draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders Internet-Draft Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders
Expires: August 25, 2017 G. Hankins Expires: September 28, 2017 NTT
G. Hankins
Nokia Nokia
February 21, 2017 March 27, 2017
Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
session. session.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
skipping to change at page 1, line 40 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 26 skipping to change at page 2, line 27
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be There are BGP routing security issues that need to be addressed to
revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a make the Internet more stable. Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the
need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default problem, but software defects or operator misconfigurations can
behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks contribute too. This document provides guidance to BGP [RFC4271]
[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator implementers to improve the default level of Internet routing
misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability security.
we aim to address.
Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing. significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this
this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions. without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
2. Solution Requirements 2. Solution Requirements
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
document: document:
o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
the EBGP peer. the EBGP peer.
skipping to change at page 3, line 31 skipping to change at page 3, line 31
o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability. security capability.
3. Acknowledgments 3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, and John Heasley. Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald
Smith.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document addresses a basic routing security flaw caused by This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by
permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
mitigated by a secure default behavior. mitigated by a secure default behavior.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
skipping to change at page 4, line 39 skipping to change at page 4, line 39
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch Jared Mauch
NTT Communications Akamai Technologies
8285 Reese Lane 8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103 Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US US
Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net Email: jared@akamai.com
Job Snijders Job Snijders
NTT Communications NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ Amsterdam 1065 SZ
NL NL
Email: job@ntt.net Email: job@ntt.net
Greg Hankins Greg Hankins
Nokia Nokia
 End of changes. 10 change blocks. 
20 lines changed or deleted 21 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/