draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-13.txt   draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-14.txt 
GEOPRIV H. Tschofenig GEOPRIV H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Standards Track F. Adrangi Intended status: Standards Track F. Adrangi
Expires: December 26, 2007 Intel Expires: January 5, 2008 Intel
M. Jones M. Jones
A. Lior A. Lior
Bridgewater Bridgewater
June 24, 2007 July 4, 2007
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter
draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-13.txt draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-14.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2008.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes procedures for conveying access network This document describes procedures for conveying access network
ownership and location information based on a civic and geospatial ownership and location information based on a civic and geospatial
location format in Remote Authentication Dial In User Service location format in Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
skipping to change at page 3, line 13 skipping to change at page 3, line 13
and addressed in this document. and addressed in this document.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Location Delivery based on Out-of-Band Agreements . . . . 6 3.1. Location Delivery based on Out-of-Band Agreements . . . . 6
3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request . . . . . . 9 3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request . . . . . . 9
3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Location Data Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3. Location Data Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.1. Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.1. Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.6. Location-Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.6. Location-Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.7. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.7. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 5. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 6. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.1. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 7.1. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2.1. RADIUS Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.1. RADIUS Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2.2. RADIUS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2.2. RADIUS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.3. Identity Information and Location Information . . . . . . 35 7.3. Identity Information and Location Information . . . . . . 37
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier . . . . . . . 37 8.1. New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier . . . . . . . 39
8.2. New Registry: Location Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8.2. New Registry: Location Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . 39 8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . 41
8.4. New Registry: Entity Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8.4. New Registry: Entity Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 42
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . 49
A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's
Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.3. Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.3. Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 56 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 58
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Wireless networks (including wireless LAN) are being deployed in Wireless networks (including wireless LAN) are being deployed in
public places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee public places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee
shops by a diverse set of operators such as cellular network shops by a diverse set of operators such as cellular network
operators, Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed operators, Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed
broadband operators. The proposed attributes are also applicable to broadband operators. The proposed attributes are also applicable to
other situations (such as wired networks) where operator network other situations (such as wired networks) where operator network
ownership and location information has to be conveyed to the RADIUS ownership and location information has to be conveyed to the RADIUS
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(e.g., by determining the appropriate tariff and taxation in (e.g., by determining the appropriate tariff and taxation in
dependence of the location of the access network and the end host), dependence of the location of the access network and the end host),
location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for
roaming environments and to enable other location aware services. roaming environments and to enable other location aware services.
This document describes attributes to convey location-related This document describes attributes to convey location-related
information both within authentication and accounting exchanges. information both within authentication and accounting exchanges.
These attributes are usable both within RADIUS and Diameter. These attributes are usable both within RADIUS and Diameter.
Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [9] defines access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [10] defines
requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to
geographic location information. The model includes a Location geographic location information. The model includes a Location
Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server
(LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location
Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule
Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which
enforces access control policies on requests to location information. enforces access control policies on requests to location information.
In Appendix A the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol are In Appendix A the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol are
compared to the functionality provided by this document. compared to the functionality provided by this document.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [1]. document are to be interpreted as described in [1].
RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [10]. RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [11].
Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
authorization policy rules is taken from [9]. authorization policy rules is taken from [10].
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information
The following exchanges show how location information is conveyed in The following exchanges show how location information is conveyed in
RADIUS. Note that the description of the individual scenarios RADIUS. Note that the description of the individual scenarios
assumes that privacy policies allow location conveyed in RADIUS; assumes that privacy policies allow location conveyed in RADIUS;
however the exchanges are also applicableto Diameter, as noted in however the exchanges are also applicableto Diameter, as noted in
Section 6. A discussion about the privacy treatment is provided in Section 6. A discussion about the privacy treatment is provided in
Section 7.2. Section 7.2.
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| Success | | | Success | |
|<----------------------| | |<----------------------| |
| | | | | |
Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements
3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request 3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request
If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although
it is needed by the RADIUS server to compute the authorization it is needed by the RADIUS server to compute the authorization
decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client. This decision then, if the Location-Capable attribute is included in the
exchange is shown in Figure 2. In the initial Access-Request message Access-Request message, then the RADIUS server MAY challenge the
from the NAS to the RADIUS server the Location-Capable attribute is RADIUS client. This exchange is shown in Figure 2. The inclusion of
attached to indicate that the NAS understands the Access-Challenge the Location-Capable attribute in an Access-Request message indicates
message. The subsequent Access-Challenge message sent from the that the NAS supports this specification and is capable of providing
RADIUS server to the NAS provides a hint regarding the type of location in response to an Access-Challenge. The subsequent Access-
desired location information attributes. The NAS treates the Basic- Challenge message sent from the RADIUS server to the NAS provides a
Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules attributes as opaque data hint regarding the type of desired location information attributes.
(e.g., it echoes these rules provided by the server within the The NAS treates the Basic-Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules
Access-Challenge back in the Access-Request). In the shown message attributes as opaque data (e.g., it echoes these rules provided by
flow the location attributes are then provided in the subsequent the server within the Access-Challenge back in the Access-Request).
