draft-ietf-hip-base-02.txt   draft-ietf-hip-base-03.txt 
Network Working Group R. Moskowitz Network Working Group R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft ICSAlabs, a Division of TruSecure Internet-Draft ICSAlabs, a Division of TruSecure
Expires: August 25, 2005 Corporation Expires: December 25, 2005 Corporation
P. Nikander P. Nikander
P. Jokela (editor) P. Jokela (editor)
Ericsson Research NomadicLab Ericsson Research NomadicLab
T. Henderson T. Henderson
The Boeing Company The Boeing Company
February 21, 2005 June 23, 2005
Host Identity Protocol Host Identity Protocol
draft-ietf-hip-base-02 draft-ietf-hip-base-03
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract Abstract
This memo specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP). This memo specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP).
HIP provides a rapid exchange of Host Identities (public keys)
The overall description of protocol and the underlying architectural between hosts and uses a Sigma-compliant [REF] Diffie-Hellman key
thinking is available in the separate HIP architecture specification. exchange to establish shared secrets between such endpoints. The
The Host Identity Protocol is used to establish a rapid protocol is designed to be resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) and
authentication between two hosts and to provide continuity of Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and when used together with another
communications between those hosts independent of the networking suitable security protocol, such as Encapsulated Security Payload
layer. (ESP) [24], it provides encryption and/or authentication protection
for upper layer protocols such as TCP and UDP, while enabling
The various forms of the Host Identity, Host Identity Tag (HIT) and continuity of communications across network layer address changes.
Local Scope Identifier (LSI), are covered in detail. It is described
how they are used to support authentication and the establishment of
keying material, which is then used for protecting subsequent HIP
messages, and which can be used for generating session keys for other
security protocols, such as IPsec Encapsulaed Security Payload (ESP).
The basic state machine for HIP provides a HIP compliant host with
the resiliency to avoid many denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The
basic HIP exchange for two public hosts shows the actual packet flow.
Other HIP exchanges, including those that work across NATs, are
covered elsewhere.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 A new name space and identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1 A New Name Space and Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The HIP base exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2 The HIP Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Host Identifier (HI) and its representations . . . . . . . . 9 2.1 Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1 Restricting HIT values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2 Generating a HIT from a HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. Host Identifier (HI) and its Representations . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Local Scope Identifier (LSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Host Identity Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3.2 Generating a HIT from a HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 HIP base exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.1 Creating a HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol . . . . . . . . 18 4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.3 HIP replay protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 TCP and UDP pseudo-header computation for user data . . . 20 4.1.3 HIP Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3 Updating a HIP association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.1.4 Refusing a HIP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4 Error processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.2 Updating a HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5 Certificate distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.3 Error Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.6 Sending data on HIP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.4 HIP State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.7 Transport Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.4.1 HIP States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. HIP protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.4.2 HIP State Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1 HIP Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2 Refusing a HIP exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.5 User Data Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3 Reboot and SA timeout restart of HIP . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.5.1 TCP and UDP Pseudo-header Computation for User Data . 24
5.4 HIP State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.5.2 Sending Data on HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.1 HIP States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.5.3 Transport Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.2 HIP State Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.5.4 Reboot and SA Timeout Restart of HIP . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.6 Certificate Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Packet formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1 Payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5.1 Payload Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.1 HIP Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.1.1 HIP Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1.2 Checksum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.1.2 Checksum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2 HIP parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.1.3 HIP Fragmentation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.1 TLV format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 5.1.4 Solving the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.2 Defining new parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 5.2 HIP Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.2.3 R1_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5.2.1 TLV Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.4 PUZZLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 5.2.2 Defining New Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.5 SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5.2.3 R1_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2.6 DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 5.2.4 PUZZLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2.7 HIP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 5.2.5 SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.8 HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.2.6 DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.9 CERT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.2.7 HIP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2.10 HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.2.8 HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.11 HMAC_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5.2.9 HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.12 HIP_SIGNATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5.2.10 HMAC_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.13 HIP_SIGNATURE_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5.2.11 HIP_SIGNATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.14 SEQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.2.12 HIP_SIGNATURE_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.15 ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5.2.13 SEQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.16 ENCRYPTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 5.2.14 ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2.17 NOTIFY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.2.15 ENCRYPTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2.18 ECHO_REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5.2.16 NOTIFY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.2.19 ECHO_RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2.17 ECHO_REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.3 ICMP messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.2.18 ECHO_RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.1 Invalid Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.3 HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.3.2 Other problems with the HIP header and packet 5.3.1 I1 - the HIP Initiator Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.3.2 R1 - the HIP Responder Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.3.3 Invalid Cookie Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.3.3 I2 - the Second HIP Initiator Packet . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3.4 Non-existing HIP association . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 5.3.4 R2 - the Second HIP Responder Packet . . . . . . . . . 53
7. HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.3.5 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.1 I1 - the HIP initiator packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 5.3.6 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.2 R1 - the HIP responder packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5.3.7 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet . . . . . . 55
7.3 I2 - the second HIP initiator packet . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.3.8 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP Closing Acknowledgment Packet . . 55
7.4 R2 - the second HIP responder packet . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.4 ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.5 CER - the HIP Certificate Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.4.1 Invalid Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.6 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 5.4.2 Other Problems with the HIP Header and Packet
7.7 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.8 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet . . . . . . . . 59 5.4.3 Invalid Cookie Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.9 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP closing acknowledgment packet . . . . 59 5.4.4 Non-existing HIP Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
8. Packet processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 6. Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.1 Processing outgoing application data . . . . . . . . . . . 61 6.1 Processing Outgoing Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 58
8.2 Processing incoming application data . . . . . . . . . . . 62 6.2 Processing Incoming Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE calculation and verification . . . . . 63 6.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification . . . . . 60
8.3.1 HMAC calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 6.3.1 HMAC Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
8.3.2 Signature calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 6.3.2 Signature Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8.4 Initiation of a HIP exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 6.4 HIP KEYMAT Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.4.1 Sending multiple I1s in parallel . . . . . . . . . . . 65 6.5 Initiation of a HIP Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.4.2 Processing incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable 6.5.1 Sending Multiple I1s in Parallel . . . . . . . . . . . 64
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 6.5.2 Processing Incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable
8.5 Processing incoming I1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.5.1 R1 Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6.6 Processing Incoming I1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.5.2 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.6.1 R1 Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.6 Processing incoming R1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 6.6.2 Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.6.1 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 6.7 Processing Incoming R1 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.7 Processing incoming I2 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6.7.1 Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.7.1 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6.8 Processing Incoming I2 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.8 Processing incoming R2 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 6.8.1 Handling Malformed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.9 Sending UPDATE packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 6.9 Processing Incoming R2 Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.10 Receiving UPDATE packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 6.10 Sending UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.10.1 Handling a SEQ paramaeter in a received UPDATE 6.11 Receiving UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.11.1 Handling a SEQ paramaeter in a received UPDATE
message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.10.2 Handling an ACK parameter in a received UPDATE 6.11.2 Handling an ACK Parameter in a Received UPDATE
packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.11 Processing CER packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.12 Processing NOTIFY Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.12 Processing NOTIFY packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.13 Processing CLOSE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.13 Processing CLOSE packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.14 Processing CLOSE_ACK Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.14 Processing CLOSE_ACK packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 6.15 Dropping HIP Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.15 Dropping HIP associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 7. HIP Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9. HIP KEYMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
10. HIP Fragmentation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11. HIP Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 11.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
14. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 11.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
15.1 Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 A. Probabilities of HIT Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
15.2 Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 B. Probabilities in the Cookie Calculation . . . . . . . . . . 90
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 C. Using Responder Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A. Probabilities of HIT collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 D. Generating a HIT from a HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B. Probabilities in the cookie calculation . . . . . . . . . . 88 E. Example Checksums for HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
C. Using responder cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 E.1 IPv6 HIP Example (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
D. Example checksums for HIP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 E.2 IPv4 HIP Packet (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
D.1 IPv6 HIP example (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 E.3 TCP Segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
D.2 IPv4 HIP packet (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 F. 384-bit Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
D.3 TCP segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 96
E. 384-bit group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 95
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) provides a rapid exchange of Host This memo specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP).
Identities between two hosts. The protocol is designed to be A high-level description of the protocol and the underlying
resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Man-in-the-middle (MitM) architectural thinking is available in the separate HIP architecture
attacks, and when used together with another suitable security description [25]. Briefly, the HIP architecture proposes an
protocol, such as Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) [23], it alternative to the dual use of IP addresses as "locators" (routing
provides DoS and MitM protection for upper layer protocols, such as labels) and "identifiers" (endpoint, or host, identifiers). Instead,
TCP and UDP. in HIP, the host identifiers are public keys of a public/private key
pair. By using public keys (and their representations) as host
identifiers, to which higher layer protocols are bound instead of an
IP address, dynamic changes to IP address sets can be directly
authenticated between hosts, and if desired, strong authentication
between hosts at the TCP/IP stack level can be obtained.
1.1 A new name space and identifiers This memo specifies the base HIP protocol ("base exchange") used
between hosts to establish communications context (keying material,
per-packet context tags) prior to communications. It also defines a
packet format and procedures for updating an active HIP association.
Other elements of the HIP architecture are specified in other
documents, including how HIP can be combined with a variant of the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) for encryption and/or
authentication protection, mobility and host multihoming extensions,
DNS extensions for storing host identities, HIP-related
infrastructure in the network, techniques for NAT traversal, and
possibly other future extensions.
1.1 A New Name Space and Identifiers
The Host Identity Protocol introduces a new namespace, the Host The Host Identity Protocol introduces a new namespace, the Host
Identity. The effects of this change are explained in the companion Identity. Some ramifications of this new namespace are explained in
document, the HIP architecture [21] specification. the companion document, the HIP architecture [25] specification.
There are two main representations of the Host Identity, the full There are two main representations of the Host Identity, the full
Host Identifier (HI) and the Host Identity Tag (HIT). The HI is a Host Identifier (HI) and the Host Identity Tag (HIT). The HI is a
public key and directly represents the Identity. Since there are public key and directly represents the Identity. Since there are
different public key algorithms that can be used with different key different public key algorithms that can be used with different key
lengths, the HI is not good for use as a packet identifier, or as an lengths, the HI is not good for use as a packet identifier, or as an
index into the various operational tables needed to support HIP. index into the various operational tables needed to support HIP.
Consequently, a hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), becomes Consequently, a hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), becomes
the operational representation. It is 128 bits long and is used in the operational representation. It is 128 bits long and is used in
the HIP payloads and to index the corresponding state in the end the HIP payloads and to index the corresponding state in the end
hosts. hosts. The HIT has an important security property in that it is
self-certifying (see Section 3).
1.2 The HIP base exchange 1.2 The HIP Base Exchange
The HIP base exchange is a two-party cryptographic protocol that The HIP base exchange is a two-party cryptographic protocol used to
consists of four packets. The first party is called the Initiator establish communications context between hosts. The base exchange is
and the second party the Responder. The four-packet design helps to a Sigma-compliant [REF] four packet exchange. The first party is
make HIP DoS resilient. The protocol exchanges Diffie-Hellman keys called the Initiator and the second party the Responder. The four-
in the 2nd and 3rd packets, and authenticates the parties in the 3rd packet design helps to make HIP DoS resilient. The protocol
and 4th packets. Additionally, it starts the cookie exchange in the exchanges Diffie-Hellman keys in the 2nd and 3rd packets, and
2nd packet, completing it in the 3rd packet. authenticates the parties in the 3rd and 4th packets. Additionally,
the Responder starts a cookie puzzle exchange in the 2nd packet, with
the Initiator completing it in the 3rd packet before the Responder
stores any state from the exchange.
The exchange uses the Diffie-Hellman exchange to hide the Host The exchange can use the Diffie-Hellman output to encrypt the Host
Identity of the Initiator in packet 3. The Responder's Host Identity Identity of the Initiator in packet 3 (although Aura et al. [29]
is not protected. It should be noted, however, that both the notes that such operation may interfere with packet-inspecting
Initiator's and the Responder's HITs are transported as such (in middleboxes), or the Host Identity may instead be sent unencrypted.
cleartext) in the packets, allowing an eavesdropper with a priori The Responder's Host Identity is not protected. It should be noted,
knowledge about the parties to verify their identities. however, that both the Initiator's and the Responder's HITs are
transported as such (in cleartext) in the packets, allowing an
eavesdropper with a priori knowledge about the parties to verify
their identities.
Data packets start after the 4th packet. The 3rd and 4th HIP packets Data packets start to flow after the 4th packet. The 3rd and 4th HIP
may carry a data payload in the future. However, the details of this packets may carry a data payload in the future. However, the details
are to be defined later as more implementation experience is gained. of this are to be defined later as more implementation experience is
gained.
Finally, HIP is designed as an end-to-end authentication and key Finally, HIP is designed as an end-to-end authentication and key
establishment protocol, to be used with Encapsulated Security Payload establishment protocol, to be used with Encapsulated Security Payload
(ESP) [23] and other end-to-end security protocols. The base (ESP) [24] and other end-to-end security protocols. The base
protocol lacks the details for security association management and protocol lacks the details for security association management and
much of the fine-grained policy control found in Internet Key much of the fine-grained policy control found in Internet Key
Exchange IKE RFC2409 [8] that allows IKE to support complex gateway Exchange IKE RFC2409 [8] that allows IKE to support complex gateway
policies. Thus, HIP is not a replacement for IKE. policies. Thus, HIP is not a replacement for IKE.
2. Conventions used in this document 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1 Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [5]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [5].
3. Host Identifier (HI) and its representations 2.2 Notation
[x] indicates that x is optional.
{x} indicates that x is encrypted.
<x>y indicates that "x" is encrypted with the key "y".
--> signifies "Initiator to Responder" communication (requests).
<-- signifies "Responder to Initiator" communication (replies).
| signifies concatenation of information-- e.g. X | Y is the
concatenation of X with Y.
Ltrunc (SHA-1(), K) denotes the lowest order K bits of the SHA-1
result.
(This section needs work.)
2.3 Definitions
(This section needs work. Examples from IKE include "Perfect Forward
Secrecy", "Security Association")
Unused Association Lifetime (UAL): Implementation-specific time for
which, if no packet is sent or received for this time interval, a
host MAY begin to tear down an active association.
HIT Hash Algorithm: hash algorithm used to generate a Host Identity
Tag (HIT) from the Host Identity public key. Currently SHA-1 [23] is
used.
3. Host Identifier (HI) and its Representations
A public key of an asymmetric key pair is used as the Host Identifier A public key of an asymmetric key pair is used as the Host Identifier
(HI). Correspondingly, the host itself is defined as the entity that (HI). Correspondingly, the host itself is defined as the entity that
holds the private key from the key pair. See the HIP architecture holds the private key from the key pair. See the HIP architecture
specification [21] for more details about the difference between an specification [25] for more details about the difference between an
identity and the corresponding identifier. identity and the corresponding identifier.
HIP implementations MUST support the Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) [14] HIP implementations MUST support the Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) [15]
public key algorithm, and SHOULD support the Digital Signature public key algorithm, and SHOULD support the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) [13] algorithm; other algorithms MAY be supported. Algorithm (DSA) [13] algorithm; other algorithms MAY be supported.
A hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), is used in protocols A hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), is used in protocols
to represent the Host Identity. The HIT is 128 bits long and has the to represent the Host Identity. The HIT is 128 bits long and has the
following three key properties: i) it is the same length as an IPv6 following three key properties: i) it is the same length as an IPv6
address and can be used in address-sized fields in APIs and address and can be used in address-sized fields in APIs and
protocols, ii) it is self-certifying (i.e., given a HIT, it is protocols, ii) it is self-certifying (i.e., given a HIT, it is
computationally hard to find a Host Identity key that matches the computationally hard to find a Host Identity key that matches the
HIT), and iii) the probability of HIT collision between two hosts is HIT), and iii) the probability of HIT collision between two hosts is
very low. very low.
In many environments, 128 bits is still considered large. For Finally, HIs and HITs are not expected to be carried explicitly in
example, currently used IPv4 based applications are constrained with the headers of user data packets, due to their sizes. Depending on
32-bit address fields. Another problem is that the cohabitation of the form of further communication, other methods are used to map the
IPv6 and HIP might require some applications to differentiate an IPv6 data packet to the these representatives of host identities. For
address from a HIT. Thus, a third representation, the Local Scope example, if ESP is used to protect data traffic, the Security
Identifier (LSI), may be needed. There are two types of such LSIs: Parameter Index (SPI) can be used for this purpose. In some cases,
32-bit IPv4-compatible ones and 128-bit IPv6-compatible ones. The this makes it possible to use HIP without an additional explicit
LSI provides a compression of the HIT with only a local scope so that protocol header.
it can be carried efficiently in any application level packet and
used in API calls. The LSIs do not have the same properties as HITs
(i.e., they are not self-certifying nor are they as unlikely to
collide -- hence their local scope), and consequently they must be
used more carefully.
Finally, HIs, HITs, and LSIs are not expected to be carried
explicitly in the headers of user data packets. Depending on the
form of further communication, other methods are used to map the data
packet to the these representatives of host identities. For example,
if ESP is used to protect data traffic, the Security Parameter Index
(SPI) can be used for this purpose. In some cases, this makes it
possible to use HIP without an additional explicit protocol header.
3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT) 3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT)
The Host Identity Tag is a 128 bits long value -- a hash of the Host The Host Identity Tag is a 128 bits long value -- a hash of the Host
Identifier. There are two advantages of using a hash over the actual Identifier. There are two advantages of using a hash over the actual
Identity in protocols. Firstly, its fixed length makes for easier Host Identity public key in protocols. Firstly, its fixed length
protocol coding and also better manages the packet size cost of this makes for easier protocol coding and also better manages the packet
technology. Secondly, it presents a consistent format to the size cost of this technology. Secondly, it presents a consistent
protocol whatever underlying identity technology is used. format to the protocol whatever underlying identity technology is
used.
There are two types of HITs. HITs of the first type, called _type 1
HIT_, consist of 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the public key. HITs
of the second type consist of a Host Assigning Authority Field (HAA),
and only the last 64 bits come from a SHA-1 hash of the Host
Identity. This latter format for HIT is recommended for 'well known'
systems. It is possible to support a resolution mechanism for these
names in hierarchical directories, like the DNS. Another use of HAA
is in policy controls, see Section 11.
As the type of a HIT cannot be determined by inspecting its contents,
the HIT type must be communicated by some external means.
When comparing HITs for equality, it is RECOMMENDED that conforming There are two types of HITs. HITs of the first type, called _Type 1
implementations ignore the TBD top most bits. This is to allow HIT_, consist of an 8-bit prefix followed by 120 bits of the hash of
better compatibility for legacy IPv6 applications; see [29]. the public key. HITs of the second type (Type 2 HIT) consist of a
However, independent of how many bits are actually used for HIT Host Assigning Authority Field (HAA), and only the last 64 bits come
comparison, it is also RECOMMENDED that the final equality decision from a SHA-1 hash of the Host Identity. This latter format for HIT
is based on the public key and not the HIT, if possible. See also is recommended for 'well known' systems. It is possible to support a
Section 3.2 for related discussion. resolution mechanism for these names in hierarchical directories,
like the DNS. Another use of HAA is in policy controls, see
Section 7.
This document fully specifies only type 1 HITs. HITs that consists This document fully specifies only Type 1 HITs. HITs that consists
of the HAA field and the hash are specified in [25]. of the HAA field and the hash are specified in [27].
Any conforming implementation MUST be able to deal with Type 1 HITs. Any conforming implementation MUST be able to deal with Type 1 HITs.
When handling other than type 1 HITs, the implementation is When handling other than Type 1 HITs, the implementation is
RECOMMENDED to explicitly learn and record the binding between the RECOMMENDED to explicitly learn and record the binding between the
Host Identifier and the HIT, as it may not be able to generate such Host Identifier and the HIT, as it may not be able to generate such
HITs from the Host Identifiers. HITs from the Host Identifiers. It is a matter of policy whether a
host will accept a HIP connection when such binding is not known.
3.1.1 Restricting HIT values The following figure shows the structure of a Type 1 HIT.
To facilitate experimentation and make certain kind of 1
implementations easier, the following restrictions are temporarily 0 2
placed on HITs. These restriction are to be lifted at the end of 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ... 7
2008. That is, after January 1st 2009, any implementation claiming +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-//-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
conformance to this specification MUST accept any HITs from peers and | Prefix | Hash |
be able to process them normally. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-//-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The restrictions: Before the end of 2008, all implementations SHOULD Prefix (8 bits) - Fixed prefix, TBD. All other values reserved.
restrict the HITs they generate to ones whose upper-most (left-most)
two bits are either binary01 or10. That is, when generating new HIs,
if the resulting HIT has as its first two bits as00 or11, the
implementation SHOULD generate new HIs until it generates one that
fulfills this restriction. Additionally, a conforming implementation
MAY refuse to communicate with a peer that has a HIT with the
upper-most bits either00 or11. When refusing a HIP connection on
this bases, the implementation MAY send an R2 with a NOTIFY payload,
with the NOTIFY code being UNSUPPORTED_HIT_VALUE_RANGE. Any such
NOTIFYs may be rate-limited
A rationale: One way to experimentally implement HIP is to use 0x40 - SHA-1 hash algorithm
unmodified IPv6, TCP and UDP implementations in the stack, using HITs All other values reserved.
in the place of IPv6 addresses. This modification makes it easier to
use existing IPv6 data structures to hold HITs and to distinguish
between the two data types. If the IPv6 address space and the HIT
value space overlap, it becomes hard to define secure IPsec policies
without explicitly tagging the values either as HITs or IPv6
addresses.
3.1.2 Generating a HIT from a HI Hash (120 bits) - Lower-order bits of the hash (as specified by
the hash algorithm) of the public key
The 128 or 64 hash bits in a HIT MUST be generated by taking the Additional values for the prefix (including different hash
least significant 128 or 64 bits of the SHA-1 [22] hash of the Host algorithms, or other information) may be defined in the future. A
Identifier as it is represented in the Host Identity field in a HIP host may receive a HIT for which it does not understand the prefix.
payload packet. In such a case, it will not be able to check the mapping between HI
and HIT.
3.2 Generating a HIT from a HI
The 120 or 64 hash bits in a HIT MUST be generated by taking the
least significant 120 or 64 bits of the HIT Hash Algorithm hash of
the Host Identifier as it is represented in the Host Identity field
in a HIP payload packet.
For Identities that are either RSA or DSA public keys, the HIT is For Identities that are either RSA or DSA public keys, the HIT is
formed as follows: formed as follows:
1. The public key is encoded as specified in the corresponding 1. The public key is encoded as specified in the corresponding
DNSSEC document, taking the algorithm specific portion of the DNSSEC document, taking the algorithm specific portion of the
RDATA part of the KEY RR. There is currently only two defined RDATA part of the KEY RR. There is currently only two defined
public key algorithms: RSA and DSA. Hence, either of the public key algorithms: RSA and DSA. Hence, either of the
following applies: following applies:
The RSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC3110 [14]
The RSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC3110 [15]
Section 2, taking the exponent length (e_len), exponent (e) Section 2, taking the exponent length (e_len), exponent (e)
and modulus (n) fields concatenated. The length (n_len) of and modulus (n) fields concatenated. The length (n_len) of
the modulus (n) can be determined from the total HI length the modulus (n) can be determined from the total HI length
(hi_len) and the preceding HI fields including the exponent (hi_len) and the preceding HI fields including the exponent
(e). Thus, the data to be hashed has the same length as the (e). Thus, the data to be hashed has the same length as the
HI (hi_len). The fields MUST be encoded in network byte HI (hi_len). The fields MUST be encoded in network byte
order, as defined in RFC3110 [14]. order, as defined in RFC3110 [15].
The DSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC2536 [13] The DSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC2536 [13]
Section 2, taking the fields T, Q, P, G, and Y, concatenated. Section 2, taking the fields T, Q, P, G, and Y, concatenated.
Thus, the data to be hashed is 1 + 20 + 3 * 64 + 3 * 8 * T Thus, the data to be hashed is 1 + 20 + 3 * 64 + 3 * 8 * T
octets long, where T is the size parameter as defined in octets long, where T is the size parameter as defined in
RFC2536 [13]. The size parameter T, affecting the field RFC2536 [13]. The size parameter T, affecting the field
lengths, MUST be selected as the minimum value that is long lengths, MUST be selected as the minimum value that is long
enough to accommodate P, G, and Y. The fields MUST be encoded enough to accommodate P, G, and Y. The fields MUST be encoded
in network byte order, as defined in RFC2536 [13]. in network byte order, as defined in RFC2536 [13].
2. A SHA-1 hash [22] is calculated over the encoded key.
3. The least significant 128 or 64 bits of the hash result are used
to create the HIT, as defined above.
The following pseudo-codes illustrates the process for both RSA and 2. A SHA-1 hash [23] is calculated over the encoded key.
DSA. The symbol := denotes assignment; the symbol += denotes
appending. The pseudo-function encode_in_network_byte_order takes
two parameters, an integer (bignum) and a length in bytes, and
returns the integer encoded into a byte string of the given length.
switch ( HI.algorithm )
{
case RSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e_len,
( HI.RSA.e_len > 255 ) ? 3 : 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e, HI.RSA.e_len )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.n, HI.RSA.n_len )
break;
case DSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.T , 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Q , 20 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.P , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.G , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Y , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
break;
}
digest := SHA-1 ( buffer )
hit_128 := low_order_bits ( digest, 128 )
hit_haa := concatenate ( HAA, low_order_bits ( digest, 64 ) )
3.2 Local Scope Identifier (LSI)
LSIs are 32 or 128 bits long localized representations of a Host 3. The least significant 120 or 64 bits of the hash result are used
Identity. The purpose of an LSI is to facilitate using Host to create the HIT, as defined above.
