draft-ietf-hip-cert-09.txt   draft-ietf-hip-cert-10.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Host Identity Protocol Heer
Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Internet-Draft Communication and Distributed
Intended status: Experimental Aachen University Updates: 5201 (if approved) Systems, RWTH Aachen University
Expires: July 22, 2011 Varjonen Intended status: Experimental Varjonen
Helsinki Institute for Information Expires: September 10, 2011 Helsinki Institute for Information
Technology Technology
January 18, 2011 March 9, 2011
Host Identity Protocol Certificates Host Identity Protocol Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-cert-09 draft-ietf-hip-cert-10
Abstract Abstract
The CERT parameter is a container for X.509.v3 certificates and The CERT parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is
Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. It is used for used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP) control control packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter
packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter and the and the error signaling in case of a failed verification.
error signaling in case of a failed verification. Additionally, this Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host
document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in Identity Tags in X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates.
X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates.
The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are
obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or
failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the
certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario- certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-
specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2011. The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
skipping to change at page 2, line 15 skipping to change at page 2, line 20
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a
private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic
namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
data and issue certificates with their private key. This document data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section
5.2 of [RFC5201]. 5.2 of [RFC5201], and thus, updates [RFC5201].
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. CERT Parameter 2. CERT Parameter
The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
certificates. It MAY either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3
certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is
specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT
parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
parameter. parameter.
The CERT parameter is covered, when present, by the HIP SIGNATURE The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
field and is a non-critical parameter. SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
in the I1 packet is not recommended because it can increase the in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain multiple CERT processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
parameters. These parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or
certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert group specifies a unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert
group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be
certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate chains). For interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate
grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert count field chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert
MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique Cert group count field MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique
field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with
Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical grouping. the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical
The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT parameters in the grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT
group. parameters in the group.
CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained
in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a
higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching
Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST
be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple
packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the
next HIP control packet. next HIP control packet.
skipping to change at page 4, line 27 skipping to change at page 4, line 27
Type 768 Type 768
Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive HIP control packets. in several consecutive HIP control packets.
Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate
Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. of 8 bytes.
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the
signature and hash algorithms.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number | | Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 |
| X.509.v3 | 1 | | X.509.v3 | 1 |
| SPKI | 2 | | SPKI | 2 |
| Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 | | Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 |
| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 | | Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 | | LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 | | LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 | | Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 | | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in
certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC5280]. The X.509.v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as X.509.v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in
defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding
[RFC2693]. Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling
procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].
Hash and URL encodings (3 and 4) are used as defined in [RFC5996] Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used
Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP as defined in [RFC5996] Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings
control packets, but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to
check a local cache against the hash. resolve the URL or check a local cache against the hash.
LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using
LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires
the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache
against the URL. against the URL.
Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in
[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check a local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
When using X.509.v3 certificates to transmit information related to HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in x.509.v3. HITs
HIP hosts, HITs MAY be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843]. When Host
represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are Identifier ( HI ) is used to sign the certificate the respective HIT
represented as issuer or subject alternative name extensions as MUST be placed in to the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN) extension
defined in [RFC5280]. If only the HIT of the host is presented as using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in [RFC5280]. When
either the issuer or the subject the respective HIT MUST be placed the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified by a HIT and HI,
into the respective entity's DN's Common Name (CN) section in a colon the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Subject Alternative Name
delimited presentation format defined in [RFC5952]. Inclusion of CN (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress and the full HI
is not necessary if DN contains any other naming information. It is is presented as the subjects public key info as defined in [RFC5280].
RECOMMENDED to use the FQDN/NAI from the hosts HOST_ID parameter in
the DN if one exists. The full HIs are presented in the public key
entries of X.509.v3 certificates.
The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer
and subject in the DN and in the X.509.v3 extension alternative and subject in the X.509.v3 extension alternative names.
names.
Format of DN:
Issuer: CN=hit-of-issuer
Subject: CN=hit-of-subject
Example DN:
Issuer: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
Subject: CN=2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Format of X509v3 extensions: Format of X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-issuer IP Address:hit-of-issuer
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:hit-of-subject IP Address:hit-of-subject
Example X509v3 extensions: Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3 IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed PKI environment in which the As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different) (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In this
neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor can it
include them in the certificates. be configured to compute HITs and include them in the certificates.
In this scenario, it is RECOMMENDED that the HIP peers have and use
some mechanism of defining trusted root CAs for the purpose of
establishing HIP communications. Furthermore it is recommended that
the HIP peers have and use some mechanism of checking peer
certificate validity for revocation, signature, minimum cryptographic
strength, etc., up to the trusted root CA.
When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as
specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
keys. keys.
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 7, line 38
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type
768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].
The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
Review.
In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message
types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order
and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by
the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence, the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence,
hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with
outstanding certificates if state space is scarce. outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.
Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow DoS attacks, where
the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in
[RFC2693] and for X.509.v3 in [RFC5280]
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3. most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
10. References 10. Normative References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
September 1999. September 1999.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, June 2006. RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access [RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
June 2006. June 2006.
[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, [RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008. "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, [RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010. RFC 5996, September 2010.
10.2. Informative References [X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and (DER)", July 2002.
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, <http://
www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/
X.690-0207.pdf>.
Appendix A. SPKI certificate example Appendix A. SPKI certificate example
This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example
has been indented for readability. has been indented for readability.
(sequence (sequence
(public_key (public_key
(rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (rsa-pkcs1-sha1
(e #010001#) (e #010001#)
skipping to change at page 13, line 30 skipping to change at page 12, line 39
leading zeroes in HITs). leading zeroes in HITs).
Changes from version 07 to 08: Changes from version 07 to 08:
o Updated and checked the references. o Updated and checked the references.
Changes from version 08 to 09: Changes from version 08 to 09:
o Fixing boilerplate. o Fixing boilerplate.
Changes from version 09 to 10:
o IANA considerations updated based on the IANA review.
o Updates based on the hip-chairs review.
o Updates based on the Gen-ART review.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Aachen University Communication and Distributed Systems, RWTH Aachen University
Ahornstrasse 55 Ahornstrasse 55
Aachen Aachen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 241 80 214 36 Phone: +49 241 80 20 776
Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/
Samu Varjonen Samu Varjonen
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b
Helsinki Helsinki
Finland Finland
Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
URI: http://www.hiit.fi URI: http://www.hiit.fi
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