GEOPRIV                                                    H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft                                    Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                              F. Adrangi
Expires: March 31, December 11, 2007                                         Intel
                                                                M. Jones
                                                                 A. Lior
                                                             Bridgewater
                                                      September 27, 2006
                                                            June 9, 2007

  Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
                  draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-10.txt the Remote Authentication Dial In User
                       Service (RADIUS) Protocol
                  draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-11.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document describes RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
   (RADIUS) attributes for conveying access network ownership and
   location information based on a civic and geospatial location format.

   The distribution of location information is a privacy sensitive task.
   Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important
   and addressed in this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Authentication/Authorization Phase  Location Delivery  . . . based on Out-of-Band Agreements  . . . .  6
     3.2.  Mid-session Authorization  . .  Location Delivery based on Initial Request . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request . . . . . .  9
   4.  Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.1.  Scenario 1 - Use of
     3.4.  Location Information Delivery in AAA  . . . . Accounting Messages . 11
     4.2.  Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other
           Services . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.  Attributes . . . . . . . . . 12
     4.1.  Operator-Name Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Operator-Name 12
     4.2.  Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.3.  Location Data Attribute  . . . 13
     5.2.  Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.3.  Location-Info-Civic Attribute 17
       4.3.1.  Civic Location Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     5.4.  Location-Info-Geo Attribute . . 18
       4.3.2.  Geospatial Location Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.5.
     4.4.  Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     5.6. 19
     4.5.  Extended Policy Rules Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     5.7. 22
     4.6.  Challenge-Capable Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     5.8. 23
     4.7.  Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   6. 24
   5.  Table of Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   7. 30
   6.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   8.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements 31
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     8.1.  Distribution of Location Information at the User's
           Home Network . . . . . 32
     7.1.  Communication Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     8.2.  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
           Network 32
     7.2.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
       7.2.1.  RADIUS Client  . . . . . . . 35
     8.3.  Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
       7.2.2.  RADIUS Server  . . . . . 36
   9.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
       7.2.3.  RADIUS Broker  . . . . . 42
     9.1.  Entity in the visited network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
     9.2.  Entity in the home network . 35
     7.3.  Identity Information and Location Information  . . . . . . 36
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . 43
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
     8.1.  New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier  . . . . . . . 46
   11. IANA Considerations 38
     8.2.  New Registry: Location Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
     8.3.  New Registry: Challenge Capable Attribute  . . . . . . . . 49
     11.1. 40
     8.4.  New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier  . . Entity Types . . . . . 49
     11.2. New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 50
   12. Acknowledgments . 40
     8.5.  New Registry: Privacy Flags  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     8.6.  New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . 52
   13. References . . . 41
   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     13.1. Normative 43
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . 44
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
   Appendix A.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements  . . . . . . . . . 47
     A.1.  Distribution of Location Information at the User's
           Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     A.2.  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
           Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
     A.3.  Requirements matching  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 . 49
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 55
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 58 56

1.  Introduction

   Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public
   places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by
   a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators (GSM
   and CDMA), operators,
   Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed broadband
   operators.

   When  Note that the proposed attributes are applicable for all
   sorts of wireless and wired networks whenever operator network
   ownership and location information has to be conveyed to the RADIUS
   server.

   In the case when the home network needs to know the location of the
   user then, when a user executes the network access authentication procedure to
   such a network,
   procedure, information about the location and ownership of this the
   visited network needs to be conveyed to the user's home network to which the
   user has a contractual relationship. network.  The
   main intent of this document is to enable location aware billing
   (e.g., by determining the appropriate tariff and taxation in
   dependence of the location of the access network and the end host),
   location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for
   roaming environments and to enable other location aware services.

   This document describes AAA RADIUS attributes, which are used added by a AAA
   RADIUS client or a AAA proxy in an access network, RADIUS proxy, to convey location-
   related location-related
   information to the user's home AAA server.

   Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for
   wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used RADIUS server in other types of
   wireless and wired networks whenever location information is
   required. Access-Request packets, or
   additionally, within Accounting-Request packets.

   Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
   access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy. [10] [9] defines
   requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to
   geographic location information.  The model includes a Location
   Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server
   (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location
   Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule
   Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which
   enforces access control policies on requests to location information.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD
   In Appendix A the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol are
   compared to the functionality provided by this document.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].

   RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [2] and [3]. [10].

   Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
   authorization policy rules is taken from [10].

   Based on today's protocols we assume that the [9].

3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information

   The following exchanges show how location information is
   provided by the access network where conveyed in
   RADIUS.  Note that the end host is attached.  As
   part description of the network attachment authentication to individual scenarios
   assumes that privacy policies allow the AAA server location information is sent from the AAA client to the AAA server.
   The authenticated identity might refer to a user, a device or
   something else.  Although there might often be a user associated with being distributed.
   A discussion about the authentication process (either directly or indirectly; indirectly
   when a binding between a device and a user exists) there is no
   assurance that a particular real-world entity (such as a person)
   triggered this process.  Since location based authorization privacy treatment is
   executed provided in Section 7.2.

3.1.  Location Delivery based on Out-of-Band Agreements

   Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location
   information during the network access authentication of and
   authorization procedure.  Upon a particular
   "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's privacy within
   this document even though scenarios exist where this might not apply
   (and device or network privacy might be the better term).
   Furthermore, authentication request from
   an access network client, the authors believe Network Access Server (NAS) submits a
   RADIUS Access-Request message that there contains location information
   attributes among other required attributes.  In this scenario
   location information is attached to the Access-Request message
   without an explicit request from the RADIUS server.  Note that such
   an approach with a relationship prior agreement between the NAS (or other nodes in the access network) RADIUS client and the location of
   the entity that triggered the network access authentication, such as
   the user.  The NAS might
   RADIUS server is only applicable in many cases know certain environments.  For
   example, in deployment environments where the location of RADIUS client and the end
   host through various techniques (e.g., wire databases, wireless
   triangulation).  Knowing
   RADIUS server belong to the same organizational entity.

    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    |         |             | Network |                   |  RADIUS |
    | User    |             | Access  |                   |  Server |
    |         |             | Server  |                   |         |
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Location-Information       |
        |                       | + Location-Data              |
        |                       | + Basic-Policy-Rules         |
        |                       | + Operator-Name              |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Success               |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |

        Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements

3.2.  Location Delivery based on Initial Request

   If no location of a network (where information is provided by the user or
   end host RADIUS client although
   it is attached) might in many networks also reveal enough
   information about needed by the location of RADIUS server to compute the user or authorization
   decision then the end host.  A
   similar assumption is also made with regard to RADIUS server challenges the location
   information obtained via DHCP (see for example [4]). RADIUS client.  This
   information might be used by applications
   exchange is shown in other protocols (such as
   SIP [11] with extensions [12]) to indicate Figure 2.  In the location of a
   particular user even though initial Access-Request message
   from the location "only" refers NAS to the
   location of RADIUS server the network or equipment within the network.  This
   assumption might not hold in all scenarios but seems Challenge-Capable attribute is
   attached to be reasonable
   and practicable.

   Please note indicate that the authors use the terms end host and user
   interchangably.

3.  Delivery Methods for Location Information

   Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy
   rules, are transported via NAS understands the RADIUS protocol Access-Challenge
   message.  The subsequent Access-Challenge message sent from the AAA client to
   the AAA server.  A few attributes are introduced for this purpose, as
   listed in Section 5, whereby delivery to the
   RADIUS server can happen
   during to the authentication/authorization phase (described in
   Section 3.1), or in NAS provides a hint regarding the mid-session using type of
   desired location information attributes.  In the dynamic authorization
   protocol framework (described in Section 3.2).  This section
   describes messages flows for both delivery methods.