Access-Request message. When receiving this Access-Request message In the shown message flow the location attributes are then provided
the authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a in the subsequent Access-Request message. When receiving this
number of criteria, including the newly defined attributes listed in Access-Request message the authorization procedure at the RADIUS
Section 4. server might be based on a number of criteria, including the newly
defined attributes listed in Section 4.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | Network | | RADIUS | | | | Network | | RADIUS |
| User | | Access | | Server | | User | | Access | | Server |
| | | Server | | | | | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | | | |
| Authentication phase | | | Authentication phase | |
| begin | | | begin | |
|---------------------->| | |---------------------->| |
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| |<-----------------------------| | |<-----------------------------|
| Authentication | | | Authentication | |
| Success | | | Success | |
|<----------------------| | |<----------------------| |
| | | | | |
Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Initial Request Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Initial Request
3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request 3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request
The demand mid-session location delivery method utilizes the Change The on demand mid-session location delivery method utilizes the
of Authorization (COA) message, as defined in [11]. At anytime Change of Authorization (COA) message, as defined in [12]. At any
during the session the Dynamic Authorization Client MAY send a COA time during the session the Dynamic Authorization Client MAY send a
message containing session identification attributes to the RADIUS COA message containing session identification attributes to the
client (i.e., Dynamic Authorization Server). The COA message may RADIUS client (i.e., Dynamic Authorization Server). By including a
instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access- Service-Type attribute with a value of "Authorize Only" a CoA-Request
Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in may instruct the NAS to generate an Access-Request containing a
which case the RADIUS client MUST include location information in Service-Type attribute with value "Authorize Only" in which case the
this Access-Request if this functionality was previously set in the RADIUS client MUST include location information in this Access-
Requested-Info attribute, which also implies the echoing of the Request if the Requested-Info attribute included in the Access-Accept
Basic-Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules attributes received in included the flag setting 'FUTURE_REQUESTS'. This also implies the
the previous Access-Accept within the Access-Request sent in response echoing of the Basic-Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules
to the CoA-Request. attributes received in the previous Access-Accept within the Access-
Request sent in response to the CoA-Request.
Figure 3 shows the approach graphically. Figure 3 shows the approach graphically.
+---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
| Dynamic | | Dynamic | | Dynamic | | Dynamic |
| Authorization | | Authorization | | Authorization | | Authorization |
| Server | | Client | | Server | | Client |
+---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| |
: :
: Initial Protocol Interaction :
: (details omitted) :
: :
| |
| Access-Accept |
| + Requested-Info (FUTURE_REQUESTS) |
| + Basic-Policy-Rules |
| + Extended-Policy-Rules |
|<----------------------------------------------|
| |
: :
: <<Some time later>> :
: :
| |
| COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
|<----------------------------------------------| |<----------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
| + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" | | + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" |
|---------------------------------------------->| |---------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"| | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
| + Location-Information | | + Location-Information |
| + Location-Data | | + Location-Data |
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| + Extended-Policy-Rules | | + Extended-Policy-Rules |
|---------------------------------------------->| |---------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Access-Accept | | Access-Accept |
|<----------------------------------------------| |<----------------------------------------------|
| | | |
Figure 3: Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request Figure 3: Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request
Upon receiving the Access-Request message containing the Service-Type Upon receiving the Access-Request message containing the Service-Type
hint attribute with a value of Authorize-Only from the NAS, the attribute with a value of Authorize-Only from the NAS, the RADIUS
RADIUS server responds with either an Access-Accept or an Access- server responds with either an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject
Reject message. message.
RFC 3576 [3] is needed when location information is requested on RFC 3576 [3] is needed when location information is requested on
demand and location information cannot be obtained from accounting demand and location information cannot be obtained from accounting
messages at all or not in a timely fashion. messages at all or not in a timely fashion.
3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages 3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages
Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages. Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, when the Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, when the
session stops and periodically during the lifetime of the session. session stops and periodically during the lifetime of the session.
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace ID | Operator-Name ... | Namespace ID | Operator-Name ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Operator-Name ... | Operator-Name ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Namespace ID: Namespace ID:
The value within this field contains the The value within this field contains the
operator namespace identifier. The Namespace ID value operator namespace identifier. The Namespace ID value
is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer value. is encoded in ASCII.
Example: 1 for REALM Example: 1 for REALM
Operator-Name: Operator-Name:
The text field of variable length contains an The text field of variable length contains an
Access Network Operator Name. Access Network Operator Name.
This field is a RADIUS base data type of Text. This field is a RADIUS base data type of Text.
Example: anyisp.example.com Example: anyisp.example.com
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The Namespace ID field provides information about the operator The Namespace ID field provides information about the operator
namespace. This document defines four values for this attribute that namespace. This document defines four values for this attribute that
are listed below. Additional namespace identifiers must be are listed below. Additional namespace identifiers must be
registered with IANA (see Section 8.1) and must be associated with an registered with IANA (see Section 8.1) and must be associated with an
organization responsible for managing the namespace. organization responsible for managing the namespace.
TADIG (0): TADIG (0):
This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined
in [12]. TADIG codes are assigned by the TADIG Working Group in [13]. TADIG codes are assigned by the TADIG Working Group
within the GSM Association. The TADIG Code consists of two within the GSM Association. The TADIG Code consists of two
fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of
a three-character country code and a two-character alphanumeric a three-character country code and a two-character alphanumeric
operator (or company) ID. operator (or company) ID.
