draft-ietf-hip-cert-03.txt   draft-ietf-hip-cert-04.txt 
Host Identity Protocol Heer Host Identity Protocol Heer
Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH
Intended status: Informational Aachen University Intended status: Experimental Aachen University
Expires: October 30, 2010 Varjonen Expires: March 27, 2011 Varjonen
Helsinki Institute for Information Helsinki Institute for Information
Technology Technology
April 28, 2010 September 23, 2010
HIP Certificates HIP Certificates
draft-ietf-hip-cert-03 draft-ietf-hip-cert-04
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a certificate parameter called CERT for the The CERT parameter is a container for X.509.v3 certificates and
Host Identity Protocol (HIP). The CERT parameter is a container for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. It is used for
X.509.v3 certificates and for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) carrying these certificates in HIP control packets. This document
certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in HIP only specifies the certificate parameter and the error signaling in
control packets. Additionally, this document specifies the case of a failed verification. The use of certificates including how
representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509.v3 and in SPKI certificates are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken
certificates. upon successful or failed verification are to be defined in the
documents that use the certificate parameter. Additionally, this
document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in
X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified, provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified,
and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it
for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English. than English.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the BSD License.
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by
means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a
private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The
Host Identity Protocol (HIP)[RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic
namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. Each host's identity is namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign data with host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
their private key. This document specifies a CERT parameter that is data with their private key. This document specifies the CERT
used to transmit digital signatures in HIP. It fills the placeholder parameter, which is used to transmit digital certificates in HIP. It
specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201]. fills the placeholder specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201].
2. CERT Parameter 2. CERT Parameter
The CERT parameter is a container for a certain types of digital The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
certificates. It may either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3 certificates. It MAY either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3
certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
However, it defines some organizational parameters that help HIP However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
hosts to transmit semantically grouped parameters in a more transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
systematic way. way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
is intentionally not discussed in this document.
The CERT parameter may be covered by the HIP SIGNATURE field and is a The CERT parameter is covered, when present, by the HIP SIGNATURE
non-critical parameter. field and is a non-critical parameter.
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets but using CERT in The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets but using it in the
I1 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Each allowed HIP control packet may contain I1 packet is not recommended because it can increase the processing
multiple CERT parameters. These parameters may be related or times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s.
unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert Each HIP control packet MAY contain multiple CERT parameters. These
group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that should be parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are
interpreted in a certain order (e.g. for expressing certificate managed in Cert groups. A Cert group specifies a group of related
chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.
count field must be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique for expressing certificate chains). For grouping CERT parameters,
Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with the Cert group and the Cert count field MUST be set. Ungrouped
the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical certificates exhibit a unique Cert group field and set the Cert count
grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert group number in the group
parameters in the group. field indicate a logical grouping. The Cert count field indicates
the number of CERT parameters in the group.
CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group may be contained CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained
in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a
higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching
Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters must Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST
be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
to their Cert group field. Cert groups may only span multiple to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple
packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. Only one Cert packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. Only a single
group may span two subsequent packets. Cert group MAY span two subsequent packets.
The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field must start from 1 up a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up
to Cert count. to Cert count.
The Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each
host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | | Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate / | Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
skipping to change at page 4, line 10 skipping to change at page 4, line 34
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes. of 8 bytes.
The following certificate types are defined: The following certificate types are defined:
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number | | Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
| X.509.v3 | 1 | | X.509.v3 | 1 |
| SPKI | 2 | | SPKI | 2 |
| URL of X.509.v3 | 3 | | Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 |
| URL of SPKI | 4 | | Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| Hash of X.509.v3 | 5 | | LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 |
| Hash of SPKI | 6 | | LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 7 | | Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 8 | | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 9 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 10 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+ +--------------------------------+-------------+
Next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI
certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC3280]. The certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC3280]. The
Wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as
defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in
[RFC2693]. [RFC2693].
Hash and URL encodings (3 to 6) are used as defined in [RFC4306]. Hash and URL encodings (3 to 4) are used as defined in [RFC4306]
Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP control packets, Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP
but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check local cache control packets, but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or
against the hash. check a local cache against the hash.
LDAP URL encoding (7 and 8) is used as defined in [RFC2255]. Using LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC2255]. Using
LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires
requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check local the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache
cache against the URL. against the URL.
Distinguished name (DN) encoding (9 and 10) is used as defined in Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in
[RFC1779]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control [RFC1779]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
check local cache against the DN. check a local cache against the DN.