3.1.  Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery

   Figure 1 shows an example shown message flow for delivering location
   information during
   these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request
   message.  When receiving this Access-Request message the network access authentication and
   authorization procedure.  Upon a network authentication request from
   an access network client, procedure at the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request
   message that contains location information attributes among other
   required attributes.  These attributes are added server might be based on various
   criteria (such as local policy, business relationship with
   subscriber's home network provider and in case a
   number of location
   information also by considering privacy policies). criteria, including the newly defined attributes listed in
   Section 4.

    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    | Network         |             | Network |                   |   AAA  RADIUS |
    | Access User    |             | Access  |                   |  Server |
    | Client         |             | Server  |                   |         |
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Request               |
        |                       | + Location-Information Challenge-Capable          |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept Access-Challenge             |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|                       | Authentication  + Basic-Policy-Rules        |
        |                       | Success  + Extended-Policy-Rules     |
        |
        |<----------------------|                       |  + Requested-Info            |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting-Request Access-Request               |
        |                       |  + Location-Information      |
        |                       |  + Location-Data             |
        |                       |  + Basic-Policy-Rules        |
        |                       |  + Extended-Policy-Rules     |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |

        Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements

   If no location information is provided by the
        :                       :                              :
        :       Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform         :
        :    Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization    :
        :                  ...continued...                     :
        :                       :                              :
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS client although
   it is needed by                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Success               |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |

           Figure 2: Location Delivery based on Initial Request

3.3.  Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request

   The demand mid-session location delivery method utilizes the RADIUS server to compute Change
   of Authorization (COA) message, as defined in [3].  At anytime during
   the authorization
   decision then session the RADIUS server challenges MAY send a COA message containing
   session identification attributes to the RADIUS client.  This
   exchange is shown in Figure 2.  The Access-Challenge thereby provides
   a hint to COA
   message MAY instruct the Network Access Server regarding RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only
   Access-Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-
   Only") in which case the type of RADIUS client MUST include location
   information attributes that are desired.  In the shown message flow
   these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request
   message.  When receiving this Access-Request message the
   authorization procedure at if it did so on a previous Access-
   Request so that the RADIUS server might be can authorize based on a
   number of criteria, including location
   information.

   Figure 3 shows the newly defined attributes listed in
   Section 5.

    +---------+ approach graphically.

    +---------+                                    +---------+
    | Network |                                    | Network |                   |   AAA   |
    | Access  RADIUS |
    | Access  |                                    |  Server |
    | Client  |             | Server  |                                    |         |
    +---------+                                    +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                              |
        | Authentication phase  |
        |                                               | begin
        |  COA  + Service-Type "Authorize Only"         |
        |---------------------->|
        |<----------------------------------------------|
        |                                               |
        |  COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only"      |
        |          + Error-Cause  "Request Initiated"   | RADIUS
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        |                                               |
        | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
        |             + Location-Information            |
        |             + Challenge-Capable          | Location-Data                   |                       |----------------------------->|
        |             + Basic-Policy-Rules              |
        |             + Extended-Policy-Rules           |
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        | RADIUS                                               |
        | Access-Accept                                 | Access-Challenge
        |<----------------------------------------------|
        |                                               |                       |  + Rule set

         Figure 3: Location Delivery based on Mid-Session Request

   Upon receiving the Access-Request message containing the Service-Type
   hint attribute with a value of Authorize-Only from the NAS, the
   RADIUS server responds with either an Access-Accept or an Access-
   Reject message.

   RFC 3576 [3] is needed when location information is requested on
   demand and location information cannot be obtained from accounting
   messages at all or not in a timely fashion.

3.4.  Location Delivery in Accounting Messages

   Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
   Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, when the
   session stops and periodically during the lifetime of the session.
   Accounting messages may also be generated when the user roams during
   handoff.

   Accounting information may be needed by the billing system to
   calculate the user's bill.  For example, there may be different
   tariffs or tax rates applied based on the location.

   If the RADIUS server needs to obtain location information in
   accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info
   attribute to the Access-Accept message.

   Figure 4 shows the message exchange.

    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
    |         |             |  + Requested-Info Network |                   |                       |<-----------------------------|  RADIUS |
    | User    |             | Access  |                   |  Server | RADIUS
    |         |             | Access-Request Server  |                   |         | + Location-Information
    +---------+             +---------+                   +---------+
        |                       |                       |----------------------------->|                              |
        | Authentication phase  |                              |
        | begin                 |                              |
        |---------------------->|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        :                       :                              :
        :       Multiple       Protocol Exchanges to perform                  :
        :    Authentication, Key Exchange      Authentication and Authorization                :
        :                  ...continued...                     :
        :                       :                              :
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Access-Accept                |
        |                       |  + Requested-Info            |
        |                       |  + Basic-Policy-Rules        |
        |                       |  + Extended-Policy-Rules     |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        | Authentication        |                              |
        | Success               |                              |
        |<----------------------|                              |
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting-Request           |
        |                       |  + Location-Information      |
        |                       |  + Location-Data             |
        |                       |  + Basic-Policy-Rules        |
        |                       |  + Extended-Policy-Rules     |
        |                       |----------------------------->|
        |                       |                              |
        |                       | RADIUS                       |
        |                       | Accounting-Response          |
        |                       |<-----------------------------|
        |                       |                              |

            Figure 2: 4: Location Delivery based on Request
   If the AAA server needs to obtain location information also in
   accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info Accounting Messages

4.  Attributes

4.1.  Operator-Name Attribute

   This attribute to carries the Access-Accept to express that is desired (if privacy
   policy allow it) operator namespace identifier and the Network Access Server SHOULD then include
   location information
   operator name.  The operator name is combined with the namespace
   identifier to uniquely identify the RADIUS accounting messages .

3.2.  Mid-session Authorization owner of an access network.  The mid-session delivery method uses the Change
   value of Authorization
   (COA) message as defined in [5].  At anytime during the session the
   RADIUS server MAY send a COA message containing session
   identification attributes and Operator-Name is a Requested-Info attribute attribute to
   the AAA client if authorization policies allow it. non-NULL terminated string whose
   length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes.

   The COA message
   MAY instruct Operator-Name attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request messages where the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access-
   Request (Access-Request with Service-Type Acc-Status-Type is set to "Authorize-Only") in
   which case
   Start, Interim, or Stop.

   A summary of the RADIUS client includes location information in this
   Access-Request if policies allow it.

   Figure Operator-Name attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3 shows the approach graphically.

    +---------+                                    +---------+
    |   AAA   |                                    |   AAA   |
    |  Client |                                    |  Server |
    |  (NAS)  |                                    |         |
    +---------+                                    +---------+
        |                                               |
        |  COA  + Service-Type "Authorize Only"         |
        |       + Requested-Info
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |
        |<----------------------------------------------|     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only"      |
        |          + Error-Cause  "Request Initiated"   |
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        |                                               |
        | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
        |             + Location-Information            |
        |             + Policy-Rules                    |
        |---------------------------------------------->|
        |                                               |
        | Access-Accept                                 |
        |<----------------------------------------------|
        |                                               |

                    Figure 3: Mid-session Authorization

   Upon receiving the Access-Request message containing the Service-Type
   hint attribute with a value of Authorize-Only from the NAS, the
   RADIUS server responds with either an Access-Accept or an Access-
   Reject message.

