draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders Internet-Draft J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: May 4, 2017 G. Hankins Expires: August 25, 2017 G. Hankins
Nokia Nokia
October 31, 2016 February 21, 2017
Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
Policies draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-03
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
there is no import or export policy associated with a BGP session for there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family. session.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a
need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks
[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
we aim to address. we aim to address.
Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default. Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
all networks to reach each other. As the Internet has become more permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing. significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is confederation boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When
implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send
policies configured on EBGP sessions. routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
2. Solution Requirements 2. Solution Requirements
The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
Family apply to the solution described in this document: document:
o Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
import policy was configured. (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
the EBGP peer.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
export policy was configured. export policy was configured.
o Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures o Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export
preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes. nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a
policy engine.
o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability. security capability.
3. Acknowledgments 3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
Brian Dickson. Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, and John Heasley.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP This document addresses a basic routing security flaw caused by
speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
policies. Operators have a need for implementers to address the implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
attacks from a permissive security behavior. Attacks and inadvertent adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a mitigated by a secure default behavior.
secure default behavior.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Contributors 6. Contributors
The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
described in this document: described in this document:
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