draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-12.txt   draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-13.txt 
GEOPRIV H. Tschofenig GEOPRIV H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Standards Track F. Adrangi Intended status: Standards Track F. Adrangi
Expires: December 20, 2007 Intel Expires: December 26, 2007 Intel
M. Jones M. Jones
A. Lior A. Lior
Bridgewater Bridgewater
June 18, 2007 June 24, 2007
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS and Diameter
draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-12.txt draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-13.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 20, 2007. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 26, 2007.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes procedures for conveying access network This document describes procedures for conveying access network
ownership and location information based on a civic and geospatial ownership and location information based on a civic and geospatial
location format in Remote Authentication Dial In User Service location format in Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
skipping to change at page 3, line 21 skipping to change at page 3, line 21
3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request . . . . . . 9 3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request . . . . . . 9
3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. Location Delivery in Accounting Messages . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Location Data Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.3. Location Data Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.1. Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.3.1. Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.3.2. Geospatial Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.6. Location-Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4.6. Location-Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.7. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.7. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7.1. Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.2.1. RADIUS Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2.1. RADIUS Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2.2. RADIUS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.2.2. RADIUS Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.3. Identity Information and Location Information . . . . . . 36 7.3. Identity Information and Location Information . . . . . . 35
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.1. New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier . . . . . . . 38 8.1. New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier . . . . . . . 37
8.2. New Registry: Location Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 8.2. New Registry: Location Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8.3. New Registry: Challenge Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . 40 8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . 39
8.4. New Registry: Entity Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.4. New Registry: Entity Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 8.5. New Registry: Privacy Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 41 8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 40
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . 47 Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . 47
A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's
Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.3. Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.3. Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 56 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 56
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public Wireless networks (including wireless LAN) are being deployed in
places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by public places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee
a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators, shops by a diverse set of operators such as cellular network
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed broadband operators, Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed
operators. Note that the proposed attributes are applicable for all broadband operators. The proposed attributes are also applicable to
sorts of wireless and wired networks whenever operator network other situations (such as wired networks) where operator network
ownership and location information has to be conveyed to the RADIUS ownership and location information has to be conveyed to the RADIUS
server. server.
In the case when the home network needs to know the location of the In the case when the home network needs to know the location of the
user then, when a user executes the network access authentication user then, when a user executes the network access authentication
procedure, information about the location and ownership of the procedure, information about the location and ownership of the
visited network needs to be conveyed to the user's home network. The visited network needs to be conveyed to the user's home network. The
main intent of this document is to enable location aware billing main intent of this document is to enable location aware billing
(e.g., by determining the appropriate tariff and taxation in (e.g., by determining the appropriate tariff and taxation in
dependence of the location of the access network and the end host), dependence of the location of the access network and the end host),
location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for
roaming environments and to enable other location aware services. roaming environments and to enable other location aware services.
This document describes RADIUS attributes, which are added by a This document describes attributes to convey location-related
RADIUS client or a RADIUS proxy, to convey location-related information both within authentication and accounting exchanges.
information to the RADIUS server in Access-Request packets, or These attributes are usable both within RADIUS and Diameter.
additionally, within Accounting-Request packets. The description is
also applicable for usage with Diameter.
Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [9] defines access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [9] defines
requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to
geographic location information. The model includes a Location geographic location information. The model includes a Location
Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server
(LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location
Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule
Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which
enforces access control policies on requests to location information. enforces access control policies on requests to location information.
skipping to change at page 6, line 9 skipping to change at page 6, line 9
RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [10]. RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [10].
Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
authorization policy rules is taken from [9]. authorization policy rules is taken from [9].
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information
The following exchanges show how location information is conveyed in The following exchanges show how location information is conveyed in
RADIUS. Note that the description of the individual scenarios RADIUS. Note that the description of the individual scenarios
assumes that privacy policies allow the location being distributed. assumes that privacy policies allow location conveyed in RADIUS;
A discussion about the privacy treatment is provided in Section 7.2. however the exchanges are also applicableto Diameter, as noted in
Section 6. A discussion about the privacy treatment is provided in
Section 7.2.
3.1. Location Delivery based on Out-of-Band Agreements 3.1. Location Delivery based on Out-of-Band Agreements
Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location
information during the network access authentication and information during the network access authentication and
authorization procedure. Upon a network authentication request from authorization procedure. Upon a network authentication request from
an access network client, the Network Access Server (NAS) submits a an access network client, the Network Access Server (NAS) submits a
RADIUS Access-Request message that contains location information RADIUS Access-Request message that contains location information
attributes among other required attributes. In this scenario attributes among other required attributes. In this scenario
location information is attached to the Access-Request message location information is attached to the Access-Request message
without an explicit request from the RADIUS server. Note that such without an explicit request from the RADIUS server. Note that such
an approach with a prior agreement between the RADIUS client and the an approach with a prior agreement between the RADIUS client and the
RADIUS server is only applicable in certain environments. For RADIUS server is only applicable in certain environments. For
example, in deployment environments where the RADIUS client and the example, in deployment environments where the RADIUS client and the
RADIUS server belong to the same organizational entity. RADIUS server belong to the same organizational entity. The Basic-
Policy-Rules attribute is populated based on the defaults described
in Section 4.4, unless it has been explicitly configured otherwise.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | Network | | RADIUS | | | | Network | | RADIUS |
| User | | Access | | Server | | User | | Access | | Server |
| | | Server | | | | | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | | | |
| Authentication phase | | | Authentication phase | |
| begin | | | begin | |
|---------------------->| | |---------------------->| |
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3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request 3.2. Location Delivery based on Initial Request
If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although
it is needed by the RADIUS server to compute the authorization it is needed by the RADIUS server to compute the authorization
decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client. This decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client. This
exchange is shown in Figure 2. In the initial Access-Request message exchange is shown in Figure 2. In the initial Access-Request message
from the NAS to the RADIUS server the Location-Capable attribute is from the NAS to the RADIUS server the Location-Capable attribute is
attached to indicate that the NAS understands the Access-Challenge attached to indicate that the NAS understands the Access-Challenge
message. The subsequent Access-Challenge message sent from the message. The subsequent Access-Challenge message sent from the
RADIUS server to the NAS provides a hint regarding the type of RADIUS server to the NAS provides a hint regarding the type of
desired location information attributes. In the shown message flow desired location information attributes. The NAS treates the Basic-
these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules attributes as opaque data
message. When receiving this Access-Request message the (e.g., it echoes these rules provided by the server within the
authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a Access-Challenge back in the Access-Request). In the shown message
flow the location attributes are then provided in the subsequent
Access-Request message. When receiving this Access-Request message
the authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a
number of criteria, including the newly defined attributes listed in number of criteria, including the newly defined attributes listed in
Section 4. Section 4.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | Network | | RADIUS | | | | Network | | RADIUS |
| User | | Access | | Server | | User | | Access | | Server |
| | | Server | | | | | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | | | |
| Authentication phase | | | Authentication phase | |
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| Authentication | | | Authentication | |
| Success | | | Success | |
|<----------------------| | |<----------------------| |
| | | | | |
Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Initial Request Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Initial Request
3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request 3.3. Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request
The demand mid-session location delivery method utilizes the Change The demand mid-session location delivery method utilizes the Change
of Authorization (COA) message, as defined in [3]. At anytime during of Authorization (COA) message, as defined in [11]. At anytime
the session the RADIUS server MAY send a COA message containing during the session the Dynamic Authorization Client MAY send a COA
session identification attributes to the RADIUS client. The COA message containing session identification attributes to the RADIUS
message may instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only client (i.e., Dynamic Authorization Server). The COA message may
Access-Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize- instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access-
Only") in which case the RADIUS client MUST include location Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in
information in this Access-Request if this functionality was which case the RADIUS client MUST include location information in
previously set in the Requested-Info attribute. this Access-Request if this functionality was previously set in the
Requested-Info attribute, which also implies the echoing of the
Basic-Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules attributes received in
the previous Access-Accept within the Access-Request sent in response
to the CoA-Request.