   Since location information can be sent in accounting records
   (including accounting interim records), RFC 3576 [5] is only needed
   for authorization changes.

4.  Scenarios

   In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of
   location information.  Location information may refer to the
   (visited) network or to the end host.  How the network obtains the
   end hosts location information       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Operator-Name

     Length:

       >= 5

     Value:

       The Value field is out of the scope of this document.
   There are at least two potential consumers of location information: the AAA
   server and location-based services.  The privacy implications of
   these scenarios are described in Section 9.

4.1.  Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information octets in AAA

   The home network operator requires location information for
   authorization length, and billing purposes.  The operator may deny service if
   location information is not available, or it may offer limited
   service only.  The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA
   server. format
       is shown below. The location data type of the AAA client and/or the end host Value field is transferred
   from the NAS to the RADIUS server (based on a pre-established
   agreement or if the RADIUS server asks for it under consideration of
   privacy policies).  The NAS and intermediaries (if any) string.
       All fields are not
   allowed to use that information other than transmitted from left to forward it to the home
   network. right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Namespace ID  | Operator-Name                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Operator-Name                                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Namespace ID:

       The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the user requesting
   access to the network.  If the user's location policies are available
   to the RADIUS server, value within this field contains the RADIUS server MUST deliver those policies
   in
       operator namespace identifier. The Namespace ID value
       is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer value.

       Example: 1 for REALM

     Operator-Name:

       The text field of variable length contains an
       Access Accept to the RADIUS client. Network Operator Name.
       This information MAY be
   needed if intermediaries or other elements want to act as Location
   Servers (see Section 4.2).  If the NAS or intermediaries do not
   receive policies from the field is a RADIUS server (or the end host itself) then
   they MUST NOT make any use base data type of the location Text.

       Example: anyisp.example.com

   The Namespace ID field provides information other than
   forwarding it to about the user's home network.

   Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
   Accounting messages operator
   namespace.  This document defines four values for this attribute that
   are generated when the session starts, stops listed below.  Additional namespace identifiers must be
   registered with IANA (see Section 8.1) and
   periodically.  Accounting messages may also must be generated when associated with an
   organization responsible for managing the
   user roams during handoff. namespace.

   TADIG (0):

      This information may namespace can be needed by the
   billing system used to calculate the user's bill.  For example, there may
   be different tariffs or tax rates applied indicate operator names based on the location.
   Unless otherwise specified by authorization rules, location
   information
      Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined
      in [11].  TADIG codes are assigned by the accounting stream MUST NOT TADIG Working Group
      within the GSM Association.  The TADIG Code consists of two
      fields, with a total length of five ASCII characters consisting of
      a three-character country code and a two-character alphanumeric
      operator (or company) ID.

   REALM (1):

      The REALM operator namespace can be transmitted used to indicate operator
      names based on any registered domain name.  Such names are
      required to third
   parties.

   Location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent in unique and the proxy chain rights to the home network (unless specified otherwise).

4.2.  Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services

   Location Servers use a given realm name are entities that receive
      obtained coincident with acquiring the user's location
   information and transmit it rights to other entities.  In this second
   scenario, Location Servers comprise also use a particular
      Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).

   E212 (2):

      The E212 namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      the NAS Mobile Country Code (MCC) and the RADIUS
   server. Mobile Network Code (MNC)
      defined in [12].  The RADIUS servers MCC/MCC values are in assigned by the home network, in
      Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the visited
   network, or ITU-T
      and designated administrators in broker networks.

   Unless explicitly authorized different countries.  The E212
      value consists of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed
      by two or three ASCII digits containing the user's location policy, location
   information MUST NOT MNC.

   ICC (3):

      The ICC namespace can be transmitted used to other parties outside the
   proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server.

   Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server MUST
   transmit the ruleset (if available) indicate operator names based on
      International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Carrier Codes (ICC)
      defined in an Access-Accept.  The RADIUS
   client, intermediate proxies [13].  ICC values are allowed to share location
   information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed.

5.  Attributes

5.1.  Operator-Name Attribute

   This attribute carries the operator namespace identifier assigned by national regulatory
      authorities and are coordinated by the
   operator name.  The operator name is combined with Telecommunication
      Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the namespace
   identifier to uniquely identify ITU Telecommunication
      Standardization Sector (ITU-T).  When using the owner of an access network.  The
   value of ICC namespace, the Operator-Name is
      attribute consists of three uppercase ASCII characters containing
      a non-NULL terminated string whose
   length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes. three-letter alphabetic country code as defined in [14],
      followed by one to six uppercase alphanumeric ASCII characters
      containing the ICC itself.

4.2.  Location-Information Attribute

   The Operator-Name Location-Information attribute SHOULD MAY be sent in Access-Request, Access-Request and
   in Accounting-Request records where messages.  For the Accounting-Request message
   the Acc-Status-Type is may be set to Start,
   Interim, Interim or Stop.

   A summary of

   The Location-Information Attribute provides meta-data about the Operator-Name
   location information, such as sighting time, time-to-live, location
   determination method, etc.  Note that this attribute is largely
   treated as an opaque blob, like the Location-Data attribute to which
   it refers.

   The format is shown below.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    Type:

      To Be Assigned by IANA  - Operator-Name Location-Information

    Length:

      >= 5 21

    Value:

      The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
      is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All
      The fields are transmitted from left to right:

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Namespace ID   Index                       | Operator-Name Code          |  Entity       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Sighting Time                                                 ~
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Sighting Time                                                 |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Time-to-Live                                                 ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Operator-Name Time-to-Live                                                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |   Method                                                     ...
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Namespace ID:

    Index (16 bits):

      The 16-bit unsigned integer value within allows this field contains attribute
      to provide information relating to the
       operator namespace identifier. The Namespace ID value
       is encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer value.

       Example: 1 for REALM

     Operator-Name:

       The text field of variable length contains an
       Access Network Operator Name.
       This field is a RADIUS base data type of Text.

       Example: anyisp.example.com

   The Namespace ID field provides information about included
      in the operator
   namespace. Location-Data attribute to which it refers (via the Index).

    Code: (8 bits):

      Describes the location profile that is carried in this attribute
      as an unsigned 8-bit integer value.

    Entity (8 bits):

      This document defines four values for field encodes which location this attribute refers to as an
      unsigned 8-bit integer value.

    Sighting Time (64 bits):

      NTP timestamp for the 'sighting time' field.

    Time-to-Live (64 bits):

      NTP timestamp for the 'time-to-live' field.

    Method (variable):

      Describes the way that the location information was
      determined. The values are listed below.  Additional namespace identifiers MUST be registered with IANA (see Section 11.1 below) and MUST be associated
   with an organization responsible for managing the namespace.
   Requests to IANA will be evaluated by Expert Review as described in
   Section 11.1.

   TADIG (0):

      This namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      Transferred Account Data Interchange Group (TADIG) codes defined
      in [13].  TADIG codes are assigned 'method' Tokens
      registry by the TADIG Working Group
      within the GSM Association. RFC 4119. The TADIG Code consists data type of two
      fields, with this
      field is a total length of five ASCII characters consisting string.

   The following fields need more explanation:

   sighting time:

      This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate.
      The data type of this field is a three-character country code string and and the content is
      expressed in the 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp
      format [15].

   time-to-live:

      This field gives a two-character aplhanumeric
      operator (or company) ID.

