draft-ietf-hip-cert-12.txt   rfc6253.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer
Internet-Draft Communication and Distributed Request for Comments: 6253 COMSYS, RWTH Aachen University
Updates: 5201 (if approved) Systems, RWTH Aachen University Updates: 5201 S. Varjonen
Intended status: Experimental Varjonen Category: Experimental Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
Expires: September 15, 2011 Helsinki Institute for Information ISSN: 2070-1721 May 2011
Technology
March 14, 2011
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-cert-12
Abstract Abstract
The CERT parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP) certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
control packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
and the error signaling in case of a failed verification. CERT parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and SPKI certificates. representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are The concrete use of certificates, including how certificates are
obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or
failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the failed verification, is specific to the scenario in which the
certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario- certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-
specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
This document updates RFC 5201. This document updates RFC 5201.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute published for examination, experimental implementation, and
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- evaluation.
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." community. It has received public review and has been approved for
publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 15, 2011. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
skipping to change at page 2, line 32 skipping to change at page 2, line 35
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a means of a digital signature and thus enable the holder of a private
private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic
namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
data and issue certificates with their private key. This document data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in
5.2 of [RFC5201], and thus, updates [RFC5201]. Section 5.2 of [RFC5201] and thus updates [RFC5201].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
2119 [RFC2119]. RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. CERT Parameter 2. CERT Parameter
The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is is intentionally not discussed in this document, because it is
specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT
parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter. SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED, because it can
increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or
unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert
group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be
interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate
chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert
count field MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique count field MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique
Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with
the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical
skipping to change at page 3, line 49 skipping to change at page 3, line 49
be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple
packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the
next HIP control packet. next HIP control packet.
The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up
to Cert count. to Cert count.
The Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each The Cert group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each
host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | | Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate / | Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 768 Type 768
Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding.
Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters.
Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive HIP control packets. in several consecutive HIP control packets.
Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate.
Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate.
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. of 8 bytes.
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the
signature and hash algorithms. signature and hash algorithms.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number | | Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 | | Reserved | 0 |
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| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 | | Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 | | LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 | | LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 | | Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 | | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in
X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in
[RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is Distinguished Encoding [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished
Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling
procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693]. procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].
Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used
as defined in [RFC5996] Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC5996]. Using hash and URL encodings
results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
a local cache against the hash. a local cache against the hash.
LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encodings (5 and 6)
LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in
the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache smaller HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
against the URL. certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the
string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check a local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in x.509 If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in
v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843]. X.509 v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in
When Host Identifier ( HI ) is used to sign the certificate the [RFC4843]. When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the
respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN) certificate, the respective HIT MUST be placed into the Issuer
extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in Alternative Name (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress
[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified as defined in [RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP
by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Subject host, identified by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT MUST be placed
Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress into the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the
and the full HI is presented as the subjects public key info as GeneralName form iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the
defined in [RFC5280]. subject's public key info as defined in [RFC5280].
The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer
and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names. and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
Format of X509v3 extensions: Format of X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-issuer IP Address:hit-of-issuer
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-subject IP Address:hit-of-subject
Example X509v3 extensions: Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3 IP Address:2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP Appendix B shows a full example of an X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor
can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
certificates. certificates.
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the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as
specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
keys. keys.
4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities 4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities
When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP
hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can
represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following, we define
the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as
S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human- S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-
readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented
in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates. in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.
As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as As an example, the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as
follows: follows:
Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content. Appendix A shows a full example of a SPKI certificate with HIP
content.
5. Revocation of Certificates 5. Revocation of Certificates
Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as Section 5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled
defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693]. as defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693].
6. Error signaling 6. Error Signaling
If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder
requires the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the connection). requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g., reject the
The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by sending a HIP connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
CREDENTIALS_NEEDED. CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE. message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ ----- ------------------------------------ -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48 CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials. as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated
from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and
Cert ID of the certificate parameter that caused the failure. Cert ID of the Certificate parameter that caused the failure.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type
768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].
