draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft Akamai Internet-Draft Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders
Expires: September 28, 2017 NTT Expires: October 12, 2017 NTT
G. Hankins G. Hankins
Nokia Nokia
March 27, 2017 April 10, 2017
Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
session. session.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing. significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this
solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
without policies configured on EBGP sessions. without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
2. Solution Requirements 2. Solution
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this The following requirements apply to all BGP speakers:
document:
o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection o A BGP speaker MUST consider any routes advertised by an EBGP peer
(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for ineligible for route selection (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no
the EBGP peer. import policy was configured for the peer.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no o A BGP speaker MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
export policy was configured. export policy was configured for the peer.
o Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export o A BGP speaker SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export
nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a
policy engine. policy engine.
o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. o A BGP speaker MAY provide a configuration option to disable the
preceding behaviors, but it MUST implement them by default.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability.
3. Acknowledgments 3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas, Donald
Smith. Smith, and Dale Worley.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by
permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
mitigated by a secure default behavior. mitigated by a secure default behavior.
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