   REALM (1):

      The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator
      names based on any registered domain name.  Such names are
      required to hint until when location information should be unique
      considered current.  The data type of this field is a string and
      the rights to use a given realm name are
      obtained coincident with acquiring content is expressed in the rights 64 bit Network Time Protocol (NTP)
      timestamp format [15].  Note that the time-to-live field is
      different than Retention Expires field used in the Basic Policy
      Rules attribute, see Section 4.4.  Retention expires indicates the
      time the recipient is no longer permitted to use a particular
      Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).

   E212 (2):

      The E212 namespace possess the location
      information.

   Entity:

      Location information can be used refer to indicate operator names based on different entities.  This
      document registers two entity values, namely:

         Value (0) describes the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC)
      defined in [14]. location of the user's client device

         Value (1) describes the location of the RADIUS client

      The MCC/MCC registry used for these values are assigned is established by this
      document, see Section 8.4.

   Code:

      This field indicates the
      Telecommunications Standardization Bureau (TSB) within content of the ITU-T
      and designated administrators location profile carried
      in different countries.  The E212 the Location-Data attribute.  Two profiles are defined in this
      document, namely one civic location profile (see Section 4.3.1)
      that uses value consists (0) and a geospatial location profile (see
      Section 4.3.2) that uses the value (1).

   The length of three ASCII digits containing the MCC, followed
      by two or three ASCII digits containing Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
   octets.

4.3.  Location Data Attribute

   For the MNC.

   ICC (3): RADIUS protocol location information is an opaque object.

   The ICC namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on
      ITU Carrier Codes (ICC) defined in [15].  ICC values are assigned
      by national regulatory authorities and are coordinated by the
      Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T.
      When using the ICC namespace, the attribute consists of three
      uppercase ASCII characters containing a three-letter alphabetic
      country code as defined in [16], followed by one to six uppercase
      alphanumeric ASCII characters containing the ICC itself.

5.2.  Location-Information Attribute

   The Location-Information attribute SHOULD Location-Data attribute MAY be sent in Access-Request and in
   Accounting-Request messages.  For the Accounting-Request message the
   Acc-Status-Type may be set to Start, Interim or Stop.

   The Location-Information Attribute provides meta-data about the
   location information, such as sighting time, time-to-live, mechanism
   that was used to determine the location information, etc.  The format is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Information Location-Data

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       The
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index                       | Code          |  Entity       |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 ~
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Sighting Time                                                 |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live  Location                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Time-to-Live                                                  |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Method  Location                                                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows to associate
       the Location-Information Location-Data attribute with
       Location-Info-Civic and Location-Info-Geo the
       Location-Information attributes.

     Code (8 bits):

       Describes

     Location (variable):

       The format of the location format that data depends on the location
       profile. This document defines two location profiles.
       Details of the location profiles is carried in this attribute
       as an unsigned 8-bit integer value. Two values are defined by
       this document:

       (0) describes civic described below.

4.3.1.  Civic Location Profile

   Civic location information
       (1) describes geospatial is a popular way to describe the location information

     Entity (8 bits): of an
   entity.  This field encodes which section defines the civic location this attribute refers information profile
   corresponding to as an
       unsigned 8-bit integer value. Two values are defined by this
       document: the value (0) describes indicated in the location Code field of the user's client device
       (1) describes the
   Location-Information attribute.  The location format is based on the
   encoding format defined in Section 3.1 of [4] whereby the AAA client

     Sighting Time (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for first 3
   octets (i.e., the 'sighting time' field.

     Time-to-Live (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp code for this DHCP option, the 'time-to-live' field.

     Method (variable):

       Describes length of the way that DHCP
   option, and the location information was
       determined. The values 'what' element are registered with the 'method' Tokens
       registry by RFC 4119. The data type of this
       field is a string.

   The following two fields need some explanation:

   sighting time:

      This field indicates when not included) are not put into the
   Location Information was accurate.
      The data type of this field is a string and of the format is a 64 bit
      NTP timestamp [17].

   time-to-live: above-described RADIUS Location-Data attribute.

4.3.2.  Geospatial Location Profile

   This field gives a hint until when section defines the geospatial location information should be
      considered current.  Note that the time-to-live field is different
      than retention-expires.  The latter indicates profile
   corresponding to the time value (1) indicated in the
      recipient is no longer permitted to possess Code field of the
   Location-Information attribute.  Geospatial location
      information.  The data type of this field information is a string and
   encoded as an opaque object whereby the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [17].

   The length reused from the
   Section 2 of RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format
   [5]. starting with starting with the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
   octets.

5.3.  Location-Info-Civic Attribute

   Civic location third octet (i.e., the code for
   the DHCP option and the length field is a popular way to describe not included).

4.4.  Basic Policy Rules Attribute

   Policy rules control the location distribution of an
   entity.  For the RADIUS protocol civic location information is an
   opaque object and information.  In
   some environments the RADIUS server parses client might know the location information privacy
   preferences of the user based on pre-configuration or the encoding format defined in [4].  The data format
   described in Section 3.1 user
   communicated them as part of [4] is used.

   Location-Info-Civic the network attachment.  Note, however,
   at the time of writing such a protocol extension has not be available
   for network attachment protocols.  In many other cases the RADIUS
   server (or an entity with a relationship to the RADIUS server) might
   possess the user's authorization policies.  The Basic-Policy-Rules
   attribute SHOULD MAY be sent in Access-Request an an Access-Request, Access-Accept, an
   Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in an Accounting-Request messages.  For message.

   If the Accounting-Request RADIUS client does not know the user's policy and no out-of-
   band agreement regarding the delivery of location information between
   the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server exists then the RADIUS client
   MUST NOT attach location information in the initial Access-Request
   message but should rather wait for the
   Acc-Status-Type may be set RADIUS server to Start, Interim or Stop.

   The Location-Information attribute provides information about civic send an
   Access-Challenge for location information.  The format is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Info-Civic

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and

   If the format
       is shown below. The data type RADIUS client does not know the user's policy but an out-of-
   band agreement regarding the delivery of location information between
   the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right: RADIUS client and the RADIUS server exists then the RADIUS client
   MAY transfer location information in the initial Access-Request
   message to the RADIUS server.  Since policies always travel with
   location information it is necessary to attach default policies with
   restrictive privacy settings appropriate for the respective
   environment in this case.  The 'retransmission-allowed' flag MUST be
   set to '0' meaning that the location must not be shared with other
   parties (other than forarding them to the RADIUS server).  In case
   the RADIUS server knows the user's privacy policies then these
   policies SHOULD be sent from the RADIUS server to the RADIUS client
   in a subsequent response message, namely Access-Challenge and Access-
   Accept, and these policies will be applied to further location
   dissemination and in subsequent RADIUS interactions (e.g., when
   attaching location information to Accounting messages).

   Note that the authorization framework defined in [16] and [17]
   together with the Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration
   Access Protocol (XCAP) [18] gives users the ability to change their
   privacy policies using a standardized protocol.

   With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
   in [19] and encodes them in a non-XML format.  Two fields ('sighting
   time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
   Information attribute to conform to the GEOPRIV requirements [9],
   Section 2.7.

   The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index     Type      |  Civic Location    Length     |            Value            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Civic Location       Value (cont.)                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Basic-Policy-Rules

     Length:

       >= 12

     Value:

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows to associate Value field is at least 8 octets in length, and the Location-Info-Civic attribute with the
       Location-Information attributes.

