Global Routing Operations                                       J. Mauch
Internet-Draft                                               J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track                                     NTT
Expires: November 11, 2016 May 10, 4, 2017                                          G. Hankins
                                                                   Nokia
                                                        October 31, 2016

 By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP
                            peering session.
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01

 Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without
                                Policies
                     draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02

Abstract

   This document defines the default behaviour behavior of a BGP speaker when
   there is no
   explicit import or export policy is associated with a BGP peering session. session for
   the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2016. May 4, 2017.

Copyright Notice

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Solution Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2   3
   3.  Solution Requirements  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Acknowledgements . . .   3
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  IANA Considerations  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   4
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3   4
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4

1.  Introduction

   BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
   revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem.  There is a
   need to provide guidance to BGP implementors implementers for the default
   behaviors of a well functioning internet Internet ecosystem.  Routing leaks
   [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
   [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
   misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on internet Internet stability
   we aim to address.

   Usually

   Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a configured peer or
   neighbor. by default.
   This practice dates back to the early days of internet
   protocols in being very the Internet, where
   operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow
   all networks to reach each other.  With  As the core of the
   internet becoming Internet has become more
   densely interconnected interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer speaker poses signficiant
   significant risks to the reachability of critical services. Internet routing.

   This proposal specification intends to solve improve this situation by requiring the
   explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any non-iBGP EBGP
   speaking session such as customers, peers peers, or confederation boundaries.
   boundaries in a base router or VPN instances.  When this solution is
   implemented, devices will no longer pass BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without explicit policy.
   policies configured on EBGP sessions.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Solution Requirements

   The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address
   Family apply to the solution described in this document:

   o  Software MUST mark consider any routes from an eBGP EBGP peer as 'invalid' in
      the Adj-RIB-In, invalid, if no explicit
      import policy was configured.

   o  Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an eBGP peer without an
      operator configuring a policy.

   o  Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in
      this mode. EBGP peer, if no
      export policy was configured.

   o  Software MUST SHOULD provide protection from internal failures
      preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes.

   o  Software MUST operate in this mode by default.

   o  Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
      security capability.

4.  Acknowledgements

3.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their
   comments
   comments, support and support: review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
   Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner.

5. Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and
   Brian Dickson.

4.  Security Considerations

   This document addresses the basic security posture behavior of how a BGP speaking
   device within
   speaker propagates routes in a network. default configuration without
   policies.  Operators have a need for implementors implementers to address the
   problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible
   attacks from a permissive security posture. behavior.  Attacks and inadvertent
   advertisements cause business impact necessitating this that can be mitigated by a
   secure default behavior.

6.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Contributors

   The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
   described in this document:

   Jakob Heitz
   Cisco

   Email: jheitz@cisco.com

   Ondrej Filip
   CZ.NIC

   Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and A.
              Robachevsky, "Methods for Detection B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Mitigation Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-
              mitigation-02 (work in progress), March 2016. RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

Authors' Addresses

   Jared Mauch
   NTT Communications, Inc. Communications
   8285 Reese Lane
   Ann Arbor  Michigan 48103
   US

   Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications, Inc. Communications
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   NL

   Email: job@ntt.net

   Greg Hankins
   Nokia
   777 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com