REALM (1): REALM (1):
The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator
names based on any registered domain name. Such names are names based on any registered domain name. Such names are
required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are
obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Since this operator is
limited to ASCII, any registered domain name which contains non-
ASCII characters must be encoded. To encode a domain name, first
ensure that any non-ASCII characters are in Unicode [14], then
apply the toAscii operation from RFC 3490 [4] to each label, then
re-assemble the encoded labels into a FQDN.
E212 (2): E212 (2):
The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC)
defined in [13]. The MCC/MCC values are assigned by the defined in [15]. The MCC/MCC values are assigned by the
Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T
and designated administrators in different countries. The E212 and designated administrators in different countries. The E212
value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed
by two or three ASCII digits containing the MNC. by two or three ASCII digits containing the MNC.
ICC (3): ICC (3):
The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Carrier Codes (ICC) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Carrier Codes (ICC)
defined in [14]. ICC values are assigned by national regulatory defined in [16]. ICC values are assigned by national regulatory
authorities and are coordinated by the Telecommunication authorities and are coordinated by the Telecommunication
Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T). When using the ICC namespace, the Standardization Sector (ITU-T). When using the ICC namespace, the
attribute consists of three uppercase ASCII characters containing attribute consists of three uppercase ASCII characters containing
a three-letter alphabetic country code as defined in [15], a three-letter alphabetic country code as defined in [17],
followed by one to six uppercase alphanumeric ASCII characters followed by one to six uppercase alphanumeric ASCII characters
containing the ICC itself. containing the ICC itself.
4.2. Location-Information Attribute 4.2. Location-Information Attribute
The Location-Information attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and The Location-Information attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and
in Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message in Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message
the Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop. the Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.
The Location-Information attribute provides meta-data about the The Location-Information attribute provides meta-data about the
skipping to change at page 16, line 47 skipping to change at page 18, line 4
registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this
field is a string. field is a string.
The following fields need more explanation: The following fields need more explanation:
sighting time: sighting time:
This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate. This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate.
The data type of this field is a string and and the content is The data type of this field is a string and and the content is
expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp
format [16]. format [18].
time-to-live: time-to-live:
This field gives a hint until when location information should be This field gives a hint until when location information should be
considered current. The data type of this field is a string and considered current. The data type of this field is a string and
the content is expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) the content is expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP)
timestamp format [16]. Note that the time-to-live field is timestamp format [18]. Note that the time-to-live field is
different than Retention Expires field used in the Basic Policy different than Retention Expires field used in the Basic Policy
Rules attribute, see Section 4.4. Retention expires indicates the Rules attribute, see Section 4.4. Retention expires indicates the
time the recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location time the recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
information. information.
Entity: Entity:
Location information can refer to different entities. This Location information can refer to different entities. This
document registers two entity values, namely: document registers two entity values, namely:
skipping to change at page 19, line 4 skipping to change at page 20, line 11
The format of the location data depends on the location The format of the location data depends on the location
profile. This document defines two location profiles. profile. This document defines two location profiles.
Details of the location profiles is described below. Details of the location profiles is described below.
4.3.1. Civic Location Profile 4.3.1. Civic Location Profile
Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an
entity. This section defines the civic location information profile entity. This section defines the civic location information profile
corresponding to the value (0) indicated in the Code field of the corresponding to the value (0) indicated in the Code field of the
Location-Information attribute. The location format is based on the Location-Information attribute. The location format is based on the
encoding format defined in Section 3.1 of [4] whereby the first 3 encoding format defined in Section 3.1 of [5] whereby the first 3
octets (i.e., the code for this DHCP option, the length of the DHCP octets (i.e., the code for this DHCP option, the length of the DHCP
option, and the 'what' element are not included) are not put into the option, and the 'what' element are not included) are not put into the
Location field of the above-described RADIUS Location-Data attribute. Location field of the above-described RADIUS Location-Data attribute.
4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile 4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile
This section defines the geospatial location information profile This section defines the geospatial location information profile
corresponding to the value (1) indicated in the Code field of the corresponding to the value (1) indicated in the Code field of the
Location-Information attribute. Geospatial location information is Location-Information attribute. Geospatial location information is
encoded as an opaque object whereby the format is reused from the encoded as an opaque object whereby the format is reused from the
Section 2 of RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format Section 2 of RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format
[5]. starting with starting with the third octet (i.e., the code for [6]. starting with starting with the third octet (i.e., the code for
the DHCP option and the length field is not included). the DHCP option and the length field is not included).
4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute 4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute
The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an an Access-Request, The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an an Access-Request,
Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and an
Accounting-Request message. Accounting-Request message.
Policy rules control the distribution of location information. The Policy rules control the distribution of location information. The
obligation with respect to understanding and processing of the Basic obligation with respect to understanding and processing of the Basic
Policy Rules attribute for RADIUS clients is to utilize a default Policy Rules attribute for RADIUS clients is to utilize a default
value of Basic-Policy-Rules unless explicitly configured otherwise, value of Basic-Policy-Rules unless explicitly configured otherwise,
and also for clients to echo the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute that and also for clients to echo the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute that
they receive from a server. As a default, the note-well field does they receive from a server. As a default, the note-well field does
not carry a pointer to human readable privacy policies, the not carry a pointer to human readable privacy policies, the
retransmission-allowed is set to zero (0), i.e., further distribution retransmission-allowed is set to zero (0), i.e., further distribution
is not allowed, and the retention-expiresf field is set to 24 hours. is not allowed, and the retention-expires field is set to 24 hours.