Figure 3 shows the approach graphically. Figure 3 shows the approach graphically.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
| Network | | RADIUS | | Dynamic | | Dynamic |
| Access | | Server | | Authorization | | Authorization |
| Server | | | | Server | | Client |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
|<----------------------------------------------| |<----------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
| + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" | | + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" |
|---------------------------------------------->| |---------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"| | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
| + Location-Information | | + Location-Information |
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session stops and periodically during the lifetime of the session. session stops and periodically during the lifetime of the session.
Accounting messages may also be generated when the user roams during Accounting messages may also be generated when the user roams during
handoff. handoff.
Accounting information may be needed by the billing system to Accounting information may be needed by the billing system to
calculate the user's bill. For example, there may be different calculate the user's bill. For example, there may be different
tariffs or tax rates applied based on the location. tariffs or tax rates applied based on the location.
If the RADIUS server needs to obtain location information in If the RADIUS server needs to obtain location information in
accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info
attribute to the Access-Accept message. attribute to the Access-Accept message. The Basic-Policy-Rules and
the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes are to be echoed in the
Accounting-Request if indicated in the Access-Accept.
Figure 4 shows the message exchange. Figure 4 shows the message exchange.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | Network | | RADIUS | | | | Network | | RADIUS |
| User | | Access | | Server | | User | | Access | | Server |
| | | Server | | | | | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | | | |
| Authentication phase | |
| begin | |
|---------------------->| |
| | |
: : : : : :
: Protocol Exchanges to perform : : Initial Protocol Interaction :
: Authentication and Authorization : : (details omitted) :
: : : : : :
| | | | | |
| | RADIUS | | | RADIUS |
| | Access-Accept | | | Access-Accept |
| | + Requested-Info | | | + Requested-Info |
| | + Basic-Policy-Rules | | | + Basic-Policy-Rules |
| | + Extended-Policy-Rules | | | + Extended-Policy-Rules |
| |<-----------------------------| | |<-----------------------------|
| Authentication | | | Authentication | |
| Success | | | Success | |
skipping to change at page 14, line 12 skipping to change at page 14, line 12
The Namespace ID field provides information about the operator The Namespace ID field provides information about the operator
namespace. This document defines four values for this attribute that namespace. This document defines four values for this attribute that
are listed below. Additional namespace identifiers must be are listed below. Additional namespace identifiers must be
registered with IANA (see Section 8.1) and must be associated with an registered with IANA (see Section 8.1) and must be associated with an
organization responsible for managing the namespace. organization responsible for managing the namespace.
TADIG (0): TADIG (0):
This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined
in [11]. TADIG codes are assigned by the TADIG Working Group in [12]. TADIG codes are assigned by the TADIG Working Group
within the GSM Association. The TADIG Code consists of two within the GSM Association. The TADIG Code consists of two
fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of
a three-character country code and a two-character alphanumeric a three-character country code and a two-character alphanumeric
operator (or company) ID. operator (or company) ID.
REALM (1): REALM (1):
The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator
names based on any registered domain name. Such names are names based on any registered domain name. Such names are
required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are
obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
E212 (2): E212 (2):
The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC)
defined in [12]. The MCC/MCC values are assigned by the defined in [13]. The MCC/MCC values are assigned by the
Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T
and designated administrators in different countries. The E212 and designated administrators in different countries. The E212
value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed
by two or three ASCII digits containing the MNC. by two or three ASCII digits containing the MNC.
ICC (3): ICC (3):
The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Carrier Codes (ICC) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Carrier Codes (ICC)
defined in [13]. ICC values are assigned by national regulatory defined in [14]. ICC values are assigned by national regulatory
authorities and are coordinated by the Telecommunication authorities and are coordinated by the Telecommunication
Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T). When using the ICC namespace, the Standardization Sector (ITU-T). When using the ICC namespace, the
attribute consists of three uppercase ASCII characters containing attribute consists of three uppercase ASCII characters containing
a three-letter alphabetic country code as defined in [14], a three-letter alphabetic country code as defined in [15],
followed by one to six uppercase alphanumeric ASCII characters followed by one to six uppercase alphanumeric ASCII characters
containing the ICC itself. containing the ICC itself.
4.2. Location-Information Attribute 4.2. Location-Information Attribute
The Location-Information attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and The Location-Information attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and
in Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message in Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message
the Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop. the Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.
The Location-Information attribute provides meta-data about the The Location-Information attribute provides meta-data about the
location information, such as sighting time, time-to-live, location location information, such as sighting time, time-to-live, location
determination method, etc. Note that this attribute is largely determination method, etc. Implementations SHOULD treat this
treated as an opaque blob, like the Location-Data attribute to which attribute as undistinguished octets, like the Location-Data attribute
it refers. to which it refers.
The format is shown below. The format is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ... | Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String (cont.) ... | String (cont.) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 16, line 47 skipping to change at page 16, line 47
registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this
field is a string. field is a string.