Identities in existing IPv4 or IPv6 based protocols and APIs. The
LSI can be used anywhere in system processes where IP addresses have
traditionally been used, such as IPv4 and IPv6 API calls and FTP PORT
commands.
The IPv4-compatible LSIs MUST be allocated from the TBD subnet and In Appendix D the HIT generation process is illustrated using pseudo-
the IPv6-compatible LSIs MUST be allocated from the TBD subnet. That code.
makes it easier to differentiate between LSIs and IP addresses at the
API level. By default, the low order 24 bits of an IPv4-compatible
LSI are equal to the low order 24 bits of the corresponding HIT,
while the low order TBD bits of an IPv6-compatible LSI are equal to
the low order TBD bits of the corresponding HIT.
A host performing a HIP handshake may discover that the LSI formed 4. Protocol Overview
from the peer's HIT collides with another LSI in use locally (i.e.,
the lower 24 or TBD bits of two different HITs are the same). In
that case, the host MUST handle the LSI collision locally such that
application calls can be disambiguated. One possible means of doing
so is to perform a Host NAT function to locally convert a peer's LSI
into a different LSI value. This would require the host to ensure
that LSI bits on the wire (i.e., in the application data stream) are
converted back to match that host's LSI. Other alternatives for
resolving LSI collisions may be added in the future.
4. Host Identity Protocol The following material is an overview of the HIP protocol operation,
and does not contain all details of the packet formats or the packet
processing steps. Section 5 and Section 6 describe in more detail
the packet formats and packet processing steps, respectively, and are
normative in case of any conflicts with this section.
The Host Identity Protocol is IP protocol TBD (number will be The Host Identity Protocol is IP protocol TBD (Editor's note:
assigned by IANA). The HIP payload (Section 6.1) header could be protocol number will be assigned by IANA; for testing purposes, the
carried in every datagram. However, since HIP datagrams are protocol number 99 is currently used). The HIP payload (Section 5.1)
relatively large (at least 40 bytes), it is desirable to 'compress' header could be carried in every IP datagram. However, since HIP
the HIP header so that the HIP header only occur in datagrams to headers are relatively large (40 bytes), it is desirable to
establish or change HIP state. The actual method for header 'compress' the HIP header so that the HIP header only occurs in
'compression' and matching data packets with existing HIP control packets used to establish or change HIP state. The actual
associations (if any) is defined in separate extension documents, method for header 'compression' and for matching data packets with
describing transport formats and methods. All HIP implementations existing HIP associations (if any) is defined in separate extension
MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP transport format for HIP [23]. documents, describing transport formats and methods. All HIP
implementations MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP transport format
for HIP [24].
For testing purposes, the protocol number 99 is currently used. 4.1 Creating a HIP Association
4.1 HIP base exchange By definition, the system initiating a HIP exchange is the Initiator,
and the peer is the Responder. This distinction is forgotten once
the base exchange completes, and either party can become the
Initiator in future communications.
The HIP base exchange serves to manage the establishment of state The HIP base exchange serves to manage the establishment of state
between an Initiator and a Responder. The last three packets of the between an Initiator and a Responder. The first packet, I1,
exchange, R1, I2, and R2, constitute a standard authenticated initiates the exchange, and the last three packets, R1, I2, and R2,
Diffie-Hellman key exchange for session key generation. During the constitute a standard authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange for
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a piece of keying material is generated. session key generation. During the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, a
The HIP association keys are drawn from this keying material. If piece of keying material is generated. The HIP association keys are
other cryptographic keys are needed, e.g., to be used with ESP, they drawn from this keying material. If other cryptographic keys are
are expected to be drawn from the same keying material. needed, e.g., to be used with ESP, they are expected to be drawn from
the same keying material.
The Initiator first sends a trigger packet, I1, to the Responder. The Initiator first sends a trigger packet, I1, to the Responder.
The packet contains only the HIT of the Initiator and possibly the The packet contains only the HIT of the Initiator and possibly the
HIT of the Responder, if it is known. HIT of the Responder, if it is known.
The second packet, R1, starts the actual exchange. It contains a The second packet, R1, starts the actual exchange. It contains a
puzzle, that is, a cryptographic challenge that the Initiator must puzzle-- a cryptographic challenge that the Initiator must solve
solve before continuing the exchange. In addition, it contains the before continuing the exchange. The level of difficulty of the
puzzle can be adjusted based on level of trust with the Initiator,
current load, or other factors. In addition, the R1 contains the
initial Diffie-Hellman parameters and a signature, covering part of initial Diffie-Hellman parameters and a signature, covering part of
the message. Some fields are left outside the signature to support the message. Some fields are left outside the signature to support
pre-created R1s. pre-created R1s.
In the I2 packet, the Initiator must display the solution to the In the I2 packet, the Initiator must display the solution to the
received puzzle. Without a correct solution, the I2 message is received puzzle. Without a correct solution, the I2 message is
discarded. The I2 also contains a Diffie-Hellman parameter that discarded. The I2 also contains a Diffie-Hellman parameter that
carries needed information for the Responder. The packet is signed carries needed information for the Responder. The packet is signed
by the sender. by the sender.
The R2 packet finalizes the base exchange. The packet is signed. The R2 packet finalizes the base exchange. The packet is signed.
The base exchange is illustrated below. The base exchange is illustrated below. The term "key" refers to the
host identity public key, and "sig" represents a signature using such
key. The packets contain other parameters not shown in this figure.
Initiator Responder Initiator Responder
I1: trigger exchange I1: trigger exchange
--------------------------> -------------------------->
select pre-computed R1 select pre-computed R1
R1: puzzle, D-H, key, sig R1: puzzle, D-H, key, sig
<------------------------- <-------------------------
check sig remain stateless check sig remain stateless
solve puzzle solve puzzle
I2: solution, D-H, {key}, sig I2: solution, D-H, {key}, sig
--------------------------> -------------------------->
compute D-H check cookie compute D-H check cookie
check puzzle check puzzle
check sig check sig
R2: sig R2: sig
<-------------------------- <--------------------------
check sig compute D-H check sig compute D-H
In R1, the signature covers the packet, after setting the Initiator
HIT, header checksum, and the PUZZLE parameter's Opaque and Random #I
fields temporarily to zero, and excluding any TLVs that follow the
signature.
In I2, the signature covers the whole packet, excluding any TLVs that
follow the signature.
In R2, the signature and the HMAC cover the whole envelope.
In this section we cover the overall design of the base exchange.
The details are the subject of the rest of this memo.
4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism 4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism
The purpose of the HIP cookie mechanism is to protect the Responder The purpose of the HIP cookie mechanism is to protect the Responder
from a number of denial-of-service threats. It allows the Responder from a number of denial-of-service threats. It allows the Responder
to delay state creation until receiving I2. Furthermore, the puzzle to delay state creation until receiving I2. Furthermore, the puzzle
included in the cookie allows the Responder to use a fairly cheap included in the cookie allows the Responder to use a fairly cheap
calculation to check that the Initiator is "sincere" in the sense calculation to check that the Initiator is "sincere" in the sense
that it has churned CPU cycles in solving the puzzle. that it has churned CPU cycles in solving the puzzle.
The Cookie mechanism has been explicitly designed to give space for The Cookie mechanism has been explicitly designed to give space for
various implementation options. It allows a responder implementation various implementation options. It allows a Responder implementation
to completely delay session specific state creation until a valid I2 to completely delay session specific state creation until a valid I2
is received. In such a case a validly formatted I2 can be rejected is received. In such a case a correctly formatted I2 can be rejected
earliest only once the Responder has checked its validity by only once the Responder has checked its validity by computing one
computing one hash function. On the other hand, the design also hash function. On the other hand, the design also allows a Responder
allows a responder implementation to keep state about received I1s, implementation to keep state about received I1s, and match the
and match the received I2s against the state, thereby allowing the received I2s against the state, thereby allowing the implementation
implementation to avoid the computational cost of the hash function. to avoid the computational cost of the hash function. The drawback
The drawback of this latter approach is the requirement of creating of this latter approach is the requirement of creating state.
state. Finally, it also allows an implementation to use other Finally, it also allows an implementation to use other combinations
combinations of the space-saving and computation-saving mechanisms. of the space-saving and computation-saving mechanisms.
One possible way for a Responder to remain stateless but drop most One possible way for a Responder to remain stateless but drop most
spoofed I2s is to base the selection of the cookie on some function spoofed I2s is to base the selection of the cookie on some function
over the Initiator's Host Identity. The idea is that the Responder over the Initiator's Host Identity. The idea is that the Responder
has a (perhaps varying) number of pre-calculated R1 packets, and it has a (perhaps varying) number of pre-calculated R1 packets, and it
selects one of these based on the information carried in I1. When selects one of these based on the information carried in I1. When
the Responder then later receives I2, it checks that the cookie in the Responder then later receives I2, it checks that the cookie in
the I2 matches with the cookie sent in the R1, thereby making it the I2 matches with the cookie sent in the R1, thereby making it
impractical for the attacker to first exchange one I1/R1, and then impractical for the attacker to first exchange one I1/R1, and then
generate a large number of spoofed I2s that seemingly come from generate a large number of spoofed I2s that seemingly come from
different IP addresses or use different HITs. The method does not different IP addresses or use different HITs. The method does not
protect from an attacker that uses fixed IP addresses and HITs, protect from an attacker that uses fixed IP addresses and HITs,
though. Against such an attacker it is probably best to create a though. Against such an attacker it is probably best to create a
piece of local state, and remember that the puzzle check has piece of local state, and remember that the puzzle check has
previously failed. See Appendix C for one possible implementation. previously failed. See Appendix C for one possible implementation.
Note, however, that the implementations MUST NOT use the exact Implementations SHOULD include sufficient randomness to the algorithm
implementation given in the appendix, and SHOULD include sufficient so that algorithm complexity attacks become impossible [30].
randomness to the algorithm so that algorithm complexity attacks
become impossible [27].
The Responder can set the puzzle difficulty for Initiator, based on The Responder can set the puzzle difficulty for Initiator, based on
its concern of trust of the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD use its level of trust of the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD use
heuristics to determine when it is under a denial-of-service attack, heuristics to determine when it is under a denial-of-service attack,
and set the puzzle difficulty value K appropriately; see below. and set the puzzle difficulty value K appropriately; see below.
The Responder starts the cookie exchange when it receives an I1. The The Responder starts the cookie exchange when it receives an I1. The
Responder supplies a random number I, and requires the Initiator to Responder supplies a random number I, and requires the Initiator to
find a number J. To select a proper J, the Initiator must create the find a number J. To select a proper J, the Initiator must create the
concatenation of I, the HITs of the parties, and J, and take a SHA-1 concatenation of I, the HITs of the parties, and J, and take a SHA-1
hash over this concatenation. The lowest order K bits of the result hash over this concatenation. The lowest order K bits of the result
MUST be zeros. The value K sets the difficulty of the puzzle. MUST be zeros. The value K sets the difficulty of the puzzle.
skipping to change at page 17, line 9 skipping to change at page 14, line 10
To prevent pre-computation attacks, the Responder MUST select the To prevent pre-computation attacks, the Responder MUST select the
number I in such a way that the Initiator cannot guess it. number I in such a way that the Initiator cannot guess it.
Furthermore, the construction MUST allow the Responder to verify that Furthermore, the construction MUST allow the Responder to verify that
the value was indeed selected by it and not by the Initiator. See the value was indeed selected by it and not by the Initiator. See
Appendix C for an example on how to implement this. Appendix C for an example on how to implement this.
Using the Opaque data field in an ECHO_REQUEST parameter, the Using the Opaque data field in an ECHO_REQUEST parameter, the
Responder can include some data in R1 that the Initiator must copy Responder can include some data in R1 that the Initiator must copy
unmodified in the corresponding I2 packet. The Responder can unmodified in the corresponding I2 packet. The Responder can
generate the Opaque data in various ways; e.g. using the sent I, generate the Opaque data in various ways; e.g. using the sent I, some
some secret, and possibly other related data. Using this same secret, and possibly other related data. Using this same secret,
secret, received I in I2 packet and possible other data, the Receiver received I in I2 packet and possible other data, the Receiver can
can verify that it has itself sent the I to the Initiator. The verify that it has itself sent the I to the Initiator. The Responder
Responder MUST change the secret periodically. MUST change the secret periodically.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Responder generates a new cookie and a new It is RECOMMENDED that the Responder generates a new cookie and a new
R1 once every few minutes. Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that the R1 once every few minutes. Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Responder remembers an old cookie at least 2*lifetime seconds after Responder remembers an old cookie at least 2*lifetime seconds after
it has been deprecated. These time values allow a slower Initiator it has been deprecated. These time values allow a slower Initiator
to solve the cookie puzzle while limiting the usability that an old, to solve the cookie puzzle while limiting the usability that an old,
solved cookie has to an attacker. solved cookie has to an attacker.
NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether R1 should NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether R1 should
include a timestamp in order to protect the Initiator from replay include a timestamp in order to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks. The decision was NOT to include a timestamp. attacks. The decision was to NOT include a timestamp.
NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether a memory NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether a memory
bound function should be used for the puzzle instead of a CPU bound bound function should be used for the puzzle instead of a CPU bound
function. The decision was not to use memory bound functions. At function. The decision was not to use memory bound functions. At
the time of the decision the idea of memory bound functions was the time of the decision the idea of memory bound functions was
relatively new and their IPR status were unknown. Once there is more relatively new and their IPR status were unknown. Once there is more
experience about memory bound functions and once their IPR status is experience about memory bound functions and once their IPR status is
better known, it may be reasonable to reconsider this decision. better known, it may be reasonable to reconsider this decision.
In R1, the values I and K are sent in network byte order. Similarly, 4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Protocol
in I2 the values I and J are sent in network byte order. The SHA-1
hash is created by concatenating, in network byte order, the
following data, in the following order:
64-bit random value I, in network byte order, as appearing in R1
and I2.
128-bit initiator HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
128-bit responder HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
64-bit random value J, in network byte order, as appearing in I2.
In order to be a valid response cookie, the K low-order bits of the
resulting SHA-1 digest must be zero.
Notes:
The length of the data to be hashed is 48 bytes.
All the data in the hash input MUST be in network byte order.
The order of the initiator and responder HITs are different in the
R1 and I2 packets, see Section 6.1. Care must be taken to copy
the values in right order to the hash input.
Precomputation by the Responder
Sets up the puzzle difficulty K.
Creates a signed R1 and caches it.
Responder
Selects a suitable cached R1.
Generates a random number I.
Sends I and K in an R1.
Saves I and K for a Delta time.
Initiator
Generates repeated attempts to solve the puzzle until a matching J
is found:
Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K ) == 0
Sends I and J in an I2.
Responder
Verifies that the received I is a saved one.
Finds the right K based on I.
Computes V := Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K )
Rejects if V != 0
Accept if V == 0
The Ltrunc (SHA-1(), K) denotes the lowest order K bits of the SHA-1
result.
4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol
The packets R1, I2, and R2 implement a standard authenticated The packets R1, I2, and R2 implement a standard authenticated Diffie-
Diffie-Hellman exchange. The Responder sends its public Hellman exchange. The Responder sends its public Diffie-Hellman key
Diffie-Hellman key and its public authentication key, i.e., its host and its public authentication key, i.e., its host identity, in R1.
identity, in R1. The signature in R1 allows the Initiator to verify The signature in R1 allows the Initiator to verify that the R1 has
that the R1 has been once generated by the Responder. However, since been once generated by the Responder. However, since it is
it is precomputed and therefore does not cover all of the packet, it precomputed and therefore does not cover all of the packet, it does
does not protect from replay attacks. not protect from replay attacks.
When the Initiator receives an R1, it computes the Diffie-Hellman When the Initiator receives an R1, it computes the Diffie-Hellman
session key. It creates a HIP association using keying material from session key. It creates a HIP association using keying material from
the session key (see Section 9), and uses the association to encrypt the session key (see Section 6.4), and may use the association to
its public authentication key, i.e., host identity. The resulting I2 encrypt its public authentication key, i.e., host identity. The
contains the Initiator's Diffie-Hellman key and its encrypted public resulting I2 contains the Initiator's Diffie-Hellman key and its
authentication key. The signature in I2 covers all of the packet. (optionally) encrypted public authentication key. The signature in
I2 covers all of the packet.
The Responder extracts the Initiator Diffie-Hellman public key from The Responder extracts the Initiator Diffie-Hellman public key from
the I2, computes the Diffie-Hellman session key, creates a the I2, computes the Diffie-Hellman session key, creates a
corresponding HIP association, and decrypts the Initiator's public corresponding HIP association, and decrypts the Initiator's public
authentication key. It can then verify the signature using the authentication key. It can then verify the signature using the
authentication key. authentication key.
The final message, R2, is needed to protect the Initiator from replay The final message, R2, is needed to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks. attacks.
4.1.3 HIP replay protection 4.1.3 HIP Replay Protection
The HIP protocol includes the following mechanisms to protect against The HIP protocol includes the following mechanisms to protect against
malicious replays. Responders are protected against replays of I1 malicious replays. Responders are protected against replays of I1
packets by virtue of the stateless response to I1s with presigned R1 packets by virtue of the stateless response to I1s with presigned R1
messages. Initiators are protected against R1 replays by a messages. Initiators are protected against R1 replays by a
monotonically increasing "R1 generation counter" included in the R1. monotonically increasing "R1 generation counter" included in the R1.
Responders are protected against replays or false I2s by the cookie Responders are protected against replays or false I2s by the cookie
mechanism (Section 4.1.1 above), and optional use of opaque data. mechanism (Section 4.1.1 above), and optional use of opaque data.
Hosts are protected against replays to R2s and UPDATEs by use of a Hosts are protected against replays to R2s and UPDATEs by use of a
less expensive HMAC verification preceding HIP signature less expensive HMAC verification preceding HIP signature
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puzzles. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current puzzles. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current
generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. A generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. A
system's local counter MUST be incremented at least as often as every system's local counter MUST be incremented at least as often as every
time old R1s cease to be valid, and SHOULD never be decremented, lest time old R1s cease to be valid, and SHOULD never be decremented, lest
the host expose its peers to the replay of previously generated, the host expose its peers to the replay of previously generated,
higher numbered R1s. Also, the R1 generation counter MUST NOT roll higher numbered R1s. Also, the R1 generation counter MUST NOT roll
over; if the counter is about to become exhausted, the corresponding over; if the counter is about to become exhausted, the corresponding
HI must be abandoned and replaced with a new one. HI must be abandoned and replaced with a new one.
A host may receive more than one R1, either due to sending multiple A host may receive more than one R1, either due to sending multiple
I1s (Section 8.4.1) or due to a replay of an old R1. When sending I1s (Section 6.5.1) or due to a replay of an old R1. When sending
multiple I1s, an initiator SHOULD wait for a small amount of time multiple I1s, an initiator SHOULD wait for a small amount of time
after the first R1 reception to allow possibly multiple R1s to after the first R1 reception to allow possibly multiple R1s to
arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set with the largest arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set with the largest
R1 generation counter. If an initiator is processing an R1 or has R1 generation counter. If an Initiator is processing an R1 or has
already sent an I2 (still waiting for R2) and it receives another R1 already sent an I2 (still waiting for R2) and it receives another R1
with a larger R1 generation counter, it MAY elect to restart R1 with a larger R1 generation counter, it MAY elect to restart R1
processing with the fresher R1, as if it were the first R1 to arrive. processing with the fresher R1, as if it were the first R1 to arrive.
Upon conclusion of an active HIP association with another host, the Upon conclusion of an active HIP association with another host, the
R1 generation counter associated with the peer host SHOULD be R1 generation counter associated with the peer host SHOULD be
flushed. A local policy MAY override the default flushing of R1 flushed. A local policy MAY override the default flushing of R1
counters on a per-HIT basis. The reason for recommending the counters on a per-HIT basis. The reason for recommending the
flushing of this counter is that there may be hosts where the R1 flushing of this counter is that there may be hosts where the R1
generation counter (occasionally) decreases; e.g., due to hardware generation counter (occasionally) decreases; e.g., due to hardware
failure. failure.
4.2 TCP and UDP pseudo-header computation for user data 4.1.4 Refusing a HIP Exchange
When computing TCP and UDP checksums on user data packets that flow A HIP aware host may choose not to accept a HIP exchange. If the
through sockets bound to HITs or LSIs, the IPv6 pseudo-header format host's policy is to only be an Initiator, it should begin its own HIP
[11] MUST be used. Additionally, the HITs MUST be used in the place exchange. A host MAY choose to have such a policy since only the
of the IPv6 addresses in the IPv6 pseudo-header. Note that the Initiator HI is protected in the exchange. There is a risk of a race
pseudo-header for actual HIP payloads is computed differently; see condition if each host's policy is to only be an Initiator, at which
Section 6.1.2. point the HIP exchange will fail.
4.3 Updating a HIP association If the host's policy does not permit it to enter into a HIP exchange
with the Initiator, it should send an ICMP 'Destination Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited' message. A more complex HIP packet is
not used here as it actually opens up more potential DoS attacks than
a simple ICMP message.
4.2 Updating a HIP Association
A HIP association between two hosts may need to be updated over time. A HIP association between two hosts may need to be updated over time.
Examples include the need to rekey expiring user data security Examples include the need to rekey expiring user data security
associations, add new security associations, or change IP addresses associations, add new security associations, or change IP addresses
associated with hosts. The UPDATE packet is used for those and other associated with hosts. The UPDATE packet is used for those and other
similar purposes. This document only specifies the UPDATE packet similar purposes. This document only specifies the UPDATE packet
format and basic processing rules, with mandatory TLVs. The actual format and basic processing rules, with mandatory TLVs. The actual
usage is defined in separate specifications. usage is defined in separate specifications.
HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry
skipping to change at page 20, line 33 skipping to change at page 16, line 39
Examples include the need to rekey expiring user data security Examples include the need to rekey expiring user data security
associations, add new security associations, or change IP addresses associations, add new security associations, or change IP addresses
associated with hosts. The UPDATE packet is used for those and other associated with hosts. The UPDATE packet is used for those and other
similar purposes. This document only specifies the UPDATE packet similar purposes. This document only specifies the UPDATE packet
format and basic processing rules, with mandatory TLVs. The actual format and basic processing rules, with mandatory TLVs. The actual
usage is defined in separate specifications. usage is defined in separate specifications.
HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry
multiple HIP parameters, for updating the HIP state between two multiple HIP parameters, for updating the HIP state between two
peers. The UPDATE mechanism has the following properties: peers. The UPDATE mechanism has the following properties:
UPDATE messages carry a monotonically increasing sequence number UPDATE messages carry a monotonically increasing sequence number
and are explicitly acknowledged by the peer. Lost UPDATEs or and are explicitly acknowledged by the peer. Lost UPDATEs or
acknowledgments may be recovered via retransmission. Multiple acknowledgments may be recovered via retransmission. Multiple
UPDATE messages may be outstanding. UPDATE messages may be outstanding.
UPDATE is protected by both HMAC and HIP_SIGNATURE parameters, UPDATE is protected by both HMAC and HIP_SIGNATURE parameters,
since processing UPDATE signatures alone is a potential DoS attack since processing UPDATE signatures alone is a potential DoS attack
against intermediate systems. against intermediate systems.
The UPDATE packet is defined in Section 7.6. The UPDATE packet is defined in Section 5.3.5.
4.4 Error processing 4.3 Error Processing
HIP error processing behaviour depends on whether there exists an HIP error processing behavior depends on whether there exists an
active HIP association or not. In general, if an HIP association active HIP association or not. In general, if an HIP association
exists between the sender and receiver of a packet causing an error exists between the sender and receiver of a packet causing an error
condition, the receiver SHOULD respond with a NOTIFY packet. On the condition, the receiver SHOULD respond with a NOTIFY packet. On the
other hand, if there are no existing HIP associations between the other hand, if there are no existing HIP associations between the
sender and receiver, or the receiver cannot reasonably determine the sender and receiver, or the receiver cannot reasonably determine the
identity of the sender, the receiver MAY respond with a suitable ICMP identity of the sender, the receiver MAY respond with a suitable ICMP
message; see Section 6.3 for more details. message; see Section 5.4 for more details.
4.5 Certificate distribution
HIP does not define how to use certificates. However, it does define
a simple certificate transport mechanisms that MAY be used to
implement certificate-based security policies. The certificate
payload is defined in Section 6.2.9, and the certificate packet in
Section 7.5.
4.6 Sending data on HIP packets
A future version of this document may define how to include user data
on various HIP packets. However, currently the HIP header is a
terminal header, and not followed by any other headers.
4.7 Transport Formats
The actual data transmission format, used for user data after the HIP
base exchange, is not defined in this document. Such transport
formats and methods are described in separate specifications. All
HIP implementations MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP transport
format for HIP [23].
When new transport formats are defined, the corresponding parameters
MUST have smaller type value than the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter. The
order in which the transport formats are presented in the R1 packet,
is the preferred order. The last of the transport formats MUST be
ESP transport format, represented by the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter.
5. HIP protocol overview
The following material is an overview of the HIP protocol operation.
Section 8 describes the packet processing steps in more detail.
A typical HIP packet flow is shown below, between an Initiator (I)
and a Responder (R). It illustrates the exchange of four HIP packets
(I1, R1, I2, and R2).
I --> Directory: lookup R
I <-- Directory: return R's addresses, and HI and/or HIT
I1 I --> R (Hi. Here is my I1, let's talk HIP)
R1 I <-- R (OK. Here is my R1, handle this HIP cookie)
I2 I --> R (Compute, compute, here is my counter I2)
R2 I <-- R (OK. Let's finish HIP with my R2)
I --> R (data)
I <-- R (data)
By definition, the system initiating a HIP exchange is the Initiator,
and the peer is the Responder. This distinction is forgotten once
the base exchange completes, and either party can become the
initiator in future communications.