With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
in [17] and encodes them in a non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting in [19] and encodes them in a non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting
time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location- time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
Information attribute to conform to the GEOPRIV requirements [9], Information attribute to conform to the GEOPRIV requirements [10],
Section 2.7. Section 2.7.
The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below. The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ... | Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String (cont.) ... | String (cont.) ...
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Retention Expires (64 bits): Retention Expires (64 bits):
NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field. NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.
Note Well (variable): Note Well (variable):
This field contains a URI that points to human readable This field contains a URI that points to human readable
privacy instructions. The data type of this field is string. privacy instructions. The data type of this field is string.
This document reuses fields of the RFC 4119 [17] 'usage-rules' This document reuses fields of the RFC 4119 [19] 'usage-rules'
element. These fields have the following meaning: element. These fields have the following meaning:
retransmission-allowed: retransmission-allowed:
When the value of this field is to zero (0), then the recipient of When the value of this field is to zero (0), then the recipient of
this Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed this Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed
location information, or the object as a whole, with other location information, or the object as a whole, with other
parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location
information with other parties by considering the extended policy information with other parties by considering the extended policy
rules. rules.
retention-expires: retention-expires:
This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient
is no longer permitted to possess the location information. The is no longer permitted to possess the location information. The
data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP
timestamp [16]. timestamp [18].
note-well: note-well:
This field contains a URI that points to human readable privacy This field contains a URI that points to human readable privacy
instructions. This field is useful when location information is instructions. This field is useful when location information is
distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a
location based service. RADIUS entities are not supposed to location based service. RADIUS entities are not supposed to
process this field. process this field.
Whenever a Location Object leaves the RADIUS eco-system the URI in Whenever a Location Object leaves the RADIUS eco-system the URI in
the note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable the note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable
text. For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a text. For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a
SIP based environment then the human readable text is placed into SIP based environment then the human readable text is placed into
the 'note-well' element of the 'usage-rules' element contained in the 'note-well' element of the 'usage-rules' element contained in
the PIDF-LO document (see [17]). the PIDF-LO document (see [19]).
4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute 4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute
The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an Access-Request, The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an Access-Request,
an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in an an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in an
Accounting-Request message whenever location information is Accounting-Request message whenever location information is
transmitted. transmitted.
The ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length. The ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.
It contains a URI that indicates where the richer ruleset can be It contains a URI that indicates where the richer ruleset can be
found. This URI SHOULD use the HTTPS URI scheme. As a deviation found. This URI SHOULD use the HTTPS URI scheme. As a deviation
from [17] this field only contains a reference and does not carry an from [19] this field only contains a reference and does not carry an
attached extended rule set. This modification is motivated by the attached extended rule set. This modification is motivated by the
size limitations imposed by RADIUS. size limitations imposed by RADIUS.
Policy rules control the distribution of location information and, as Policy rules control the distribution of location information and, as
with the Basic Policy Rules attribute the obligation with respect to with the Basic Policy Rules attribute the obligation with respect to
understanding and processing of the Extended Policy Rules attribute understanding and processing of the Extended Policy Rules attribute
for RADIUS clients is when they are explicitly configured to attach for RADIUS clients is when they are explicitly configured to attach
the URI, and also for clients to echo the Extended-Policy-Rules the URI, and also for clients to echo the Extended-Policy-Rules
attribute that they receive from a server. There is no expectation attribute that they receive from a server. There is no expectation
that RADIUS clients will need to retrieve data at the URL specified that RADIUS clients will need to retrieve data at the URL specified
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Other bit positions are available via IANA Other bit positions are available via IANA
registration. registration.
4.7. Requested-Info Attribute 4.7. Requested-Info Attribute
The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate
what location information about which entity it wants to receive. what location information about which entity it wants to receive.
The latter aspect refers to the entities that are indicated in the The latter aspect refers to the entities that are indicated in the
Entity field of the Location-Information attribute. Entity field of the Location-Information attribute.
The Requested-Info attribute MAY be sent in an an Access-Accept or in
an Access-Challenge packet.
If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the
following cases need to be differentiated. If the RADIUS client and following cases need to be differentiated. If the RADIUS client and
the RADIUS server have agreed out-of-band to mandate the transfer of the RADIUS server have agreed out-of-band to mandate the transfer of
location information for every network access authentication request location information for every network access authentication request
then the processing listed below is not applicable. then the processing listed below is not applicable.
o If the RADIUS server requires location information for computing o If the RADIUS server requires location information for computing
the authorization decision and the RADIUS client does not provide the authorization decision and the RADIUS client does not provide
it with the Access-Request message then the Requested-Info it with the Access-Request message then the Requested-Info
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Location-Data OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Location-Data OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Basic-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Basic-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Requested-Info OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Requested-Info OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Location-Capable OctetString| | P,M | | V | Y | Location-Capable OctetString| | P,M | | V | Y |
----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----| ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
The attributes in this specification have no special translation The attributes in this specification have no special translation
requirements for Diameter to RADIUS or RADIUS to Diameter gateways; requirements for Diameter to RADIUS or RADIUS to Diameter gateways;
they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers, they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers,
alignment, and padding. See also Section 4.1 of [6] and Section 9 of alignment, and padding. See also Section 4.1 of [7] and Section 9 of
[18]. [20].
