change at page 23, line 31
service, they also limit the scope of the scan space. service, they also limit the scope of the scan space.
In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, the third party can also In addition to the Public Homenet Zone, the third party can also
monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. This monitor the traffic associated with the Public Homenet Zone. This
traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user traffic may provide an indication of the services an end user
accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although, accesses, plus how and when they use these services. Although,
caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is caching may obfuscate this information inside the home network, it is
likely that outside your home network this information will not be likely that outside your home network this information will not be
cached. cached.
14. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves The Homenet Naming Architecture described in this document solves
exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector. exposing the HNA's DNS service as a DoS attack vector.
14.1. HNA DM channels 13.1. HNA DM channels
The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security The HNA DM channels are specified to include their own security
mechanisms that are designed to provide the minimum attacke surface, mechanisms that are designed to provide the minimum attacke surface,
and to authenticate transactions where necessary. and to authenticate transactions where necessary.
14.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses Note that in the case of the Reverse Homenet Zone, the data is less
subject to attacks than in the Public Homenet Zone. In addition, the
HNA and the DM MAY belong to the same administrative domain, i.e. the
ISP. More specifically, the WAN interface is located in the ISP
network. As a result, if provisioned using DHCPv6, the security
credential may not even transit in the home network. On the other
hand, if the HNA is not hosted at the border of the home network, the
credential may rely on the security associated to DHCPv6. Even if
HNA and DM are in the same administrative domain it is strongly
RECOMMENDED to use a secure channel.
13.2. Names are less secure than IP addresses
This document describes how an end user can make their services and This document describes how an end user can make their services and
devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using devices from his home network reachable on the Internet by using
names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to names rather than IP addresses. This exposes the home network to
attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP attackers, since names are expected to include less entropy than IP
addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is addresses. In fact, with IP addresses, the Interface Identifier is
64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given 64 bits long leading to up to 2^64 possibilities for a given
subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of subnetwork. This is not to mention that the subnet prefix is also of
64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other 64 bits long, thus providing up to 2^64 possibilities. On the other
hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the hand, names used either for the home network domain or for the
devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas, devices present less entropy (livebox, router, printer, nicolas,
jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary jennifer, ...) and thus potentially exposes the devices to dictionary
attacks. attacks.
14.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses 13.3. Names are less volatile than IP addresses
IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service. IP addresses may be used to locate a device, a host or a service.
However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time However, home networks are not expected to be assigned a time
invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only invariant prefix by ISPs. As a result, observing IP addresses only
provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the provides some ephemeral information about who is accessing the
service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile service. On the other hand, names are not expected to be as volatile
as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more as IP addresses. As a result, logging names over time may be more
valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end valuable than logging IP addresses, especially to profile an end
user's characteristics. user's characteristics.
PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense, PTR provides a way to bind an IP address to a name. In that sense,
responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For responding to PTR DNS queries may affect the end user's privacy. For
that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries that reason end users may choose not to respond to PTR DNS queries
and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response. and MAY instead return a NXDOMAIN response.
14.4. DNS Reflection Attacks 13.4. DNS Reflection Attacks
An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one An attacker performs a reflection attack when it sends traffic to one
or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back or more intermediary nodes (reflectors), that in turn send back
response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an response traffic to the victim. Motivations for using an
intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as intermediary node might be anonymity of the attacker, as well as
amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node amplification of the traffic. Typically, when the intermediary node
is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim is a DNSSEC server, the attacker sends a DNSSEC query and the victim
is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how is likely to receive a DNSSEC response. This section analyzes how
the different components may be involved as a reflector in a the different components may be involved as a reflector in a
reflection attack. Section 14.5 considers the Hidden Primary, reflection attack. Section 13.5 considers the Hidden Primary,
Section 14.6 the Synchronization Server, and Section 14.7 the Public Section 13.6 the Synchronization Server, and Section 13.7 the Public
Authoritative Server(s). Authoritative Server(s).
14.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary 13.5. Reflection Attack involving the Hidden Primary
With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected With the specified architecture, the Hidden Primary is only expected
to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section to receive DNS queries of type SOA, AXFR or IXFR. This section
analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform analyzes how these DNS queries may be used by an attacker to perform
a reflection attack. a reflection attack.
DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less DNS queries of type AXFR and IXFR use TCP and as such are less
subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only subject to reflection attacks. This makes SOA queries the only
remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based remaining practical vector of attacks for reflection attacks, based
on UDP. on UDP.
skipping to change at page 24, line 38 skipping to change at page 25, line 31
SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which SOA queries are expected to follow a very specific pattern, which
makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such makes rate limiting techniques an efficient way to limit such
attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home attacks, and associated impact on the naming service of the home
network. network.
Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could Motivations for such a flood might be a reflection attack, but could
also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden also be a resource exhaustion attack performed against the Hidden
Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with Primary. The Hidden Primary only expects to exchange traffic with
the DM, that is its associated secondary. Even though secondary the DM, that is its associated secondary. Even though secondary
servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 11, the Hidden servers may be renumbered as mentioned in Section 10, the Hidden
Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the Primary is likely to perform a DNSSEC resolution and find out the
associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the Hidden associated secondary's IP addresses in use. As a result, the Hidden
Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic based Primary is likely to limit the origin of its incoming traffic based
on the origin IP address. on the origin IP address.
With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are With filtering rules based on IP address, SOA flooding attacks are
limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary limited to forged packets with the IP address of the secondary
server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary server. In other words, the only victims are the Hidden Primary
itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to itself or the secondary. There is a need for the Hidden Primary to
limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the limit that flood to limit the impact of the reflection attack on the
skipping to change at page 25, line 33 skipping to change at page 26, line 24
may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate may have its legitimate query rejected is higher. If a legitimate
SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry SOA is discarded, the secondary will re-send SOA query every "retry
time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time" time" second until "expire time" seconds occurs, where "retry time"
and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA. and "expire time" have been defined in the SOA.
As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to As a result, it is RECOMMENDED to set rate limiting policies to
protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time protect HNA resources. If a flood lasts more than the expired time
defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a defined by the SOA, it is RECOMMENDED to re-initiate a
synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries. synchronization between the Hidden Primary and the secondaries.
14.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM 13.6. Reflection Attacks involving the DM
The DM acts as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary. The The DM acts as a secondary coupled with the Hidden Primary. The
secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and secondary expects to receive NOTIFY query, SOA responses, AXFR and
IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary. IXFR responses from the Hidden Primary.
Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response Sending a NOTIFY query to the secondary generates a NOTIFY response
as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the as well as initiating an SOA query exchange from the secondary to the
Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign Hidden Primary. As mentioned in [RFC1996], this is a known "benign
denial of service attack". As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate denial of service attack". As a result, the DM SHOULD enforce rate
limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to the Hidden limiting on sending SOA queries and NOTIFY responses to the Hidden
Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is flooded with valid and Primary. Most likely, when the secondary is flooded with valid and
signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed signed NOTIFY queries, it is under a replay attack which is discussed
in Section 14.9. The key thing here is that the secondary is likely in Section 13.9. The key thing here is that the secondary is likely
to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the to be designed to be able to process much more traffic than the
Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA. Hidden Primary hosted on a HNA.
This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY This paragraph details how the secondary may limit the NOTIFY
queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary queries. Because the Hidden Primary may be renumbered, the secondary
SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In SHOULD NOT perform permanent IP filtering based on IP addresses. In
addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden addition, a given secondary may be shared among multiple Hidden
Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The Primaries which make filtering rules based on IP harder to set. The
time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not time at which a NOTIFY is sent by the Hidden Primary is not
predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily predictable. However, a flood of NOTIFY messages may be easily
detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is detected, as a NOTIFY originated from a given Homenet Zone is
expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses, expected to have a very limited number of unique source IP addresses,
even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY even when renumbering is occurring. As a result, the secondary, MAY
rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries. rate limit incoming NOTIFY queries.
On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary On the Hidden Primary side, it is recommended that the Hidden Primary
sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the sends a NOTIFY as long as the zone has not been updated by the
secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under secondary. Multiple SOA queries may indicate the secondary is under
attack. attack.