5.1 HIP Scenarios
The HIP protocol and state machine is designed to recover from one of The HIP protocol and state machine is designed to recover from one of
the parties crashing and losing its state. The following scenarios the parties crashing and losing its state. The following scenarios
describe the main use cases covered by the design. describe the main use cases covered by the design.
No prior state between the two systems. No prior state between the two systems.
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The process The system with data to send is the Initiator. The process
follows the standard four packet base exchange, establishing follows the standard four packet base exchange, establishing
the HIP association. the HIP association.
The system with data to send has no state with the receiver, but The system with data to send has no state with the receiver, but
the receiver has a residual HIP association. the receiver has a residual HIP association.
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The Initiator The system with data to send is the Initiator. The Initiator
acts as in no prior state, sending I1 and getting R1. When the acts as in no prior state, sending I1 and getting R1. When the
Responder receives a valid I2, the old association is Responder receives a valid I2, the old association is
'discovered' and deleted, and the new association is 'discovered' and deleted, and the new association is
established. established.
The system with data to send has an HIP association, but the The system with data to send has an HIP association, but the
receiver does not. receiver does not.
The system sends data on the outbound user data security The system sends data on the outbound user data security
association. The receiver 'detects' the situation when it association. The receiver 'detects' the situation when it
receives a user data packet that it cannot match to any HIP receives a user data packet that it cannot match to any HIP
association. The receiving host MUST discard this packet. association. The receiving host MUST discard this packet.
Optionally, the receiving host MAY send an ICMP packet with the Optionally, the receiving host MAY send an ICMP packet with the
Parameter Problem type to inform about non-existing HIP Parameter Problem type to inform about non-existing HIP
association (see Section 6.3), and it MAY initiate a new HIP association (see Section 5.4), and it MAY initiate a new HIP
negotiation. However, responding with these optional negotiation. However, responding with these optional
mechanisms is implementation or policy dependent. mechanisms is implementation or policy dependent.
5.2 Refusing a HIP exchange 4.4 HIP State Machine
A HIP aware host may choose not to accept a HIP exchange. If the
host's policy is to only be an Initiator, it should begin its own HIP
exchange. A host MAY choose to have such a policy since only the
Initiator HI is protected in the exchange. There is a risk of a race
condition if each host's policy is to only be an Initiator, at which
point the HIP exchange will fail.
If the host's policy does not permit it to enter into a HIP exchange
with the Initiator, it should send an ICMP 'Destination Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited' message. A more complex HIP packet is
not used here as it actually opens up more potential DoS attacks than
a simple ICMP message.
5.3 Reboot and SA timeout restart of HIP
Simulating a loss of state is a potential DoS attack. The following
process has been crafted to manage state recovery without presenting
a DoS opportunity.
If a host reboots or times out, it has lost its HIP state. If the
system that lost state has a datagram to deliver to its peer, it
simply restarts the HIP exchange. The peer replies with an R1 HIP
packet, but does not reset its state until it receives the I2 HIP
packet. The I2 packet MUST have a valid solution to the puzzle and,
if inserted in R1, a valid Opaque data as well as a valid signature.
Note that either the original Initiator or the Responder could end up
restarting the exchange, becoming the new Initiator.
If a system receives a user data packet that cannot be matched to any
existing HIP association, it is possible that it has lost the state
and its peer has not. It MAY send an ICMP packet with the Parameter
Problem type, the Pointer pointing to the referred HIP-related
association information. Reacting to such traffic depends on the
implementation and the environment where the implementation is used.
After sending the I1, the HIP negotiation proceeds as normally and,
when successful, the SA is created at the initiating end. The peer
end removes the OLD SA and replaces it with the new one.
5.4 HIP State Machine
The HIP protocol itself has little state. In the HIP base exchange, The HIP protocol itself has little state. In the HIP base exchange,
there is an Initiator and a Responder. Once the SAs are established, there is an Initiator and a Responder. Once the SAs are established,
this distinction is lost. If the HIP state needs to be this distinction is lost. If the HIP state needs to be re-
re-established, the controlling parameters are which peer still has established, the controlling parameters are which peer still has
state and which has a datagram to send to its peer. The following state and which has a datagram to send to its peer. The following
state machine attempts to capture these processes. state machine attempts to capture these processes.
The state machine is presented in a single system view, representing The state machine is presented in a single system view, representing
either an Initiator or a Responder. There is not a complete overlap either an Initiator or a Responder. There is not a complete overlap
of processing logic here and in the packet definitions. Both are of processing logic here and in the packet definitions. Both are
needed to completely implement HIP. needed to completely implement HIP.
Implementors must understand that the state machine, as described Implementors must understand that the state machine, as described
here, is informational. Specific implementations are free to here, is informational. Specific implementations are free to
implement the actual functions differently. Section 8 describes the implement the actual functions differently. Section 6 describes the
packet processing rules in more detail. This state machine focuses packet processing rules in more detail. This state machine focuses
on the HIP I1, R1, I2, and R2 packets only. Other states may be on the HIP I1, R1, I2, and R2 packets only. Other states may be
introduced by mechanisms in other drafts (such as mobility and introduced by mechanisms in other drafts (such as mobility and
multihoming). multihoming).
5.4.1 HIP States 4.4.1 HIP States
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| State | Explanation | | State | Explanation |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| UNASSOCIATED | State machine start | | UNASSOCIATED | State machine start |
| | | | | |
| I1-SENT | Initiating HIP | | I1-SENT | Initiating HIP |
| | | | | |
| I2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP | | I2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP |
| | | | | |
skipping to change at page 24, line 45 skipping to change at page 18, line 45
| ESTABLISHED | HIP association established | | ESTABLISHED | HIP association established |
| | | | | |
| CLOSING | HIP association closing, no data can be | | CLOSING | HIP association closing, no data can be |
| | sent | | | sent |
| | | | | |
| CLOSED | HIP association closed, no data can be sent | | CLOSED | HIP association closed, no data can be sent |
| | | | | |
| E-FAILED | HIP exchange failed | | E-FAILED | HIP exchange failed |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
5.4.2 HIP State Processes 4.4.2 HIP State Processes
+------------+ +------------+
|UNASSOCIATED| Start state |UNASSOCIATED| Start state
+------------+ +------------+
User data to send requiring a new HIP association, send I1 and go to I1-SENT User data to send requiring a new HIP association, send I1 and go to
I1-SENT
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at UNASSOCIATED Receive I1, send R1 and stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive I2, process Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at UNASSOCIATED if fail, stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive user data for unknown HIP association, optionally send ICMP as Receive user data for unknown HIP association, optionally send ICMP
defined in as defined in
Section 6.3 Section 5.4
and stay at UNASSOCIATED and stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive CLOSE, optionally send ICMP Parameter Problem and stay Receive CLOSE, optionally send ICMP Parameter Problem and stay
in UNASSOCIATED. in UNASSOCIATED.
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at UNASSOCIATED Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at UNASSOCIATED
+---------+ +---------+
| I1-SENT | Initiating HIP | I1-SENT | Initiating HIP
+---------+ +---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at I1-SENT Receive I1,
if the local HIT is smaller than the peer HIT, drop I1 and stay
at I1-SENT
if the local HIT is greater than the peer HIT, send R1 and stay
at I1-SENT
Receive I2, process Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at I1-SENT if fail, stay at I1-SENT
Receive R1, process Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT if successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT
if fail, go to E-FAILED if fail, go to E-FAILED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I1-SENT Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I1-SENT
Timeout, increment timeout counter Timeout, increment timeout counter
If counter is less than I1_RETRIES_MAX, send I1 and stay at I1-SENT If counter is less than I1_RETRIES_MAX, send I1 and stay at
I1-SENT
If counter is greater than I1_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED If counter is greater than I1_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED
+---------+ +---------+
| I2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP | I2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP
+---------+ +---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at I2-SENT Receive I1, send R1 and stay at I2-SENT
Receive R1, process Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and cycle at I2-SENT if successful, send I2 and cycle at I2-SENT
if fail, stay at I2-SENT if fail, stay at I2-SENT
Receive I2, process Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT if successful, and
if local HIT is smaller than the peer HIT, drop I2 and stay
at I2-SENT
if local HIT is greater than the peer HIT, send R2 and go to
R2-SENT
if fail, stay at I2-SENT if fail, stay at I2-SENT
Receive R2, process Receive R2, process
if successful, go to ESTABLISHED if successful, go to ESTABLISHED
if fail, go to E-FAILED if fail, go to E-FAILED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I2-SENT Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I2-SENT
Timeout, increment timeout counter Timeout, increment timeout counter
If counter is less than I2_RETRIES_MAX, send I2 and stay at I2-SENT If counter is less than I2_RETRIES_MAX, send I2 and stay at
I2-SENT
If counter is greater than I2_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED If counter is greater than I2_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED
+---------+ +---------+
| R2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP | R2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP
+---------+ +---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at R2-SENT Receive I1, send R1 and stay at R2-SENT
Receive I2, process, Receive I2, process,
if successful, send R2, and cycle at R2-SENT if successful, send R2, and cycle at R2-SENT
if failed, stay at R2-SENT if failed, stay at R2-SENT
Receive R1, drop and stay at R2-SENT Receive R1, drop and stay at R2-SENT
Receive R2, drop and stay at R2-SENT Receive R2, drop and stay at R2-SENT
Move to ESTABLISHED after an implementation specific time. Receive data, move to ESTABLISHED
No packet sent/received during UAL minutes, send CLOSE and go to
CLOSING
+------------+ +------------+
|ESTABLISHED | HIP association established |ESTABLISHED | HIP association established
+------------+ +------------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at ESTABLISHED Receive I1, send R1 and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive I2, process with cookie and possible Opaque data verification Receive I2, process with cookie and possible Opaque data verification
if successful, send R2, drop old HIP association, establish a new if successful, send R2, drop old HIP association, establish a
HIP association, to to R2-SENT new HIP association, to to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at ESTABLISHED if fail, stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive R1, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED Receive R1, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive R2, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED Receive R2, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive user data for HIP association, process and stay at ESTABLISHED Receive user data for HIP association, process and stay at
No packet sent/received during UAL minutes, send CLOSE and go to CLOSING. ESTABLISHED
No packet sent/received during UAL minutes, send CLOSE and go to
CLOSING.
Receive CLOSE, process Receive CLOSE, process
if successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to CLOSED if successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to CLOSED
if failed, stay at ESTABLISHED if failed, stay at ESTABLISHED
+---------+ +---------+
| CLOSING | HIP association has not been used for UAL (Unused | CLOSING | HIP association has not been used for UAL (Unused
+---------+ Association Lifetime) minutes. +---------+ Association Lifetime) minutes.
User data to send, requires the creation of another incarnation User data to send, requires the creation of another incarnation
of the HIP association, started by sending an I1, of the HIP association, started by sending an I1,
skipping to change at page 28, line 4 skipping to change at page 22, line 19
if successful, send CLOSE_ACK, stay at CLOSED if successful, send CLOSE_ACK, stay at CLOSED
if failed, stay at CLOSED if failed, stay at CLOSED
Receive CLOSE_ACK, process Receive CLOSE_ACK, process
if successful, discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED if successful, discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED
if failed, stay at CLOSED if failed, stay at CLOSED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at CLOSED Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at CLOSED
Timeout (UAL + 2MSL), discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED Timeout (UAL + 2MSL), discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED
+----------+ +----------+
| E-FAILED | HIP failed to establish association with peer | E-FAILED | HIP failed to establish association with peer
+----------+ +----------+
Move to UNASSOCIATED after an implementation specific time. Re-negotiation Move to UNASSOCIATED after an implementation specific time.
is possible after moving to UNASSOCIATED state. Re-negotiation is possible after moving to UNASSOCIATED state.
5.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram 4.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram
The following diagram shows the major state transitions. Transitions The following diagram shows the major state transitions. Transitions
based on received packets implicitly assume that the packets are based on received packets implicitly assume that the packets are
successfully authenticated or processed. successfully authenticated or processed.
+-+ +------------------------------+ +-+ +---------------------------+
I1 received, send R1 | | | | I1 received, send R1 | | | |
| v v | | v v |
Datagram to send +--------------+ I2 received, send R2 | Datagram to send +--------------+ I2 received, send R2 |
+---------------| UNASSOCIATED |---------------+ | +---------------| UNASSOCIATED |---------------+ |
| +--------------+ | | | +--------------+ | |
v | | v | |
+---------+ I2 received, send R2 | | +---------+ I2 received, send R2 | |
+---->| I1-SENT |---------------------------------------+ | | +---->| I1-SENT |---------------------------------------+ | |
| +---------+ | | | | +---------+ | | |
| | +------------------------+ | | | | | +------------------------+ | | |
| | R1 received, | I2 received, send R2 | | | | | | R1 received, | I2 received, send R2 | | | |
| v send I2 | v v v | | v send I2 | v v v |
| +---------+ | +---------+ | | +---------+ | +---------+ |
| +->| I2-SENT |------------+ | R2-SENT |<-----+ | | +->| I2-SENT |------------+ | R2-SENT |<----+ |
| | +---------+ +---------+ | | | | +---------+ +---------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |receive | | | |
| |R1, send | timeout, | receive I2,| |
| |I2 |R2 received +--------------+ data | send R2| |
| | +----------->| ESTABLISHED |<---------+ | |
| | +--------------+ | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | +---------------------------+ | | | | ||timeout | |
| | | | | | | |receive | || | |
| | | | No packet sent/received | | | |R1, send | || receive I2,| |
| | | | for UAL min, send CLOSE | | | |I2 |R2 received +--------------+ data || send R2| |
| | | | | | | | +----------->| ESTABLISHED |<-------+| | |
| | | | +---------+<-+ timeout | | | | +--------------+ | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | +------------+ | +------------------------+ |
| | | | | | |
| | | No packet sent| | | |
| | | /received for | +----+ | |
| | | UAL min, send | V | |
| | | CLOSE | +---------+<-+ timeout | |
| | | +--->| CLOSING |--+ (UAL+MSL) | | | | | +--->| CLOSING |--+ (UAL+MSL) | |
| | | +---------+ retransmit | | | | | +---------+ retransmit | |
+--+----------------------------+---------+ | | | | CLOSE | | +--|------------|----------------------+ | | | | CLOSE | |
| +----------------------------+-----------+ | | +----------------+ | | +------------|------------------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| | | +-----------+ +------------------+--+ | | | +-----------+ +------------------|--+
| | | | receive CLOSE, CLOSE_ACK | | | | +------------+ | receive CLOSE, CLOSE_ACK | |
| | | | send CLOSE_ACK received or | | | | | | send CLOSE_ACK received or | |
| | v v timeout | | | | v v timeout | |
| | +--------+ (UAL+MSL) | | | | +--------+ (UAL+MSL) | |
| +---------------------------| CLOSED |---------------------------+ | | +------------------------| CLOSED |---------------------------+ |
+------------------------------+--------+------------------------------+ +---------------------------+--------+------------------------------+
Datagram to send ^ | timeout (UAL+2MSL), Datagram to send ^ | timeout (UAL+2MSL),
+-+ move to UNASSOCIATED +-+ move to UNASSOCIATED
CLOSE received, CLOSE received,
send CLOSE_ACK send CLOSE_ACK
6. Packet formats 4.5 User Data Considerations
6.1 Payload format 4.5.1 TCP and UDP Pseudo-header Computation for User Data
When computing TCP and UDP checksums on user data packets that flow
through sockets bound to HITs, the IPv6 pseudo-header format [11]
MUST be used, even if the outer addresses on the packet are IPv4
addresses. Additionally, the HITs MUST be used in the place of the
IPv6 addresses in the IPv6 pseudo-header. Note that the pseudo-
header for actual HIP payloads is computed differently; see
Section 5.1.2.
4.5.2 Sending Data on HIP Packets
A future version of this document may define how to include user data
on various HIP packets. However, currently the HIP header is a
terminal header, and not followed by any other headers.
4.5.3 Transport Formats
The actual data transmission format, used for user data after the HIP
base exchange, is not defined in this document. Such transport
formats and methods are described in separate specifications. All
HIP implementations MUST implement, at minimum, the ESP transport
format for HIP [24].
When new transport formats are defined, they get the type value from
the HIP Transform type value space 2048 - 4095. The order in which
the transport formats are presented in the R1 packet, is the
preferred order. The last of the transport formats MUST be ESP
transport format, represented by the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter.
4.5.4 Reboot and SA Timeout Restart of HIP
Simulating a loss of state is a potential DoS attack. The following
process has been crafted to manage state recovery without presenting
a DoS opportunity.
If a host reboots or times out, it has lost its HIP state. If the
system that lost state has a datagram to deliver to its peer, it
simply restarts the HIP exchange. The peer replies with an R1 HIP
packet, but does not reset its state until it receives the I2 HIP
packet. The I2 packet MUST have a valid solution to the puzzle and,
if inserted in R1, a valid Opaque data as well as a valid signature.
Note that either the original Initiator or the Responder could end up
restarting the exchange, becoming the new Initiator.
If a system receives a user data packet that cannot be matched to any
existing HIP association, it is possible that it has lost the state
and its peer has not. It MAY send an ICMP packet with the Parameter
Problem type, the Pointer pointing to the referred HIP-related
association information. Reacting to such traffic depends on the
implementation and the environment where the implementation is used.
After sending the I1, the HIP negotiation proceeds as normally and,
when successful, the SA is created at the initiating end. The peer
end removes the OLD SA and replaces it with the new one.
4.6 Certificate Distribution
HIP base specification does not define how to use certificates or how
to transfer them between hosts. These functions are defined in a
separate specification. The parameter type value, used for carrying
certificates, is reserved: CERT, Type 768.
5. Packet Formats
5.1 Payload Format
All HIP packets start with a fixed header. All HIP packets start with a fixed header.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Payload Len | Type | VER. | RES. | | Next Header | Header Length | Packet Type | VER. | RES. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Controls | Checksum | | Controls | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sender's Host Identity Tag (HIT) | | Sender's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receiver's Host Identity Tag (HIT) | | Receiver's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| | | |
skipping to change at page 31, line 17 skipping to change at page 27, line 17
number is expected to be incremented only if there are incompatible number is expected to be incremented only if there are incompatible
changes to the protocol. Most extensions can be handled by defining changes to the protocol. Most extensions can be handled by defining
new packet types, new parameter types, or new controls. new packet types, new parameter types, or new controls.
The following four bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be The following four bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be
zero when sent, and they SHOULD be ignored when handling a received zero when sent, and they SHOULD be ignored when handling a received
packet. packet.
The HIT fields are always 128 bits (16 bytes) long. The HIT fields are always 128 bits (16 bytes) long.
6.1.1 HIP Controls 5.1.1 HIP Controls
The HIP control section transfers information about the structure of The HIP Controls section conveys information about the structure of
the packet and capabilities of the host. the packet and capabilities of the host.
The following fields have been defined: The following fields have been defined:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SHT | DHT | | | | | | | | |C|A| | SHT | DHT | | | | | | | | | |A|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
C - Certificate One or more certificate packets (CER) follows this SHT - Sender's HIT Type: Currently the following values are
HIP packet (see Section 7.5). specified:
A - Anonymous If this is set, the sender's HI in this packet is
anonymous, i.e., one not listed in a directory. Anonymous HIs
SHOULD NOT be stored. This control is set in packets R1 and/or
I2. The peer receiving an anonymous HI may choose to refuse it.
SHT - Sender's HIT Type Currently the following values are specified:
0 RESERVED 0 RESERVED
1 Type 1 HIT 1 Type 1 HIT
2 Type 2 HIT 2 Type 2 HIT
3-6 UNASSIGNED 3-6 UNASSIGNED
7 RESERVED 7 RESERVED
DHT - Destination's HIT Type Using the same values as SHT.
DHT - Destination's HIT Type: Uses the same values as the SHT.
A - Anonymous: If this is set, the sender's HI in this packet is
anonymous, i.e., one not listed in a directory. Anonymous HIs
SHOULD NOT be stored. This control is set in packets R1 and/or
I2. The peer receiving an anonymous HI may choose to refuse it.
The rest of the fields are reserved for future use and MUST be set to The rest of the fields are reserved for future use and MUST be set to
zero on sent packets and ignored on received packets. zero on sent packets and ignored on received packets.
6.1.2 Checksum 5.1.2 Checksum
The checksum field is located at the same location within the header The checksum field is located at the same location in the header as
as the checksum field in UDP packets, enabling hardware assisted the checksum field in UDP packets, aiding hardware assisted checksum
checksum generation and verification. Note that since the checksum generation and verification. Note that since the checksum covers the
covers the source and destination addresses in the IP header, it must source and destination addresses in the IP header, it must be
be recomputed on HIP-aware NAT boxes. recomputed on HIP-aware NAT devices.
If IPv6 is used to carry the HIP packet, the pseudo-header [11] If IPv6 is used to carry the HIP packet, the pseudo-header [11]
contains the source and destination IPv6 addresses, HIP packet length contains the source and destination IPv6 addresses, HIP packet length
in the pseudo-header length field, a zero field, and the HIP protocol in the pseudo-header length field, a zero field, and the HIP protocol
number (TBD, see Section 4) in the Next Header field. The length number (TBD, see Section 4) in the Next Header field. The length
field is in bytes and can be calculated from the HIP header length field is in bytes and can be calculated from the HIP header length
field: (HIP Header Length + 1) * 8. field: (HIP Header Length + 1) * 8.
In case of using IPv4, the IPv4 UDP pseudo header format [1] is used. In case of using IPv4, the IPv4 UDP pseudo header format [1] is used.
In the pseudo header, the source and destination addresses are those In the pseudo header, the source and destination addresses are those
used in the IP header, the zero field is obviously zero, the protocol used in the IP header, the zero field is obviously zero, the protocol
is the HIP protocol number (TBD, see Section 4), and the length is is the HIP protocol number (TBD, see Section 4), and the length is
calculated as in the IPv6 case. calculated as in the IPv6 case.
6.2 HIP parameters 5.1.3 HIP Fragmentation Support
A HIP implementation must support IP fragmentation / reassembly.
Fragment reassembly MUST be implemented in both IPv4 and IPv6, but
fragment generation MUST be implemented only in IPv4 (IPv4 stacks and
networks will usually do this by default) and SHOULD be implemented
in IPv6. In IPv6 networks, the minimum MTU is larger, 1280 bytes,
than in IPv4 networks. The larger MTU size is usually sufficient for
most HIP packets, and therefore fragment generation may not be
needed. If a host expects to send HIP packets that are larger than
the minimum IPv6 MTU, it MUST implement fragment generation even for
IPv6.
In IPv4 networks, HIP packets may encounter low MTUs along their
routed path. Since HIP does not provide a mechanism to use multiple
IP datagrams for a single HIP packet, support for path MTU discovery
does not bring any value to HIP in IPv4 networks. HIP-aware NAT
devices MUST perform any IPv4 reassembly/fragmentation.
All HIP implementations MUST employ a reassembly algorithm that is
sufficiently resistant to DoS attacks.
5.1.4 Solving the Puzzle
This subsection describes the puzzle solving details.
In R1, the values I and K are sent in network byte order. Similarly,
in I2 the values I and J are sent in network byte order. The SHA-1
hash is created by concatenating, in network byte order, the
following data, in the following order:
64-bit random value I, in network byte order, as appearing in R1
and I2.
128-bit Initiator HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
128-bit Responder HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
64-bit random value J, in network byte order, as appearing in I2.
In order to be a valid response cookie, the K low-order bits of the
resulting SHA-1 digest must be zero.
Notes:
i) The length of the data to be hashed is 48 bytes.
ii) All the data in the hash input MUST be in network byte order.
iii) The order of the Initiator and Responder HITs are different
in the R1 and I2 packets, see Section 5.1. Care must be taken to
copy the values in right order to the hash input.
The following procedure describes the processing steps involved,
assuming that the Responder chooses to precompute the R1 packets:
Precomputation by the Responder:
Sets up the puzzle difficulty K.
Creates a signed R1 and caches it.
Responder:
Selects a suitable cached R1.
Generates a random number I.
Sends I and K in an R1.
Saves I and K for a Delta time.
Initiator:
Generates repeated attempts to solve the puzzle until a matching J
is found:
Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K ) == 0
Sends I and J in an I2.
Responder:
Verifies that the received I is a saved one.
Finds the right K based on I.
Computes V := Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K )
Rejects if V != 0
Accept if V == 0
5.2 HIP Parameters
The HIP Parameters are used to carry the public key associated with The HIP Parameters are used to carry the public key associated with
the sender's HIT, together with other related security and other the sender's HIT, together with related security and other
information. The HIP Parameters consists of ordered parameters, information. They consist of ordered parameters, encoded in TLV
encoded in TLV format. format.
The following parameter types are currently defined. The following parameter types are currently defined.