     Civic Location (variable):

       The format of the data
       is described in Section 3.1 of [4]
       whereby the first 3 octets (i.e., the code for this DHCP option,
       the length shown below. The data type of the DHCP option, and the 'what' element)
       are not included.

5.4.  Location-Info-Geo Attribute

   Geospatial location information is encoded as an opaque object
   whereby the format Value field is reused string.
       All fields are transmitted from [6].

   Location-Info-Geo attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
   Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set left to Start,
   Interim or Stop if available.

   The Location-Information attribute provides information about
   geospatial location information.  The format is shown below. right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type  Flags                        |    Length Retention Expires            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |            Value Retention Expires                                            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.) Retention Expires             | Note Well                    ...

     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Location-Info-Geo

     Length:

       >= 21

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and
     | Note Well                                                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Flag (16 bits):

       Only the format first bit (R) is shown below. The data type of defined and corresponds to the Value field is string.
       retransmission-allowed field. All fields other bits are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3 reserved
       and MUST be zero.

        0                   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |   Index                       |  Geo Location                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Geo Location                                                ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Index (16 bits):
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |R|o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       The 16-bit unsigned integer value allows symbol 'o' refers to associate
       the Location-Info-Geo attribute with reserved flags.

     Retention Expires (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for the
       Location-Information attributes.

     Geo Location (variable):

       The RFC 3825 Location Configuration Information (LCI) format
       defined in Section 2 'retention-expires' field.

     Note Well (variable):

       This field contains a URI that points to human readable
       privacy instructions. The data type of RFC 3825 starting with starting with
       the third octet (i.e., the code for the DHCP option and the
       length this field is not included).

5.5.  Basic Policy Rules Attribute

   Policy rules control the distribution string.

   This document reuses fields of location location
   information.  In some environments the RFC 4119 [19] 'usage-rules'
   element.  These fields have the AAA client might know following meaning:

   retransmission-allowed:

      When the
   privacy preferences value of this element is '0', then the user based on pre-configuration recipient of this
      Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed location
      information, or the
   user communicated them object as part a whole, with other parties.  The
      value of '1' allows to share the network attachment.  In many location information with other cases
      parties by considering the AAA server (or extended policy rules.

   retention-expires:

      This field specifies an entity with a relationship to absolute date at which time the
   AAA server) might Recipient
      is no longer permitted to possess the user's authorization policies. location information.  The
   Basic-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in an an Access-Request,
   Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject
      data type of this field is a string and an
   Accounting-Request message.

   When the AAA client does not know the user's policy then the
   following procedure format is applicable:

   o  The AAA client SHOULD NOT attach location information in the
      initial Access-Request message but should rather wait for the AAA
      server to receive a challenge for location information.

   o  If 64 bit NTP
      timestamp [15].

   note-well:

      This field contains a roamig agreement or legal circumstances require the AAA
      client URI that points to transfer location human readable privacy
      instructions.  This field is useful when location information in the initial Access-
      Request message is
      distributed to the AAA server (even though user specific
      policies third party entities, which can include humans in a
      location based service.  RADIUS entities are not available supposed to the AAA client) then the access
      network attaches default authorization policies.  In
      process this case
      default policies with restrictive privacy settings appropriate for field.

      Whenever a Location Object leaves the respective environment are attached RADIUS eco-system the URI in this case.  The
      'retransmission-allowed' flag
      the note-well attribute MUST be set expanded to '0' meaning that the
      location must not be shared with other parties (other than
      forarding them human readable
      text.  For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a
      SIP based environment then the user's home network).  In case human readable text is placed into
      the home
      network knows 'note-well' element of the user's privacy policies then these policies
      SHOULD 'usage-rules' element contained in
      the PIDF-LO document (see [19]).

4.5.  Extended Policy Rules Attribute

   The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MAY be sent from the RADIUS server to the RADIUS client in a
      subsequent response message and these policies will be applied to
      further location dissemination an Access-Request,
   an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and in subsequent RADIUS
      interactions (e.g., when attaching an
   Accounting-Request message whenever location information to
      Accounting messages).

   Note is
   transmitted.

   The ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.
   It contains a URI that indicates where the authorization framework defined in [18] and [19]
   together with XCAP [20] gives users richer ruleset can be
   found.  This URI SHOULD use the ability to change their
   privacy policies.

   With regard to authorization policies HTTPS URI scheme.  As a deviation
   from [19] this document reuses work done
   in [21] and encodes them in a non-XML format.  Two fields ('sighting
   time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
   Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv requirements [10],
   Section 2.7.  Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose: Basic-
   Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute.  The latter is
   defined in Section 5.6.  The Basic-Policy-Rule attribute contains a
   fixed set of privacy relevant fields whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule
   attribute field only contains a reference to a more extensive authorization and does not carry an
   attached extended rule set.  This modification is motivated by the
   size limitations imposed by RADIUS.

   The format of the Basic-Policy-Rules Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Basic-Policy-Rules Extended-Policy-Rules

     Length:

       >= 12 4

     Value:

       The Value field is at least 8 two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All
       The fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |  Flags                        | Retention Expires            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires                                            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Retention Expires             | Note Well                    ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Note Well    Ruleset Reference                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Flag (16 bits):

       Only

     Ruleset Reference:

       This field contains a URI that points to the first bit (R) is defined and corresponds policy rules.

4.6.  Challenge-Capable Attribute

   The Challenge-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a
   proxy server) to indicate support for processing general purpose
   Access-Challenge messages from the
       retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved RADIUS server, beyond those
   specified for support of the authentication methods of textual
   challenge-response, PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
   (CHAP) or the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP).  This
   mechanism allows the RADIUS server to request additional information
   from the RADIUS client prior to making an authentication and
   authorization decision.  The Challenge-Capable attribute with the
   C-flag set MUST be zero. appear in Access-Request Messages, if the NAS
   supports this feature, as a hint to the RADIUS server.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |R|o o o o o o o o o 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Value                         |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Challenge-Capable Attribute

     Length:

       4

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and the format
       is shown below. The data type of the Value field is string.
       All fields are transmitted from left to right:

        0                   1
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |C|o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       The symbol 'o' refers to reserved flags.

     Retention Expires (64 bits):

       NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.

     Note Well (variable):

       This field contains document defines a URI that points single bit only: C - Challenge Capable.

4.7.  Requested-Info Attribute

   The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to human readable
       privacy instructions. indicate
   what location information about which entity it wants to receive.
   The data type of this latter aspect refers to the entities that are indicated in the
   Entity field is string.

   This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described
   in [21].  These fields have Location-Information attribute.

   If the following meaning:

   retransmission-allowed:

      When RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
   basis to ask for location information from the value of this element is '0', RADIUS client then the recipient of this
      Location Object is not permitted
   following cases need to share be differentiated.  If the enclosed location
      information, or RADIUS client and
   the object as a whole, with other parties.  The
      value of '1' allows RADIUS server have agreed out-of-band to share mandate the transfer of
   location information with other
      parties by considering the extended policy rules.

   retention-expires:

      This field specifies an absolute date at which time for every network access authentication request
   then the Recipient processing listed below is no longer permitted to possess not applicable.

   o  If the RADIUS server requires location information.  The
      data type of this field is a string information for computing
      the authorization decision and the format RADIUS client does not provide
      it with the Access-Request message then the Requested-Info
      attribute is a 64 bit NTP
      timestamp [17].

   note-well:

      This field contains a URI which points attached to human readable privacy
      instructions.  This field is useful when location information the Access-Challenge with a hint about
      what is
      distributed to third party entities, which required.  Two cases can include humans in a
      location based service. be differentiated:

      1.  If the RADIUS entities are not supposed to client sends the requested information then the
          RADIUS server can process this field.

      Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system location-based attributes.

      2.  If the URI in RADIUS server does not receive the
      note-well attribute MUST be expanded requested
          information in response to the human readable text.
      For example, when Access-Challenge (including the Location Object is transferred to a SIP
      based environment
          Requested-Info attribute) then the human readable text is placed into RADIUS server may respond
          with an Access-Reject message with an Error-Cause attribute
          (including the
      'note-well' element of "Location-Info-Required" value).

   o  If the 'usage-rules' element contained RADIUS server would like location information in the
      PIDF-LO document (see [21]).

5.6.  Extended Policy Rules Attribute

   The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in an Access-
   Request, an Access-Accept, an Access-Challenge, an Access-Reject and
   in an
      Accounting-Request message whenever location information is
   transmitted.

   Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length.  It
   contains a URI that indicates where but does not require it for computing
      an authorization decision then the richer ruleset can be found. Access-Accept message MUST
      include a Required-Info attribute.  This URI SHOULD use is typically the HTTPS URI scheme.  As a deviation from [21]
   this field case
      when location information is used only contains a reference and for billing.  The RADIUS
      client SHOULD attach location information, if available, to the
      Accounting-Request (unless authorization policies dictate
      something different).

   If the RADIUS server does not carry send a Requested-Info attribute then
   the RADIUS client MUST NOT attach location information to messages
   towards the RADIUS server, unless an attached
   extended rule set.  This modification out-of-band agreement is motivated in
   place.  The user's authorization policies, if available, MUST be
   consulted by the size
   limitations imposed by RADIUS.

   The format RADIUS server before requesting location information
   delivery from the RADIUS client.

   Figure 11 shows a simple protocol exchange where the RADIUS server
   indicates the desire to obtain location information, namely civic
   location information of the Extended-Policy-Rules user, to grant access.  Since the
   Requested-Info attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ attached to the Access-Challenge the
   RADIUS server indicates that location information is required for
   computing an authorization decision.

    +---------+                    +---------+
    |     Type RADIUS  |    Length                    |            Value            ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ RADIUS  |       Value (cont.)                                         ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA  - Extended-Policy-Rules

     Length:

       >= 4

     Value:

       The Value field is at least two octets in length, and
    | Client  |                    | Server  |
    +---------+                    +---------+
         |                              |
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Request               |
         | + Challenge-Capable          |
         |----------------------------->|
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Challenge             |
         | + Requested-Info             |
         |   ('CIVIC_LOCATION',         |
         |    'USERS_LOCATION')         |
         | + Basic-Policy-Rules         |
         | + Extended-Policy-Rules      |
         |<-----------------------------|
         |                              |
         | RADIUS                       |
         | Access-Request               |
         | + Location-Information       |
         | + Location-Data              |
         | + Basic-Policy-Rules         |
         | + Extended-Policy-Rules      |
         |----------------------------->|
         |                              |
         |        ....                  |

         Figure 11: RADIUS server requesting location information

   The Requested-Info attribute MUST be sent by the format RADIUS server, in
   the absence of an out-of-band agreement, if it wants the RADIUS
   client to return location information and if authorization policies
   permit it.  This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access-
   Accept or in the Access-Challenge message.

   A summary of the attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute

     Length:

       10

     Value:

       The content of the Value field is shown below.
       The data type of the Value field is string.
       The fields are transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |    Ruleset Reference                                         ... Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Ruleset Reference:
     | Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Requested-Info (64 bits):

       This text field contains a URI an integer value that points to policy rules.

5.7.  Challenge-Capable Attribute

   The Challenge-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of encodes the
       requested information attributes.
       Each capability value represents a
   proxy server) to indicate support for processing general purpose
   Access-Challenge messages from the RADIUS server, beyond those
   specified for support of the authentication methods of textual
   challenge-response, CHAP or EAP. bit position.

   This mechanism allows document specifies the following capabilities:

   Name:

      CIVIC_LOCATION
   Description:

      The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request additional information from
      the RADIUS client prior
   to making an authentication and authorization decision.  The
   Challenge-Capable attribute MUST appear in Access-Request Messages,
   if the NAS supports this feature, as a hint to the RADIUS server.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Type          | Length        | Value                         |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Challenge-Capable Attribute

     Length:

       4

     Value:

       The Value field is two octets long and of type string.
       Every bit of the two octets MUST be set to 0.

5.8.  Requested-Info Attribute returned.  The Requested-Info attribute allows numerical value
      representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires the RADIUS server client to indicate
   whether it needs attach
      civic and/or geospatial location information of the
   NAS or the end host (i.e., attributes.  CIVIC_LOCATION refers to the entities that are indicated location
      profile defined in the
   Entity field Section 4.3.1.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of the Location-Information attribute).

   If the this attribute is '1'.

   Name:

      GEO_LOCATION

   Description:

      The RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
   basis uses this attribute to ask for location request information from
      the RADIUS client then the
   following cases need to be differentiated.  If returned.  The numerical value
      representing GEO_LOCATION requires the AAA RADIUS client and the
   AAA server have agreed out-of-band to mandate attach
      geospatial location attributes.  GEO_LOCATION refers to the transfer of
      location information for every network access authentication request
   then the processing listed below profile described in Section 4.3.2.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is not applicable.

   o '2'.

   Name:

      USERS_LOCATION

   Description:

      The RADIUS server requires location information for computing the
      authorization decision.  If numerical value representing USERS_LOCATION indicates that the
      RADIUS client does not provide
      location information must sent a Location-Information attribute with the Access-Request message then the
      Requested-Info
      Entity attribute is attached to expressing the Access-Challenge to
      indicate what value of zero (0).  Hence, there
      is required.  Two cases can be differentiated:

   o

      1.  If the RADIUS client sends the requested information then a one-to-one relationship between USERS_LOCATION token and the
          RADIUS server can process
      value of zero (0) of the location-based attributes.

      2.  If Entity attribute inside the RADIUS server does not receive Location-
      Information attribute.  A value of zero indicates that the requested
      location information in response to the Access-Challenge (including the
          Requested-Info attribute) then the RADIUS server responds with
          an Access-Reject with an Error-Cause Location-Information attribute (including refers
      to the
          "Location-Info-Required" value).  Note user's client device.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is '4'.

   Name:

      NAS_LOCATION

   Description:

      The numerical value representing NAS_LOCATION indicates that an Access-Reject
          message SHOULD only be sent if the
      RADIUS server MUST use client must sent a Location-Information attribute that
      contains location information for returning with the Entity attribute expressing
      the value of one (1).  Hence, there is a positive access control
          decision.

   o  If one-to-one relationship
      between NAS_LOCATION token and the value of one (1) of the Entity
      attribute inside the Location-Information attribute.  A value of
      one indicates that the RADIUS server would like location information in the
      Accounting-Request message but does not require it for computing
      an authorization decision then an Access-Accept MUST include a
      Required-Info attribute.  This Location-
      Information attribute refers to the RADIUS client.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute is typically '8'.