14.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers 13.7. Reflection Attacks involving the Public Authoritative Servers
Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are Reflection attacks involving the Public Authoritative Server(s) are
similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is not similar to attacks on any Outsourcing Infrastructure. This is not
specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus are specific to the architecture described in this document, and thus are
considered as out of scope. considered as out of scope.
In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this In fact, one motivation of the architecture described in this
document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks document is to expose the Public Authoritative Server(s) to attacks
instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative instead of the HNA, as it is believed that the Public Authoritative
Server(s) will be better able to defend itself. Server(s) will be better able to defend itself.
14.8. Flooding Attack 13.8. Flooding Attack
The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where The purpose of flooding attacks is mostly resource exhaustion, where
the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example. the resource can be bandwidth, memory, or CPU for example.
One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit One goal of the architecture described in this document is to limit
the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the the surface of attack on the HNA. This is done by outsourcing the
DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the DNS service to the Public Authoritative Server(s). By doing so, the
HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the HNA limits its DNS interactions between the Hidden Primary and the
DM. This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as DM. This limits the number of entities the HNA interacts with as
well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR. well as the scope of DNS exchanges - NOTIFY, SOA, AXFR, IXFR.
The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the The use of an authenticated channel with SIG(0) or TSIG between the
HNA and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so HNA and the DM, enables detection of illegitimate DNS queries, so
appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the queries. If appropriate action may be taken - like dropping the queries. If
signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay signatures are validated, then most likely, the HNA is under a replay
attack, as detailed in Section 14.9 attack, as detailed in Section 13.9
In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is In order to limit the resource required for authentication, it is
recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0) recommended to use TSIG that uses symmetric cryptography over SIG(0)
that uses asymmetric cryptography. that uses asymmetric cryptography.
14.9. Replay Attack 13.9. Replay Attack
Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a Replay attacks consist of an attacker either resending or delaying a
legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or legitimate message that has been sent by an authorized user or
process. As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated process. As the Hidden Primary and the DM use an authenticated
channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries channel, replay attacks are mostly expected to use forged DNS queries
in order to provide valid traffic. in order to provide valid traffic.
From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated From the perspective of an attacker, using a correctly authenticated
DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a DNS query may not be detected as an attack and thus may generate a
response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources response. Generating and sending a response consumes more resources
than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the than either dropping the query by the defender, or generating the
query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion query by the attacker, and thus could be used for resource exhaustion
attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS attacks. In addition, as the authentication is performed at the DNS
layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to layer, the source IP address could be impersonated in order to
perform a reflection attack. perform a reflection attack.
Section 14.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and Section 13.4 details how to mitigate reflection attacks and
Section 14.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both Section 13.8 details how to mitigate resource exhaustion. Both
sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This sections assume a context of DoS with a flood of DNS queries. This
section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks. section suggests a way to limit the attack surface of replay attacks.
As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame As SIG(0) and TSIG use inception and expiration time, the time frame
for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge for replay attack is limited. SIG(0) and TSIG recommends a fudge
value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between value of 5 minutes. This value has been set as a compromise between
possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid possibly loose time synchronization between devices and the valid
lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization lifetime of the message. As a result, better time synchronization
policies could reduce the time window of the attack. policies could reduce the time window of the attack.
[](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS [](<!- <section title="DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS
hosted data hosted data
Deploying DNSSEC is recommended, since in some cases the information Deploying DNSSEC is recommended, since in some cases the information
stored in the DNS is used by the ISP or an IT department to grant stored in the DNS is used by the ISP or an IT department to grant
access. For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to access. For example some servers may perform PTR DNS queries to
grant access based on host names. DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in grant access based on host names. DNSSEC mitigates lack of trust in
DNS, and it is RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs. DNS, and it is RECOMMENDED to deploy DNSSEC on HNAs.