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+ +-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+
| TLV | Type | Length | Data | | TLV | Type | Length | Data |
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+ +-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+
| R1_COUNTER | 2 | 12 | System Boot Counter | | R1_COUNTER | 128 | 12 | System Boot Counter |
| | | | | | | | | |
| PUZZLE | 5 | 12 | K and Random #I | | PUZZLE | 257 | 12 | K and Random #I |
| | | | | | | | | |
| SOLUTION | 7 | 20 | K, Random #I and puzzle | | SOLUTION | 321 | 20 | K, Random #I and puzzle |
| | | | solution J | | | | | solution J |
| | | | | | | | | |
| SEQ | 11 | 4 | Update packet ID number | | SEQ | 385 | 4 | Update packet ID number |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ACK | 13 | variable | Update packet ID number | | ACK | 449 | variable | Update packet ID number |
| | | | | | | | | |
| DIFFIE_HELLMAN | 15 | variable | public key | | DIFFIE_HELLMAN | 513 | variable | public key |
| | | | | | | | | |
| HIP_TRANSFORM | 17 | variable | HIP Encryption and Integrity | | HIP_TRANSFORM | 577 | variable | HIP Encryption and Integrity |
| | | | Transform | | | | | Transform |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ENCRYPTED | 21 | variable | Encrypted part of I2 or CER | | ENCRYPTED | 641 | variable | Encrypted part of I2 packet |
| | | | packets |
| | | | | | | | | |
| HOST_ID | 35 | variable | Host Identity with Fully | | HOST_ID | 705 | variable | Host Identity with Fully |
| | | | Qualified Domain Name or NAI | | | | | Qualified Domain Name or NAI |
| | | | | | | | | |
| CERT | 64 | variable | HI Certificate | | CERT | 768 | variable | HI Certificate; used to |
| | | | transfer certificates. Usage |
| | | | defined in a separate |
| | | | document. |
| | | | | | | | | |
| NOTIFY | 256 | variable | Informational data | | NOTIFY | 832 | variable | Informational data |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ECHO_REQUEST | 1022 | variable | Opaque data to be echoed | | ECHO_REQUEST | 897 | variable | Opaque data to be echoed |
| | | | back; under signature | | | | | back; under signature |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ECHO_RESPONSE | 1024 | variable | Opaque data echoed back; | | ECHO_RESPONSE | 961 | variable | Opaque data echoed back; |
| | | | under signature | | | | | under signature |
| | | | | | | | | |
| HMAC | 65245 | 20 | HMAC based message | | HMAC | 61505 | 20 | HMAC based message |
| | | | authentication code, with | | | | | authentication code, with |
| | | | key material from | | | | | key material from |
| | | | HIP_TRANSFORM | | | | | HIP_TRANSFORM |
| | | | | | | | | |
| HMAC_2 | 65247 | 20 | HMAC based message | | HMAC_2 | 61569 | 20 | HMAC based message |
| | | | authentication code, with | | | | | authentication code, with |
| | | | key material from | | | | | key material from |
| | | | HIP_TRANSFORM | | | | | HIP_TRANSFORM |
| | | | | | | | | |
| HIP_SIGNATURE_2 | 65277 | variable | Signature of the R1 packet | | HIP_SIGNATURE_2 | 61633 | variable | Signature of the R1 packet |
| | | | | | HIP_SIGNATURE | 61697 | variable | Signature of the packet |
| HIP_SIGNATURE | 65279 | variable | Signature of the packet |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ECHO_REQUEST | 65281 | variable | Opaque data to be echoed | | ECHO_REQUEST | 63661 | variable | Opaque data to be echoed |
| | | | back | | | | | back; after signature |
| | | | | | | | | |
| ECHO_RESPONSE | 65283 | variable | Opaque data echoed back; | | ECHO_RESPONSE | 63425 | variable | Opaque data echoed back; |
| | | | after signature | | | | | after signature |
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+ +-----------------+-------+----------+------------------------------+
6.2.1 TLV format Because the ordering (from lowest to highest) of HIP parameters is
strictly enforced, the parameter type values for existing parameters
have been spaced to allow for future protocol extensions. Parameters
numbered between 0-1023 are used in HIP handshake and update
procedures and are covered by signatures. Parameters numbered
between 1024-2047 are reserved. Parameters numbered between 2048-
4095 are used for parameters related to HIP transform types.
Parameters numbered between 4096 and (2^16 - 2^12) 61439 are
reserved. Parameters numbered beteween 61440-62463 are used for
signatures and signed MACs. Parameters numbered between 62464-63487
are used for parameters that fall outside of the signed area of the
packet. Parameters numbered between 63488-64511 are used for
rendezvous and other relaying services. Parameters numbered between
64512-65535 are reserved.
The TLV encoded parameters are described in the following 5.2.1 TLV Format
The TLV-encoded parameters are described in the following
subsections. The type-field value also describes the order of these subsections. The type-field value also describes the order of these
fields in the packet, except for type values from 2048 to 4095 which fields in the packet, except for type values from 2048 to 4095 which
are reserved for new transport forms. The parameters MUST be are reserved for new transport forms. The parameters MUST be
included into the packet so that the types form an increasing order. included in the packet such that their types form an increasing
If the order does not follow this rule, the packet is considered to order. If the order does not follow this rule, the packet is
be malformed and it MUST be discarded. considered to be malformed and it MUST be discarded.
Parameters using type values from 2048 up to 4095 are transport Parameters using type values from 2048 up to 4095 are transport
formats. Currently, one transport format is defined: the ESP formats. Currently, one transport format is defined: the ESP
transport format [23]. The order of these parameters does not follow transport format [24]. The order of these parameters does not follow
the order of their type value, but they are put in the packet in the order of their type value, but they are put in the packet in
order of preference. First one of the transport formats it the most order of preference. The first of the transport formats it the most
preferred, and so on. preferred, and so on.
All the TLV parameters have a length (including Type and Length All of the TLV parameters have a length (including Type and Length
fields) which is a multiple of 8 bytes. When needed, padding MUST be fields) which is a multiple of 8 bytes. When needed, padding MUST be
added to the end of the parameter so that the total length becomes a added to the end of the parameter so that the total length becomes a
multiple of 8 bytes. This rule ensures proper alignment of data. If multiple of 8 bytes. This rule ensures proper alignment of data. If
padding is added, the Length field MUST NOT include the padding. Any padding is added, the Length field MUST NOT include the padding. Any
added padding bytes MUST be set zero by the sender, but their content added padding bytes MUST be zeroed by the sender, and their values
SHOULD NOT be checked on the receiving end. SHOULD NOT be checked by the receiver.
Consequently, the Length field indicates the length of the Contents Consequently, the Length field indicates the length of the Contents
field (in bytes). The total length of the TLV parameter (including field (in bytes). The total length of the TLV parameter (including
Type, Length, Contents, and Padding) is related to the Length field Type, Length, Contents, and Padding) is related to the Length field
according to the following formula: according to the following formula:
Total Length = 11 + Length - (Length + 3) % 8; Total Length = 11 + Length - (Length + 3) % 8;
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |C| Length | | Type |C| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
/ Contents / / Contents /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding | | | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type code for the parameter Type Type code for the parameter. 16 bits long, C-bit
being part of the Type code.
C Critical. One if this parameter is critical, and C Critical. One if this parameter is critical, and
MUST be recognized by the recipient, zero otherwise. MUST be recognized by the recipient, zero otherwise.
The C bit is considered to be a part of the Type field. The C bit is considered to be a part of the Type
Consequently, critical parameters are always odd field. Consequently, critical parameters are always
and non-critical ones have an even value. odd and non-critical ones have an even value.
Length Length of the Contents, in bytes. Length Length of the Contents, in bytes.
Contents Parameter specific, defined by Type Contents Parameter specific, defined by Type
Padding Padding, 0-7 bytes, added if needed Padding Padding, 0-7 bytes, added if needed
Critical parameters MUST be recognized by the recipient. If a Critical parameters MUST be recognized by the recipient. If a
recipient encounters a critical parameter that it does not recognize, recipient encounters a critical parameter that it does not recognize,
it MUST NOT process the packet any further. It MAY send an ICMP or it MUST NOT process the packet any further. It MAY send an ICMP or
NOTIFY, as defined in Section 4.4. NOTIFY, as defined in Section 4.3.
Non-critical parameters MAY be safely ignored. If a recipient Non-critical parameters MAY be safely ignored. If a recipient
encounters a non-critical parameter that it does not recognize, it encounters a non-critical parameter that it does not recognize, it
SHOULD proceed as if the parameter was not present in the received SHOULD proceed as if the parameter was not present in the received
packet. packet.
6.2.2 Defining new parameters 5.2.2 Defining New Parameters
Future specifications may define new parameters as needed. When Future specifications may define new parameters as needed. When
defining new parameters, care must be taken to ensure that the defining new parameters, care must be taken to ensure that the
parameter type values are appropriate and leave suitable space for parameter type values are appropriate and leave suitable space for
other future extensions. One must remember that the parameters MUST other future extensions. One must remember that the parameters MUST
always be arranged in the increasing order by the type code, thereby always be arranged in the increasing order by type code, thereby
limiting the order of parameters. limiting the order of parameters.
The following rules must be followed when defining new parameters. The following rules must be followed when defining new parameters.
1. The low order bit C of the Type code is used to distinguish 1. The low order bit C of the Type code is used to distinguish
between critical and non-critical parameters. between critical and non-critical parameters.
2. A new parameter may be critical only if an old recipient ignoring 2. A new parameter may be critical only if an old recipient ignoring
it would cause security problems. In general, new parameters it would cause security problems. In general, new parameters
SHOULD be defined as non-critical, and expect a reply from the SHOULD be defined as non-critical, and expect a reply from the
recipient. recipient.
3. If a system implements a new critical parameter, it MUST provide 3. If a system implements a new critical parameter, it MUST provide
the ability to configure the associated feature off, such that the ability to configure the associated feature off, such that
the critical parameter is not sent at all. The configuration the critical parameter is not sent at all. The configuration
option must be well documented. By default, sending of such a option must be well documented. By default, sending of such a
new critical parameter SHOULD be off. In other words, the new critical parameter SHOULD be off. In other words, the
management interface MUST allow vanilla standards-only mode as a management interface MUST allow vanilla standards-only mode as a
default configuration setting, and MAY allow new critical default configuration setting, and MAY allow new critical
payloads to be configured on (and off). payloads to be configured on (and off).
4. The following type codes are reserved for future base protocol
extensions, and may be assigned only through an appropriate WG or
RFC action.
0 - 511
65024 - 65535
5. The following type codes are reserved for experimentation and
private use. Types SHOULD be selected in a random fashion from
this range, thereby reducing the probability of collisions. A
method employing genuine randomness (such as flipping a coin)
SHOULD be used.
32768 - 49141
6. All other parameter type codes MUST be registered by the IANA.
See Section 13.
6.2.3 R1_COUNTER 4. See section Section 9 for allocation rules regarding type codes.
5.2.3 R1_COUNTER
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved, 4 bytes | | Reserved, 4 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R1 generation counter, 8 bytes | | R1 generation counter, 8 bytes |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 2 Type 128
Length 12 Length 12
R1 generation R1 generation
counter The current generation of valid puzzles counter The current generation of valid puzzles
The R1_COUNTER parameter contains an 64-bit unsigned integer in The R1_COUNTER parameter contains an 64-bit unsigned integer in
network byte order, indicating the current generation of valid network byte order, indicating the current generation of valid
puzzles. The sender is supposed to increment this counter puzzles. The sender is supposed to increment this counter
periodically. It is RECOMMENDED that the counter value is periodically. It is RECOMMENDED that the counter value is
incremented at least as often as old PUZZLE values are deprecated so incremented at least as often as old PUZZLE values are deprecated so
that SOLUTIONs to them are no longer accepted. that SOLUTIONs to them are no longer accepted.
The R1_COUNTER parameter is optional. It SHOULD be included in the The R1_COUNTER parameter is optional. It SHOULD be included in the
R1 (in which case it is covered by the signature), and if present in R1 (in which case it is covered by the signature), and if present in
the R1, it MAY be echoed (including the Reserved field in verbatim) the R1, it MAY be echoed (including the Reserved field verbatim) by
by the Initiator in the I2. the Initiator in the I2.
6.2.4 PUZZLE 5.2.4 PUZZLE
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Lifetime | Opaque, 2 bytes | | K, 1 byte | Lifetime | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random # I, 8 bytes | | Random # I, 8 bytes |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 5 Type 257
Length 12 Length 12
K K is the number of verified bits K K is the number of verified bits
Lifetime Puzzle lifetime 2^(value-32) seconds Lifetime Puzzle lifetime 2^(value-32) seconds
Opaque Data set by the Responder, indexing the puzzle Opaque Data set by the Responder, indexing the puzzle
Random #I random number Random #I random number
Random #I is represented as 64-bit integer, K and Lifetime as 8-bit Random #I is represented as 64-bit integer, K and Lifetime as 8-bit
integer, all in network byte order. integer, all in network byte order.
The PUZZLE parameter contains the puzzle difficulty K and an 64-bit The PUZZLE parameter contains the puzzle difficulty K and a 64-bit
puzzle random integer #I. Puzzle Lifetime indicates the time during puzzle random integer #I. The Puzzle Lifetime indicates the time
which the puzzle solution is valid and sets a time limit for during which the puzzle solution is valid, and sets a time limit
initiator which it should not exceed while trying to solve the which should not be exceeded by the Initiator while it attempts to
puzzle. The lifetime is indicated as power of 2 using formula solve the puzzle. The lifetime is indicated as a power of 2 using
2^(Lifetime-32) seconds. A puzzle MAY be augmented by including an the formula 2^(Lifetime-32) seconds. A puzzle MAY be augmented with
ECHO_REQUEST parameter to an R1. The contents of the ECHO_REQUEST an ECHO_REQUEST parameter included in the R1; the contents of the
are then echoed back in ECHO_RESPONSE, allowing the Responder to use ECHO_REQUEST are then echoed back in the ECHO_RESPONSE, allowing the
the included information as a part of puzzle processing. Responder to use the included information as a part of its puzzle
processing.
The Opaque and Random #I field are not covered by the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 The Opaque and Random #I field are not covered by the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameter. parameter.
6.2.5 SOLUTION 5.2.5 SOLUTION
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Reserved | Opaque, 2 bytes | | K, 1 byte | Reserved | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random #I, 8 bytes | | Random #I, 8 bytes |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Puzzle solution #J, 8 bytes | | Puzzle solution #J, 8 bytes |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 7 Type 321
Length 20 Length 20
K K is the number of verified bits K K is the number of verified bits
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Opaque Copied unmodified from the received PUZZLE TLV Opaque copied unmodified from the received PUZZLE TLV
Random #I random number Random #I random number
Puzzle solution Puzzle solution
#J random number #J random number
Random #I, and Random #J are represented as 64-bit integers, K as Random #I, and Random #J are represented as 64-bit integers, K as an
8-bit integer, all in network byte order. 8-bit integer, all in network byte order.
The SOLUTION parameter contains a solution to a puzzle. It also The SOLUTION parameter contains a solution to a puzzle. It also
echoes back the random difficulty K, the Opaque field, and the puzzle echoes back the random difficulty K, the Opaque field, and the puzzle
integer #I. integer #I.
6.2.6 DIFFIE_HELLMAN 5.2.6 DIFFIE_HELLMAN
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Group ID | Public Value / | Group ID | Public Value /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | padding | / | padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 15 Type 513
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
padding
Group ID defines values for p and g Group ID defines values for p and g
Public Value the sender's public Diffie-Hellman key Public Value the sender's public Diffie-Hellman key
The following Group IDs have been defined: The following Group IDs have been defined:
Group Value Group Value
Reserved 0 Reserved 0
384-bit group 1 384-bit group 1
OAKLEY well known group 1 2 OAKLEY well known group 1 2
1536-bit MODP group 3 1536-bit MODP group 3
skipping to change at page 39, line 40 skipping to change at page 37, line 24
6144-bit MODP group 5 6144-bit MODP group 5
8192-bit MODP group 6 8192-bit MODP group 6
The MODP Diffie-Hellman groups are defined in [18]. The OAKLEY group The MODP Diffie-Hellman groups are defined in [18]. The OAKLEY group
is defined in [9]. The OAKLEY well known group 5 is the same as the is defined in [9]. The OAKLEY well known group 5 is the same as the
1536-bit MODP group. 1536-bit MODP group.
A HIP implementation MUST support Group IDs 1 and 3. The 384-bit A HIP implementation MUST support Group IDs 1 and 3. The 384-bit
group can be used when lower security is enough (e.g. web surfing) group can be used when lower security is enough (e.g. web surfing)
and when the equipment is not powerful enough (e.g. some PDAs). and when the equipment is not powerful enough (e.g. some PDAs).
Equipment powerful enough SHOULD implement also group ID 5. The Equipment powerful enough SHOULD implement also group ID 5. The 384-
384-bit group is defined in Appendix E. bit group is defined in Appendix F.
To avoid unnecessary failures during the base exchange, the rest of To avoid unnecessary failures during the base exchange, the rest of
the groups SHOULD be implemented in hosts where resources are the groups SHOULD be implemented in hosts where resources are
adequate. adequate.
6.2.7 HIP_TRANSFORM 5.2.7 HIP_TRANSFORM
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transform-ID #1 | Transform-ID #2 | | Transform-ID #1 | Transform-ID #2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transform-ID #n | Padding | | Transform-ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 17 Type 577
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
padding
Transform-ID Defines the HIP Suite to be used Transform-ID Defines the HIP Suite to be used
The following Suite-IDs are defined ([20],[24]): The following Suite-IDs are defined ([21],[26]):
XXX: Deprecate MD5 in the light of recent development? XXX: Deprecate MD5 in the light of recent development?
Suite-ID Value Suite-ID Value
RESERVED 0 RESERVED 0
AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 1 AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 1
3DES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 2 3DES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 2
3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 3 3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 3
BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 4 BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 4
NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA1 5 NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA1 5
NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-MD5 6 NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-MD5 6
skipping to change at page 40, line 40 skipping to change at page 38, line 19
3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 3 3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 3
BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 4 BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 4
NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA1 5 NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA1 5
NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-MD5 6 NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-MD5 6
There MUST NOT be more than six (6) HIP Suite-IDs in one HIP There MUST NOT be more than six (6) HIP Suite-IDs in one HIP
transform TLV. The limited number of transforms sets the maximum transform TLV. The limited number of transforms sets the maximum
size of HIP_TRANSFORM TLV. The HIP_TRANSFORM TLV MUST contain at size of HIP_TRANSFORM TLV. The HIP_TRANSFORM TLV MUST contain at
least one of the mandatory Suite-IDs. least one of the mandatory Suite-IDs.
The Responder lists supported and desired Suite-IDs in order of
preference in the R1, up to the maximum of six Suite-IDs. In the I2,
the Initiator MUST choose and insert only one of the corresponding
Suite-IDs that will be used for generating the I2.
Mandatory implementations: AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 and NULL-ENCRYPTION Mandatory implementations: AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 and NULL-ENCRYPTION
with HMAC-SHA1. with HMAC-SHA1.
6.2.8 HOST_ID 5.2.8 HOST_ID
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HI Length |DI-type| DI Length | | HI Length |DI-type| DI Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Host Identity / | Host Identity /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Domain Identifier / / | Domain Identifier /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 35 Type 705
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding Padding
HI Length Length of the Host Identity in octets HI Length Length of the Host Identity in octets
DI-type type of the following Domain Identifier field DI-type type of the following Domain Identifier field
DI Length length of the FQDN or NAI in octets DI Length length of the FQDN or NAI in octets
Host Identity actual host identity Host Identity actual host identity
Domain Identifier the identifier of the sender Domain Identifier the identifier of the sender
The Host Identity is represented in RFC2535 [12] format. The The Host Identity is represented in RFC2535 [12] format. The
algorithms used in RDATA format are the following: algorithms used in RDATA format are the following:
Algorithms Values Algorithms Values
RESERVED 0 RESERVED 0
DSA 3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED) DSA 3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED) RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
The following DI-types have been defined: The following DI-types have been defined:
skipping to change at page 41, line 47 skipping to change at page 39, line 21
RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED) RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
The following DI-types have been defined: The following DI-types have been defined:
Type Value Type Value
none included 0 none included 0
FQDN 1 FQDN 1
NAI 2 NAI 2
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format. FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format.
NAI Network Access Identifier, in binary format. The NAI Network Access Identifier
format of the NAI is login@FQDN. [22]
The format for the FQDN is defined in RFC1035 [3] Section 3.1. The format for the FQDN is defined in RFC1035 [3] Section 3.1.
If there is no Domain Identifier, i.e. the DI-type field is zero, If there is no Domain Identifier, i.e. the DI-type field is zero,
also the DI Length field is set to zero. also the DI Length field is set to zero.
6.2.9 CERT 5.2.9 HMAC
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 64
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding
Cert count total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive CER packets
Cert ID the order number for this certificate
Cert Type describes the type of the certificate
The receiver must know the total number (Cert count) of certificates
that it will receive from the sender, related to the R1 or I2. The
Cert ID identifies the particular certificate and its order in the
certificate chain. The numbering in Cert ID MUST go from 1 to Cert
count.
The following certificate types are defined:
Cert format Type number
X.509 v3 1
The encoding format for X.509v3 certificate is defined in [15].
6.2.10 HMAC
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| HMAC | | HMAC |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65245 Type 61505
Length 20 Length 20
HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the HIP HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the
packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any HIP packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any
following HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 following parameters, such as HIP_SIGNATURE,
parameters. The checksum field MUST be set to zero HIP_SIGNATURE_2, ECHO_REQUEST, or ECHO_RESPONSE.
The checksum field MUST be set to zero
and the HIP header length in the HIP common header and the HIP header length in the HIP common header
MUST be calculated not to cover any excluded MUST be calculated not to cover any excluded
parameters when the HMAC is calculated. parameters when the HMAC is calculated.
The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in
Section 8.3.1 Section 6.3.1
6.2.11 HMAC_2 5.2.10 HMAC_2
The TLV structure is the same as in Section 6.2.10. The fields are: The TLV structure is the same as in Section 5.2.9. The fields are:
Type 65247 Type 61569
Length 20 Length 20
HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the HIP HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the
packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any HIP packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any
following HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 following parameters such as HIP_SIGNATURE,
parameters and including an additional sender's HIP_SIGNATURE_2, ECHO_REQUEST, or ECHO_RESPONSE,
and including an additional sender's
HOST_ID TLV during the HMAC calculation. The HOST_ID TLV during the HMAC calculation. The
checksum field MUST be set to zero and the HIP checksum field MUST be set to zero and the HIP
header length in the HIP common header MUST be header length in the HIP common header MUST be
calculated not to cover any excluded parameters when calculated not to cover any excluded parameters
the HMAC is calculated. when the HMAC is calculated.
The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in
Section 8.3.1 Section 6.3.1
6.2.12 HIP_SIGNATURE 5.2.11 HIP_SIGNATURE
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SIG alg | Signature / | SIG alg | Signature /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65279 (2^16-2^8-1) Type 61697
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
SIG alg Signature algorithm SIG alg Signature algorithm
Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP packet, Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP packet,
excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV field and any TLVs excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE parameter and any
that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV. The checksum field parameters that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV.
MUST be set to zero, and the HIP header length in the The checksum field MUST be set to zero, and the HIP
HIP common header MUST be calculated only to the header length in the HIP common header MUST be
beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV when the signature calculated only to the beginning of the
is calculated. HIP_SIGNATURE TLV when the signature is calculated.
The signature algorithms are defined in Section 6.2.8. The signature The signature algorithms are defined in Section 5.2.8. The signature
in the Signature field is encoded using the proper method depending in the Signature field is encoded using the proper method depending
on the signature algorithm (e.g. according to [14] in case of RSA, on the signature algorithm (e.g. according to [15] in case of RSA, or
or according to [13] in case of DSA). according to [13] in case of DSA).
The HIP_SIGNATURE calculation and verification process is presented The HIP_SIGNATURE calculation and verification process is presented
in Section 8.3.2 in Section 6.3.2
6.2.13 HIP_SIGNATURE_2 5.2.12 HIP_SIGNATURE_2
The TLV structure is the same as in Section 6.2.12. The fields are: The TLV structure is the same as in Section 5.2.11. The fields are:
Type 65277 (2^16-2^8-3) Type 61633
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
SIG alg Signature algorithm SIG alg Signature algorithm
Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP R1 packet, Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP R1 packet,
excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV field and any excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 parameter and any
TLVs that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV. Initiator's parameters that follow. Initiator's HIT, checksum
HIT, checksum field, and the Opaque and Random #I field, and the Opaque and Random #I fields in the
fields in the PUZZLE TLV MUST be set to zero while PUZZLE TLV MUST be set to zero while computing the
computing the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 signature. Further, the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 signature. Further, the HIP packet
HIP packet length in the HIP header MUST be length in the HIP header MUST be calculated to the
calculated to the beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV when the
TLV when the signature is calculated. signature is calculated.
Zeroing the Initiator's HIT makes it possible to create R1 packets Zeroing the Initiator's HIT makes it possible to create R1 packets
beforehand to minimize the effects of possible DoS attacks. Zeroing beforehand to minimize the effects of possible DoS attacks. Zeroing
the I and Opaque fields allows these fields to be populated the I and Opaque fields allows these fields to be populated
dynamically on precomputed R1s. dynamically on precomputed R1s.
Signature calculation and verification follows the process in Signature calculation and verification follows the process in
Section 8.3.2. Section 6.3.2.
6.2.14 SEQ 5.2.13 SEQ
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update ID | | Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 11 Type 385
Length 4 Length 4
Update ID 32-bit sequence number Update ID 32-bit sequence number
The Update ID is an unsigned quantity, initialized by a host to zero The Update ID is an unsigned quantity, initialized by a host to zero
upon moving to ESTABLISHED state. The Update ID has scope within a upon moving to ESTABLISHED state. The Update ID has scope within a
single HIP association, and not across multiple associations or single HIP association, and not across multiple associations or
multiple hosts. The Update ID is incremented by one before each new multiple hosts. The Update ID is incremented by one before each new
UPDATE that is sent by the host (i.e., the first UPDATE packet UPDATE that is sent by the host (i.e., the first UPDATE packet
originated by a host has an Update ID of 1). originated by a host has an Update ID of 1).
6.2.15 ACK 5.2.14 ACK
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| peer Update ID | | peer Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 13 Type 449
Length variable (multiple of 4) Length variable (multiple of 4)
peer Update ID 32-bit sequence number corresponding to the peer Update ID 32-bit sequence number corresponding to the
Update ID being acked. Update ID being acked.
The ACK parameter includes one or more Update IDs that have been The ACK parameter includes one or more Update IDs that have been
received from the peer. The Length field identifies the number of received from the peer. The Length field identifies the number of
peer Update IDs that are present in the parameter. peer Update IDs that are present in the parameter.