What this specification says about the applicability of the What this specification says about the applicability of the
attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to
AA-Request [18] or Diameter-EAP-Request [19]. What is said about AA-Request [20] or Diameter-EAP-Request [21]. What is said about
Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [18] or Diameter- Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [20] or Diameter-
EAP-Answer [19] with Result-Code AVP set to EAP-Answer [21] with Result-Code AVP set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. What is said about Access-Accept applies DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. What is said about Access-Accept applies
in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that
indicate success. Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject indicate success. Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject
packets applies in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer packets applies in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer
messages that indicate failure. messages that indicate failure.
What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request
[18]. [20].
What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting- What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting-
Request [18] as well. Request [20] as well.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
A number of security aspects are relevant for the distribution of A number of security aspects are relevant for the distribution of
location information via RADIUS. These aspects are discussed in location information via RADIUS. These aspects are discussed in
separate sub-sections. separate sub-sections.
7.1. Communication Security 7.1. Communication Security
Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in
[9], namely mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, [10], namely mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity,
data object confidentiality and replay protection. data object confidentiality and replay protection.
If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the
participating RADIUS entities is provided then adversaries can spoof participating RADIUS entities is provided then adversaries can spoof
and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are
proposed for RADIUS: proposed for RADIUS:
o [2] proposes the usage of a static key that raised concerns o [2] proposes the usage of a static key that raised concerns
regarding the lack dynamic key management. At the time of regarding the lack dynamic key management. At the time of
writing, work is ongoing to address some shortcomings of [2] writing, work is ongoing to address some shortcomings of [2]
attribute security protection. attribute security protection.
o RADIUS over IPsec [20] enables the use of standard key management o RADIUS over IPsec [22] enables the use of standard key management
mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [21], to establish IPsec mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [23], to establish IPsec
security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be used to security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be used to
prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information. prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information.
Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this
document, it is also required for the transport of keying material document, it is also required for the transport of keying material
in the context of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence, in the context of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence,
this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled. this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled.
Mutual authentication MUST be provided between neighboring RADIUS Mutual authentication MUST be provided between neighboring RADIUS
entities to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Since mutual entities to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Since mutual
authentication is already required for key transport within RADIUS authentication is already required for key transport within RADIUS
messages it does not represent a deployment obstacle. Since IPsec messages it does not represent a deployment obstacle. Since IPsec
protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already
no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those
described in [20]. described in [22].
In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the
following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not
integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the
contents of the Location Object or to insert, modify and delete contents of the Location Object or to insert, modify and delete
attributes or individual fields. To address these problems the attributes or individual fields. To address these problems the
Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
entire Access-Request packet. The Message-Authenticator (80) is also entire Access-Request packet. The Message-Authenticator (80) is also
required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern
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not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has
to be placed on the RADIUS entities to behave according to the to be placed on the RADIUS entities to behave according to the
defined rules. Furthermore, the RADIUS protocol does not involve the defined rules. Furthermore, the RADIUS protocol does not involve the
user in their protocol interaction except for tunneling user in their protocol interaction except for tunneling
authentication information (such as EAP messages) through their authentication information (such as EAP messages) through their
infrastructure. RADIUS and Diameter have even become a de-facto infrastructure. RADIUS and Diameter have even become a de-facto
protocol for key distribution for network access authentication protocol for key distribution for network access authentication
applications. Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the applications. Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the
trust placed into the infrastructure particularly from the security trust placed into the infrastructure particularly from the security
area when it comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is area when it comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is
described in [22]. described in [24].
7.2. Privacy Considerations 7.2. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
location information within RADIUS. Note also that it is possible location information within RADIUS. Note also that it is possible
for the RADIUS server to obtain some amount of location information for the RADIUS server to obtain some amount of location information
from the NAS identifier. This document, however, describes from the NAS identifier. This document, however, describes
procedures to convey more accurate location information about the end procedures to convey more accurate location information about the end
host and/or the network. In a number of deployment environments host and/or the network. In a number of deployment environments
location information about the network also reveals the current location information about the network also reveals the current
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7.2.2. RADIUS Server 7.2.2. RADIUS Server
The RADIUS server is a natural place for storing authorization The RADIUS server is a natural place for storing authorization
policies since the user typically has some sort of trust relationship policies since the user typically has some sort of trust relationship
with the entity operating the RADIUS server. Once the infrastructure with the entity operating the RADIUS server. Once the infrastructure
is deployed and location aware applications are available then there is deployed and location aware applications are available then there
might be a strong desire to use location information for other might be a strong desire to use location information for other
purposes as well. purposes as well.
The Common Policy framework [23] that was extended for geolocation The Common Policy framework [25] that was extended for geolocation
privacy [24] are tailored for this purpose. The Extensible Markup privacy [26] are tailored for this purpose. The Extensible Markup
Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) [25] gives Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) [27] gives
users the ability to change their privacy policies using a users the ability to change their privacy policies using a
standardized protocol. These policies are an important tool for standardized protocol. These policies are an important tool for
limiting further distribution of the user's location to other limiting further distribution of the user's location to other
location based services. location based services.