The following fields need more explanation: The following fields need more explanation:
sighting time: sighting time:
This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate. This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate.
The data type of this field is a string and and the content is The data type of this field is a string and and the content is
expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp
format [15]. format [16].
time-to-live: time-to-live:
This field gives a hint until when location information should be This field gives a hint until when location information should be
considered current. The data type of this field is a string and considered current. The data type of this field is a string and
the content is expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) the content is expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP)
timestamp format [15]. Note that the time-to-live field is timestamp format [16]. Note that the time-to-live field is
different than Retention Expires field used in the Basic Policy different than Retention Expires field used in the Basic Policy
Rules attribute, see Section 4.4. Retention expires indicates the Rules attribute, see Section 4.4. Retention expires indicates the
time the recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location time the recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
information. information.
Entity: Entity:
Location information can refer to different entities. This Location information can refer to different entities. This
document registers two entity values, namely: document registers two entity values, namely:
skipping to change at page 17, line 41 skipping to change at page 17, line 41
in the Location-Data attribute. Two profiles are defined in this in the Location-Data attribute. Two profiles are defined in this
document, namely one civic location profile (see Section 4.3.1) document, namely one civic location profile (see Section 4.3.1)
that uses value (0) and a geospatial location profile (see that uses value (0) and a geospatial location profile (see
Section 4.3.2) that uses the value (1). Section 4.3.2) that uses the value (1).
The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253 The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
octets. octets.
4.3. Location Data Attribute 4.3. Location Data Attribute
For the RADIUS protocol location information is an opaque object.
The Location-Data attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and in The Location-Data attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and in
Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message the Accounting-Request messages. For the Accounting-Request message the
Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop. Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.
Implementations SHOULD treat this attribute as undistinguished
octets.
The format is shown below. The format is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ... | Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String (cont.) ... | String (cont.) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 19, line 21 skipping to change at page 19, line 21
This section defines the geospatial location information profile This section defines the geospatial location information profile
corresponding to the value (1) indicated in the Code field of the corresponding to the value (1) indicated in the Code field of the
Location-Information attribute. Geospatial location information is Location-Information attribute. Geospatial location information is
encoded as an opaque object whereby the format is reused from the encoded as an opaque object whereby the format is reused from the
Section 2 of RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format Section 2 of RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format
[5]. starting with starting with the third octet (i.e., the code for [5]. starting with starting with the third octet (i.e., the code for
the DHCP option and the length field is not included). the DHCP option and the length field is not included).
4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute 4.4. Basic Policy Rules Attribute
Policy rules control the distribution of location information. In The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an an Access-Request,
some environments the RADIUS client might know the privacy Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and an
preferences of the user based on pre-configuration or the user Accounting-Request message.
communicated them as part of the network attachment. Note, however,
at the time of writing such a protocol extension has not be available
for network attachment protocols. In many other cases the RADIUS
server (or an entity with a relationship to the RADIUS server) might
possess the user's authorization policies. The Basic-Policy-Rules
attribute MAY be sent in an an Access-Request, Access-Accept, an
Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and an Accounting-Request message.
If the RADIUS client does not know the user's policy and no out-of-
band agreement regarding the delivery of location information between
the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server exists then the RADIUS client
MUST NOT attach location information in the initial Access-Request
message but should rather wait for the RADIUS server to send an
Access-Challenge for location information.
If the RADIUS client does not know the user's policy but an out-of-
band agreement regarding the delivery of location information between
the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server exists then the RADIUS client
MAY transfer location information in the initial Access-Request
message to the RADIUS server. Since policies always travel with
location information it is necessary to attach default policies with
restrictive privacy settings appropriate for the respective
environment in this case. The 'retransmission-allowed' flag MUST be
set to '0' meaning that the location must not be shared with other
parties (other than forarding them to the RADIUS server). In case
the RADIUS server knows the user's privacy policies then these
policies SHOULD be sent from the RADIUS server to the RADIUS client
in a subsequent response message, namely Access-Challenge and Access-
Accept, and these policies will be applied to further location
dissemination and in subsequent RADIUS interactions (e.g., when
attaching location information to Accounting messages).
Note that the authorization framework defined in [16] and [17] Policy rules control the distribution of location information. The
together with the Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration obligation with respect to understanding and processing of the Basic
Access Protocol (XCAP) [18] gives users the ability to change their Policy Rules attribute for RADIUS clients is to utilize a default
privacy policies using a standardized protocol. value of Basic-Policy-Rules unless explicitly configured otherwise,
and also for clients to echo the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute that
they receive from a server. As a default, the note-well field does
not carry a pointer to human readable privacy policies, the
retransmission-allowed is set to zero (0), i.e., further distribution
is not allowed, and the retention-expiresf field is set to 24 hours.
With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
in [19] and encodes them in a non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting in [17] and encodes them in a non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting
time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location- time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
Information attribute to conform to the GEOPRIV requirements [9], Information attribute to conform to the GEOPRIV requirements [9],
Section 2.7. Section 2.7.
The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below. The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ... | Type | Length | String ...
skipping to change at page 21, line 32 skipping to change at page 21, line 5
Retention Expires (64 bits): Retention Expires (64 bits):
NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field. NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.
Note Well (variable): Note Well (variable):
This field contains a URI that points to human readable This field contains a URI that points to human readable
privacy instructions. The data type of this field is string. privacy instructions. The data type of this field is string.
This document reuses fields of the RFC 4119 [19] 'usage-rules' This document reuses fields of the RFC 4119 [17] 'usage-rules'
element. These fields have the following meaning: element. These fields have the following meaning:
retransmission-allowed: retransmission-allowed:
When the value of this element is '0', then the recipient of this When the value of this field is to zero (0), then the recipient of
Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed location this Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed
information, or the object as a whole, with other parties. The location information, or the object as a whole, with other
value of '1' allows to share the location information with other parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location
parties by considering the extended policy rules. information with other parties by considering the extended policy
rules.
retention-expires: retention-expires:
This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient
is no longer permitted to possess the location information. The is no longer permitted to possess the location information. The
data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP
timestamp [15]. timestamp [16].
note-well: note-well:
This field contains a URI that points to human readable privacy This field contains a URI that points to human readable privacy
instructions. This field is useful when location information is instructions. This field is useful when location information is
distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a
location based service. RADIUS entities are not supposed to location based service. RADIUS entities are not supposed to
process this field. process this field.