6.2.16 ENCRYPTED 5.2.15 ENCRYPTED
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV / | IV /
/ / / /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
/ Encrypted data / / Encrypted data /
/ / / /
/ +-------------------------------+ / +-------------------------------+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 21 Type 641
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
IV Initialization vector, if needed, otherwise nonexistent. IV Initialization vector, if needed, otherwise
The length of the IV is inferred from the HIP transform. nonexistent. The length of the IV is inferred from
Encrypted The data is encrypted using an encryption algorithm as the HIP transform.
data defined in HIP transform. Encrypted The data is encrypted using an encryption algorithm
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple data as defined in HIP transform.
of 8 bytes. Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a
multiple of 8 bytes.
The encrypted data is in TLV format itself. Consequently, the first The ENCRYPTED parameter encapsulates another TLV, the encrypted data,
fields in the contents are Type and Length, allowing the contents to which is also in TLV format. Consequently, the first fields in the
be easily parsed after decryption. Each of the TLVs to be encrypted, encapsulated parameter(s) are Type and Length, allowing the contents
must be padded according to rules in Section 6.2.1 before encryption. to be easily parsed after decryption.
If the encryption algorithm requires the length of the data to be Both the ENCRYPTED parameter and the encapsulated TLV(s) MUST be
encrypted to be a multiple of the cipher algorithm block size, padded. The padding needed for the ENCRYPTED parameter is referred
thereby necessitating padding, and if the encryption algorithm does as the "outer" padding. Correspondingly, the padding for the
not specify the padding contents, then an implementation MUST append parameter(s) encapsulated within the ENCRYPTED parameter is referred
the TLV parameter that is to be encrypted with an additional padding, as the "inner" padding.
so that the length of the resulting cleartext is a multiple of the
cipher block size length. Such a padding MUST be constructed as
specified in [19] Section 2.4. On the other hand, if the data to be
encrypted is already a multiple of the block size, or if the
encryption algorithm does specify padding as per [19] Section 2.4,
then such additional padding SHOULD NOT be added.
The Length field in the inside, to be encrypted TLV does not include The inner padding follows exactly the rules of Section 5.2.1. The
the padding. The Length field in the outside ENCRYPTED TLV is the outer padding also follows the same rules but with an exception.
length of the data after encryption (including the Reserved field, Namely, some algorithms require that the data to be encrypted must be
the IV field, and the output from the encryption process specified a multiple of the cipher algorithm block size. In this case, the
for that suite, but not any additional external padding). Note that outer padding MUST include extra padding, as specified by the
the length of the cipher suite output may be smaller or larger than encryption algorithm. The size of the extra padding is selected so
the length of the data to be encrypted, since the encryption process that the the length of the ENCRYPTED is the minimum value that is
may compress the data or add additional padding to the data. both multiple of eight and the cipher block size. The encryption
algorithm may specify padding bytes other than zero; for example, AES
[33] uses the PKCS5 padding scheme [14] (see section 6.1.1) where the
remaining n bytes to fill the block each have the value n.
The ENCRYPTED payload may contain additional external padding, if the Note that the length of the cipher suite output may be smaller or
result of encryption, the TLV header and the IV is not a multiple of larger than the length of the data to be encrypted, since the
8 bytes. The contents of this external padding MUST follow the rules encryption process may compress the data or add additional padding to
given in Section 6.2.1. the data.
6.2.17 NOTIFY 5.2.16 NOTIFY
The NOTIFY parameter is used to transmit informational data, such as The NOTIFY parameter is used to transmit informational data, such as
error conditions and state transitions, to a HIP peer. A NOTIFY error conditions and state transitions, to a HIP peer. A NOTIFY
parameter may appear in the NOTIFY packet type. The use of the parameter may appear in the NOTIFY packet type. The use of the
NOTIFY parameter in other packet types is for further study. NOTIFY parameter in other packet types is for further study.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Notify Message Type | | Reserved | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| / | /
/ Notification data / / Notification data /
/ +---------------+ / +---------------+
/ | Padding | / | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 256 Type 832
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Notify Message Specifies the type of notification Notify Message Specifies the type of notification
Type Type
Notification Informational or error data transmitted in addition Notification Informational or error data transmitted in addition
Data to the Notify Message Type. Values for this field are Data to the Notify Message Type. Values for this field
type specific (see below). are type specific (see below).
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a
of 8 bytes. multiple of 8 bytes.
Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA
could not be established. It can also be status data that a process could not be established. It can also be status data that a process
managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process. managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.
The table below lists the Notification messages and their The table below lists the Notification messages and their
corresponding values. corresponding values.
To avoid certain types of attacks, a Responder SHOULD avoid sending a To avoid certain types of attacks, a Responder SHOULD avoid sending a
NOTIFY to any host with which it has not successfully verified a NOTIFY to any host with which it has not successfully verified a
puzzle solution. puzzle solution.
skipping to change at page 48, line 46 skipping to change at page 46, line 46
the other status types. To aid debugging, more detailed the other status types. To aid debugging, more detailed
error information SHOULD be written to a console or log. error information SHOULD be written to a console or log.
NO_DH_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 14 NO_DH_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 14
None of the proposed group IDs was acceptable. None of the proposed group IDs was acceptable.
INVALID_DH_CHOSEN 15 INVALID_DH_CHOSEN 15
The D-H Group ID field does not correspond to one offered The D-H Group ID field does not correspond to one offered
by the responder. by the Responder.
NO_HIP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 16 NO_HIP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 16
None of the proposed HIP Transform crypto suites was None of the proposed HIP Transform crypto suites was
acceptable. acceptable.
INVALID_HIP_TRANSFORM_CHOSEN 17 INVALID_HIP_TRANSFORM_CHOSEN 17
The HIP Transform crypto suite does not correspond to The HIP Transform crypto suite does not correspond to
one offered by the responder. one offered by the Responder.
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 24 AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 24
Sent in response to a HIP signature failure. Sent in response to a HIP signature failure.
CHECKSUM_FAILED 26 CHECKSUM_FAILED 26
Sent in response to a HIP checksum failure. Sent in response to a HIP checksum failure.
HMAC_FAILED 28 HMAC_FAILED 28
Sent in response to a HIP HMAC failure. Sent in response to a HIP HMAC failure.
ENCRYPTION_FAILED 32 ENCRYPTION_FAILED 32
The responder could not successfully decrypt the The Responder could not successfully decrypt the
ENCRYPTED TLV. ENCRYPTED TLV.
INVALID_HIT 40 INVALID_HIT 40
Sent in response to a failure to validate the peer's Sent in response to a failure to validate the peer's
HIT from the corresponding HI. HIT from the corresponding HI.
BLOCKED_BY_POLICY 42 BLOCKED_BY_POLICY 42
The responder is unwilling to set up an association The Responder is unwilling to set up an association
for some policy reason (e.g. received HIT is NULL for some policy reason (e.g. received HIT is NULL
and policy does not allow opportunistic mode). and policy does not allow opportunistic mode).
SERVER_BUSY_PLEASE_RETRY 44 SERVER_BUSY_PLEASE_RETRY 44
The responder is unwilling to set up an association The Responder is unwilling to set up an association
as it is suffering under some kind of overload and as it is suffering under some kind of overload and
has chosen to shed load by rejecting your request. has chosen to shed load by rejecting your request.
You may retry if you wish, however you MUST find You may retry if you wish, however you MUST find
another (different) puzzle solution for any such another (different) puzzle solution for any such
retries. Note that you may need to obtain a new retries. Note that you may need to obtain a new
puzzle with a new I1/R1 exchange. puzzle with a new I1/R1 exchange.
I2_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 46 I2_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 46
The responder has received your I2 but had to queue The Responder has received your I2 but had to queue
the I2 for processing. The puzzle was correctly solved the I2 for processing. The puzzle was correctly solved
and the responder is willing to set up an association and the Responder is willing to set up an association
but has currently a number of I2s in processing queue. but has currently a number of I2s in processing queue.
R2 will be sent after the I2 has been processed. R2 will be sent after the I2 has been processed.
NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES Value NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES Value
------------------------------ ----- ------------------------------ -----
(None defined at present) (None defined at present)
6.2.18 ECHO_REQUEST 5.2.17 ECHO_REQUEST
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) | | Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65281 or 1022 Type 63661 or 897
Length variable Length variable
Opaque data Opaque data, supposed to be meaningful only to the Opaque data Opaque data, supposed to be meaningful only to the
node that sends ECHO_REQUEST and receives a corresponding node that sends ECHO_REQUEST and receives a
ECHO_RESPONSE. corresponding ECHO_RESPONSE.
The ECHO_REQUEST parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the The ECHO_REQUEST parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the
sender wants to get echoed back in the corresponding reply packet. sender wants to get echoed back in the corresponding reply packet.
The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any
purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet
and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_REQUEST MAY be and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_REQUEST MAY be
covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type
field selected for the parameter; Type 1022 ECHO_REQUEST is covered field selected for the parameter; Type 897 ECHO_REQUEST is covered
and Type 65281 is not. and Type 63661 is not covered. A HIP packet can contain only one
ECHO_REQUEST parameter.
6.2.19 ECHO_RESPONSE 5.2.18 ECHO_RESPONSE
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | | Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) | | Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65283 or 1024 Type 63425 or 961
Length variable Length variable
Opaque data Opaque data, copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST Opaque data Opaque data, copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST
parameter that triggered this response. parameter that triggered this response.
The ECHO_RESPONSE parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the The ECHO_RESPONSE parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the
sender of the ECHO_REQUEST wants to get echoed back. The opaque data sender of the ECHO_REQUEST wants to get echoed back. The opaque data
is copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST parameter. is copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST parameter.
The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any
purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet
and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_RESPONSE MAY be and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_RESPONSE MAY be
covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type
field selected for the parameter; Type 1024 ECHO_RESPONSE is covered field selected for the parameter; Type 961 ECHO_RESPONSE is covered
and Type 65283 is not. and Type 63425 is not.
6.3 ICMP messages
When a HIP implementation detects a problem with an incoming packet,
and it either cannot determine the identity of the sender of the
packet or does not have any existing HIP association with the sender
of the packet, it MAY respond with an ICMP packet. Any such replies
MUST be rate limited as described in [4]. In most cases, the ICMP
packet will have the Parameter Problem type (12 for ICMPv4, 4 for
ICMPv6), with the Pointer field pointing to the field that caused the
ICMP message to be generated.
6.3.1 Invalid Version
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has an
unrecognized HIP version number, it SHOULD respond, rate limited,
with an ICMP packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing
to the VER./RES. byte in the HIP header.
6.3.2 Other problems with the HIP header and packet structure
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has other
unrecoverable problems in the header or packet format, it MAY
respond, rate limited, with an ICMP packet with type Parameter
Problem, the Pointer pointing to the field that failed to pass the
format checks. However, an implementation MUST NOT send an ICMP
message if the Checksum fails; instead, it MUST silently drop the
packet.
6.3.3 Invalid Cookie Solution
If a HIP implementation receives an I2 packet that has an invalid
cookie solution, the behaviour depends on the underlying version of
IP. If IPv6 is used, the implementation SHOULD respond with an ICMP
packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing to the
beginning of the Puzzle solution #J field in the SOLUTION payload in
the HIP message.
If IPv4 is used, the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP packet
with the type Parameter Problem, copying enough of bytes form the I2
message so that the SOLUTION parameter fits in to the ICMP message,
the Pointer pointing to the beginning of the Puzzle solution #J
field, as in the IPv6 case. Note, however, that the resulting ICMPv4
message exceeds the typical ICMPv4 message size as defined in [2].
6.3.4 Non-existing HIP association
If a HIP implementation receives a CLOSE, or UPDATE packet, or any
other packet whose handling requires an existing association, that
has either a Receiver or Sender HIT that does not match with any
existing HIP association, the implementation MAY respond, rate
limited, with an ICMP packet with the type Parameter Problem, the
Pointer pointing to the the beginning of the first HIT that does not
match.
A host MUST NOT reply with such an ICMP if it receives any of the
following messages: I1, R2, I2, R2, CER, and NOTIFY. When
introducing new packet types, a specification SHOULD define the
appropriate rules for sending or not sending this kind of ICMP
replies.
7. HIP Packets 5.3 HIP Packets
There are nine basic HIP packets. Four are for the HIP base There are eight basic HIP packets. Four are for the HIP base
exchange, one is for updating, one is for sending certificates, one exchange, one is for updating, one is for sending notifications, and
for sending notifications, and two for closing a HIP association. two for closing a HIP association.
Packets consist of the fixed header as described in Section 6.1, Packets consist of the fixed header as described in Section 5.1,
followed by the parameters. The parameter part, in turn, consists of followed by the parameters. The parameter part, in turn, consists of
zero or more TLV coded parameters. zero or more TLV coded parameters.
In addition to the base packets, other packets types will be defined In addition to the base packets, other packets types will be defined
later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility
and multi-homing is not included in this specification. and multi-homing is not included in this specification.
Packet representation uses the following operations: Packet representation uses the following operations:
() parameter () parameter
skipping to change at page 53, line 26 skipping to change at page 50, line 4
later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility
and multi-homing is not included in this specification. and multi-homing is not included in this specification.
Packet representation uses the following operations: Packet representation uses the following operations:
() parameter () parameter
x{y} operation x on content y x{y} operation x on content y
<x>i x exists i times <x>i x exists i times
[] optional parameter [] optional parameter
x | y x or y x | y x or y
In the future, an OPTIONAL upper layer payload MAY follow the HIP In the future, an OPTIONAL upper layer payload MAY follow the HIP
header. The payload proto field in the header indicates if there is header. The Next Header field in the header indicates if there is
additional data following the HIP header. The HIP packet, however, additional data following the HIP header. The HIP packet, however,
MUST NOT be fragmented. This limits the size of the possible MUST NOT be fragmented. This limits the size of the possible
additional data in the packet. additional data in the packet.
7.1 I1 - the HIP initiator packet 5.3.1 I1 - the HIP Initiator Packet
The HIP header values for the I1 packet: The HIP header values for the I1 packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 1 Packet Type = 1
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT, or NULL DST HIT = Responder's HIT, or NULL
IP ( HIP () ) IP ( HIP () )
The I1 packet contains only the fixed HIP header. The I1 packet contains only the fixed HIP header.
Valid control bits: none Valid control bits: none
The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT either from a DNS lookup of The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT either from a DNS lookup of
the Responder's FQDN, from some other repository, or from a local the Responder's FQDN, from some other repository, or from a local
table. If the Initiator does not know the Responder's HIT, it may table. If the Initiator does not know the Responder's HIT, it may
attempt opportunistic mode by using NULL (all zeros) as the attempt opportunistic mode by using NULL (all zeros) as the
Responder's HIT. If the Initiator send a NULL as the Responder's Responder's HIT. If the Initiator sends a NULL as the Responder's
HIT, it MUST be able to handle all MUST and SHOULD algorithms from HIT, it MUST be able to handle all MUST and SHOULD algorithms from
Section 3, which are currently RSA and DSA. Section 3, which are currently RSA and DSA.
Since this packet is so easy to spoof even if it were signed, no Since this packet is so easy to spoof even if it were signed, no
attempt is made to add to its generation or processing cost. attempt is made to add to its generation or processing cost.
Implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1 packets, Implementations MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1
discarding those with common content that arrive within a small time packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a
delta. small time delta.
7.2 R1 - the HIP responder packet 5.3.2 R1 - the HIP Responder Packet
The HIP header values for the R1 packet: The HIP header values for the R1 packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 2 Packet Type = 2
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [ R1_COUNTER, ] IP ( HIP ( [ R1_COUNTER, ]
PUZZLE, PUZZLE,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN, DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_TRANSFORM, HIP_TRANSFORM,
HOST_ID, HOST_ID,
[ ECHO_REQUEST, ] [ ECHO_REQUEST, ]
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 ) HIP_SIGNATURE_2 )
[, ECHO_REQUEST ]) [, ECHO_REQUEST ])
Valid control bits: C, A Valid control bits: C, A
The R1 packet may be followed by one or more CER packets. In this If the Responder HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
case, the C-bit in the control field MUST be set.
If the responder HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
The initiator HIT MUST match the one received in I1. If the The Initiator HIT MUST match the one received in I1. If the
Responder has multiple HIs, the responder HIT used MUST match Responder has multiple HIs, the Responder HIT used MUST match
Initiator's request. If the Initiator used opportunistic mode, the Initiator's request. If the Initiator used opportunistic mode, the
Responder may select freely among its HIs. Responder may select freely among its HIs.
The R1 generation counter is used to determine the currently valid The R1 generation counter is used to determine the currently valid
generation of puzzles. The value is increased periodically, and it generation of puzzles. The value is increased periodically, and it
is RECOMMENDED that it is increased at least as often as solutions to is RECOMMENDED that it is increased at least as often as solutions to
old puzzles are not accepted any longer. old puzzles are no longer accepted.
The Puzzle contains a random #I and the difficulty K. The difficulty The Puzzle contains a random #I and the difficulty K. The difficulty
K is the number of bits that the Initiator must get zero in the K is the number of bits that the Initiator must get zero in the
puzzle. The random #I is not covered by the signature and must be puzzle. The random #I is not covered by the signature and must be
zeroed during the signature calculation, allowing the sender to zeroed during the signature calculation, allowing the sender to
select and set the #I into a pre-computed R1 just prior sending it to select and set the #I into a pre-computed R1 just prior sending it to
the peer. the peer.
The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral, but can be reused over a The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral, but can be reused over a
number of connections. In fact, as a defense against I1 storms, an number of connections. In fact, as a defense against I1 storms, an
implementation MAY use the same Diffie-Hellman value for a period of implementation MAY use the same Diffie-Hellman value for a period of
time, for example, 15 minutes. By using a small number of different time, for example, 15 minutes. By using a small number of different
Cookies for a given Diffie-Hellman value, the R1 packets can be Cookies for a given Diffie-Hellman value, the R1 packets can be pre-
pre-computed and delivered as quickly as I1 packets arrive. A computed and delivered as quickly as I1 packets arrive. A scavenger
scavenger process should clean up unused DHs and Cookies. process should clean up unused DHs and Cookies.
The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the encryption and integrity algorithms The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the encryption and integrity algorithms
supported by the Responder to protect the HI exchange, in the order supported by the Responder to protect the HI exchange, in the order
of preference. All implementations MUST support the AES [10] with of preference. All implementations MUST support the AES [19] with
HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6]. HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6].
The ECHO_REQUEST contains data that the sender wants to receive The ECHO_REQUEST contains data that the sender wants to receive
unmodified in the corresponding response packet in the ECHO_RESPONSE unmodified in the corresponding response packet in the ECHO_RESPONSE
parameter. The ECHO_REQUEST can be either covered by the signature, parameter. The ECHO_REQUEST can be either covered by the signature,
or it can be left out from it. In the first case, the ECHO_REQUEST or it can be left out from it. In the first case, the ECHO_REQUEST
gets Type number 1022 and in the latter case 65281. gets Type number 897 and in the latter case 63661.
The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, after The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, after
setting the initiator HIT, header checksum as well as the Opaque setting the Initiator HIT, header checksum as well as the Opaque
field and the Random #I in the PUZZLE parameter temporarily to zero, field and the Random #I in the PUZZLE parameter temporarily to zero,
and excluding any TLVs that follow the signature, as described in and excluding any TLVs that follow the signature, as described in
Section 6.2.13. This allows the Responder to use precomputed R1s. Section 5.2.12. This allows the Responder to use precomputed R1s.
The Initiator SHOULD validate this signature. It SHOULD check that The Initiator SHOULD validate this signature. It SHOULD check that
the responder HI received matches with the one expected, if any. the Responder HI received matches with the one expected, if any.
7.3 I2 - the second HIP initiator packet 5.3.3 I2 - the Second HIP Initiator Packet
The HIP header values for the I2 packet: The HIP header values for the I2 packet:
Header: Header:
Type = 3 Type = 3
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT DST HIT = Responder's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [R1_COUNTER,] IP ( HIP ( [R1_COUNTER,]
SOLUTION, SOLUTION,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN, DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_TRANSFORM, HIP_TRANSFORM,
ENCRYPTED { HOST_ID }, ENCRYPTED { HOST_ID } or HOST_ID,
[ ECHO_RESPONSE ,] [ ECHO_RESPONSE ,]
HMAC, HMAC,
HIP_SIGNATURE HIP_SIGNATURE
[, ECHO_RESPONSE] ) ) [, ECHO_RESPONSE] ) )
Valid control bits: C, A Valid control bits: C, A
The HITs used MUST match the ones used previously. The HITs used MUST match the ones used previously.
If the initiator HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set. If the Initiator HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
The Initiator MAY include an unmodified copy of the R1_COUNTER The Initiator MAY include an unmodified copy of the R1_COUNTER
parameter received in the corresponding R1 packet into the I2 packet. parameter received in the corresponding R1 packet into the I2 packet.
The Solution contains the random # I from R1 and the computed # J. The Solution contains the random # I from R1 and the computed # J.
The low order K bits of the SHA-1(I | ... | J) MUST be zero. The low order K bits of the SHA-1(I | ... | J) MUST be zero.
The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral. If precomputed, a scavenger The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral. If precomputed, a scavenger
process should clean up unused DHs. process should clean up unused DHs.
The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the encryption and integrity used to The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the single encryption and integrity
protect the HI exchange selected by the Initiator. All transform selected by the Initiator, that will be used to protect the
implementations MUST support the AES transform [10]. HI exchange. The chosen transform MUST correspond to one offered by
the Responder in the R1. All implementations MUST support the AES
transform [19].
The Initiator's HI is encrypted using the HIP_TRANSFORM encryption The Initiator's HI MAY be encrypted using the HIP_TRANSFORM
algorithm. The keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman encryption algorithm. The keying material is derived from the
exchanged as defined in Section 9. Diffie-Hellman exchanged as defined in Section 6.4.
The ECHO_RESPONSE contains the the unmodified Opaque data copied from The ECHO_RESPONSE contains the the unmodified Opaque data copied from
the corresponding ECHO_REQUEST TLV. The ECHO_RESPONSE can be either the corresponding ECHO_REQUEST TLV. The ECHO_RESPONSE can be either
covered by the signature, or it can be left out from it. In the covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE or not covered. In the former
first case, the ECHO_RESPONSE gets Type number 1024 and in the latter case, the ECHO_RESPONSE gets Type number 961, in the latter it is
case 65283. 63425.
The HMAC is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any TLVs The HMAC is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any TLVs
after the HMAC, as described in Section 8.3.1. The Responder MUST after the HMAC, as described in Section 6.3.1. The Responder MUST
validate the HMAC. validate the HMAC.
The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any
TLVs after the HIP_SIGNATURE, as described in Section 6.2.12. The TLVs after the HIP_SIGNATURE, as described in Section 5.2.11. The
Responder MUST validate this signature. It MAY use either the HI in Responder MUST validate this signature. It MAY use either the HI in
the packet or the HI acquired by some other means. the packet or the HI acquired by some other means.
7.4 R2 - the second HIP responder packet 5.3.4 R2 - the Second HIP Responder Packet
The HIP header values for the R2 packet: The HIP header values for the R2 packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 4 Packet Type = 4
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( HMAC_2, HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) IP ( HIP ( HMAC_2, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none Valid control bits: none
The HMAC_2 is calculated over whole HIP envelope, with Responder's The HMAC_2 is calculated over whole HIP envelope, with Responder's
HOST_ID TLV concatenated with the HIP envelope. The HOST_ID TLV is HOST_ID TLV concatenated with the HIP envelope. The HOST_ID TLV is
removed after the HMAC calculation. The procedure is described in removed after the HMAC calculation. The procedure is described in
8.3.1. 8.3.1.
The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope. The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope.
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The HMAC_2 is calculated over whole HIP envelope, with Responder's The HMAC_2 is calculated over whole HIP envelope, with Responder's
HOST_ID TLV concatenated with the HIP envelope. The HOST_ID TLV is HOST_ID TLV concatenated with the HIP envelope. The HOST_ID TLV is
removed after the HMAC calculation. The procedure is described in removed after the HMAC calculation. The procedure is described in
8.3.1. 8.3.1.
The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope. The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope.
The Initiator MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature. The Initiator MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature.
7.5 CER - the HIP Certificate Packet 5.3.5 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet
The CER packet is OPTIONAL.
The Optional CER packets over the Announcer's HI by a higher level
authority known to the Recipient is an alternative method for the
Recipient to trust the Announcer's HI (over DNSSEC or PKI).
The HIP header values for CER packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 5
SRC HIT = Announcer's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( <CERT>i , HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) or
IP ( HIP ( ENCRYPTED { <CERT>i }, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: None
Certificates in the CER packet MAY be encrypted. The encryption
algorithm is provided in the HIP transform of the previous (R1 or I2)
packet.
7.6 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet
Support for the UPDATE packet is MANDATORY. Support for the UPDATE packet is MANDATORY.
The HIP header values for the UPDATE packet: The HIP header values for the UPDATE packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 6 Packet Type = 6
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
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processing of the UPDATE. A host MAY choose to hold the UPDATE processing of the UPDATE. A host MAY choose to hold the UPDATE
carrying ACK for a short period of time to allow for the possibility carrying ACK for a short period of time to allow for the possibility
of piggybacking the ACK parameter, in a manner similar to TCP delayed of piggybacking the ACK parameter, in a manner similar to TCP delayed
acknowledgments. acknowledgments.
A sender MAY choose to forego reliable transmission of a particular A sender MAY choose to forego reliable transmission of a particular
UPDATE (e.g., it becomes overcome by events). The semantics are such UPDATE (e.g., it becomes overcome by events). The semantics are such
that the receiver MUST acknowledge the UPDATE but the sender MAY that the receiver MUST acknowledge the UPDATE but the sender MAY
choose to not care about receiving the ACK. choose to not care about receiving the ACK.
