draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03.txt   draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04.txt 
GROW D. McPherson GROW D. McPherson
Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc. Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc.
Intended status: Informational S. Amante Intended status: Informational S. Amante
Expires: May 22, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc. Expires: November 1, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc.
E. Osterweil E. Osterweil
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
D. Mitchell D. Mitchell
Twitter, Inc. Twitter, Inc.
November 18, 2013 April 30, 2014
Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03 draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates
how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily
circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via
BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing
Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements
discussions and subsequent specification. discussions and subsequent specification.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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and designs address these operational security issues. and designs address these operational security issues.
The authors believe the capability to prevent route-leaks and leak- The authors believe the capability to prevent route-leaks and leak-
attacks should be a primary engineering objective in any secure attacks should be a primary engineering objective in any secure
routing architecture. routing architecture.
6. Informative References 6. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification", Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
February 2013. November 2013.
[LEAK_ATTACK_ON_GOOGLE] [LEAK_ATTACK_ON_GOOGLE]
CloudFlare, CF., "Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit CloudFlare, CF., "Why Google Went Offline Today and a Bit
about How the Internet Works", November 2012, <http:// about How the Internet Works", November 2012, <http://
blog.cloudflare.com/ blog.cloudflare.com/
why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about>. why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about>.
[NANOG_LEAK_TALK] [NANOG_LEAK_TALK]
Mauch, J., "Detecting Routing Leaks by Counting", Mauch, J., "Detecting Routing Leaks by Counting",
October 2007, <http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog41/ October 2007, <http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog41/
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