Whenever a Location Object leaves the RADIUS eco-system the URI in Whenever a Location Object leaves the RADIUS eco-system the URI in
the note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable the note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable
text. For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a text. For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a
SIP based environment then the human readable text is placed into SIP based environment then the human readable text is placed into
the 'note-well' element of the 'usage-rules' element contained in the 'note-well' element of the 'usage-rules' element contained in
the PIDF-LO document (see [19]). the PIDF-LO document (see [17]).
4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute 4.5. Extended Policy Rules Attribute
The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an Access-Request, The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent in an Access-Request,
an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in an an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in an
Accounting-Request message whenever location information is Accounting-Request message whenever location information is
transmitted. transmitted.
The ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length. The ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.
It contains a URI that indicates where the richer ruleset can be It contains a URI that indicates where the richer ruleset can be
found. This URI SHOULD use the HTTPS URI scheme. As a deviation found. This URI SHOULD use the HTTPS URI scheme. As a deviation
from [19] this field only contains a reference and does not carry an from [17] this field only contains a reference and does not carry an
attached extended rule set. This modification is motivated by the attached extended rule set. This modification is motivated by the
size limitations imposed by RADIUS. size limitations imposed by RADIUS.
Policy rules control the distribution of location information and, as
with the Basic Policy Rules attribute the obligation with respect to
understanding and processing of the Extended Policy Rules attribute
for RADIUS clients is when they are explicitly configured to attach
the URI, and also for clients to echo the Extended-Policy-Rules
attribute that they receive from a server. There is no expectation
that RADIUS clients will need to retrieve data at the URL specified
in the attribute and to parse the XML policies.
The format of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below. The format of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ... | Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String (cont.) ... | String (cont.) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
skipping to change at page 23, line 41 skipping to change at page 23, line 9
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Ruleset Reference: Ruleset Reference:
This field contains a URI that points to the policy rules. This field contains a URI that points to the policy rules.
4.6. Location-Capable Attribute 4.6. Location-Capable Attribute
The Location-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a The Location-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a
proxy server) to indicate support for the functionality specified in proxy server) to indicate support for the functionality specified in
this document. The Location-Capable attribute with the L-flag set this document. The Location-Capable attribute with the value for
MUST appear in Access-Request Messages, if the NAS supports the 'Location Capable' MUST be sent with the Access-Request messages, if
functionality described in this document. the NAS supports the functionality described in this document and is
capable of sending location information. A RADIUS server SHOULD NOT
challenge for location information unless the Location-Capable
attribute has been sent to it.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String | | Type | Length | Integer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| String (cont.) | | Integer (cont.) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Capable Attribute To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Capable Attribute
Length: Length:
4 6
Value:
This field is four octets in length, and the format Integer:
is shown below. The data type of this field is string.
All fields are transmitted from left to right:
0 1 This field is a 32-bit integer value.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 Only a single value is defined for this field:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L|o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The symbol 'o' refers to reserved flags available for Value | Semantic
assignment via IANA. ----------+-----------------
1 | Location Capable
This document defines a single bit only: L - Location Capable. Other bit positions are available via IANA
registration.
4.7. Requested-Info Attribute 4.7. Requested-Info Attribute
The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate
what location information about which entity it wants to receive. what location information about which entity it wants to receive.
The latter aspect refers to the entities that are indicated in the The latter aspect refers to the entities that are indicated in the
Entity field of the Location-Information attribute. Entity field of the Location-Information attribute.
If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the
skipping to change at page 27, line 8 skipping to change at page 26, line 8
the absence of an out-of-band agreement, if it wants the RADIUS the absence of an out-of-band agreement, if it wants the RADIUS
client to return location information and if authorization policies client to return location information and if authorization policies
permit it. This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access- permit it. This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access-
Accept or in the Access-Challenge message. Accept or in the Access-Challenge message.
A summary of the attribute is shown below. A summary of the attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value ... | Type | Length | Integer ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value (cont.) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value (cont.) | | Integer (cont.) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute
Length: Length:
10 6
Value:
The content of the Value field is shown below.
The data type of the Value field is string.
The fields are transmitted from left to right:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Requested-Info |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Requested-Info |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Requested-Info (64 bits): Integer:
This text field contains an integer value that encodes the The content of the Integer field encodes the
requested information attributes. requested information attributes.
Each capability value represents a bit position. Each capability value represents a bit position.
This document specifies the following capabilities: This document specifies the following capabilities:
Name: Name:
CIVIC_LOCATION CIVIC_LOCATION
Description: Description:
The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from
the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value
representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach
civic location attributes. CIVIC_LOCATION refers to the location civic location attributes. CIVIC_LOCATION refers to the location
profile defined in Section 4.3.1. profile defined in Section 4.3.1.
Numerical Value: Numerical Value:
skipping to change at page 32, line 32 skipping to change at page 31, line 32
Basic-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Basic-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Requested-Info OctetString| M | P | | V | Y | Requested-Info OctetString| M | P | | V | Y |
Location-Capable OctetString| | P,M | | V | Y | Location-Capable OctetString| | P,M | | V | Y |
----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----| ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
The attributes in this specification have no special translation The attributes in this specification have no special translation
requirements for Diameter to RADIUS or RADIUS to Diameter gateways; requirements for Diameter to RADIUS or RADIUS to Diameter gateways;
they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers, they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers,
alignment, and padding. See also Section 4.1 of [6] and Section 9 of alignment, and padding. See also Section 4.1 of [6] and Section 9 of
[20]. [18].
What this specification says about the applicability of the What this specification says about the applicability of the
attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to
AA-Request [20] or Diameter-EAP-Request [21]. What is said about AA-Request [18] or Diameter-EAP-Request [19]. What is said about
Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [20] or Diameter- Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [18] or Diameter-
EAP-Answer [21] with Result-Code AVP set to EAP-Answer [19] with Result-Code AVP set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. What is said about Access-Accept applies DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH. What is said about Access-Accept applies
in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that
indicate success. Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject indicate success. Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject
packets applies in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer packets applies in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer
messages that indicate failure. messages that indicate failure.
What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request
[20]. [18].
What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting- What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting-
Request [20] as well. Request [18] as well.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
A number of security aspects are relevant for the distribution of A number of security aspects are relevant for the distribution of
location information via RADIUS. These aspects are discussed in location information via RADIUS. These aspects are discussed in
separate sub-sections. separate sub-sections.