The RADIUS server MUST behave according to the following guidelines: The RADIUS server MUST behave according to the following guidelines:
o The RADIUS server MUST attach available rules to the Access- o The RADIUS server MUST attach available rules to the Access-
Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message when the Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message when the
RADIUS client is supposed to provide location information. RADIUS client is supposed to provide location information.
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brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
to learn movement patterns of users. to learn movement patterns of users.
The user's identity can be "leaked" to the visited network or RADIUS The user's identity can be "leaked" to the visited network or RADIUS
brokers in a number of ways: brokers in a number of ways:
o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the
particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to
avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [26]. avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [28].
Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
them dynamically. them dynamically.
o Network access authentication procedures, such as PPP CHAP [27] or o Network access authentication procedures, such as PPP CHAP [29] or
EAP [22], may reveal the user's identity as a part of the EAP [24], may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem
in EAP methods, for instance by employing private Network Access in EAP methods, for instance by employing private Network Access
Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [28] and Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [30] and
by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
(e.g., [28], [29] [30], [31]). Support for identity privacy (e.g., [30], [31] [32], [33]). Support for identity privacy
within CHAP is not available. within CHAP is not available.
o RADIUS may return information from the home network to the visited o RADIUS may return information from the home network to the visited
in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the user or in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the user or
at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the
use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some accounting use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some accounting
attribute usage scenarios [32]. attribute usage scenarios [34].
o Mobility protocols may reveal some long-term identifier, such as a o Mobility protocols may reveal some long-term identifier, such as a
home address. home address.
o Application layer protocols may reveal other permanent o Application layer protocols may reveal other permanent
identifiers. identifiers.
To prevent the correlation of identities with location information it To prevent the correlation of identities with location information it
is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information from all is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information from all
sources, not just one. sources, not just one.
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In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanisms to achieve information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanisms to achieve
this functionality are discussed in Section 7.1. this functionality are discussed in Section 7.1.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values
defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in
the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 3575 [7], in accordance with the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 3575 [8], in accordance with
BCP 26 [8]. Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in BCP 26 [9]. Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in
the Diameter name space. For RADIUS attributes and registries the Diameter name space. For RADIUS attributes and registries
created by this document IANA is requested to place them at created by this document IANA is requested to place them at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types. http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types.
This document defines the following attributes: This document defines the following attributes:
Operator-Name Operator-Name
Location-Information Location-Information
Location-Data Location-Data
Basic-Policy-Rules Basic-Policy-Rules
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Section 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute and a Code Section 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute and a Code
field that contains 8 bit integer value. Two values, zero and one, field that contains 8 bit integer value. Two values, zero and one,
are defined in this document, namely: are defined in this document, namely:
Value (0): Civic location profile described in Section 4.3.1 Value (0): Civic location profile described in Section 4.3.1
Value (1): Geospatial location profile described in Section 4.3.2 Value (1): Geospatial location profile described in Section 4.3.2
The remaining values are reserved for future use. The remaining values are reserved for future use.
Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a Following the policies outline in [8] the available bits with a
description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the value and the corresponding Each registration must include the value and the corresponding
semantic of the defined location profile. semantic of the defined location profile.
8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute 8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute
Section 4.6 defines the Location-Capable attribute that contains a Section 4.6 defines the Location-Capable attribute that contains a
bit map. 32 bits are available whereby a single bit, bit (0), bit map. 32 bits are available whereby a single bit, bit (0),
indicating 'Location Capable' is defined by this document. Bits 1-15 indicating 'Location Capable' is defined by this document. Bits 1-15
are reserved for future use. are reserved for future use.
Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a Following the policies outline in [8] the available bits with a
description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of
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Section 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute that contains Section 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute that contains
an 8 bit Entity field. Two values are registered by this document, an 8 bit Entity field. Two values are registered by this document,
namely: namely:
Value (0) describes the location of the user's client device Value (0) describes the location of the user's client device
Value (1) describes the location of the RADIUS client Value (1) describes the location of the RADIUS client
All other values are reserved for future use. All other values are reserved for future use.
Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a Following the policies outline in [8] the available bits with a
description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the value and a corresponding Each registration must include the value and a corresponding
description. description.
8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags 8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags
Section 4.4 defines the Basic Policy Rules attribute that contains Section 4.4 defines the Basic Policy Rules attribute that contains
flags indicating privacy settings. 16 bits are available whereby a flags indicating privacy settings. 16 bits are available whereby a
single bit, bit (0), indicating 'retransmission allowed' is defined single bit, bit (0), indicating 'retransmission allowed' is defined
by this document. Bits 1-15 are reserved for future use. by this document. Bits 1-15 are reserved for future use.
Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a Following the policies outline in [8] the available bits with a
description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of
skipping to change at page 41, line 5 skipping to change at page 43, line 5
+----------+----------------------+ +----------+----------------------+
| 1 | CIVIC_LOCATION | | 1 | CIVIC_LOCATION |
| 2 | GEO_LOCATION | | 2 | GEO_LOCATION |
| 4 | USERS_LOCATION | | 4 | USERS_LOCATION |
| 8 | NAS_LOCATION | | 8 | NAS_LOCATION |
| 16 | FUTURE_REQUESTS | | 16 | FUTURE_REQUESTS |
+----------+----------------------+ +----------+----------------------+
The semantic of these values is defined in Section 4.7. The semantic of these values is defined in Section 4.7.