3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities 3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using X.509.v3 When using X.509.v3 certificates to transmit information related to
certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can HIP hosts, HITs MAY be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can
represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are
represented as issuer and subject alternative name extensions as represented as issuer and subject alternative name extensions as
defined in [RFC2459]. If only HIP information is presented as either defined in [RFC2459]. If only HIP information is presented as either
the issuer or the subject the HIT is also placed into the respective the issuer or the subject the HIT is also placed into the respective
entity's DNs Common Name (CN) section in a colon delimited entity's DNs Common Name (CN) section in a colon delimited
presentation format. Inclusion of CN is not necessary if DN contains presentation format. Inclusion of CN is not necessary if DN contains
any other information. It is RECOMMENDED to use FQDN/NAI from the any other information. It is RECOMMENDED to use the FQDN/NAI from
hosts HOST_ID parameter in DN if one exists. Full HIs are presented the hosts HOST_ID parameter in the DN if one exists. The full HIs
in the public key entries of X.509.v3 certificates. are presented in the public key entries of X.509.v3 certificates.
As an example, in a case where the issuer and the subject are both The following example illustrates a case in which the issuer and the
HIP enabled, the HITs are expressed as follows: subject are both HIP enabled.
Format: Format:
Issuer: CN=hit-of-host Issuer: CN=hit-of-host
Subject: CN=hit-of-host Subject: CN=hit-of-host
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST
skipping to change at page 5, line 33 skipping to change at page 6, line 28
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056
Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP
content. content.
As another example, consider a managed PKI environment in which the
peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different)
managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to
HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up
to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is
neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and
include them in the certificates.
In this scenario, it is recommended that the HIP peers have and use
some mechanism of defining trusted root CAs for the purpose of
establishing HIP communications. Furthermore it is recommended that
the HIP peers have and use some mechanism of checking peer
certificate validity for revocation, signature, minimum cryptographic
strength, etc., up to the trusted root CA.
When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as
specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
Certificates and compute peer HITs based on the Certificate public
keys.
4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities 4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities
HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using SPKI When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP
certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can
represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define
the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as
S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human- S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-
readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented
in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates. in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.
As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as
follows: follows:
Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content. Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content.
5. Revocation of Certificates 5. Revocation of Certificates
Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as defined in Section 5. Revocation of X.509.v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section
in [RFC2693] Revocation of X.509.v3 certificates is handled as 5 in [RFC2459]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as
defined in Section 5 in [RFC2459]. defined in Section 5 in [RFC2693].
6. Signaling 6. Error signaling
HIP end-hosts and HIP-aware middleboxes need to inform, the initiator If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder
or the responder, of the need for a certificate or need for a chain requires the Responder may take actions (e.g. blocking the
of certificates. They also need a way to inform about failing to connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
meet required conditions. HIP services [HIP.service] describes the sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
signaling. Signaling for the requirements and failures with CREDENTIALS_NEEDED.
certificates is described in Section 4.1 of [HIP.service].
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association
as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
Notification Data contains 4 octets, in order Cert group,
Cert count, Cert ID, and Cert type of the certificate
parameter that caused the failure.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type
768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. The 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].
Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each host
that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
Certificate type registry are given in Section 2.
In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message
types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer
fragmentation allows, i.e. sending of fragments in wrong order and fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order
skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by the and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by
victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory).
It is not recommended to use grouping or hash and URL encodings when It is not recommended to use grouping or hash and URL encodings when
HIP-aware middleboxes are anticipated to be present on the HIP aware middleboxes are anticipated to be present on the
communication path between peers because fetching remote certificates communication path between peers because fetching remote certificates
require the middlebox to buffer the packets and to request remote require the middlebox to buffer the packets and to request remote
data. This makes these devices prone to denial of service (DoS) data. This makes these devices prone to denial of service (DoS)
attacks. Moreover, middleboxes and responders that request remote attacks. Moreover, middleboxes and responders that request remote
certificates can be used as deflectors for distributed denial of certificates can be used as deflectors for distributed denial of
service attacks. service attacks.
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank M. Komu and T. Henderson of fruitful The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
conversations on the subject. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[HIP.service]
Heer, T., Wirtz, H., and S. Varjonen, "Service Identifiers
for HIP", <draft-heer-hip-service-00.txt>.
[RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished [RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished
Names", RFC 1779, March 1995. Names", RFC 1779, March 1995.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2255] Howes, T. and M. Smith, "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255, [RFC2255] Howes, T. and M. Smith, "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255,
December 1997. December 1997.
[RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T., and D. Solo, "Internet [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T., and D. Solo, "Internet
skipping to change at page 8, line 9 skipping to change at page 10, line 7
[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - [X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology -
ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding
Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, <http:// Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, <http://
www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/ www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/
X.690-0207.pdf>. X.690-0207.pdf>.
Appendix A. SPKI certificate example Appendix A. SPKI certificate example
This section shows a self-signed SPKI certificate of HIT 2001:14:6cf: This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example
fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056. The example has been indented for has been indented for readability.
readability.
(sequence (sequence
(public_key (public_key
(rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (rsa-pkcs1-sha1
(e #010001#) (e #010001#)
(n |n1CheoELqYRSkHYMQddub2TpILl+6H9wC/as6zFCZqOY43hsZgAjG0F (n |uV7M1dl7OcJCPnlJrX8MvQ8SmE6wne5idnp7VfDMolestu
GoQwtyOyQjzO2Ykb2TmUCZemTYui/sR0zIbdwg1xafKl7ggZDkhk5an JqvB69z3UwlVuSr3VVaQvDSA+15BUweYkis/1+UVnSDdcS
PtGDxJxFalTYo6/A5ZQv8uatbaJgB/G7VM8G+O9HLucadad2zQUXpQf XUTz6AUTH1tPifoebYPp4s+9XG/vAh7I25pImjW4uL6Jvq
gbK3S8=| vI3WBE36wBt3Zmq12hpdA8jSIE1CRZYA8=|
) )
) )
) )
(cert (cert
(issuer (issuer
(hash hit 2001:0014:06cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056) (hash hit 2001:001e:d709:1980:5c6a:bb0c:7650:a027)
) )
(subject (subject
(hash hit 2001:0014:06cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056) (hash hit 2001:001c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3)
) )
(not-before "2008-07-12_22:11:07") (not-before "2010-06-22_16:40:47")
(not-after "2008-07-22_22:11:07") (not-after "2010-07-02_16:40:47")
) )
(signature (signature
(hash sha1 |kfElDhagiK0Bsqtj32Gq3t/1mxgA|) (hash sha1 |+UzjNn5+bXo3aMZQNGGtapKdlFAA|)
|HiIqjjZIUzypvoxQyO0UovPm5uC4Xte0scEcBnENDIfn2DNy/bAtxGEdKq4O |Fhioyxi0mpHa2aq2ofhotsauYyDuCa45mMAQ+yTEGOzcc1K+Prx
dW80vTCmkF8/HXclgXLLVch3DxRNdSbYiiks000HpQt/OKqlTH+uUHBcHOAo +O6kFecKxl+Cwz9qXEI6a/zfAnZqLj18yvszM1D/tH+W3RKl2LW
E42LmDskM9T5KQJoC/CH7871zfvojPnpkl2dUngOWv4q0r/wSJ0=| +lASsCDKXOi9ObNx+Dwzj3YlHABPxt4gGk0XVadEMXfCPDqiLF+
zMR9fW5/OaJ+vRwhKs=|
) )
) )
Appendix B. X.509.v3 certificate example Appendix B. X.509.v3 certificate example
This section shows a self-signed X.509.v3 certificate of HIT 2001:14: This section shows a X.509.v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056.