7.1. Communication Security 7.1. Communication Security
Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in
skipping to change at page 33, line 27 skipping to change at page 32, line 27
If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the
participating RADIUS entities is provided then adversaries can spoof participating RADIUS entities is provided then adversaries can spoof
and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are
proposed for RADIUS: proposed for RADIUS:
o [2] proposes the usage of a static key that raised concerns o [2] proposes the usage of a static key that raised concerns
regarding the lack dynamic key management. At the time of regarding the lack dynamic key management. At the time of
writing, work is ongoing to address some shortcomings of [2] writing, work is ongoing to address some shortcomings of [2]
attribute security protection. attribute security protection.
o RADIUS over IPsec [22] enables the use of standard key management o RADIUS over IPsec [20] enables the use of standard key management
mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [23], to establish IPsec mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [21], to establish IPsec
security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be used to security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be used to
prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information. prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information.
Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this
document, it is also required for the transport of keying material document, it is also required for the transport of keying material
in the context of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence, in the context of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence,
this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled. this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled.
Mutual authentication MUST be provided between neighboring RADIUS Mutual authentication MUST be provided between neighboring RADIUS
entities to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Since mutual entities to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Since mutual
authentication is already required for key transport within RADIUS authentication is already required for key transport within RADIUS
messages it does not represent a deployment obstacle. Since IPsec messages it does not represent a deployment obstacle. Since IPsec
protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already
no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those
described in [22]. described in [20].
In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the
following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not
integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the
contents of the Location Object or to insert, modify and delete contents of the Location Object or to insert, modify and delete
attributes or individual fields. To address these problems the attributes or individual fields. To address these problems the
Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
entire Access-Request packet. The Message-Authenticator (80) is also entire Access-Request packet. The Message-Authenticator (80) is also
required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern
skipping to change at page 34, line 29 skipping to change at page 33, line 29
not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has
to be placed on the RADIUS entities to behave according to the to be placed on the RADIUS entities to behave according to the
defined rules. Furthermore, the RADIUS protocol does not involve the defined rules. Furthermore, the RADIUS protocol does not involve the
user in their protocol interaction except for tunneling user in their protocol interaction except for tunneling
authentication information (such as EAP messages) through their authentication information (such as EAP messages) through their
infrastructure. RADIUS and Diameter have even become a de-facto infrastructure. RADIUS and Diameter have even become a de-facto
protocol for key distribution for network access authentication protocol for key distribution for network access authentication
applications. Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the applications. Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the
trust placed into the infrastructure particularly from the security trust placed into the infrastructure particularly from the security
area when it comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is area when it comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is
described in [24]. described in [22].
7.2. Privacy Considerations 7.2. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
location information within RADIUS. Note also that it is possible location information within RADIUS. Note also that it is possible
for the RADIUS server to obtain some amount of location information for the RADIUS server to obtain some amount of location information
from the NAS identifier. This document, however, describes from the NAS identifier. This document, however, describes
procedures to convey more accurate location information about the end procedures to convey more accurate location information about the end
host and/or the network. In a number of deployment environments host and/or the network. In a number of deployment environments
location information about the network also reveals the current location information about the network also reveals the current
skipping to change at page 35, line 22 skipping to change at page 34, line 22
o If neither an out-of-band agreement exists nor location o If neither an out-of-band agreement exists nor location
information is requested by the RADIUS server then location information is requested by the RADIUS server then location
information is not disclosed by the RADIUS client. information is not disclosed by the RADIUS client.
o The RADIUS client MUST pass location information to other entities o The RADIUS client MUST pass location information to other entities
(e.g., when information is written to a local database or to the (e.g., when information is written to a local database or to the
log files) only together with the policy rules. The entity log files) only together with the policy rules. The entity
receiving the location information (together with the policies) receiving the location information (together with the policies)
MUST follow the guidance given with these rules. MUST follow the guidance given with these rules.
o A RADIUS client MUST include any rules available towards the o A RADIUS client MUST include Basic-Policy-Rules and Extended-
RADIUS server. Policy-Rules attributes that are configured within an Access-
Request packet.
o If the RADIUS client receives the Basic-Policy-Rules and the o NAS implementations supporting this specification, which are
Extended-Policy-Rules attribute with an Access-Accept or an configured to provide location information, MUST echo Basic-
Access-Challenge message then these attributes MUST be attached in Policy-Rules and Extended-Policy-Rules attributes unmodified
subsequent RADIUS messages that contain the Location-Information within a subsequent Access-Request packet. In addition, an
attribute (such as accounting messages). Access-Request packet sent with a Service-Type value of "Authorize
Only" MUST include Basic-Policy-Rules or Extended-Policy-Rules
attributes received in a previous Access-Accept if the
FUTURE_REQUESTS flag was set in the Requested-Info attribute.
7.2.2. RADIUS Server 7.2.2. RADIUS Server
The RADIUS server is a natural place for storing authorization The RADIUS server is a natural place for storing authorization
policies since the user typically has some sort of trust relationship policies since the user typically has some sort of trust relationship
with the entity operating the RADIUS server. Once the infrastructure with the entity operating the RADIUS server. Once the infrastructure
is deployed and location aware applications are available then there is deployed and location aware applications are available then there
might be a strong desire to use location information for other might be a strong desire to use location information for other
purposes as well. The Common Policy framework [16] that was extended purposes as well.
for geolocation privacy [17] are tailored for this purpose. These
policies might be useful for limiting further distribution of the
user's location to other location based services. The home RADIUS
server (or a similar entity) thereby acts as a location server for
access to location services.
The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines: The Common Policy framework [23] that was extended for geolocation
privacy [24] are tailored for this purpose. The Extensible Markup
Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) [25] gives
users the ability to change their privacy policies using a
standardized protocol. These policies are an important tool for
limiting further distribution of the user's location to other
location based services.
o The RADIUS server MUST pass location information to other entities The RADIUS server MUST behave according to the following guidelines:
only together with the policy rules. The entity receiving the
location information (together with the policies) MUST follow the
guidance given with these rules. This includes the distribution
of location information via local storage and for further
distribution. The entity receiving the location information
(together with the policies) MUST follow the guidance given with
these rules. The RADIUS server has to ensure that the user's
preferences are taken care of within the given boundaries (such as
legal regulations or operational considerations). For example, a
user might not want the home network to store information about
its location information beyond a indicated time frame. However,
a user might on the other hand want to ensure that disputes
concerning the billed amount can be resolved. Location
information might help to resolve the dispute. The user might,
for example, be able to show that he has never been at the
indicated place.
o The RADIUS server MUST attach available rules to the Access- o The RADIUS server MUST attach available rules to the Access-
Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message when the Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message when the
RADIUS client is supposed to provide location information. RADIUS client is supposed to provide location information.
o When location information is made available to other entities
(e.g., writing to stable storage for latter billing processing)
then the RADIUS server MUST attach the privacy rules to location
information.