UPDATEs MAY be retransmitting without incrementing SEQ. If the same UPDATEs MAY be retransmitted without incrementing SEQ. If the same
subset of parameters is included in multiple UPDATEs with different subset of parameters is included in multiple UPDATEs with different
SEQs, the host MUST ensure that receiver processing of the parameters SEQs, the host MUST ensure that receiver processing of the parameters
multiple times will not result in a protocol error. multiple times will not result in a protocol error.
7.7 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet 5.3.6 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet
The NOTIFY packet is OPTIONAL. The NOTIFY packet MAY be used to The NOTIFY packet is OPTIONAL. The NOTIFY packet MAY be used to
provide information to a peer. Typically, NOTIFY is used to indicate provide information to a peer. Typically, NOTIFY is used to indicate
some type of protocol error or negotiation failure. some type of protocol error or negotiation failure.
The HIP header values for the NOTIFY packet: The HIP header values for the NOTIFY packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 7 Packet Type = 7
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT, or zero if unknown DST HIT = Recipient's HIT, or zero if unknown
IP ( HIP (<NOTIFY>i, [HOST_ID, ] HIP_SIGNATURE) ) IP ( HIP (<NOTIFY>i, [HOST_ID, ] HIP_SIGNATURE) )
Valid control bits: None Valid control bits: None
The NOTIFY packet is used to carry one or more NOTIFY parameters. The NOTIFY packet is used to carry one or more NOTIFY parameters.
7.8 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet 5.3.7 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE packet: The HIP header values for the CLOSE packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 8 Packet Type = 8
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REQUEST, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REQUEST, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none Valid control bits: none
The sender MUST include an ECHO_REQUEST used to validate CLOSE_ACK The sender MUST include an ECHO_REQUEST used to validate CLOSE_ACK
received in response, and both an HMAC and a signature (calculated received in response, and both an HMAC and a signature (calculated
over the whole HIP envelope). over the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature if it The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature if it
has a HIP association state, and MUST reply with a CLOSE_ACK has a HIP association state, and MUST reply with a CLOSE_ACK
containing an ECHO_REPLY corresponding to the received ECHO_REQUEST. containing an ECHO_REPLY corresponding to the received ECHO_REQUEST.
7.9 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP closing acknowledgment packet 5.3.8 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP Closing Acknowledgment Packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet: The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 9 Packet Type = 9
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REPLY, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REPLY, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
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The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet: The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet:
Header: Header:
Packet Type = 9 Packet Type = 9
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REPLY, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REPLY, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none Valid control bits: none
The sender MUST include both an HMAC and signature (calculated over The sender MUST include both an HMAC and signature (calculated over
the whole HIP envelope). the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature. The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature.
8. Packet processing 5.4 ICMP Messages
When a HIP implementation detects a problem with an incoming packet,
and it either cannot determine the identity of the sender of the
packet or does not have any existing HIP association with the sender
of the packet, it MAY respond with an ICMP packet. Any such replies
MUST be rate limited as described in [4]. In most cases, the ICMP
packet will have the Parameter Problem type (12 for ICMPv4, 4 for
ICMPv6), with the Pointer field pointing to the field that caused the
ICMP message to be generated.
5.4.1 Invalid Version
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has an
unrecognized HIP version number, it SHOULD respond, rate limited,
with an ICMP packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing
to the VER./RES. byte in the HIP header.
5.4.2 Other Problems with the HIP Header and Packet Structure
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has other
unrecoverable problems in the header or packet format, it MAY
respond, rate limited, with an ICMP packet with type Parameter
Problem, the Pointer pointing to the field that failed to pass the
format checks. However, an implementation MUST NOT send an ICMP
message if the Checksum fails; instead, it MUST silently drop the
packet.
5.4.3 Invalid Cookie Solution
If a HIP implementation receives an I2 packet that has an invalid
cookie solution, the behavior depends on the underlying version of
IP. If IPv6 is used, the implementation SHOULD respond with an ICMP
packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing to the
beginning of the Puzzle solution #J field in the SOLUTION payload in
the HIP message.
If IPv4 is used, the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP packet
with the type Parameter Problem, copying enough of bytes from the I2
message so that the SOLUTION parameter fits into the ICMP message,
the Pointer pointing to the beginning of the Puzzle solution #J
field, as in the IPv6 case. Note, however, that the resulting ICMPv4
message exceeds the typical ICMPv4 message size as defined in [2].
5.4.4 Non-existing HIP Association
If a HIP implementation receives a CLOSE, or UPDATE packet, or any
other packet whose handling requires an existing association, that
has either a Receiver or Sender HIT that does not match with any
existing HIP association, the implementation MAY respond, rate
limited, with an ICMP packet with the type Parameter Problem, the
Pointer pointing to the the beginning of the first HIT that does not
match.
A host MUST NOT reply with such an ICMP if it receives any of the
following messages: I1, R2, I2, R2, and NOTIFY. When introducing new
packet types, a specification SHOULD define the appropriate rules for
sending or not sending this kind of ICMP replies.
6. Packet Processing
Each host is assumed to have a single HIP protocol implementation Each host is assumed to have a single HIP protocol implementation
that manages the host's HIP associations and handles requests for new that manages the host's HIP associations and handles requests for new
ones. Each HIP association is governed by a conceptual state ones. Each HIP association is governed by a conceptual state
machine, with states defined above in Section 5.4. The HIP machine, with states defined above in Section 4.4. The HIP
implementation can simultaneously maintain HIP associations with more implementation can simultaneously maintain HIP associations with more
than one host. Furthermore, the HIP implementation may have more than one host. Furthermore, the HIP implementation may have more
than one active HIP association with another host; in this case, HIP than one active HIP association with another host; in this case, HIP
associations are distinguished by their respective HITs. It is not associations are distinguished by their respective HITs. It is not
possible to have more than one HIP associations between any given possible to have more than one HIP association between any given pair
pair of HITs. Consequently, the only way for two hosts to have more of HITs. Consequently, the only way for two hosts to have more than
than one parallel association is to use different HITs, at least at one parallel association is to use different HITs, at least at one
one end. end.
The processing of packets depends on the state of the HIP The processing of packets depends on the state of the HIP
association(s) with respect to the authenticated or apparent association(s) with respect to the authenticated or apparent
originator of the packet. A HIP implementation determines whether it originator of the packet. A HIP implementation determines whether it
has an active association with the originator of the packet based on has an active association with the originator of the packet based on
the HITs. In the case of user data carried in a specific transport the HITs. In the case of user data carried in a specific transport
format, the transport format document specifies how the incoming format, the transport format document specifies how the incoming
packets are matched with the active associations. packets are matched with the active associations.
8.1 Processing outgoing application data 6.1 Processing Outgoing Application Data
In a HIP host, an application can send application level data using In a HIP host, an application can send application level data using
HITs or LSIs as source and destination identifiers. The HITs and HITs or local scope identifiers (LSIs) as source and destination
LSIs may be specified via a backwards compatible API (see [29]) or a identifiers. The HITs and LSIs may be specified via a backwards
completely new API. The exact format and method for transferring the compatible API (see [32]) or a completely new API. The exact format
data from the source HIP host to the destination HIP host is defined and method for transferring the data from the source HIP host to the
in the corresponding transport format document. The actual data is destination HIP host is defined in the corresponding transport format
transmitted in the network using the appropriate source and document. The actual data is transmitted in the network using the
destination IP addresses. Here, we specify the processing rules only appropriate source and destination IP addresses. Here, we specify
for the base case where both hosts have only single usable IP the processing rules only for the base case where both hosts have
addresses; the multi-address multi-homing case will be specified only single usable IP addresses; the multi-address multi-homing case
separately. will be specified separately.
If the IPv4 or IPv6 backward compatible APIs and therefore LSIs are If the IPv4 or IPv6 backward compatible APIs and therefore LSIs are
supported, it is assumed that the LSIs will be converted into proper supported, it is assumed that the LSIs will be converted into proper
HITs somewhere in the stack. The exact location of the conversion is HITs somewhere in the stack. The exact location of the conversion is
an implementation specific issue and not discussed here. The an implementation specific issue and not discussed here. The
following conceptual algorithm discusses only HITs, with the following conceptual algorithm discusses only HITs, with the
assumption that the LSI-to-HIT conversion takes place somewhere. assumption that the LSI-to-HIT conversion takes place somewhere.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT. outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT.
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If the IPv4 or IPv6 backward compatible APIs and therefore LSIs are If the IPv4 or IPv6 backward compatible APIs and therefore LSIs are
supported, it is assumed that the LSIs will be converted into proper supported, it is assumed that the LSIs will be converted into proper
HITs somewhere in the stack. The exact location of the conversion is HITs somewhere in the stack. The exact location of the conversion is
an implementation specific issue and not discussed here. The an implementation specific issue and not discussed here. The
following conceptual algorithm discusses only HITs, with the following conceptual algorithm discusses only HITs, with the
assumption that the LSI-to-HIT conversion takes place somewhere. assumption that the LSI-to-HIT conversion takes place somewhere.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT. outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT.
1. If the datagram has a specified source address, it MUST be a HIT. 1. If the datagram has a specified source address, it MUST be a HIT.
If it is not, the implementation MAY replace the source address If it is not, the implementation MAY replace the source address
with a HIT. Otherwise it MUST drop the packet. with a HIT. Otherwise it MUST drop the packet.
2. If the datagram has an unspecified source address, the 2. If the datagram has an unspecified source address, the
implementation must choose a suitable source HIT for the implementation must choose a suitable source HIT for the
datagram. In selecting a proper local HIT, the implementation datagram.
SHOULD consult the table of currently active HIP sessions, and
preferably select a HIT that already has an active session with
the target HIT.
3. If there is no active HIP session with the given < source, 3. If there is no active HIP session with the given < source,
destination > HIT pair, one must be created by running the base destination > HIT pair, one must be created by running the base
exchange. The implementation SHOULD queue at least one packet exchange. While waiting for the base exchange to complete, the
per HIP session to be formed, and it MAY queue more than one. implementation SHOULD queue at least one packet per HIP session
to be formed, and it MAY queue more than one.
4. Once there is an active HIP session for the given < source, 4. Once there is an active HIP session for the given < source,
destination > HIT pair, the outgoing datagram is passed to destination > HIT pair, the outgoing datagram is passed to
transport handling. The possible transport formats are defined transport handling. The possible transport formats are defined
in separate documents, of which the ESP transport format for HIP in separate documents, of which the ESP transport format for HIP
is mandatory for all HIP implementations. is mandatory for all HIP implementations.
5. The HITs in the datagram are replaced with suitable IP addresses.
For IPv6, the rules defined in [16] SHOULD be followed. Note
that this HIT-to-IP-address conversion step MAY also be performed
at some other point in the stack, e.g., before wrapping the
packet into the output format.
8.2 Processing incoming application data 5. Before sending the packet, the HITs in the datagram are replaced
with suitable IP addresses. For IPv6, the rules defined in [16]
SHOULD be followed. Note that this HIT-to-IP-address conversion
step MAY also be performed at some other point in the stack,
e.g., before wrapping the packet into the output format.
6.2 Processing Incoming Application Data
The transport format and method (defined in separate specifications) The transport format and method (defined in separate specifications)
determines the format in which incoming HIP packets arrive to the determines the format in which incoming HIP packets arrive to the
host. The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for host. The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
incoming datagrams. The specific transport format and method incoming datagrams. The specific transport format and method
specifications define in more detail the packet processing, related specifications define in more detail the packet processing, related
to the method. to the method.
1. The incoming datagram is mapped to an existing HIP association, 1. The incoming datagram is mapped to an existing HIP association,
typically using some information from the packet. For example, typically using some information from the packet. For example,
such mapping may be based on IPsec Security Parameter Index (SPI) such mapping may be based on ESP Security Parameter Index (SPI).
or a protocol port number.
2. The specific transport format is unwrapped, in a way depending on 2. The specific transport format is unwrapped, in a way depending on
the transport format, yielding a packet that looks like a the transport format, yielding a packet that looks like a
standard (unencrypted) IP packet. If possible, this step SHOULD standard (unencrypted) IP packet. If possible, this step SHOULD
also verify that the packet was indeed (once) sent by the remote also verify that the packet was indeed (once) sent by the remote
HIP host, as identified by the HIP association. HIP host, as identified by the HIP association.
3. The IP addresses in the datagram are replaced with the HITs 3. The IP addresses in the datagram are replaced with the HITs
associated with the HIP association. Note that this associated with the HIP association. Note that this IP-address-
IP-address-to-HIT conversion step MAY also be performed at some to-HIT conversion step MAY also be performed at some other point
other point in the stack. in the stack.
4. The datagram is delivered to the upper layer. Demultiplexing the 4. The datagram is delivered to the upper layer. Demultiplexing the
datagram the right upper layer socket is based on the HITs (or datagram the right upper layer socket is based on the HITs (or
LSIs). LSIs).
8.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE calculation and verification 6.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification
The following subsections define the actions for processing HMAC, The following subsections define the actions for processing HMAC,
HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs. HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs.
8.3.1 HMAC calculation 6.3.1 HMAC Calculation
The following process applies both to the HMAC and HMAC_2 TLVs. When The following process applies both to the HMAC and HMAC_2 TLVs. When
processing HMAC_2, the difference is that the HMAC calculation processing HMAC_2, the difference is that the HMAC calculation
includes pseudo HOST_ID field containing the Responder's information includes a pseudo HOST_ID field containing the Responder's
as sent in the R1 packet earlier. information as sent in the R1 packet earlier.
The HMAC TLV is defined in Section 6.2.10 and HMAC_2 TLV in Both the Initiator and the Responder should take some care when
Section 6.2.11. HMAC calculation and verification process: verifying or calculating the HMAC_2. Specifically, the Responder
should preserve other parameters than the HOST_ID when sending the
R2. Also, the Initiator has to preserve the HOST_ID exactly as it
was received in the R1 packet.
The HMAC TLV is defined in Section 5.2.9 and HMAC_2 TLV in
Section 5.2.10. HMAC calculation and verification process:
Packet sender: Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet, without the HMAC or any possible 1. Create the HIP packet, without the HMAC or any possible
HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs. HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs.
2. In case of HMAC_2 calculation, add a HOST_ID (Responder) TLV to 2. In case of HMAC_2 calculation, add a HOST_ID (Responder) TLV to
the packet. the packet.
3. Calculate the Length field in the HIP header. 3. Calculate the Length field in the HIP header.
4. Compute the HMAC. 4. Compute the HMAC.
5. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet. 5. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet.
6. Add the HMAC TLV to the packet and any HIP_SIGNATURE or 6. Add the HMAC TLV to the packet and any HIP_SIGNATURE or
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs that may follow. HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs that may follow.
7. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header. 7. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header.
Packet receiver: Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field. 1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Remove the HMAC or HMAC_2 TLV, and if the packet contains any 2. Remove the HMAC or HMAC_2 TLV, and if the packet contains any
HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 fields, remove them too, saving HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 fields, remove them too, saving
the contents if they will be needed later. the contents if they will be needed later.
3. In case of HMAC_2, build and add a HOST_ID TLV (with Responder 3. In case of HMAC_2, build and add a HOST_ID TLV (with Responder
information) to the packet. information) to the packet. The HOST_ID TLV should be identical
to the one previously received from the Responder.
4. Recalculate the HIP packet length in the HIP header and clear the 4. Recalculate the HIP packet length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros). Checksum field (set it to all zeros).
5. Compute the HMAC and verify it against the received HMAC. 5. Compute the HMAC and verify it against the received HMAC.
6. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet before 6. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet before
further processing. further processing.
8.3.2 Signature calculation 6.3.2 Signature Calculation
The following process applies both to the HIP_SIGNATURE and The following process applies both to the HIP_SIGNATURE and
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs. When processing HIP_SIGNATURE_2, the only HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs. When processing HIP_SIGNATURE_2, the only
difference is that instead of HIP_SIGNATURE TLV, the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 difference is that instead of HIP_SIGNATURE TLV, the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
TLV is used, and the Initiator's HIT and PUZZLE Opaque and Random #I TLV is used, and the Initiator's HIT and PUZZLE Opaque and Random #I
fields are cleared (set to all zeros) before computing the signature. fields are cleared (set to all zeros) before computing the signature.
The HIP_SIGNATURE TLV is defined in Section 6.2.12 and the The HIP_SIGNATURE TLV is defined in Section 5.2.11 and the
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV in Section 6.2.13. HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV in Section 5.2.12.
Signature calculation and verification process: Signature calculation and verification process:
Packet sender: Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet without the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV or any TLVs 1. Create the HIP packet without the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV or any TLVs
that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV. that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV.
2. Calculate the Length field in the HIP header.
2. Calculate the Length field and zero the Checksum field in the HIP
header.
3. Compute the signature. 3. Compute the signature.
4. Add the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV to the packet. 4. Add the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV to the packet.
5. Add any TLVs that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV. 5. Add any TLVs that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV.
6. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header.
6. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header, and calculate the
Checksum field.
Packet receiver: Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field. 1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Save the contents of the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and any TLVs following 2. Save the contents of the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and any TLVs following
the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and remove them from the packet. the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and remove them from the packet.
3. Recalculate the HIP packet Length in the HIP header and clear the 3. Recalculate the HIP packet Length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros). Checksum field (set it to all zeros).
4. Compute the signature and verify it against the received 4. Compute the signature and verify it against the received
signature. signature.
The verification can use either the HI received from a HIP packet, The verification can use either the HI received from a HIP packet,
the HI from a DNS query, if the FQDN has been received either in the the HI from a DNS query, if the FQDN has been received in the HOST_ID
HOST_ID or in the CER packet, or one received by some other means. packet, or one received by some other means.
8.4 Initiation of a HIP exchange 6.4 HIP KEYMAT Generation
HIP keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman Kij produced
during the HIP base exchange. The Initiator has Kij during the
creation of the I2 packet, and the Responder has Kij once it receives
the I2 packet. This is why I2 can already contain encrypted
information.
The KEYMAT is derived by feeding Kij and the HITs into the following
operation; the | operation denotes concatenation.
KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
where
K1 = SHA-1( Kij | sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) | I | J | 0x01 )
K2 = SHA-1( Kij | K1 | 0x02 )
K3 = SHA-1( Kij | K2 | 0x03 )
...
K255 = SHA-1( Kij | K254 | 0xff )
K256 = SHA-1( Kij | K255 | 0x00 )
etc.
Sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) is defined as the network byte order
concatenation of the two HITs, with the smaller HIT preceding the
larger HIT, resulting from the numeric comparison of the two HITs
interpreted as positive (unsigned) 128-bit integers in network byte
order.
I and J values are from the puzzle and its solution that were
exchanged in R1 and I2 messages when this HIP association was set up.
Both hosts have to store I and J values for the HIP association for
future use.
The initial keys are drawn sequentially in the order that is
determined by the numeric comparison of the two HITs, with comparison
method described in the previous paragraph. HOST_g denotes the host
with the greater HIT value, and HOST_l the host with the lower HIT
value.
The drawing order for initial keys:
HIP-gl encryption key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-gl integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-lg encryption key (currently unused) for HOST_l's outgoing HIP
packets
HIP-lg integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_l's outgoing HIP packets
The number of bits drawn for a given algorithm is the "natural" size
of the keys. For the mandatory algorithms, the following sizes
apply:
AES 128 bits
SHA-1 160 bits
NULL 0 bits
6.5 Initiation of a HIP Exchange
An implementation may originate a HIP exchange to another host based An implementation may originate a HIP exchange to another host based
on a local policy decision, usually triggered by an application on a local policy decision, usually triggered by an application
datagram, in much the same way that an IPsec IKE key exchange can datagram, in much the same way that an IPsec IKE key exchange can
dynamically create a Security Association. Alternatively, a system dynamically create a Security Association. Alternatively, a system
may initiate a HIP exchange if it has rebooted or timed out, or may initiate a HIP exchange if it has rebooted or timed out, or
otherwise lost its HIP state, as described in Section 5.3. otherwise lost its HIP state, as described in Section 4.5.4.
The implementation prepares an I1 packet and sends it to the IP The implementation prepares an I1 packet and sends it to the IP
address that corresponds to the peer host. The IP address of the address that corresponds to the peer host. The IP address of the
peer host may be obtained via conventional mechanisms, such as DNS peer host may be obtained via conventional mechanisms, such as DNS
lookup. The I1 contents are specified in Section 7.1. The selection lookup. The I1 contents are specified in Section 5.3.1. The
of which host identity to use, if a host has more than one to choose selection of which host identity to use, if a host has more than one
from, is typically a policy decision. to choose from, is typically a policy decision.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
initiating a HIP exchange: initiating a HIP exchange:
1. The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT and one or more addresses 1. The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT and one or more addresses
either from a DNS lookup of the responder's FQDN, from some other either from a DNS lookup of the Responder's FQDN, from some other
repository, or from a local table. If the initiator does not repository, or from a local table. If the Initiator does not
know the responder's HIT, it may attempt opportunistic mode by know the Responder's HIT, it may attempt opportunistic mode by
using NULL (all zeros) as the responder's HIT. using NULL (all zeros) as the Responder's HIT.
2. The Initiator sends an I1 to one of the Responder's addresses. 2. The Initiator sends an I1 to one of the Responder's addresses.
The selection of which address to use is a local policy decision. The selection of which address to use is a local policy decision.
3. Upon sending an I1, the sender shall transition to state I1-SENT, 3. Upon sending an I1, the sender shall transition to state I1-SENT,
start a timer whose timeout value should be larger than the start a timer whose timeout value should be larger than the
worst-case anticipated RTT, and shall increment a timeout counter worst-case anticipated RTT, and shall increment a timeout counter
associated with the I1. associated with the I1.
4. Upon timeout, the sender SHOULD retransmit the I1 and restart the 4. Upon timeout, the sender SHOULD retransmit the I1 and restart the
timer, up to a maximum of I1_RETRIES_MAX tries. timer, up to a maximum of I1_RETRIES_MAX tries.
8.4.1 Sending multiple I1s in parallel 6.5.1 Sending Multiple I1s in Parallel
For the sake of minimizing the session establishment latency, an For the sake of minimizing the session establishment latency, an
implementation MAY send the same I1 to more than one of the implementation MAY send the same I1 to more than one of the
Responder's addresses. However, it MUST NOT send to more than three Responder's addresses. However, it MUST NOT send to more than three
(3) addresses in parallel. Furthermore, upon timeout, the (3) addresses in parallel. Furthermore, upon timeout, the
implementation MUST refrain from sending the same I1 packet to implementation MUST refrain from sending the same I1 packet to
multiple addresses. These limitations are placed order to avoid multiple addresses. These limitations are placed order to avoid
congestion of the network, and potential DoS attacks that might congestion of the network, and potential DoS attacks that might
happen, e.g., because someone claims to have hundreds or thousands of happen, e.g., because someone claims to have hundreds or thousands of
addresses. addresses.
As the Responder is not guaranteed to distinguish the duplicate I1's As the Responder is not guaranteed to distinguish the duplicate I1's
it receives at several of its addresses (because it avoids to store it receives at several of its addresses (because it avoids to store
states when it answers back an R1), the Initiator may receive several states when it answers back an R1), the Initiator may receive several
duplicate R1's. duplicate R1's.
The Initiator SHOULD then select the initial preferred destination The Initiator SHOULD then select the initial preferred destination
address using the source address of the selected received R1, and use address using the source address of the selected received R1, and use
the preferred address as a source address for the I2. Processing the preferred address as a source address for the I2. Processing
rules for received R1s are discussed in Section 8.6. rules for received R1s are discussed in Section 6.7.
8.4.2 Processing incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable messages 6.5.2 Processing Incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable Messages
A host may receive an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable message A host may receive an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable message
as a response to sending an HIP I1 packet. Such a packet may be an as a response to sending an HIP I1 packet. Such a packet may be an
indication that the peer does not support HIP, or it may be an indication that the peer does not support HIP, or it may be an
attempt to launch an attack by making the Initiator believe that the attempt to launch an attack by making the Initiator believe that the
Responder does not support HIP. Responder does not support HIP.
When a system receives an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable When a system receives an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable
message while it is waiting for an R1, it MUST NOT terminate the message while it is waiting for an R1, it MUST NOT terminate the
wait. It MAY continue as if it had not received the ICMP message, wait. It MAY continue as if it had not received the ICMP message,
and send a few more I1s. Alternatively, it MAY take the ICMP message and send a few more I1s. Alternatively, it MAY take the ICMP message
as a hint that the peer most probably does not support HIP, and as a hint that the peer most probably does not support HIP, and
return to state UNASSOCIATED earlier than otherwise. However, at return to state UNASSOCIATED earlier than otherwise. However, at
minimum, it MUST continue waiting for an R1 for a reasonable time minimum, it MUST continue waiting for an R1 for a reasonable time
before returning to UNASSOCIATED. before returning to UNASSOCIATED.
8.5 Processing incoming I1 packets 6.6 Processing Incoming I1 Packets
An implementation SHOULD reply to an I1 with an R1 packet, unless the An implementation SHOULD reply to an I1 with an R1 packet, unless the
implementation is unable or unwilling to setup a HIP association. If implementation is unable or unwilling to setup a HIP association. If
the implementation is unable to setup a HIP association, the host the implementation is unable to setup a HIP association, the host
SHOULD send an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable, SHOULD send an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited, message to the I1 source address. If Administratively Prohibited, message to the I1 source address. If
the implementation is unwilling to setup a HIP association, the host the implementation is unwilling to setup a HIP association, the host
MAY ignore the I1. This latter case may occur during a DoS attack MAY ignore the I1. This latter case may occur during a DoS attack
such as an I1 flood. such as an I1 flood.
The implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1 The implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1
packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a
small time delta. small time delta.
A spoofed I1 can result in an R1 attack on a system. An R1 sender A spoofed I1 can result in an R1 attack on a system. An R1 sender
MUST have a mechanism to rate limit R1s to an address. MUST have a mechanism to rate limit R1s to an address.