Following the policies outline in [7] new Capability Tokens with a Following the policies outline in [8] new Capability Tokens with a
description of their semantic for usage with the Requested-Info description of their semantic for usage with the Requested-Info
attribute will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by the O&M attribute will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by the O&M
Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT working group chairs Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT working group chairs
or the working group chairs of a designated successor working group. or the working group chairs of a designated successor working group.
Updates can be provided based on expert approval only. A designated Updates can be provided based on expert approval only. A designated
expert will be appointed by the O&M Area Directors. No mechanism to expert will be appointed by the O&M Area Directors. No mechanism to
mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned. Based on expert approval mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned. Based on expert approval
it is possible to delete entries from the registry. it is possible to delete entries from the registry.
Each registration must include: Each registration must include:
skipping to change at page 44, line 20 skipping to change at page 46, line 20
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote [2] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
June 2000. June 2000.
[3] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba, [3] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba,
"Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003. In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.
[4] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 [4] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.
[5] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses Configuration and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses Configuration
Information", RFC 4776, November 2006. Information", RFC 4776, November 2006.
[5] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host [6] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location
Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004. Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.
[6] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, [7] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[7] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote [8] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003. Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003.
[8] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA [9] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[9] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D. [10] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
[10] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000. [11] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[11] Chiba, M., "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote [12] Chiba, M., "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
draft-ietf-radext-rfc3576bis-08 (work in progress), June 2007. draft-ietf-radext-rfc3576bis-08 (work in progress), June 2007.
[12] "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association [13] "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association
Official Document TD.13", , June 2006. Official Document TD.13", , June 2006.
[13] "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and [14] "The Unicode Standard -- Worldwide Character Encoding --
Version 1.0, Addison- Wesley, Volume 1, 1991, Volume 2", ,
1992.
[15] "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and
mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212", , May 2004. mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212", , May 2004.
[14] "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks, [16] "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks,
ITU-T Recommendation M.1400", , January 2004. ITU-T Recommendation M.1400", , January 2004.
[15] "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their [17] "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their
subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1", , 1997. subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1", , 1997.
[16] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification, [18] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992. Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.
[17] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object [19] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
Format", RFC 4119, December 2005. Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.
[18] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter [20] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter
Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005. Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.
[19] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [21] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
[20] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial [22] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003. (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[21] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [23] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[22] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network [24] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network
Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005. Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
[23] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk, [25] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk,
J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Format for J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, February 2007. Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, February 2007.
[24] Schulzrinne, H., "Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for [26] Schulzrinne, H., "Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location Information", Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location Information",
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-12 (work in progress), May 2007. draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-12 (work in progress), May 2007.
[25] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [27] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
draft-ietf-simple-xcap-12 (work in progress), October 2006. draft-ietf-simple-xcap-12 (work in progress), October 2006.
[26] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless [28] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001. Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
[27] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [29] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[28] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol [30] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
(EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006. (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.
[29] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication [31] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01 Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01
(work in progress), April 2007. (work in progress), April 2007.
[30] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected [32] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected
EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress), draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
October 2004. October 2004.
[31] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method", [33] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method",
draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2007. draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2007.
[32] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney, [34] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
"Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006. "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.
[33] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation [35] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
Specification", OGC 02-023r4, Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", , http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", ,
January 2003. January 2003.
[34] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible [36] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005. LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[35] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol", [37] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
RFC 3694, September 2003. RFC 3694, September 2003.
[36] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., [38] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[37] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location [39] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location
Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-07 (work in Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-07 (work in
progress), February 2007. progress), February 2007.
Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements
This section compares the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol, This section compares the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol,
described in [9], against the approach of distributing Location described in [10], against the approach of distributing Location
Objects with RADIUS. Objects with RADIUS.
In Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 we discuss privacy implications when In Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 we discuss privacy implications when
RADIUS entities make location information available to other parties. RADIUS entities make location information available to other parties.
In Appendix A.3 the requirements are matched against these two In Appendix A.3 the requirements are matched against these two
scenarios. scenarios.
A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network
When location information is conveyed from the RADIUS client to the When location information is conveyed from the RADIUS client to the
skipping to change at page 48, line 13 skipping to change at page 50, line 13
Figure 18: Location Server at the Home Network Figure 18: Location Server at the Home Network
The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 18 denotes the entity that creates The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 18 denotes the entity that creates
the authorization rule set. the authorization rule set.
A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network
This section describes a scenario where location information made This section describes a scenario where location information made
available to Location Recipients by a Location Server in the visited available to Location Recipients by a Location Server in the visited
network. Some identifier needs to be used as an index within the network. Some identifier needs to be used as an index within the
location database. One possible identifier is the Network Access location database. One possible identifier is the Network Access
Identifier. RFC 4282 [22] and RFC 4372 [32] provide background Identifier. RFC 4282 [24] and RFC 4372 [34] provide background
whether entities in the visited network can obtain the user's NAI in whether entities in the visited network can obtain the user's NAI in
cleartext. cleartext.