-->) ->)
15. IANA Considerations 14. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
16. Acknowledgment 15. Acknowledgment
The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on The authors wish to thank Philippe Lemordant for its contributions on
the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues the early versions of the draft; Ole Troan for pointing out issues
with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this with the IPv6 routed home concept and placing the scope of this
document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and document in a wider picture; Mark Townsley for encouragement and
injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie injecting a healthy debate on the merits of the idea; Ulrik de Bie
for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian for providing alternative solutions; Paul Mockapetris, Christian
Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on Jacquenet, Francis Dupont and Ludovic Eschard for their remarks on
HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC HNA and low power devices; Olafur Gudmundsson for clarifying DNSSEC
capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as capabilities of small devices; Simon Kelley for its feedback as
dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael dnsmasq implementer; Andrew Sullivan, Mark Andrew, Ted Lemon, Mikael
Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on Abrahamson, Michael Richardson and Ray Bellis for their feedback on
handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of handling different views as well as clarifying the impact of
outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew outsourcing the zone signing operation outside the HNA; Mark Andrew
and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering. and Peter Koch for clarifying the renumbering.
17. Annex 16. Annex
17.1. Envisioned deployment scenarios 16.1. Envisioned deployment scenarios
A number of deployment have been envisionned, this section aims at A number of deployment have been envisionned, this section aims at
providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitatives and providing a brief description. The use cases are not limitatives and
this section is not normative. this section is not normative.
17.1.1. CPE Vendor 16.1.1. CPE Vendor
A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a A specific vendor with specific relations with a registrar or a
registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain registry may sell a CPE that is provisioned with provisioned domain
name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable. name. Such domain name does not need to be necessary human readable.
One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a One possible way is that the vendor also provisions the HNA with a
private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these private and public keys as well as a certificate. Note that these
keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing. Instead these keys are not expected to be used for DNSSEC signing. Instead these
keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication. keys are solely used by the HNA to proceed to the authentication.
Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to Normally the keys should be necessary and sufficient to proceed to
the authentication. The reason to combine the domain name and the the authentication. The reason to combine the domain name and the
key is that outsourcing infrastructure are likely handle names better key is that outsourcing infrastructure are likely handle names better
than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which than keys and that domain names might be used as a login which
enables the key to be regenerated. enables the key to be regenerated.
When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation When the home network owner plugs the CPE at home, the relation
between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box. between HNA and DM is expected to work out-of-the-box.
17.1.2. Agnostic CPE 16.1.2. Agnostic CPE
An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advanatge to the An CPE that is not preconfigured may also take advanatge to the
protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will protocol defined in this document but some configuration steps will
be needed. be needed.
1. The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar, 1. The owner of the home network buys a domain name to a registrar,
and as such creates an account on that registrar and as such creates an account on that registrar
2. Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing 2. Either the registrar is also providing the outsourcing
infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific infrastructure or the home network needs to create a specific
skipping to change at page 29, line 36 skipping to change at page 30, line 19
network to provide the public key gnerated by the HNA in a CSR. network to provide the public key gnerated by the HNA in a CSR.
o If the outsourcing infrastructure is not the registrar, then the o If the outsourcing infrastructure is not the registrar, then the
proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like proof of ownership needs to be established using protocols like
ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate. ACME for example that will end in the generation of a certificate.
ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of ACME is used here to the purpose of automating the generation of
the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the outsourcing the certificate, the CA may be a specific CA or the outsourcing
infrastructure. With that being done, the outsourcing infrastructure. With that being done, the outsourcing
infrastructure has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above. infrastructure has a roof of ownership and can proceed as above.
17.2. Example: Homenet Zone 16.2. Example: Homenet Zone
This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA This section is not normative and intends to illustrate how the HNA
builds the Homenet Zone. builds the Homenet Zone.
As depicted in Figure 1, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the As depicted in Figure 1, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the
Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on
the HNA. This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that the HNA. This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that
will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s). will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s).
In other words "Homenet to Public Zone transformation" is the In other words "Homenet to Public Zone transformation" is the
identity also commonly designated as "no operation" (NOP). identity also commonly designated as "no operation" (NOP).
skipping to change at page 31, line 37 skipping to change at page 32, line 34
performed on all zone files, i.e. for all Registered Homenet Domains. performed on all zone files, i.e. for all Registered Homenet Domains.