The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new certificate types, for which IANA has created and now maintains a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host sub-registry entitled "HIP Certificate Types" under the "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
Review. Review.
In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY
types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Message Types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Parameters".
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence, processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
outstanding certificates if state space is scarce. certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
scarce.
Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow DoS attacks, where Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
the target host may be subjected to bogus work. (DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in
[RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280] [RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280].
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu, and
Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D.
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3. Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in
Section 3.
10. Normative References 10. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
September 1999. September 1999.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, June 2006. RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4516] Smith, M., Ed., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, Access Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator",
June 2006. RFC 4516, June 2006.
[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix [RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007. (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, [RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., Ed., and T.
"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010. RFC 5996, September 2010.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, [X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", July 2002. (DER)", July 2002.
Appendix A. SPKI certificate example Appendix A. SPKI Certificate Example
This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example This section shows an SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The
has been indented for readability. example has been indented for readability.
(sequence (sequence
(public_key (public_key
(rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (rsa-pkcs1-sha1
(e #010001#) (e #010001#)
(n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb (n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb
k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp
OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB
mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=| mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=|
) )
skipping to change at page 10, line 35 skipping to change at page 11, line 5
) )
(signature (signature
(hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|) (hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|)
|u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy |u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy
NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI
CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm
MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=| MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|
) )
) )
Appendix B. X.509.v3 certificate example Appendix B. X.509 v3 Certificate Example
This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs. This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
Certificate: Certificate:
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0) Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com
Validity Validity
skipping to change at page 11, line 31 skipping to change at page 11, line 35
fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd: fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67: 18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26: 09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7: fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1: 98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42: df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3 9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:13:8D83:41C5:DC9F:38ED:E742:7281 IP Address:2001:13:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1C:6E02:D3E0:9B90:8417:673E:99DB IP Address:2001:1c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30: 83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f: a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a: 30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82: f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca: 4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b: e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93: 04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
57:29 57:29
Appendix C. Change log
Changes from version 00 to 01:
o Revised text on DN usage.
o Revised text on Cert group usage.
Changes from version 01 to 02:
o Revised the type numbers.
o Added a section on signaling.
Changes from version 02 to 03:
o Revised text on CERT usage in control packets.
Changes from version 03 to 04:
o Added the non-HIP aware use case to the Section 3.
o Clarified that the HITs are not always required in the
certificates.
o Rewrote the signaling section.
o LDAP URL to LDAP DN in Section 2 last paragraph.
o CERT is always covered by a signature as it's type number requires
o New example certificates
o Style and language clean-ups
o Changed IANA considerations
o Revised the type numbers
o RFC 2119 keywords
o Updated the IANA considerations section
o Rewrote the abstract
Changes from version 04 to 05:
o Clarified the examples in Section 3.
o Clarifications to Section Section 3.
o Modified the explanation of INVALID_CERTIFICATE to allow multiple
certs.
o Added reference to the IPv6 colon delimited presentation format.
o Small editorial changes.
Changes from version 05 to 06:
o Editorial changes.
o Unified the example in Section 3.
Changes from version 06 to 07:
o Editorial changes.
o Removed a the second paragraph in section 8.
o Changed the example in Appendix A (Cert created without the
leading zeroes in HITs).
Changes from version 07 to 08:
o Updated and checked the references.
Changes from version 08 to 09:
o Fixing boilerplate.
Changes from version 09 to 10:
o IANA considerations updated based on the IANA review.
o Updates based on the hip-chairs review.
o Updates based on the Gen-ART review.
Changes from version 10 to 11:
o Fixed the nits.
Changes from version 11 to 12:
o Updates based on the PKIX WG review.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Communication and Distributed Systems, RWTH Aachen University Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - COMSYS
RWTH Aachen University
Ahornstrasse 55 Ahornstrasse 55
Aachen Aachen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 241 80 20 776 Phone: +49 241 80 20 776
Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de EMail: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/ URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/
Samu Varjonen Samu Varjonen
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b
Helsinki Helsinki
Finland Finland
Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi EMail: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
URI: http://www.hiit.fi URI: http://www.hiit.fi
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