Under no circumstances does the HIP state machine transition upon It is RECOMMENDED that the HIP state machine does not transition upon
sending an R1. sending an R1.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I1 packet: responding to an I1 packet:
1. The responder MUST check that the responder HIT in the received
1. The Responder MUST check that the Responder HIT in the received
I1 is either one of its own HITs, or NULL. I1 is either one of its own HITs, or NULL.
2. If the responder is in ESTABLISHED state, the responder MAY
2. If the Responder is in ESTABLISHED state, the Responder MAY
respond to this with an R1 packet, prepare to drop existing SAs respond to this with an R1 packet, prepare to drop existing SAs
and stay at ESTABLISHED state. and stay at ESTABLISHED state.
3. If the implementation chooses to respond to the I1 with and R1
3. If the Responder is in I1-SENT state, it must make a comparison
between the sender's HIT and its own HIT. If the sender's HIT is
greater than its own HIT, it should drop the I1 and stay at I1-
SENT. If the sender's HIT is smaller than its own HIT, it should
send R1 and stay at I1-SENT. The HIT comparison goes similarly
as in Section 6.4.
4. If the implementation chooses to respond to the I1 with an R1
packet, it creates a new R1 or selects a precomputed R1 according packet, it creates a new R1 or selects a precomputed R1 according
to the format described in Section 7.2. to the format described in Section 5.3.2.
4. The R1 MUST contain the received responder HIT, unless the
5. The R1 MUST contain the received Responder HIT, unless the
received HIT is NULL, in which case the Responder SHOULD select a received HIT is NULL, in which case the Responder SHOULD select a
HIT that is constructed with the MUST algorithm in Section 3, HIT that is constructed with the MUST algorithm in Section 3,
which is currently RSA. Other than that, selecting the HIT is a which is currently RSA. Other than that, selecting the HIT is a
local policy matter. local policy matter.
5. The responder sends the R1 to the source IP address of the I1
6. The Responder sends the R1 to the source IP address of the I1
packet. packet.
8.5.1 R1 Management 6.6.1 R1 Management
All compliant implementations MUST produce R1 packets. An R1 packet All compliant implementations MUST produce R1 packets. An R1 packet
MAY be precomputed. An R1 packet MAY be reused for time Delta T, MAY be precomputed. An R1 packet MAY be reused for time Delta T,
which is implementation dependent. R1 information MUST not be which is implementation dependent. R1 information MUST not be
discarded until Delta S after T. Time S is the delay needed for the discarded until Delta S after T. Time S is the delay needed for the
last I2 to arrive back to the responder. last I2 to arrive back to the Responder.
An implementation MAY keep state about received I1s and match the An implementation MAY keep state about received I1s and match the
received I2s against the state, as discussed in Section 4.1.1. received I2s against the state, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
8.5.2 Handling malformed messages 6.6.2 Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I1 message, it SHOULD NOT If an implementation receives a malformed I1 message, it SHOULD NOT
respond with a NOTIFY message, as such practice could open up a respond with a NOTIFY message, as such practice could open up a
potential denial-of-service danger. Instead, it MAY respond with an potential denial-of-service danger. Instead, it MAY respond with an
ICMP packet, as defined in Section 6.3. ICMP packet, as defined in Section 5.4.
8.6 Processing incoming R1 packets 6.7 Processing Incoming R1 Packets
A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1 A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1
to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it is in state I1-SENT). If so, to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it is in state I1-SENT). If so,
it SHOULD process the R1 as described below, send an I2, and go to it SHOULD process the R1 as described below, send an I2, and go to
state I2-SENT, setting a timer to protect the I2. If the system is state I2-SENT, setting a timer to protect the I2. If the system is
in state I2-SENT, it MAY respond to an R1 if the R1 has a larger R1 in state I2-SENT, it MAY respond to an R1 if the R1 has a larger R1
generation counter; if so, it should drop its state due to processing generation counter; if so, it should drop its state due to processing
the previous R1 and start over from state I1-SENT. If the system is the previous R1 and start over from state I1-SENT. If the system is
in any other state with respect to that host, it SHOULD silently drop in any other state with respect to that host, it SHOULD silently drop
the R1. the R1.
When sending multiple I1s, an initiator SHOULD wait for a small When sending multiple I1s, an Initiator SHOULD wait for a small
amount of time after the first R1 reception to allow possibly amount of time after the first R1 reception to allow possibly
multiple R1s to arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set multiple R1s to arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set
with the largest R1 generation counter. with the largest R1 generation counter.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an R1 packet: responding to an R1 packet:
1. A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent 1. A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent
an I1 to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it has a HIP an I1 to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it has a HIP
association that is in state I1-SENT and that is associated with association that is in state I1-SENT and that is associated with
the HITs in the R1). If so, it should process the R1 as the HITs in the R1). If so, it should process the R1 as
described below. described below.
2. Otherwise, if the system is in any other state than I1-SENT or 2. Otherwise, if the system is in any other state than I1-SENT or
I2-SENT with respect to the HITs included in the R1, it SHOULD I2-SENT with respect to the HITs included in the R1, it SHOULD
silently drop the R1 and remain in the current state. silently drop the R1 and remain in the current state.
3. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT or I2-SENT, the received 3. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT or I2-SENT, the received
Initiator's HIT MUST correspond to the HIT used in the original, Initiator's HIT MUST correspond to the HIT used in the original,
I1 and the Responder's HIT MUST correspond to the one used, I1 and the Responder's HIT MUST correspond to the one used,
unless the I1 contained a NULL HIT. unless the I1 contained a NULL HIT.
4. The system SHOULD validate the R1 signature before applying 4. The system SHOULD validate the R1 signature before applying
further packet processing, according to Section 6.2.13. further packet processing, according to Section 5.2.12.
5. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT, and multiple valid R1s 5. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT, and multiple valid R1s
are present, the system SHOULD select from among the R1s with are present, the system SHOULD select from among the R1s with
the largest R1 generation counter. the largest R1 generation counter.
6. If the HIP association state is I2-SENT, the system MAY reenter 6. If the HIP association state is I2-SENT, the system MAY reenter
state I1-SENT and process the received R1 if it has a larger R1 state I1-SENT and process the received R1 if it has a larger R1
generation counter than the R1 responded to previously. generation counter than the R1 responded to previously.
7. The R1 packet may have the C bit set -- in this case, the system 7. The R1 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
should anticipate the receipt of HIP CER packets that contain
the host identity corresponding to the responder's HIT.
8. The R1 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the R1 and returning to MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the R1 and returning to
state UNASSOCIATED. The system SHOULD consider dropping the R1 state UNASSOCIATED. The system SHOULD consider dropping the R1
only if it used a NULL HIT in I1. If the A bit is set, the only if it used a NULL HIT in I1. If the A bit is set, the
Responder's HIT is anonymous and should not be stored. Responder's HIT is anonymous and should not be stored.
9. The system SHOULD attempt to validate the HIT against the
8. The system SHOULD attempt to validate the HIT against the
received Host Identity. received Host Identity.
10. The system MUST store the received R1 generation counter for
9. The system MUST store the received R1 generation counter for
future reference. future reference.
11. The system attempts to solve the cookie puzzle in R1. The
10. The system attempts to solve the cookie puzzle in R1. The
system MUST terminate the search after exceeding the remaining system MUST terminate the search after exceeding the remaining
lifetime of the puzzle. If the cookie puzzle is not lifetime of the puzzle. If the cookie puzzle is not
successfully solved, the implementation may either resend I1 successfully solved, the implementation may either resend I1
within the retry bounds or abandon the HIP exchange. within the retry bounds or abandon the HIP exchange.
12. The system computes standard Diffie-Hellman keying material
11. The system computes standard Diffie-Hellman keying material
according to the public value and Group ID provided in the according to the public value and Group ID provided in the
DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. The Diffie-Hellman keying material DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. The Diffie-Hellman keying material
Kij is used for key extraction as specified in Section 9. If Kij is used for key extraction as specified in Section 6.4. If
the received Diffie-Hellman Group ID is not supported, the the received Diffie-Hellman Group ID is not supported, the
implementation may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or implementation may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or
abandon the HIP exchange. abandon the HIP exchange.
13. The system selects the HIP transform from the choices presented
12. The system selects the HIP transform from the choices presented
in the R1 packet and uses the selected values subsequently when in the R1 packet and uses the selected values subsequently when
generating and using encryption keys, and when sending the I2. generating and using encryption keys, and when sending the I2.
If the proposed alternatives are not acceptable to the system, If the proposed alternatives are not acceptable to the system,
it may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or abandon the it may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or abandon the
HIP exchange. HIP exchange.
14. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
13. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters. state, including Update ID counters.
15. The system prepares and sends an I2, as described in
Section 7.3. 14. The system prepares and sends an I2, as described in
16. The system SHOULD start a timer whose timeout value should be Section 5.3.3.
15. The system SHOULD start a timer whose timeout value should be
larger than the worst-case anticipated RTT, and MUST increment a larger than the worst-case anticipated RTT, and MUST increment a
timeout counter associated with the I2. The sender SHOULD timeout counter associated with the I2. The sender SHOULD
retransmit the I2 upon a timeout and restart the timer, up to a retransmit the I2 upon a timeout and restart the timer, up to a
maximum of I2_RETRIES_MAX tries. maximum of I2_RETRIES_MAX tries.
17. If the system is in state I1-SENT, it shall transition to state
16. If the system is in state I1-SENT, it shall transition to state
I2-SENT. If the system is in any other state, it remains in the I2-SENT. If the system is in any other state, it remains in the
current state. current state.
8.6.1 Handling malformed messages 6.7.1 Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed R1 message, it MUST If an implementation receives a malformed R1 message, it MUST
silently drop the packet. Sending a NOTIFY or ICMP would not help, silently drop the packet. Sending a NOTIFY or ICMP would not help,
as the sender of the R1 typically doesn't have any state. An as the sender of the R1 typically doesn't have any state. An
implementation SHOULD wait for some more time for a possible good R1, implementation SHOULD wait for some more time for a possible good R1,
after which it MAY try again by sending a new I1 packet. after which it MAY try again by sending a new I1 packet.
8.7 Processing incoming I2 packets 6.8 Processing Incoming I2 Packets
Upon receipt of an I2, the system MAY perform initial checks to Upon receipt of an I2, the system MAY perform initial checks to
determine whether the I2 corresponds to a recent R1 that has been determine whether the I2 corresponds to a recent R1 that has been
sent out, if the Responder keeps such state. For example, the sender sent out, if the Responder keeps such state. For example, the sender
could check whether the I2 is from an address or HIT that has could check whether the I2 is from an address or HIT that has
recently received an R1 from it. The R1 may have had Opaque data recently received an R1 from it. The R1 may have had Opaque data
included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to
be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system. be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system.
Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This
skipping to change at page 69, line 24 skipping to change at page 69, line 15
included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to
be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system. be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system.
Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This
includes validation of the cookie puzzle solution, generating the includes validation of the cookie puzzle solution, generating the
Diffie-Hellman key, decrypting the Initiator's Host Identity, Diffie-Hellman key, decrypting the Initiator's Host Identity,
verifying the signature, creating state, and finally sending an R2. verifying the signature, creating state, and finally sending an R2.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I2 packet: responding to an I2 packet:
1. The system MAY perform checks to verify that the I2 corresponds 1. The system MAY perform checks to verify that the I2 corresponds
to a recently sent R1. Such checks are implementation to a recently sent R1. Such checks are implementation
dependent. See Appendix C for a description of an example dependent. See Appendix C for a description of an example
implementation. implementation.
2. The system MUST check that the Responder's HIT corresponds to one
of its own HITs. 2. The system MUST check that the Responder's HIT corresponds to
one of its own HITs.
3. If the system is in the R2-SENT state, it MAY check if the newly 3. If the system is in the R2-SENT state, it MAY check if the newly
received I2 is similar to the one that triggered moving to received I2 is similar to the one that triggered moving to R2-
R2-SENT. If so, it MAY retransmit a previously sent R2, reset SENT. If so, it MAY retransmit a previously sent R2, reset the
the R2-SENT timer, and stay in R2-SENT. R2-SENT timer, and stay in R2-SENT.
4. If the system is in any other state, it SHOULD check that the
echoed R1 generation counter in I2 is within the acceptable 4. If the system is in the I2-SENT state, it makes a comparison
range. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current between its local and sender's HITs (similarly as in
generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. If Section 6.4). If the local HIT is smaller than the sender's
the newly received I2 is outside the accepted range, the I2 is HIT, it should drop the I2 packet. Otherwise, the system should
stale (perhaps replayed) and SHOULD be dropped. process the received I2 packet.
5. The system MUST validate the solution to the cookie puzzle by
computing the SHA-1 hash described in Section 7.3. 5. To avoid the possibility to end up with different session keys
6. The I2 MUST have a single value in the HIP_TRANSFORM parameter, due to symmetric operation of the peer nodes, the Diffie-Hellman
key, I, and J selection is also based on the HIT comparison. If
the local HIT is smaller than the peer HIT, the system uses peer
Diffie-Hellman key and nonce I from the R1 packet received
earlier. The local Diffie-Hellman key and nonce J are taken
from the I2 packet sent to the peer earlier. Otherwise, it uses
peer Diffie-Hellman key and nonce J from the just arrived I2.
The local Diffie-Hellman key and nonce I are the ones that it
sent ealier in the R1 packet.
6. If the system is in any other state than R2-SENT, it SHOULD
check that the echoed R1 generation counter in I2 is within the
acceptable range. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the
current generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier
generations. If the newly received I2 is outside the accepted
range, the I2 is stale (perhaps replayed) and SHOULD be dropped.
7. The system MUST validate the solution to the cookie puzzle by
computing the SHA-1 hash described in Section 5.3.3.
8. The I2 MUST have a single value in the HIP_TRANSFORM parameter,
which MUST match one of the values offered to the Initiator in which MUST match one of the values offered to the Initiator in
the R1 packet. the R1 packet.
7. The system must derive Diffie-Hellman keying material Kij based
9. The system must derive Diffie-Hellman keying material Kij based
on the public value and Group ID in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN on the public value and Group ID in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameter. This key is used to derive the HIP association keys, parameter. This key is used to derive the HIP association keys,
as described in Section 9. If the Diffie-Hellman Group ID is as described in Section 6.4. If the Diffie-Hellman Group ID is
unsupported, the I2 packet is silently dropped. unsupported, the I2 packet is silently dropped.
8. The encrypted HOST_ID decrypted by the Initiator encryption key
defined in Section 9. If the decrypted data is not an HOST_ID 10. The encrypted HOST_ID decrypted by the Initiator encryption key
defined in Section 6.4. If the decrypted data is not a HOST_ID
parameter, the I2 packet is silently dropped. parameter, the I2 packet is silently dropped.
9. The implementation SHOULD also verify that the Initiator's HIT in
the I2 corresponds to the Host Identity sent in the I2. 11. The implementation SHOULD also verify that the Initiator's HIT
10. The system MUST verify the HMAC according to the procedures in in the I2 corresponds to the Host Identity sent in the I2.
Section 6.2.10.
11. The system MUST verify the HIP_SIGNATURE according to 12. The system MUST verify the HMAC according to the procedures in
Section 6.2.12 and Section 7.3. Section 5.2.9.
12. If the checks above are valid, then the system proceeds with
13. The system MUST verify the HIP_SIGNATURE according to
Section 5.2.11 and Section 5.3.3.
14. If the checks above are valid, then the system proceeds with
further I2 processing; otherwise, it discards the I2 and remains further I2 processing; otherwise, it discards the I2 and remains
in the same state. in the same state.
13. The I2 packet may have the C bit set -- in this case, the system
should anticipate the receipt of HIP CER packets that contain 15. The I2 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
the host identity corresponding to the responder's HIT.
14. The I2 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the I2 and returning to MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the I2 and returning to
state UNASSOCIATED. If the A bit is set, the Initiator's HIT is state UNASSOCIATED. If the A bit is set, the Initiator's HIT is
anonymous and should not be stored. anonymous and should not be stored.
15. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
16. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters. state, including Update ID counters.
16. Upon successful processing of an I2 in states UNASSOCIATED,
I1-SENT, I2-SENT, and R2-SENT, an R2 is sent and the state 17. Upon successful processing of an I2 in states UNASSOCIATED, I1-
machine transitions to state ESTABLISHED. SENT, I2-SENT, and R2-SENT, an R2 is sent and the state machine
17. Upon successful processing of an I2 in state ESTABLISHED, the transitions to state R2-SENT.
18. Upon successful processing of an I2 in state ESTABLISHED, the
old HIP association is dropped and a new one is installed, an R2 old HIP association is dropped and a new one is installed, an R2
is sent, and the state machine transitions to R2-SENT. is sent, and the state machine transitions to R2-SENT.
18. Upon transitioning to R2-SENT, start a timer. Leave R2-SENT if
either the timer expires (allowing for maximal retransmission of 19. Upon transitioning to R2-SENT, start a timer. Move to
I2s), some data has been received on the incoming HIP ESTABLISHED if some data has been received on the incoming HIP
association, or an UPDATE packet has been received (or some association, or an UPDATE packet has been received (or some
other packet that indicates that the peer has moved to other packet that indicates that the peer has moved to
ESTABLISHED). ESTABLISHED). If the timer expires (allowing for maximal
retransmissions of I2s), move to UNASSOCIATED.
8.7.1 Handling malformed messages 6.8.1 Handling Malformed Messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I2 message, the behaviour If an implementation receives a malformed I2 message, the behavior
SHOULD depend on how much checks the message has already passed. If SHOULD depend on how much checks the message has already passed. If
the puzzle solution in the message has already been checked, the the puzzle solution in the message has already been checked, the
implementation SHOULD report the error by responding with a NOTIFY implementation SHOULD report the error by responding with a NOTIFY
packet. Otherwise the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP packet. Otherwise the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP
message as defined in Section 6.3. message as defined in Section 5.4.
8.8 Processing incoming R2 packets 6.9 Processing Incoming R2 Packets
An R2 received in states UNASSOCIATED, I1-SENT, ESTABLISHED, or An R2 received in states UNASSOCIATED, I1-SENT, ESTABLISHED, or
REKEYING results in the R2 being dropped and the state machine REKEYING results in the R2 being dropped and the state machine
staying in the same state. If an R2 is received in state I2-SENT, it staying in the same state. If an R2 is received in state I2-SENT, it
SHOULD be processed. SHOULD be processed.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
incoming R2 packet: incoming R2 packet:
1. The system MUST verify that the HITs in use correspond to the 1. The system MUST verify that the HITs in use correspond to the
HITs that were received in R1. HITs that were received in R1.
2. The system MUST verify the HMAC_2 according to the procedures in 2. The system MUST verify the HMAC_2 according to the procedures in
Section 6.2.11. Section 5.2.10.
3. The system MUST verify the HIP signature according to the 3. The system MUST verify the HIP signature according to the
procedures in Section 6.2.12. procedures in Section 5.2.11.
4. If any of the checks above fail, there is a high probability of 4. If any of the checks above fail, there is a high probability of
an ongoing man-in-the-middle or other security attack. The an ongoing man-in-the-middle or other security attack. The
system SHOULD act accordingly, based on its local policy. system SHOULD act accordingly, based on its local policy.
5. If the system is in any other state than I2-SENT, the R2 is 5. If the system is in any other state than I2-SENT, the R2 is
silently dropped. silently dropped.
6. Upon successful processing of the R2, the state machine moves to 6. Upon successful processing of the R2, the state machine moves to
state ESTABLISHED. state ESTABLISHED.
8.9 Sending UPDATE packets 6.10 Sending UPDATE Packets
A host sends an UPDATE packet when it wants to update some A host sends an UPDATE packet when it wants to update some
information related to a HIP association. There are a number of information related to a HIP association. There are a number of
likely situations, e.g. mobility management and rekeying of an likely situations, e.g. mobility management and rekeying of an
existing ESP Security Association. The following paragraphs define existing ESP Security Association. The following paragraphs define
the conceptual rules for sending an UPDATE packet to the peer. the conceptual rules for sending an UPDATE packet to the peer.
Additional steps can be defined in other documents where the UPDATE Additional steps can be defined in other documents where the UPDATE
packet is used. packet is used.
1. The system increments its own Update ID value by one. 1. The system increments its own Update ID value by one.
2. The system creates an UPDATE packet that contains a SEQ parameter 2. The system creates an UPDATE packet that contains a SEQ parameter
with the current value of Update ID. The UPDATE packet may also with the current value of Update ID. The UPDATE packet may also
include an ACK of the Update ID found in the received UPDATE SEQ include an ACK of the Update ID found in a received UPDATE SEQ
parameter, if any. parameter, if any.
3. The system sends the created UPDATE packet and starts an UPDATE 3. The system sends the created UPDATE packet and starts an UPDATE
timer. The default value for the timer is 2 * RTT estimate. timer. The default value for the timer is 2 * RTT estimate.
4. If the UPDATE timer expires, the UPDATE is resent. The UPDATE 4. If the UPDATE timer expires, the UPDATE is resent. The UPDATE
can be resent UPDATE_RETRY_MAX times. The UPDATE timer SHOULD be can be resent UPDATE_RETRY_MAX times. The UPDATE timer SHOULD be
exponentially backed off for subsequent retransmissions. exponentially backed off for subsequent retransmissions.
8.10 Receiving UPDATE packets 6.11 Receiving UPDATE Packets
When a system receives an UPDATE packet, its processing depends on When a system receives an UPDATE packet, its processing depends on
the state of the HIP association and the presence of and values of the state of the HIP association and the presence of and values of
the SEQ and ACK parameters. Typically, an UPDATE message also the SEQ and ACK parameters. Typically, an UPDATE message also
carries optional parameters whose handling is defined in separate carries optional parameters whose handling is defined in separate
documents. documents.
1. If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation 1. If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation
MAY reply with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in MAY reply with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in
Section 6.3.4. Section 5.4.4.
2. If the association is in the ESTABLISHED state and the SEQ 2. If the association is in the ESTABLISHED state and the SEQ
parameter is present, the UPDATE is processed and replied as parameter is present, the UPDATE is processed and replied as
described in Section 8.10.1. described in Section 6.11.1.
3. Additionally (or alternatively), if the association is in the 3. Additionally (or alternatively), if the association is in the
ESTABLISHED state and there is an ACK (of outstanding Update ID) ESTABLISHED state and there is an ACK (of outstanding Update ID)
in the UPDATE, the UPDATE is processed as described in in the UPDATE, the UPDATE is processed as described in
Section 8.10.2. Section 6.11.2.
8.10.1 Handling a SEQ paramaeter in a received UPDATE message
6.11.1 Handling a SEQ paramaeter in a received UPDATE message
1. If the Update ID in the received SEQ is smaller than the stored 1. If the Update ID in the received SEQ is smaller than the stored
Update ID for the peer host, the packet MUST BE dropped as a Update ID for the peer host, the packet MUST BE dropped as a
duplicate. duplicate.
2. If the Update ID in the received SEQ is equal to the stored 2. If the Update ID in the received SEQ is equal to the stored
Update ID for the host, the packet is treated as a Update ID for the host, the packet is treated as a
retransmission. The HMAC verification (next step) MUST NOT be retransmission. The HMAC verification (next step) MUST NOT be
skipped. (A byte-by-byte comparison of the received and a store skipped. (A byte-by-byte comparison of the received and a stored
packet would be OK, though.) It is recommended that a host cache packet would be OK, though.) It is recommended that a host cache
the last packet that was acked to avoid the cost of generating a the last packet that was acked to avoid the cost of generating a
new ACK packet to respond to a replayed UPDATE. The system MUST new ACK packet to respond to a replayed UPDATE. The system MUST
acknowledge, again, such (apparent) UPDATE message acknowledge, again, such (apparent) UPDATE message
retransmissions but SHOULD also consider rate-limiting such retransmissions but SHOULD also consider rate-limiting such
retransmission responses to guard against replay attacks. retransmission responses to guard against replay attacks.
3. The system MUST verify the HMAC in the UPDATE packet. If the 3. The system MUST verify the HMAC in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped. verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped.
4. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the 4. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error
message logged. message logged.
5. If a new SEQ parameter is being processed, the system MUST record 5. If a new SEQ parameter is being processed, the system MUST record
the Update ID in the received SEQ parameter, for replay the Update ID in the received SEQ parameter, for replay
protection. protection.
6. An UPDATE acknowledgement packet with ACK parameter is prepared 6. An UPDATE acknowledgement packet with ACK parameter is prepared
and send to the peer. and sent to the peer.
8.10.2 Handling an ACK parameter in a received UPDATE packet 6.11.2 Handling an ACK Parameter in a Received UPDATE Packet
1. The UPDATE packet with ACK must match to an earlier sent UPDATE 1. The UPDATE packet with ACK must match with an earlier sent UPDATE
packet. If no match is found, the packet MUST be dropped. packet. If no match is found, the packet MUST be dropped.
2. The system MUST verify the HMAC in the UPDATE packet. If the 2. The system MUST verify the HMAC in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped. verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped.
3. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the 3. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error
message logged. message logged.
4. The corresponding UPDATE timer is stopped (see Section 8.9) so
that the now acknowledged UPDATE is no longer retransmitted.
8.11 Processing CER packets 4. The corresponding UPDATE timer is stopped (see Section 6.10) so
that the now acknowledged UPDATE is no longer retransmitted.
Processing CER packets is OPTIONAL, and currently undefined.
8.12 Processing NOTIFY packets 6.12 Processing NOTIFY Packets
Processing NOTIFY packets is OPTIONAL. If processed, any errors Processing NOTIFY packets is OPTIONAL. If processed, any errors
noted by the NOTIFY parameter SHOULD be taken into account by the HIP noted by the NOTIFY parameter SHOULD be taken into account by the HIP
state machine (e.g., by terminating a HIP handshake), and the error state machine (e.g., by terminating a HIP handshake), and the error
SHOULD be logged. SHOULD be logged.