7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy 7.2.3. RADIUS Proxy
A RADIUS proxy, behaving as a combined RADIUS client and RADIUS A RADIUS proxy, behaving as a combined RADIUS client and RADIUS
server, MUST follow the rules described in Section 7.2.1 and server, MUST follow the rules described in Section 7.2.1 and
Section 7.2.2. Section 7.2.2.
7.3. Identity Information and Location Information 7.3. Identity Information and Location Information
For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his
device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information. device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information.
skipping to change at page 36, line 41 skipping to change at page 35, line 35
brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
to learn movement patterns of users. to learn movement patterns of users.
The user's identity can be "leaked" to the visited network or RADIUS The user's identity can be "leaked" to the visited network or RADIUS
brokers in a number of ways: brokers in a number of ways:
o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the
particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to
avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [25]. avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [26].
Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
them dynamically. them dynamically.
o Network access authentication procedures, such as PPP CHAP [26] or o Network access authentication procedures, such as PPP CHAP [27] or
EAP [24], may reveal the user's identity as a part of the EAP [22], may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem
in EAP methods, for instance by employing private Network Access in EAP methods, for instance by employing private Network Access
Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [27] and Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [28] and
by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
(e.g., [27], [28] [29], [30]). Support for identity privacy (e.g., [28], [29] [30], [31]). Support for identity privacy
within CHAP is not available. within CHAP is not available.
o RADIUS may return information from the home network to the visited o RADIUS may return information from the home network to the visited
in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the user or in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the user or
at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the
use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some accounting use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some accounting
attribute usage scenarios [31]. attribute usage scenarios [32].
o Mobility protocols may reveal some long-term identifier, such as a o Mobility protocols may reveal some long-term identifier, such as a
home address. home address.
o Application layer protocols may reveal other permanent o Application layer protocols may reveal other permanent
identifiers. identifiers.
To prevent the correlation of identities with location information it To prevent the correlation of identities with location information it
is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information from all is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information from all
sources, not just one. sources, not just one.
skipping to change at page 40, line 14 skipping to change at page 39, line 14
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the value and the corresponding Each registration must include the value and the corresponding
semantic of the defined location profile. semantic of the defined location profile.
8.3. New Registry: Challenge Capable Attribute 8.3. New Registry: Location Capable Attribute
Section 4.6 defines the Location-Capable attribute that contains a Section 4.6 defines the Location-Capable attribute that contains a
bit map. 16 bits are available whereby a single bit, bit (0), bit map. 32 bits are available whereby a single bit, bit (0),
indicating 'Location Capable' is defined by this document. Bits 1-15 indicating 'Location Capable' is defined by this document. Bits 1-15
are reserved for future use. are reserved for future use.
Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a
description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the RADEXT
working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated working group chairs or the working group chairs of a designated
successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert successor working group. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
skipping to change at page 41, line 33 skipping to change at page 40, line 33
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry. entries from the registry.
Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of Each registration must include the bit position and the semantic of
the bit. the bit.
8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute 8.6. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute
This document creates a new IANA registry for the Requested-Info Section 4.7 defines the Requested-Info attribute that contains a bit
attribute. IANA is requested to add the following four values to map. 32 bits are available whereby a 5 bits are defined by this
this registry: document. This document creates a new IANA registry for the
Requested-Info attribute. IANA is requested to add the following
values to this registry:
+----------+----------------------+ +----------+----------------------+
| Value | Capability Token | | Value | Capability Token |
+----------+----------------------+ +----------+----------------------+
| 1 | CIVIC_LOCATION | | 1 | CIVIC_LOCATION |
| 2 | GEO_LOCATION | | 2 | GEO_LOCATION |
| 4 | USERS_LOCATION | | 4 | USERS_LOCATION |
| 8 | NAS_LOCATION | | 8 | NAS_LOCATION |
| 16 | FUTURE_REQUESTS | | 16 | FUTURE_REQUESTS |
+----------+----------------------+ +----------+----------------------+
skipping to change at page 43, line 51 skipping to change at page 42, line 51
of issues with us. We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work of issues with us. We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work
with 3GPP activities. with 3GPP activities.
The RADEXT working group chairs, David Nelson and Bernard Aboba, The RADEXT working group chairs, David Nelson and Bernard Aboba,
provided several draft reviews and we would like to thank them for provided several draft reviews and we would like to thank them for
the help and their patience. the help and their patience.
Finally, we would like to thank Bernard Aboba and Dan Romascanu for Finally, we would like to thank Bernard Aboba and Dan Romascanu for
the IETF Last Call comments, Derek Atkins for his security area the IETF Last Call comments, Derek Atkins for his security area
directorate review and Yoshiko Chong for spotting a bug in the IANA directorate review and Yoshiko Chong for spotting a bug in the IANA
consideration section. consideration section. Bernard spend of lot of his time to interact
with the authors to resolve the IETF LC issues he raised. We would
like to thank him for the energie he spend on this document.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote [2] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
skipping to change at page 44, line 45 skipping to change at page 44, line 45
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[9] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D. [9] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
[10] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000. [10] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[11] "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association [11] Chiba, M., "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
draft-ietf-radext-rfc3576bis-08 (work in progress), June 2007.
[12] "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association
Official Document TD.13", , June 2006. Official Document TD.13", , June 2006.
[12] "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and [13] "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and
mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212", , May 2004. mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212", , May 2004.
[13] "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks, [14] "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks,
ITU-T Recommendation M.1400", , January 2004. ITU-T Recommendation M.1400", , January 2004.
[14] "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their [15] "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their
subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1", , 1997. subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1", , 1997.
[15] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification, [16] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992. Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.
[16] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk, [17] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, February 2007.
[17] Schulzrinne, H., "Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location Information",
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-12 (work in progress), May 2007.
[18] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
draft-ietf-simple-xcap-12 (work in progress), October 2006.
[19] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
Format", RFC 4119, December 2005. Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.
[20] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter [18] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter
Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005. Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.
[21] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible [19] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005. August 2005.