Certificate: Certificate:
Data: Data:
Version: 3 (0x2) Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0) Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 Issuer: CN=2001:1e:d709:1980:5c6a:bb0c:7650:a027
Validity Validity
Not Before: Jul 12 18:58:38 2008 GMT Not Before: Jun 22 13:39:32 2010 GMT
Not After : Jul 22 18:58:38 2008 GMT Not After : Jul 2 13:39:32 2010 GMT
Subject: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 Subject: CN=2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Subject Public Key Info: Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit): Modulus (1024 bit):
00:9f:50:a1:7a:81:0b:a9:84:52:90:76:0c:41:d7: 00:b9:5e:cc:d5:d9:7b:39:c2:42:3e:79:49:ad:7f:
6e:6f:64:e9:20:b9:7e:e8:7f:70:0b:f6:ac:eb:31: 0c:bd:0f:12:98:4e:b0:9d:ee:62:76:7a:7b:55:f0:
42:66:a3:98:e3:78:6c:66:00:23:1b:41:46:a1:0c: cc:a2:57:ac:b6:e2:6a:bc:1e:bd:cf:75:30:95:5b:
2d:c8:ec:90:8f:33:b6:62:46:f6:4e:65:02:65:e9: 92:af:75:55:69:0b:c3:48:0f:b5:e4:15:30:79:89:
93:62:e8:bf:b1:1d:33:21:b7:70:83:5c:5a:7c:a9: 22:b3:fd:7e:51:59:d2:0d:d7:12:5d:44:f3:e8:05:
7b:82:06:43:92:19:39:6a:73:ed:18:3c:49:c4:56: 13:1f:5b:4f:89:fa:1e:6d:83:e9:e2:cf:bd:5c:6f:
a5:4d:8a:3a:fc:0e:59:42:ff:2e:6a:d6:da:26:00: ef:02:1e:c8:db:9a:48:9a:35:b8:b8:be:89:be:ab:
7f:1b:b5:4c:f0:6f:8e:f4:72:ee:71:a7:5a:77:6c: c8:dd:60:44:df:ac:01:b7:76:66:ab:5d:a1:a5:d0:
d0:51:7a:50:7e:06:ca:dd:2f 3c:8d:22:04:d4:24:59:60:0f
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions: X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 IP Address:2001:1E:D709:1980:5C6A:BB0C:7650:A027
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 IP Address:2001:1C:5A14:26DE:A07C:385B:DE35:60E3
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
19:32:0b:72:a8:6c:f9:65:20:5b:1d:9a:e1:c7:39:97:c7:8a: 48:a1:25:fb:01:31:d9:80:76:1b:1a:2d:00:f1:26:22:3c:3b:
4d:d1:01:f9:7d:0b:0d:6f:61:a2:e3:2c:62:30:28:f6:36:db: 20:a0:cb:b2:28:d2:0c:21:d3:9e:3b:4a:ab:3d:f6:ea:ad:46:
62:bc:7f:d1:9b:6d:cc:da:e3:9b:90:e7:53:9e:55:28:51:7e: f6:f5:c4:4f:71:ce:3e:7b:65:8d:58:75:2e:99:25:82:5f:73:
39:de:23:24:f5:a9:97:7a:ba:ce:54:3e:cf:8b:68:04:f6:be: 10:c6:c2:f0:4b:35:ff:5c:65:ac:fc:a4:a7:76:50:ab:62:50:
78:94:9f:d3:20:62:96:14:84:51:af:c7:ba:30:ae:b1:d6:7e: b8:86:21:e6:83:e1:c1:3d:20:c9:8e:13:ab:d7:4b:d4:ab:2d:
7f:32:42:9c:f6:f5:76:27:0a:28:58:8b:b5:85:e7:e9:5a:ff: 72:9d:f0:9f:5f:e0:6f:95:fa:a1:95:64:3f:74:63:e5:a8:1d:
aa:4c:57:55:95:09:33:ac:0b:8c:fd:05:4a:5e:60:e7:7f:d7: f7:e6:48:98:33:53:7b:91:6d:b0:cb:af:32:15:8c:e0:01:a0:
42:f0 a0:b8
Appendix C. Change log Appendix C. Change log
Changes from version 00 to 01: Changes from version 00 to 01:
o Revised text about DN usage. o Revised text about DN usage.
o Revised text about Cert group usage. o Revised text about Cert group usage.
Changes from version 01 to 02: Changes from version 01 to 02:
o Revised the type numbers. o Revised the type numbers.
o Added a section about signaling. o Added a section about signaling.
Changes from version 02 to 03: Changes from version 02 to 03:
o Revised text about CERT use in control packets. o Revised text about CERT use in control packets.
Changes from version 03 to 04:
o Added the non-HIP aware use case to the Section 3.
o Clarified that the HITs are not always required in the
certificates.
o Rewrote the signaling section.
o LDAP URL to LDAP DN in Section 2 last paragraph.
o CERT is always covered by a signature as it's type number requires
o New example certificates
o Style and language clean-ups
o Changed IANA considerations
o Revised the type numbers
o RFC 2119 keywords
o Updated the IANA considerations section
o Rewrote the abstract
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Tobias Heer Tobias Heer
Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Aachen University Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Aachen University
Ahornstrasse 55 Ahornstrasse 55
Aachen Aachen
Germany Germany
Phone: +49 241 80 214 36 Phone: +49 241 80 214 36
Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer
Samu Varjonen Samu Varjonen
Helsinki Institute for Information Technology Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
Metsnneidonkuja 4 Metsaenneidonkuja 4
Helsinki Helsinki
Finland Finland
Fax: +35896949768
Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
URI: http://www.hiit.fi URI: http://www.hiit.fi
 End of changes. 56 change blocks. 
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