To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are To limit thees updates when multiple Registered Homenet Domains are
involved, the HNA MAY fill all bindings in a specific zone file and involved, the HNA MAY fill all bindings in a specific zone file and
redirect all other zones to that zone. This can be achieved with redirect all other zones to that zone. This can be achieved with
redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME redirecting mechanisms like CNAME {{RFC2181}}, {{RFC1034}}, DNAME
{{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This is {{RFC6672}} or CNAME+DNAME {{I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname}}. This is
an implementation issue to determine whether redirection mechanisms an implementation issue to determine whether redirection mechanisms
MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when the number of MAY be preferred for large Homenet Zones, or when the number of
Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->> Registered Homenet Domain becomes quite large. -->>
17.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing 16.3. Example: HNA necessary parameters for outsourcing
This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to This section specifies the various parameters required by the HNA to
configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is configure the naming architecture of this document. This section is
informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by informational, and is intended to clarify the information handled by
the HNA and the various settings to be done. the HNA and the various settings to be done.
DM may be configured with the following parameters. These parameters DM may be configured with the following parameters. These parameters
are necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the are necessary to establish a secure channel between the HNA and the
DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the DM as well as to specify the DNS zone that is in the scope of the
communication: communication:
skipping to change at page 32, line 28 skipping to change at page 33, line 26
that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone. IP that will be set in the NS RRsets and SOA of the Homenet Zone. IP
addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To secure the addresses are optional and the FQDN is sufficient. To secure the
binding between name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is binding between name and IP addresses, a DNSSEC exchange is
required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered manually. required. Otherwise, the IP addresses should be entered manually.
o Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the o Registered Homenet Domain: The domain name used to establish the
secure channel. This name is used by the DM and the HNA for the secure channel. This name is used by the DM and the HNA for the
primary / secondary configuration as well as to index the NOTIFY primary / secondary configuration as well as to index the NOTIFY
queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered. queries of the HNA when the HNA has been renumbered.
Setting the Homenet Zone requires the following information. Setting the Homenet Zone requires the following information.
o Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple o Registered Homenet Domain: The Domain Name of the zone. Multiple
Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate Registered Homenet Domains may be provided. This will generate
the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones. the creation of multiple Public Homenet Zones.
o Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative Server(s) o Public Authoritative Server(s): The Public Authoritative Server(s)
associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple Public associated with the Registered Homenet Domain. Multiple Public
Authoritative Server(s) may be provided. Authoritative Server(s) may be provided.
Two possible methods of providing the required information would be: Two possible methods of providing the required information would be:
JSON for forward zones [should be standardized in a similar way to JSON for forward zones should be standardized in a similar way to
zone file layout in RFC1035] zone file layout in RFC1035
DHCP for reverse zones [needs a separate draft] DHCP for reverse zones needs a separate draft
18. References 17. References
18.1. Normative References
17.1. Normative References
[RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide", [RFC1033] Lottor, M., "Domain Administrators Operations Guide",
RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987, RFC 1033, DOI 10.17487/RFC1033, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1033>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
skipping to change at page 36, line 10 skipping to change at page 37, line 5
[RFC7788] Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking [RFC7788] Stenberg, M., Barth, S., and P. Pfister, "Home Networking
Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April Control Protocol", RFC 7788, DOI 10.17487/RFC7788, April
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7788>.
[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., [RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>. 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8375] Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain [RFC8375] Pfister, P. and T. Lemon, "Special-Use Domain
'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018, 'home.arpa.'", RFC 8375, DOI 10.17487/RFC8375, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8375>.
18.2. Informative References [RFC8415] Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.
17.2. Informative References
[I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns] [I-D.howard-dnsop-ip6rdns]
Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service Howard, L., "Reverse DNS in IPv6 for Internet Service
Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in Providers", draft-howard-dnsop-ip6rdns-00 (work in
progress), June 2014. progress), June 2014.
[I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options] [I-D.ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-options]
Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and Migault, D., Mrugalski, T., Griffiths, C., Weber, R., and
W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming W. Cloetens, "DHCPv6 Options for Homenet Naming
Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc- Architecture", draft-ietf-homenet-naming-architecture-dhc-
 End of changes. 86 change blocks. 
174 lines changed or deleted 241 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/