draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02.txt   draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03.txt 
GROW D. McPherson GROW D. McPherson
Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc. Internet-Draft Verisign, Inc.
Intended status: Informational S. Amante Intended status: Informational S. Amante
Expires: February 2, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc. Expires: May 22, 2014 Level 3 Communications, Inc.
E. Osterweil E. Osterweil
Verisign, Inc. Verisign, Inc.
D. Mitchell D. Mitchell
Twitter, Inc. Twitter, Inc.
August 1, 2013 November 18, 2013
Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC Route-Leaks & MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC
draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02 draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-03
Abstract Abstract
This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates
how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily
circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via
BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing BGP. It is meant to serve as input to the IETF's Global Routing
Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements
discussions and subsequent specification. discussions and subsequent specification.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 2, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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An operator would expect that such an attribute would accurately An operator would expect that such an attribute would accurately
reflect the attacker's ASN in the appropriate location of the reflect the attacker's ASN in the appropriate location of the
BGPSEC_Path. Unfortunately, as currently designed, BGPSEC_Path. Unfortunately, as currently designed,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] is unable to distinguish whether an [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] is unable to distinguish whether an
ASN is allowed, by policy, to add their ASN within the BGPSEC_Path ASN is allowed, by policy, to add their ASN within the BGPSEC_Path
attribute before the BGP update is propagated to downstream ASNs. attribute before the BGP update is propagated to downstream ASNs.
This proves that mechanisms defined in This proves that mechanisms defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] would not stop an attacker from [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol] would not stop an attacker from
completing this type of attack. completing this type of attack.
It should be noted that the attack scenario described in this
document can be mitigated by performing proper route filtering
techniques.
Discussion of out of band methods to mitigate this attack are Discussion of out of band methods to mitigate this attack are
important; albeit beyond the scope of this document. This document important; albeit beyond the scope of this document. This document
is meant to provide input into routing protocol design choices being is meant to provide input into routing protocol design choices being
considered within the IETF, and to foster discussion of the practical considered within the IETF, and to foster discussion of the practical
implications of "policy" and "intent" in operational routing system implications of "policy" and "intent" in operational routing system
security. security.
3. Acknowledgements 3. Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of John Curran.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
There are no actions for IANA in the document. There are no actions for IANA in the document.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document describes an attack on an RPKI-enabled BGPSEC and is This document describes an attack on an RPKI-enabled BGPSEC and is
meant to inform the IETF community that this vulnerability exists as meant to inform the IETF community that this vulnerability exists as
a result of route-leaks and attacks that conform to this type of a result of route-leaks and attacks that conform to this type of
behavior, and that operators should not assume that that work items behavior, and that operators should not assume that that work items
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