8.13 Processing CLOSE packets 6.13 Processing CLOSE Packets
When the host receives a CLOSE message it responds with a CLOSE_ACK When the host receives a CLOSE message it responds with a CLOSE_ACK
message and moves to CLOSED state. (The authenticity of the CLOSE message and moves to CLOSED state. (The authenticity of the CLOSE
message is verified using both HMAC and SIGNATURE). This processing message is verified using both HMAC and SIGNATURE). This processing
applies whether or not the HIP association state is CLOSING in order applies whether or not the HIP association state is CLOSING in order
to handle CLOSE messages from both ends crossing in flight. to handle CLOSE messages from both ends crossing in flight.
The HIP association is not discarded before the host moves from the The HIP association is not discarded before the host moves from the
UNASSOCIATED state. UNASSOCIATED state.
Once the closing process has started, any need to send data packets Once the closing process has started, any need to send data packets
will trigger creating and establishing of a new HIP association, will trigger creating and establishing of a new HIP association,
starting with sending an I1. starting with sending an I1.
If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation MAY If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation MAY
reply to a CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in reply to a CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in
Section 6.3.4. Section 5.4.4.
8.14 Processing CLOSE_ACK packets 6.14 Processing CLOSE_ACK Packets
When a host receives a CLOSE_ACK message it verifies that it is in When a host receives a CLOSE_ACK message it verifies that it is in
CLOSING or CLOSED state and that the CLOSE_ACK was in response to the CLOSING or CLOSED state and that the CLOSE_ACK was in response to the
CLOSE (using the included ECHO_REPLY in response to the sent CLOSE (using the included ECHO_REPLY in response to the sent
ECHO_REQUEST). ECHO_REQUEST).
The CLOSE_ACK uses HMAC and SIGNATURE for verification. The state is The CLOSE_ACK uses HMAC and SIGNATURE for verification. The state is
discarded when the state changes to UNASSOCIATED and, after that, discarded when the state changes to UNASSOCIATED and, after that,
NOTIFY is sent as a response to a CLOSE message. NOTIFY is sent as a response to a CLOSE message.
8.15 Dropping HIP associations 6.15 Dropping HIP Associations
A HIP implementation is free to drop a HIP association at any time, A HIP implementation is free to drop a HIP association at any time,
based on its own policy. If a HIP host decides to drop a HIP based on its own policy. If a HIP host decides to drop a HIP
association, it deletes the corresponding HIP state, including the association, it deletes the corresponding HIP state, including the
keying material. The implementation MUST also drop the peer's R1 keying material. The implementation MUST also drop the peer's R1
generation counter value, unless a local policy explicitly defines generation counter value, unless a local policy explicitly defines
that the value of that particular host is stored. An implementation that the value of that particular host is stored. An implementation
MUST NOT store R1 generation counters by default, but storing R1 MUST NOT store R1 generation counters by default, but storing R1
generation counter values, if done, MUST be configured by explicit generation counter values, if done, MUST be configured by explicit
HITs. HITs.
9. HIP KEYMAT 7. HIP Policies
HIP keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman Kij produced
during the HIP base exchange. The Initiator has Kij during the
creation of the I2 packet, and the Responder has Kij once it receives
the I2 packet. This is why I2 can already contain encrypted
information.
The KEYMAT is derived by feeding Kij and the HITs into the following
operation; the | operation denotes concatenation.
KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
where
K1 = SHA-1( Kij | sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) | 0x01 )
K2 = SHA-1( Kij | K1 | 0x02 )
K3 = SHA-1( Kij | K2 | 0x03 )
...
K255 = SHA-1( Kij | K254 | 0xff )
K256 = SHA-1( Kij | K255 | 0x00 )
etc.
Sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) is defined as the network byte order
concatenation of the two HITs, with the smaller HIT preceding the
larger HIT, resulting from the numeric comparison of the two HITs
interpreted as positive (unsigned) 128-bit integers in network byte
order.
The initial keys are drawn sequentially in the order that is
determined by the numeric comparison of the two HITs, with comparison
method described in the previous paragraph. HOST_g denotes the host
with the greater HIT value, and HOST_l the host with the lower HIT
value.
The drawing order for initial keys:
HIP-gl encryption key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-gl integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-lg encryption key (currently unused) for HOST_l's outgoing HIP
packets
HIP-lg integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_l's outgoing HIP packets
The number of bits drawn for a given algorithm is the "natural" size
of the keys. For the mandatory algorithms, the following sizes
apply:
AES 128 bits
SHA-1 160 bits
NULL 0 bits
10. HIP Fragmentation Support
A HIP implementation must support IP fragmentation / reassembly.
Fragment reassembly MUST be implemented in both IPv4 and IPv6, but
fragment generation MUST be implemented only in IPv4 (IPv4 stacks and
networks will usually do this by default) and SHOULD be implemented
in IPv6. In the IPv6 world, the minimum MTU is larger, 1280 bytes,
than in the IPv4 world. The larger MTU size is usually sufficient
for most HIP packets, and therefore fragment generation may not be
needed. If a host expects to send HIP packets that are larger than
the minimum IPv6 MTU, it MUST implement fragment generation even for
IPv6.
In the IPv4 world, HIP packets may encounter low MTUs along their
routed path. Since HIP does not provide a mechanism to use multiple
IP datagrams for a single HIP packet, support of path MTU discovery
does not bring any value to HIP in the IPv4 world. HIP-aware NAT
systems MUST perform any IPv4 reassembly/fragmentation.
All HIP implementations MUST employ a reassembly algorithm that is
sufficiently resistant against DoS attacks.
11. HIP Policies
There are a number of variables that will influence the HIP exchanges There are a number of variables that will influence the HIP exchanges
that each host must support. All HIP implementations MUST support that each host must support. All HIP implementations MUST support
more than one simultaneous HIs, at least one of which SHOULD be more than one simultaneous HIs, at least one of which SHOULD be
reserved for anonymous usage. Although anonymous HIs will be rarely reserved for anonymous usage. Although anonymous HIs will be rarely
used as responder HIs, they will be common for Initiators. Support used as Responder HIs, they will be common for Initiators. Support
for more than two HIs is RECOMMENDED. for more than two HIs is RECOMMENDED.
Many Initiators would want to use a different HI for different Many Initiators would want to use a different HI for different
Responders. The implementations SHOULD provide for an ACL of Responders. The implementations SHOULD provide for an ACL of
initiator HIT to responder HIT. This ACL SHOULD also include Initiator HIT to Responder HIT. This ACL SHOULD also include
preferred transform and local lifetimes. For HITs with HAAs, preferred transform and local lifetimes. For HITs with HAAs,
wildcarding SHOULD be supported. Thus if a Community of Interest, wildcarding SHOULD be supported. Thus if a Community of Interest,
like Banking, gets an RAA, a single ACL could be used. A global like Banking, gets a HAA, a single ACL could be used. A global
wildcard would represent the general policy to be used. Policy wildcard would represent the general policy to be used. Policy
selection would be from most specific to most general. selection would be from most specific to most general.
The value of K used in the HIP R1 packet can also vary by policy. K The value of K used in the HIP R1 packet can also vary by policy. K
should never be greater than 20, but for trusted partners it could be should never be greater than 20, but for trusted partners it could be
as low as 0. as low as 0.
Responders would need a similar ACL, representing which hosts they Responders would need a similar ACL, representing which hosts they
accept HIP exchanges, and the preferred transform and local accept HIP exchanges, and the preferred transform and local
lifetimes. Wildcarding SHOULD be supported for this ACL also. lifetimes. Wildcarding SHOULD be supported for this ACL also.
12. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
HIP is designed to provide secure authentication of hosts. HIP also HIP is designed to provide secure authentication of hosts. HIP also
attempts to limit the exposure of the host to various attempts to limit the exposure of the host to various denial-of-
denial-of-service and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In so doing, service and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. In so doing, HIP
HIP itself is subject to its own DoS and MitM attacks that itself is subject to its own DoS and MitM attacks that potentially
potentially could be more damaging to a host's ability to conduct could be more damaging to a host's ability to conduct business as
business as usual. usual.
Denial-of-service attacks take advantage of the cost of start of Denial-of-service attacks take advantage of the cost of start of
state for a protocol on the Responder compared to the 'cheapness' on state for a protocol on the Responder compared to the 'cheapness' on
the Initiator. HIP makes no attempt to increase the cost of the the Initiator. HIP makes no attempt to increase the cost of the
start of state on the Initiator, but makes an effort to reduce the start of state on the Initiator, but makes an effort to reduce the
cost to the Responder. This is done by having the Responder start cost to the Responder. This is done by having the Responder start
the 3-way exchange instead of the Initiator, making the HIP protocol the 3-way exchange instead of the Initiator, making the HIP protocol
4 packets long. In doing this, packet 2 becomes a 'stock' packet 4 packets long. In doing this, packet 2 becomes a 'stock' packet
that the Responder MAY use many times. The duration of use is a that the Responder MAY use many times. The duration of use is a
paranoia versus throughput concern. Using the same Diffie-Hellman paranoia versus throughput concern. Using the same Diffie-Hellman
values and random puzzle #I has some risk. This risk needs to be values and random puzzle #I has some risk. This risk needs to be
balanced against a potential storm of HIP I1 packets. balanced against a potential storm of HIP I1 packets.
This shifting of the start of state cost to the Initiator in creating This shifting of the start of state cost to the Initiator in creating
the I2 HIP packet, presents another DoS attack. The attacker spoofs the I2 HIP packet, presents another DoS attack. The attacker spoofs
the I1 HIP packet and the Responder sends out the R1 HIP packet. the I1 HIP packet and the Responder sends out the R1 HIP packet.
This could conceivably tie up the 'initiator' with evaluating the R1 This could conceivably tie up the 'Initiator' with evaluating the R1
HIP packet, and creating the I2 HIP packet. The defense against this HIP packet, and creating the I2 HIP packet. The defense against this
attack is to simply ignore any R1 packet where a corresponding I1 was attack is to simply ignore any R1 packet where a corresponding I1 was
not sent. not sent.
A second form of DoS attack arrives in the I2 HIP packet. Once the A second form of DoS attack arrives in the I2 HIP packet. Once the
attacking Initiator has solved the puzzle, it can send packets with attacking Initiator has solved the puzzle, it can send packets with
spoofed IP source addresses with either invalid encrypted HIP payload spoofed IP source addresses with either invalid encrypted HIP payload
component or a bad HIP signature. This would take resources in the component or a bad HIP signature. This would take resources in the
Responder's part to reach the point to discover that the I2 packet Responder's part to reach the point to discover that the I2 packet
cannot be completely processed. The defense against this attack is cannot be completely processed. The defense against this attack is
skipping to change at page 80, line 13 skipping to change at page 77, line 13
the first case above. the first case above.
A fourth form of DoS attack is emulating the end of state. HIP A fourth form of DoS attack is emulating the end of state. HIP
relies on timers plus a CLOSE/CLOSE_ACK handshake to explicitly relies on timers plus a CLOSE/CLOSE_ACK handshake to explicitly
signals the end of a state. Because both CLOSE and CLOSE_ACK signals the end of a state. Because both CLOSE and CLOSE_ACK
messages contain an HMAC, an outsider cannot close a connection. The messages contain an HMAC, an outsider cannot close a connection. The
presence of an additional SIGNATURE allows middle-boxes to inspect presence of an additional SIGNATURE allows middle-boxes to inspect
these messages and discard the associated state (for e.g., these messages and discard the associated state (for e.g.,
firewalling, SPI-based NATing, etc.). However, the optional behavior firewalling, SPI-based NATing, etc.). However, the optional behavior
of replying to CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem packet (as of replying to CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem packet (as
described in Section 6.3.4) might allow an IP spoofer sending CLOSE described in Section 5.4.4) might allow an IP spoofer sending CLOSE
messages to launch reflection attacks. messages to launch reflection attacks.
A fifth form of DoS attack is replaying R1s to cause the initiator to A fifth form of DoS attack is replaying R1s to cause the Initiator to
solve stale puzzles and become out of synchronization with the solve stale puzzles and become out of synchronization with the
responder. The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing Responder. The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing
counter designed to protect against this attack, as described in counter designed to protect against this attack, as described in
section Section 4.1.3. section Section 4.1.3.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without
third-party authentication. A skillful MitM could easily handle all third-party authentication. A skillful MitM could easily handle all
parts of HIP; but HIP indirectly provides the following protection parts of HIP; but HIP indirectly provides the following protection
from a MitM attack. If the Responder's HI is retrieved from a signed from a MitM attack. If the Responder's HI is retrieved from a signed
DNS zone, a certificate, or through some other secure means, the DNS zone, a certificate, or through some other secure means, the
Initiator can use this to validate the R1 HIP packet. Initiator can use this to validate the R1 HIP packet.
Likewise, if the Initiator's HI is in a secure DNS zone, a trusted Likewise, if the Initiator's HI is in a secure DNS zone, a trusted
certificate, or otherwise securely available, the Responder can certificate, or otherwise securely available, the Responder can
retrieve it after it gets the I2 HIP packet and validate that. retrieve it after it gets the I2 HIP packet and validate that.
However, since an Initiator may choose to use an anonymous HI, it However, since an Initiator may choose to use an anonymous HI, it
knowingly risks a MitM attack. The Responder may choose not to knowingly risks a MitM attack. The Responder may choose not to
accept a HIP exchange with an anonymous Initiator. accept a HIP exchange with an anonymous Initiator.
If an initiator wants to use opportunistic mode, it is vulnerable to If an Initiator wants to use opportunistic mode, it is vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, the available HI types are man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, the available HI types are
limited to the MUST implement algorithms, as per Section 3. Hence, limited to the MUST implement algorithms, as per Section 3. Hence,
if a future specification deprecates the current MUST implement if a future specification deprecates the current MUST implement
algorithm(s) and replaces it (them) with some new one(s), backward algorithm(s) and replaces it (them) with some new one(s), backward
compatibility cannot be preserved. compatibility cannot be preserved.
Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMP 'Destination Protocol Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMP 'Destination Protocol
Unreachable' are to be expected and present a DoS attack. Against an Unreachable' are to be expected and present a DoS attack. Against an
Initiator, the attack would look like the Responder does not support Initiator, the attack would look like the Responder does not support
HIP, but shortly after receiving the ICMP message, the Initiator HIP, but shortly after receiving the ICMP message, the Initiator
skipping to change at page 82, line 5 skipping to change at page 79, line 5
similar attack against the Responder is more involved. First an ICMP similar attack against the Responder is more involved. First an ICMP
message is expected if the I1 was a DoS attack and the real owner of message is expected if the I1 was a DoS attack and the real owner of
the spoofed IP address does not support HIP. The Responder SHOULD the spoofed IP address does not support HIP. The Responder SHOULD
NOT act on this ICMP message to remove the minimal state from the R1 NOT act on this ICMP message to remove the minimal state from the R1
HIP packet (if it has one), but wait for either a valid I2 HIP packet HIP packet (if it has one), but wait for either a valid I2 HIP packet
or the natural timeout of the R1 HIP packet. This is to allow for a or the natural timeout of the R1 HIP packet. This is to allow for a
sophisticated attacker that is trying to break up the HIP exchange. sophisticated attacker that is trying to break up the HIP exchange.
Likewise, the Initiator should ignore any ICMP message while waiting Likewise, the Initiator should ignore any ICMP message while waiting
for an R2 HIP packet, deleting state only after a natural timeout. for an R2 HIP packet, deleting state only after a natural timeout.
13. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned IP Protocol number TBD to HIP. This document defines a new IP Protocol number to be used for HIP.
This protocol has been assigned the number < To Be Assigned by IANA
-- for testing purposes, the protocol number 99 is currently used >.
IANA needs to create registries for: This document also creates a set of new name spaces. These are
1. HIP packet types described below.
2. HIP parameter types
14. Acknowledgments Packet Type
The 8-bit Packet Type field in a HIP protocol packet describes the
type of a HIP protocol message. It is defined in Section 5.1.
The current values are defined in Section 5.3.1 through
Section 5.3.8 and are listed below:
* I1 is 1.
* R1 is 2.
* I2 is 3.
* R2 is 4.
* UPDATE is 6.
* NOTIFY is 7.
* CLOSE is 8.
* CLOSE_ACK is 9.
New values are assigned through IETF Consensus [10].
HIP Version
The four bit Version field in a HIP protocol packet describes the
version of the HIP protocol. It is defined in Section 5.1. The
only currently defined value is 1. New values are assigned
through IETF Consensus.
HIT Type
The three bit HIT Type values appear in the Sender's HIT Type and
Destinations's HIT Type fields the Controls field in a HIP
protocol packet. They are defined in in Section 5.1 and the
currently defined values are listed below:
* Type 1 HIT is 1.
* Type 2 HIT is 2.
* Values 0 and 7 are reserved.
New values either from the unassigned or reserved space are
assigned through IETF Consensus.
Parameter Type
The 16 bit Type field in a HIP parameters describes the type of
the parameter. It is defined in Section 5.2.1. The current
values are defined in Section 5.2.3 through Section 5.2.18 and are
listed below:
* R1_COUNTER is 128.
* PUZZLE is 257.
* SOLUTION is 321.
* SEQ is 385.
* ACK is 449.
* DIFFIE_HELLMAN is 513.
* HIP_TRANSFORM is 577.
* ENCRYPTED is 641.
* HOST_ID is 705.
* CERT is 768.
* NOTIFY is 832.
* ECHO_REQUEST is 897.
* ECHO_RESPONSE is 961.
* HMAC is 61505.
* HMAC_2 is 61569.
* HIP_SIGNATURE_2 is 61633.
* HIP_SIGNATURE is 61697.
* ECHO_REQUEST is 63661.
* ECHO_RESPONSE is 63425.
The type codes 0 through 1023 and 61440 through 65535 are reserved
for future base protocol extensions, and are assigned through IETF
Consensus.
The type codes 32768 through 49141 are reserved for
experimentation and private use. Types SHOULD be selected in a
random fashion from this range, thereby reducing the probability
of collisions. A method employing genuine randomness (such as
flipping a coin) SHOULD be used.
All other type codes are assigned through First Come First Served,
with Specification Required [10].
Group ID
The eight bit Group ID values appear in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameter, defined in Section 5.2.6. The currently defined values
are listed below:
* 384-bit group is 1.
* OAKLEY well known group 1 is 2.
* 1536-bit MODP group is 3.
* 3072-bit MODP group is 4.
* 6144-bit MODP group is 5.
* 8192-bit MODP group is 6.
* Value 0 is reserved.
New values either from the reserved or unassigned space are
assigned through IETF Consensus.
Suite ID
The 16 bit Suite ID values in a HIP_TRANSFORM parameter are
defined in Section 5.2.7. The currently defined values are listed
below:
* AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 is 1.
* 3DES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 is 2.
* 3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 is 3.
* BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 is 4.
* NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA1 is 5.
* NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-MD5 is 6.
* Value 0 is reserved.
New values either from the reserved or unassigned space are
assigned through IETF Consensus.
DI-Type
The four bit DI-Type values in a HOST_ID parameter are defined in
Section 5.2.8. The currently defined values are listed below:
* None included is 0.
* FQDN is 1.
* NAI is 2.
New values are assigned through IETF Consensus.
Notify Message Type
The 16 bit Notify Message Type field in a NOTIFY parameter is
defined in Section 5.2.16. The currently defined values are
listed below:
* UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PARAMETER_TYPE is 1.
* INVALID_SYNTAX is 7.
* NO_DH_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN is 14.
* INVALID_DH_CHOSEN is 15.
* NO_HIP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN is 16.
* INVALID_HIP_TRANSFORM_CHOSEN is 17.
* AUTHENTICATION_FAILED is 24.
* CHECKSUM_FAILED is 26.
* HMAC_FAILED is 28.
* ENCRYPTION_FAILED is 32.
* INVALID_HIT is 40.
* BLOCKED_BY_POLICY is 42.
* SERVER_BUSY_PLEASE_RETRY is 44.
New values are assigned through First Come First Served, with
Specification Required.
10. Acknowledgments
The drive to create HIP came to being after attending the MALLOC The drive to create HIP came to being after attending the MALLOC
meeting at the 43rd IETF meeting. Baiju Patel and Hilarie Orman meeting at the 43rd IETF meeting. Baiju Patel and Hilarie Orman
really gave the original author, Bob Moskowitz, the assist to get HIP really gave the original author, Bob Moskowitz, the assist to get HIP
beyond 5 paragraphs of ideas. It has matured considerably since the beyond 5 paragraphs of ideas. It has matured considerably since the
early drafts thanks to extensive input from IETFers. Most early drafts thanks to extensive input from IETFers. Most
importantly, its design goals are articulated and are different from importantly, its design goals are articulated and are different from
other efforts in this direction. Particular mention goes to the other efforts in this direction. Particular mention goes to the
members of the NameSpace Research Group of the IRTF. Noel Chiappa members of the NameSpace Research Group of the IRTF. Noel Chiappa
provided the framework for LSIs and Keith Moore the impetus to provided the framework for LSIs and Keith Moore the impetus to
provide resolvability. Steve Deering provided encouragement to keep provide resolvability. Steve Deering provided encouragement to keep
working, as a solid proposal can act as a proof of ideas for a working, as a solid proposal can act as a proof of ideas for a
research group. research group.
Many others contributed; extensive security tips were provided by Many others contributed; extensive security tips were provided by
Steve Bellovin. Rob Austein kept the DNS parts on track. Paul Steve Bellovin. Rob Austein kept the DNS parts on track. Paul
Kocher taught Bob Moskowitz how to make the cookie exchange expensive Kocher taught Bob Moskowitz how to make the cookie exchange expensive
for the Initiator to respond, but easy for the Responder to validate. for the Initiator to respond, but easy for the Responder to validate.
Bill Sommerfeld supplied the Birthday concept, which later evolved Bill Sommerfeld supplied the Birthday concept, which later evolved
into the R1 generation counter, to simplify reboot management. into the R1 generation counter, to simplify reboot management. Erik
Rodney Thayer and Hugh Daniels provide extensive feedback. In the Nordmark supplied CLOSE-mechanism for closing connections. Rodney
early times of this draft, John Gilmore kept Bob Moskowitz challenged Thayer and Hugh Daniels provide extensive feedback. In the early
to provide something of value. times of this draft, John Gilmore kept Bob Moskowitz challenged to
provide something of value.
During the later stages of this document, when the editing baton was During the later stages of this document, when the editing baton was
transfered to Pekka Nikander, the input from the early implementors transfered to Pekka Nikander, the input from the early implementors
were invaluable. Without having actual implementations, this were invaluable. Without having actual implementations, this
document would not be on the level it is now. document would not be on the level it is now.
In the usual IETF fashion, a large number of people have contributed In the usual IETF fashion, a large number of people have contributed
to the actual text or ideas. The list of these people include Jeff to the actual text or ideas. The list of these people include Jeff
Ahrenholz, Francis Dupont, Derek Fawcus, George Gross, Andrew Ahrenholz, Francis Dupont, Derek Fawcus, George Gross, Andrew
McGregor, Julien Laganier, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jan Melen, Henrik McGregor, Julien Laganier, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jan Melen, Henrik
Petander, Michael Richardson, Tim Shepard, Jorma Wall, and Jukka Petander, Michael Richardson, Tim Shepard, Jorma Wall, and Jukka
Ylitalo. Our apologies to anyone whose name is missing. Ylitalo. Our apologies to anyone whose name is missing.
Once the HIP Working Group was founded in early 2004, a number of Once the HIP Working Group was founded in early 2004, a number of
changes were introduced through the working group process. Most changes were introduced through the working group process. Most
notably, the original draft was split in two, one containing the base notably, the original draft was split in two, one containing the base
exchange and the other one defining how to use ESP. exchange and the other one defining how to use ESP. Some
modifications to the protocol proposed by Aura et al. [29] were added
at a later stage.
15. References 11. References
15.1 Normative references 11.1 Normative References
[1] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, August [1] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
1980. August 1980.
[2] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, [2] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, September 1981. RFC 792, September 1981.
[3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[4] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol [4] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 1885, (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 1885,
December 1995. December 1995.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[6] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP [6] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998. and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
[7] Maughan, D., Schneider, M. and M. Schertler, "Internet Security [7] Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)",
November 1998. RFC 2408, November 1998.
[8] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", [8] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998. RFC 2409, November 1998.
[9] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC 2412, [9] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC 2412,
November 1998. November 1998.
[10] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms", [10] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
RFC 2451, November 1998. Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[11] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) [11] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998. Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[12] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", [12] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
RFC 2535, March 1999. RFC 2535, March 1999.
[13] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System [13] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999. (DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[14] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name [14] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001. Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898, September 2000.
[15] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 [15] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[16] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol [16] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003. version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
[17] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) [17] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003. Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.
[18] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP) [18] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 3526, May 2003. RFC 3526, May 2003.
[19] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", [19] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-05, April 2003. Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.
[20] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [20] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-07, April 2003. draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-05 (work in progress), April 2003.
[21] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Architecture", [21] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
Internet-Draft draft-moskowitz-hip-arch-03, May 2003. draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-07 (work in progress), April 2003.
[22] NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard", April 1995. [22] Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
draft-ietf-radext-rfc2486bis-03 (work in progress),
December 2004.
[23] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Using ESP transport [23] NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard", April 1995.
format with HIP", Internet-Draft draft-jokela-hip-esp-00,
January 2005.
15.2 Informative references [24] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and P. Nikander, "Using ESP
transport format with HIP", draft-jokela-hip-esp-00 (work in
progress), January 2005.
[24] Bellovin, S. and W. Aiello, "Just Fast Keying (JFK)", 11.2 Informative References
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ipsec-jfk-04, July 2002.
[25] Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Using Domain Name System (DNS) [25] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Architecture",