   If neither the case when location
      information NAS_LOCATION nor the USERS_LOCATION bit is used for inclusion to set then
   per-default the user's bill only.  The
      RADIUS client SHOULD attach location information to of the
      Accounting-Request (unless user's client device is returned (if
   authorization policies dictate
      something different), if it is available. allow it).  If both the RADIUS server does not send a Requested-Info attribute NAS_LOCATION and the
   USERS_LOCATION bits are set then the RADIUS client MUST NOT attach returned location information
   has to messages to
   the RADIUS server.  The user's authorization policies, if available,
   MUST be consulted by put into separate attributes.  If neither the RADIUS server before requesting
   CIVIC_LOCATION nor the GEO_LOCATION bit is set in the Requested-Info
   attribute then no location information delivery from is returned.  If both the RADIUS client.

   Figure 11 shows a simple protocol exchange where
   CIVIC_LOCATION and the RADIUS server
   indicates GEO_LOCATION bits are set then the desire to obtain location information, namely civic location
   information of the user, has to grant access.  Since the
   Requested-Info attribute is attached be put into separate attributes.  The value of
   NAS_LOCATION and USERS_LOCATION refers to the Access-Challenge the
   RADIUS server indicates that location information is required for
   computing
   requested via CIVIC_LOCATION and via GEO_LOCATION.

   As an authorization decision.

    +---------+                    +---------+
    | example, if the bits for NAS_LOCATION, USERS_LOCATION and
   GEO_LOCATION are set then location information of the RADIUS  |                    | client
   and the users' client device are returned in a geospatial location
   format.

5.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in
   which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting  #  Attribute
                                   Request
   0-1     0      0      0         0-1        TBD  Operator-Name
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Information
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Data
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Basic-Policy-Rules
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Extended-Policy-Rules
   0       0-1    0      0-1       0          TBD  Requested-Info
   0-1     0      0      0         0          TBD  Challenge-Capable

   The Location-Information and the Location-Data attribute MAY appear
   more than once.  For example, if the server asks for civic and
   geospatial location information two Location-Information attributes
   need to be sent.

   The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting #
                                   Request
   0       0       0-1     0        0        101 Error-Cause

6.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability

   When used in Diameter, the attributes defined in this specification
   can be used as Diameter AVPs from the Code space 1-255 (RADIUS
   attribute compatibility space).  No additional Diameter Code values
   are therefore allocated.  The data types and flag rules for the
   attributes are as follows:

                                     +---------------------+
                                     |    AVP Flag rules   | Client  |
                                     |----+-----+----+-----|----+
                                     | Server    |
    +---------+                    +---------+     |SHLD| MUST|    |
    Attribute Name        Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT|  NOT|Encr|
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
    Operator-Name         OctetString|    | P,M |    | RADIUS  V  | Y  | Access-Request
    Location-Information  OctetString| M  |  P  | + Challenge-Capable    |
         |----------------------------->|  V  | Y  |
    Location-Data         OctetString| M  | RADIUS  P  |    | Access-Challenge  V  | Y  | + Requested-Info
    Basic-Policy-Rules    OctetString| M  |  P  |   ('CIVIC_LOCATION',    |  V  |    'USERS_LOCATION') Y  |
         |<-----------------------------|
    Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M  |  P  |    | RADIUS  V  | Y  |
    Requested-Info        OctetString| M  | Access-Request  P  |    | + Location-Information  V  | Y  |   (civic-location)
    Challenge-Capable     OctetString|    |
         |----------------------------->| P,M |    |  V  |        .... Y  |

         Figure 11: RADIUS server requesting location information
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|

   The Requested-Info attribute MUST be sent by the attributes in this specification have no special translation
   requirements for Diameter to RADIUS server if it
   wants or RADIUS to Diameter gateways;
   they are copied as is, except for changes relating to headers,
   alignment, and padding.  See also Section 4.1 of [6] and Section 9 of
   [20].

   What this specification says about the applicability of the
   attributes for RADIUS client Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to return civic and/or geospatial
   information.  This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear
   AA-Request [20] or Diameter-EAP-Request [21].  What is said about
   Access-Challenge applies in the Access-
   Accept Diameter to AA-Answer [20] or Diameter-
   EAP-Answer [21] with Result-Code AVP set to
   DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.  What is said about Access-Accept applies
   in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that
   indicate success.  Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject
   packets applies in the Access-Challenge message. Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer
   messages that indicate failure.

   What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request
   [20].

   What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting-
   Request [20] as well.

7.  Security Considerations

   A summary number of security aspects are relevant for the attribute is shown below.

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |     Type      |    Length     |            Value             ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)                                          ...
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       Value (cont.)           |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Type:

       To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute

     Length:

       10

     Value:

       The content distribution of
   location information via RADIUS.  These aspects are discussed in
   separate sub-sections.

7.1.  Communication Security

   Requirements for the Value field is shown below.
       The data type protection of a Location Object are defined in
   [9], namely mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity,
   data object confidentiality and replay protection.

   If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the Value field
   participating RADIUS entities is string.
       The fields are provided then adversaries can spoof
   and modify transmitted from left to right:

      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     | Requested-Info                                                |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Requested-Info (64 bits):

       This text field contains an integer value that encodes the
       requested information attributes.
       Each capability value represents a bit position.

   This document specifies  Two security mechanisms are
   proposed for RADIUS:

   o  [2] proposes the following capabilities:

   Name:

      CIVIC_LOCATION
   Description:

      The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from usage of a static key that raised concerns
      regarding the RADIUS client to be returned.  The numerical value
      representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires lack dynamic key management.  At the RADIUS client time of
      writing, work is ongoing to attach
      civic location attributes.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value address some shortcomings of this [2]
      attribute is '1'.

   Name:

      GEO_LOCATION

   Description:

      The security protection.

   o  RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from over IPsec [22] enables the RADIUS client use of standard key management
      mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE and IKEv2 [23], to establish IPsec
      security associations.  Confidentiality protection MUST be returned.  The numerical value
      representing GEO_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client used to
      prevent eavesdropper gaining access to attach
      geospatial location attributes.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute information.
      Confidentiality protection is '2'.

   Name:

      USERS_LOCATION

   Description:

      The numerical value representing USERS_LOCATION indicates that the
      AAA client must sent not only a Location-Information attribute that
      contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing property required by this
      document, it is also required for the value of zero (0).  A value transport of zero indicates that the
      location information keying material
      in the Location-Information attribute refers
      to the user's client device.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value context of EAP authentication and authorization.  Hence,
      this attribute requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled.
      Mutual authentication MUST be provided between neighboring RADIUS
      entities to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.  Since mutual
      authentication is '4'.

   Name:

      NAS_LOCATION

   Description:

      The numberical value representing NAS_LOCATION indicates that the
      AAA client must sent already required for key transport within RADIUS
      messages it does not represent a Location-Information attribute deployment obstacle.  Since IPsec
      protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already
      no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those
      described in [22].

   In case that
      contains location information with IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
   RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the Entity attribute expressing
   following considerations apply.  The Access-Request message is not
   integrity protected.  This would allow an adversary to change the value of one (1).  A value
   contents of one indicates that the location
      information in Location Object or to insert, modify and delete
   attributes or individual fields.  To address these problems the Location-Information attribute refers
   Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
      AAA client.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value of this attribute
   entire Access-Request packet.  The Message-Authenticator (80) is '8'.

   If neither the NAS_LOCATION nor the USERS_LOCATION bit also
   required when EAP is set then
   per-default used and hence is supported by many modern
   RADIUS servers.