The visited network provides location information to a Location The visited network provides location information to a Location
Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP). This document enables the NAS to Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP). This document enables the NAS to
obtain the user's privacy policy via the interaction with the RADIUS obtain the user's privacy policy via the interaction with the RADIUS
server. Otherwise only default policies, which are very restrictive, server. Otherwise only default policies, which are very restrictive,
are available. This allows the Location Server in the visited are available. This allows the Location Server in the visited
network to ensure act according to the user's policies. network to ensure act according to the user's policies.
skipping to change at page 49, line 41 skipping to change at page 51, line 41
Figure 19: Location Server at the Visited Network Figure 19: Location Server at the Visited Network
Location information always travels with privacy policies. This Location information always travels with privacy policies. This
document enables the RADIUS client to obtain these policies. The document enables the RADIUS client to obtain these policies. The
Location Server can subsequently act according to these policies to Location Server can subsequently act according to these policies to
provide access control using the extended policy rules and to adhere provide access control using the extended policy rules and to adhere
the privacy statements in the basic policy rules. the privacy statements in the basic policy rules.
A.3. Requirements matching A.3. Requirements matching
Section 7.1 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object". Section 7.1 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object".
We discuss these requirements in the subsequent list. We discuss these requirements in the subsequent list.
Req. 1. (Location Object generalities): Req. 1. (Location Object generalities):
* Regarding requirement 1.1, the syntax and semantic of the * Regarding requirement 1.1, the syntax and semantic of the
location object is taken from the [5] and [4]. It is location object is taken from the [6] and [5]. It is
furthermore possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3 furthermore possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3
[33], as used with PIDF-LO [17]. [35], as used with PIDF-LO [19].
* Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the civic * Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the civic
location information format are optional. location information format are optional.
* Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item * Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item
(CAtype 29) used in the DHCP civic format gives a further (CAtype 29) used in the DHCP civic format gives a further
classification of the location. This attribute can be seen as classification of the location. This attribute can be seen as
an extension. an extension.
* Regarding requirement 1.4, this document does not define the * Regarding requirement 1.4, this document does not define the
skipping to change at page 51, line 50 skipping to change at page 53, line 50
geospatial location information as described in Section 4.3.2 geospatial location information as described in Section 4.3.2
and in Section 4.3.1. and in Section 4.3.1.
* With the support of civic and geospatial location information * With the support of civic and geospatial location information
support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled. support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.
* Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information * Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information
used by this document only refers to absolute coordinates. used by this document only refers to absolute coordinates.
However, the granularity of the location information can be However, the granularity of the location information can be
reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields
described in [5]. described in [6].
* Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be * Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
field in [5]) and via extensions to [5] and [4]. field in [6]) and via extensions to [6] and [5].
Section 7.2 of [9] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol". Section 7.2 of [10] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".
These requirements are listed below: These requirements are listed below:
Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
instructions coded in the Location Object regarding the instructions coded in the Location Object regarding the
transmission and storage of the LO. This document requires that transmission and storage of the LO. This document requires that
entities that aim to make location information available to third entities that aim to make location information available to third
parties are required to obey the privacy instructions. parties are required to obey the privacy instructions.
Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
associated with the credentials are transported to the respective associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
skipping to change at page 52, line 34 skipping to change at page 54, line 34
considerations (see Section 7.2) are also relevant for this considerations (see Section 7.2) are also relevant for this
requirement. requirement.
Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of
small target devices, the design should allow a single message/ small target devices, the design should allow a single message/
packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The
encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards
the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path) the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path)
MTU size. MTU size.
Section 7.3 of [9] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location Section 7.3 of [10] details the requirements of a "Rule based
Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below: Location Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 18 the Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 18 the
decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient
access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network. With regard to Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network. With regard to
the scenario shown in Figure 19 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy the scenario shown in Figure 19 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy
Rules are sent from the RADIUS server to the NAS (see Section 4.4, Rules are sent from the RADIUS server to the NAS (see Section 4.4,
Section 4.5 and Section 7.2 for more details). Section 4.5 and Section 7.2 for more details).
Req. 8. (LG Rules): For all usage scenario it is possible to Req. 8. (LG Rules): For all usage scenario it is possible to
skipping to change at page 53, line 27 skipping to change at page 55, line 27
Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
disclosed to other entities. disclosed to other entities.
Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language
capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A
basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
Section 4.4. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in Section 4.4. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
Section 4.5. The format of these rules are described in [23] and Section 4.5. The format of these rules are described in [25] and
[24]. [26].
Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is
provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 4.4 (and as provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 4.4 (and as
introduced with PIDF-LO [17]). introduced with PIDF-LO [19]).
Section 7.4 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object Section 7.4 of [10] details the requirements of a "Location Object
Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below: Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key
exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example, exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example,
with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods. with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality. whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
This issue is further discussed in Section 7. The importance for This issue is further discussed in Section 7. The importance for
user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already
been recognized as an important property (see, for example, a been recognized as an important property (see, for example, a
document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [34]). document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [36]).
Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 7 Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 7
RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This
allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK. used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.
Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security
requirements for the protection of Location Objects, such as requirements for the protection of Location Objects, such as
mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data
object confidentiality and replay protection. As described in object confidentiality and replay protection. As described in
skipping to change at page 55, line 7 skipping to change at page 57, line 7
Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are
mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for
Location Objects between RADIUS infrastructure elements is Location Objects between RADIUS infrastructure elements is
provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic
key management framework) rather than on relying on object key management framework) rather than on relying on object
security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS). security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig (editor)
Nokia Siemens Networks Nokia Siemens Networks
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739 Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.com URI: http://www.tschofenig.com
Farid Adrangi Farid Adrangi
Intel Corporatation Intel Corporatation
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