[22] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial [20] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003. (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[23] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [21] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[24] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network [22] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network
Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005. Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
[25] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless [23] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk,
J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, February 2007.
[24] Schulzrinne, H., "Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for
Expressing Privacy Preferences for Location Information",
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-12 (work in progress), May 2007.
[25] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
draft-ietf-simple-xcap-12 (work in progress), October 2006.
[26] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001. Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
[26] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [27] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[27] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol [28] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
(EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006. (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.
[28] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication [29] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01 Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01
(work in progress), April 2007. (work in progress), April 2007.
[29] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected [30] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected
EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress), draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
October 2004. October 2004.
[30] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method", [31] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method",
draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2007. draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2007.
[31] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney, [32] Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
"Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006. "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.
[32] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation [33] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
Specification", OGC 02-023r4, Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", , http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", ,
January 2003. January 2003.
[33] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible [34] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005. LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[34] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol", [35] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
RFC 3694, September 2003. RFC 3694, September 2003.
[35] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., [36] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[36] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location [37] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location
Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-07 (work in Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-07 (work in
progress), February 2007. progress), February 2007.
Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements Appendix A. Matching with Geopriv Requirements
This section compares the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol, This section compares the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol,
described in [9], against the approach of distributing Location described in [9], against the approach of distributing Location
Objects with RADIUS. Objects with RADIUS.
In Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 we discuss privacy implications when In Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2 we discuss privacy implications when
RADIUS is not used according to these usage scenario. In RADIUS entities make location information available to other parties.
Appendix A.3 the requirements are matched against these two In Appendix A.3 the requirements are matched against these two
scenarios. scenarios.
A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network A.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network
This section focuses on location information transport from the local When location information is conveyed from the RADIUS client to the
RADIUS server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home RADIUS RADIUS server then it might subsequently be made available for
server (acting as the Location Server). To use a more generic different purposes. This section discusses the privacy implication
scenario we assume that the visited RADIUS and the home RADIUS server for making location information available to other entities.
belong to different administrative domains. The Location Recipient
obtains location information about a particular Target via protocols
specified outside the scope of this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an
API).
Please note that the main usage scenario defined in this document To use a more generic scenario we assume that the visited RADIUS and
assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co- the home RADIUS server belong to different administrative domains.
located into a single entity with regard to location based network The Location Recipient obtains location information about a
access authorization, taxation and billing. particular Target via protocols specified outside the scope of this
document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an API).
The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically. The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.
visited network | home network visited network | home network
| |
| +----------+ | +----------+
| | Rule | | | Rule |
| | Holder | | | Holder |
| | |
| +----+-----+ | +----+-----+
| | | |
| rule|interface | rule|interface
| V +----------+ | V +----------+
+----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ |Location | | +----------+ notification |Location |
|Location | publication | Location | notification |Location | |Generator | | |Location |<------------->|Recipient |
|Generator |<------------->| Server |<------------->|Recipient | +----------+ publication |Server | interface | |
| | interface | | interface | | |RADIUS |<------------->+----------+ +----------+
+----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ |Client | interface |RADIUS | E.g., SIP/HTTP
+----------+ | |Server |
| +----------+
E.g., NAS RADIUS
| |
Local RADIUS RADIUS Home RADIUS SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
Server | Server
| |
Figure 18: Location Server at the Home Network Figure 18: Location Server at the Home Network
The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 18 denotes the entity that creates The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 18 denotes the entity that creates
the authorization rule set. the authorization rule set.
A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network A.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network
This section describes a scenario where location information made This section describes a scenario where location information made
available to Location Recipients by some entity in the visited available to Location Recipients by a Location Server in the visited
network. network. Some identifier needs to be used as an index within the
location database. One possible identifier is the Network Access
In order for this scenario to be applicable the following two Identifier. RFC 4282 [22] and RFC 4372 [32] provide background
assumptions must hold: whether entities in the visited network can obtain the user's NAI in
cleartext.
o The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to
distribute Location Objects
o The visited network is able to learn the user's identity. RFC
4282 [24] and RFC 4372 [31] discuss this aspect in more detail.
The visited network provides location information to a Location The visited network provides location information to a Location
Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP). During the network access Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP). This document enables the NAS to
authentication procedure the visited network is able to retrieve the obtain the user's privacy policy via the interaction with the RADIUS
user's authorization policies from the home RADIUS server. This server. Otherwise only default policies, which are very restrictive,
should ensure that the visited network acts according to the user's are available. This allows the Location Server in the visited
policies. network to ensure act according to the user's policies.
The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically. The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.
visited network | home network visited network | home network
| |
+----------+ | +----------+ |
|Location | | |Location | |
|Recipient | | |Recipient | |
| | | | | |
+----------+ | +----------+ |
^ | +----------+ ^ | +----------+
| | | Rule | | | | Rule |
| | | Holder | notification | | Holder |
notification | | | interface | | |
interface | +----+-----+ | | +----+-----+
| | | | | |
| | rule|interface | | rule|interface
v | V v | |
+----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | |
|Location | Rule Transport| Home | |Location | | v
|Generator |<------------->| RADIUS | |Server | | +----------+
|& Server | RADIUS | Server | +----------+ Rule Transport|RADIUS |
+----------+ | +----------+ |RADIUS |<------------->|Server |
| |Client | RADIUS +----------+
+----------+ |
|Location | |
|Generator |
+----------+
Figure 19: Location Server at the Visited Network Figure 19: Location Server at the Visited Network
Location information always travels with privacy policies. This
document enables the RADIUS client to obtain these policies. The
Location Server can subsequently act according to these policies to
provide access control using the extended policy rules and to adhere
the privacy statements in the basic policy rules.
A.3. Requirements matching A.3. Requirements matching
Section 7.1 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object". Section 7.1 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object".
We discuss these requirements in the subsequent list. We discuss these requirements in the subsequent list.
Req. 1. (Location Object generalities): Req. 1. (Location Object generalities):
* Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be * Regarding requirement 1.1, the syntax and semantic of the
understood by the RADIUS server as defined in this document. location object is taken from the [5] and [4]. It is
Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is possible to furthermore possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3
convert it to the format used in GMLv3 [32]. This document [33], as used with PIDF-LO [17].
uses the civic and geospatial location information format used
in [5] and in [4]. The format of [5] and of [4] can be
convered into a PIDF-LO [19].
* Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the civic * Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the civic
location information format are optional. location information format are optional.
* Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item * Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item
(CAtype 29) used in the DHCP civic format gives a further (CAtype 29) used in the DHCP civic format gives a further
classification of the location. This attribute can be seen as classification of the location. This attribute can be seen as
an extension. an extension.
* Regarding requirement 1.4, the location information is not * Regarding requirement 1.4, this document does not define the
defined in this document. format of the location information.
* Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for * Regarding requirement 1.5, location information is only sent
both receiving and sending location information as described in from the RADIUS client to the RADIUS server.
this document.
* Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both * Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both
location information and privacy rules. Location information location information and privacy rules. Location information
is described in Section 4.2, in Section 4.3.1 and in is described in Section 4.2, in Section 4.3.1 and in
Section 4.3.2. The corresponding privacy rules are detailed in Section 4.3.2. The corresponding privacy rules are detailed in
Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5. Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5.
* Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a * Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a
variety of protocols. The format of the object is reused from variety of protocols. The format of the object is reused from
other documents as detailed in Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1, other documents as detailed in Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1,
Section 4.3.2 Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5). Section 4.3.2 Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5).
* Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object * Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object
has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format. As such it has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format to be used
is useable on constrained devices. with RADIUS.
Req. 2. (Location Object fields): Req. 2. (Location Object fields):
* Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried * Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried
within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the
EAP method itself). As described in Section 7.2 it has a EAP method itself). As described in Section 7.2 it has a
number of advantages if this identifier is not carried in number of advantages if this identifier is not carried in
clear. This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the clear. This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the
identity in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information identity in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information
skipping to change at page 51, line 7 skipping to change at page 51, line 12
The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if
they are not defined in this protocol. they are not defined in this protocol.
* Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location * Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location
Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the
security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself. security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself.
Section 7 describes these security mechanisms offered by the Section 7 describes these security mechanisms offered by the
RADIUS protocol. The same is true for requirement 2.4. RADIUS protocol. The same is true for requirement 2.4.
* Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1 and * Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1 and
Section 4.3.2 describe the content of the Location Field. Section 4.3.2 describe the content of the location fields.
Since the location format itself is not defined in this Since the location format itself is not defined in this
document motion and direction vectors as listed in requirement document motion and direction vectors as listed in requirement
2.6 are not defined. 2.6 are not defined.
* Regarding requirement 2.6, this document provides the * Regarding requirement 2.6, this document provides the
capability for the RADIUS server to indicate what type of capability for the RADIUS server to indicate what type of
location information it would like to see from the RADIUS location information it would like to see from the RADIUS
client. client.
* Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with * Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with
skipping to change at page 52, line 11 skipping to change at page 52, line 15
* Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be * Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
field in [5]) and via extensions to [5] and [4]. field in [5]) and via extensions to [5] and [4].
Section 7.2 of [9] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol". Section 7.2 of [9] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".
These requirements are listed below: These requirements are listed below:
Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
instructions coded in the Location Object regarding the instructions coded in the Location Object regarding the
transmission and storage of the LO. This document requires that transmission and storage of the LO. This document requires that
RADIUS entities sending or receiving location MUST obey such entities that aim to make location information available to third
instructions. parties are required to obey the privacy instructions.
Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
associated with the credentials are transported to the respective associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
using protocol. Section 7 specifies how security mechanisms are using protocol. Section 7 specifies how security mechanisms are
used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security
protection for the Location Object. Additionally, the privacy protection for the Location Object. Additionally, the privacy
considerations (see Section 7.2) are also relevant for this considerations (see Section 7.2) are also relevant for this
requirement. requirement.
Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of
small target devices, the design should allow a single message/ small target devices, the design should allow a single message/
packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The
encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards
the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path) the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path)
MTU size. The concept of a transaction is not immediately MTU size.
applicable to RADIUS.
Section 7.3 of [9] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location Section 7.3 of [9] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location
Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below: Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 18 the Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 18 the
decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient
access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network. With regard to Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network. With regard to
the scenario shown in Figure 19 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy the scenario shown in Figure 19 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy
Rules are sent from the home network to the visited network (see Rules are sent from the RADIUS server to the NAS (see Section 4.4,
Section 4.4, Section 4.5 and Section 7.2 for more details). Section 4.5 and Section 7.2 for more details).
Req. 8. (LG Rules): For mid-session delivery it is possible to Req. 8. (LG Rules): For all usage scenario it is possible to
enforce the user's privacy rules for the transfer of the Location consider the privacy rule before transmitting location information
Object. For the initial transmission of a Location Object the from the NAS to the RADIUS server or even to third parties. In
user would have to use network access authentication methods which the case of an out-of-band agreement between the owner of the NAS
provide user identity confidentiality which would render the and the owner of the RADIUS server privacy might be applied on a
Location Object completely useless for the visited network. For higher granularity. For the scenario shown in Figure 18 the
the scenario shown in Figure 18 the visited network is already in visited network is already in possession of the users location
possession of the users location information prior to the information prior to the authentication and authorization of the
authentication and authorization of the user. A correlation user. A correlation between the location and the user identity
between the location and the user identity might, however, still might, however, still not be possible for the visited network (as
not be possible for the visited network (as explained in explained in Section 7.2). A Location Server in the visited
Section 7.2). The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided network has to evaluate available rulesets.
by the home RADIUS server as soon as possible.
Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
disclosed to other entities. disclosed to other entities.
Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language
capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A
basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
Section 4.4. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in Section 4.4. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
Section 4.5. The format of these rules are described in [16] and Section 4.5. The format of these rules are described in [23] and
[17]. [24].
Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is
provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 4.4 (and as provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 4.4 (and as
introduced with PIDF-LO [19]). introduced with PIDF-LO [17]).
Section 7.4 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object Section 7.4 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object
Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below: Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key
exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example, exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example,
with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods. with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality. whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
This issue is further discussed in Section 7. The importance for This issue is further discussed in Section 7. The importance for
user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already
been recognized as an important property (see for example a been recognized as an important property (see, for example, a
document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [33]). document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [34]).
Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 7 Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 7
RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This
allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK. used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.
Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security
requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual requirements for the protection of Location Objects, such as
end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data
confidentiality and replay protection. As described in Section 7 object confidentiality and replay protection. As described in
these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if mutual Section 7 these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec
authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as various if mutual authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as
Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each other. various Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each
other.
Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are
mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for
Location Objects between RADIUS infrastructure elements is Location Objects between RADIUS infrastructure elements is
provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic
key management framework) rather than on relying on object key management framework) rather than on relying on object
security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS). security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
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