   Access-Request packets including Location attribute(s) without a
   Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by
   the RADIUS server.  A RADIUS server supporting location of the user's client device attributes
   MUST be returned
   (if authorization policies allow it).  If both calculate the NAS_LOCATION correct value of the Message-Authenticator(80) and
   MUST silently discard the USERS_LOCATION bits are set then packet if it does not match the location information has to value sent.

   Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a Message-
   Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be put into separate attributes.  If neither silently discarded by the CIVIC_LOCATION nor NAS.
   A NAS supporting location attributes MUST calculate the GEO_LOCATION bit is set in correct value
   of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the Requested-Info attribute then no
   location information is returned.  If both
   packet if it does not match the CIVIC_LOCATION value sent.

   RADIUS and Diameter make some assumptions about the
   GEO_LOCATION bits are set then trust between
   traversed RADIUS entities in the location information sense that object level security is
   not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter.  Hence, some trust has
   to be put
   into separate attributes.  The value of NAS_LOCATION and
   USERS_LOCATION refers placed on the RADIUS entities to behave according to the location information requested via
   CIVIC_LOCATION and via GEO_LOCATION.  As an example, if
   defined rules.  Furthermore, the bits RADIUS protocol does not involve the
   user in their protocol interaction except for
   NAS_LOCATION, USERS_LOCATION and GEO_LOCATION are set then location tunneling
   authentication information of the AAA client (such as EAP messages) through their
   infrastructure.  RADIUS and the users' client device are
   returned in a geospatial location format.

6.  Table of Attributes

   The following table provides Diameter have even become a guide which attributes may be found in
   which RADIUS messages, and de-facto
   protocol for key distribution for network access authentication
   applications.  Hence, in what quantity.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting  #  Attribute
                                   Request
   0-1     0      0      0         0-1        TBD  Operator-Name
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Information
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Info-Civic
   0+      0      0      0         0+         TBD  Location-Info-Geo
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Basic-Policy-Rules
   0-1     0-1    0-1    0-1       0-1        TBD  Extended-Policy-Rules
   0       0-1    0      0-1       0          TBD  Requested-Info
   0-1     0      0      0         0          TBD  Challenge-Capable

   The Location-Information, the Location-Info-Civic and past there were some concerns about the Location-
   Info-Geo attribute MAY appear more than once.  For example, if
   trust placed into the
   server asks infrastructure particularly from the security
   area when it comes to keying.  The EAP keying infrastructure is
   described in [24].

7.2.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses privacy implications for civic and geospatial the distribution of
   location information two
   Location-Information attributes need to be sent.  If multiple
   Location-Information attributes are sent then they MUST NOT contain within RADIUS.

   In many cases the same information.

   The next table shows location information of the occurrence network also reveals
   the current location of the error-cause attribute.

   Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting #
                                   Request
   0       0       0-1     0        0        101 Error-Cause

7.  Diameter RADIUS Interoperability

   When used in Diameter, user with a certain degree of precision
   depending on the attributes defined in this specification
   can be used as Diameter AVPs from mechanism used, the Code space 1-255 (RADIUS
   attribute compatibility space).  No additional Diameter Code values
   are therefore allocated.  The data types and flag rules for positioning system, update
   frequency, where the
   attributes are location was generated, size of the network and
   other mechanisms (such as follows:

                                     +---------------------+
                                     |    AVP Flag rules   |
                                     |----+-----+----+-----|----+
                                     |    |     |SHLD| MUST|    |
    Attribute Name        Value Type |MUST| MAY | NOT|  NOT|Encr|
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|
    Operator-Name         OctetString|    | P,M |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Information  OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Info-Civic   OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Location-Info-Geo     OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Basic-Policy-Rules    OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Extended-Policy-Rules OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Requested-Info        OctetString| M  |  P  |    |  V  | Y  |
    Challenge-Capable     OctetString|    | P,M |    |  V  | Y  |
   ----------------------------------|----+-----+----+-----|----|

   The attributes in this specification movement traces or interpolation).

   Three types of use cases have no special translation
   requirements for Diameter to be differentiated:

   o  RADIUS or server does not want to receive location information from
      the RADIUS client.  The RADIUS client does not send location
      information to Diameter gateways;
   they are copied as is, except the RADIUS server.

   o  In case there is an out-of-band agreement between the entity
      responsible for changes relating to headers,
   alignment, and padding.  See also Section 4.1 of [7] the NAS and Section 9 of
   [22].

   What this specification says about the applicability of entity operating the
   attributes for RADIUS Access-Request packets applies in Diameter to
   AA-Request [22] or Diameter-EAP-Request [23].  What is said about
   Access-Challenge applies in Diameter to AA-Answer [22] or Diameter-
   EAP-Answer [23] with Result-Code AVP set to
   DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.  What is said about Access-Accept applies
   in Diameter to AA-Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that
   indicate success.  Similarly, what is said about RADIUS Access-Reject
   packets applies in Diameter to AA- Answer or Diameter-EAP-Answer
   messages that indicate failure.

   What is said about COA-Request applies in Diameter to Re-Auth-Request
   [22].

   What is said about Accounting-Request applies to Diameter Accounting-
   Request [22] as well.

8.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements

   This section compares server
      then location information may be sent without an explicit request
      from the Geopriv requirements described in [10] and RADIUS server.

   o  The RADIUS server dynamically requests location information from
      the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS.

   In Section 8.1 and Section 8.2 we discuss privacy implications when NAS.

7.2.1.  RADIUS is not used Client

   The RADIUS client MUST behave according to these usage scenario.  In Section 8.3
   Geopriv requirements are matched against these two scenarios.

8.1.  Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network

   This section focuses on following guidelines:

   o  If neither an out-of-band agreement exists nor location
      information transport from is requested by the local
   AAA RADIUS server (acting as then location
      information is not disclosed by the Location Generator) to RADIUS client.

   o  If the home AAA RADIUS server
   (acting provides the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      either as part of the Location Server).  To use a more generic scenario we
   assume that Access-Accept, the visited AAA and Access-Reject or the home AAA
      Access-Challenge message then the RADIUS client MUST follow the
      guidance given with these rules.

   o  If the RADIUS server belong to
   different administrative domains.  The Location Recipient obtains
   location information about a particular Target via protocols
   specified outside provides the scope Extended-Policy-Rules attributes
      either as part of this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an
   API).

   Please note that the main usage scenario defined in this document
   assumes that Access-Accept, the Location Server and Access-Reject or the Location Recipient are co-
   located into a single entity with regard to location based network
   access authorization, taxation and billing.

   The subsequent figure shows
      Access-Challenge message then the interacting entities graphically.

    visited network    |        home network
                       |
                       |        +----------+
                       |        |  Rule    |
                       |        | Holder   |
                       |        |          |
                       |        +----+-----+
                       |             |
                       |         rule|interface
                       |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
     |Location  |  publication  | Location |  notification |Location  |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |<------------->|Recipient |
     |          |  interface    |          |  interface    |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
                       |
     Local AAA RADIUS       Home AAA     SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
     Server            |         Server
                       |
              Figure 16: Location Server client MUST fetch the
      full ruleset at the Home Network

   The term 'Rule Holder' indicated URL and MUST follow the guidance
      given by these rules.

   o  If the RADIUS client in Figure 16 denotes the entity that creates visited network learns the authorization basic rule set.

8.2.  Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network

   This section describes
      set or a scenario where location information made
   available reference to Location Recipients the extended rule set by some entity means outside the
      RADIUS protocol (e.g., provided by the end host) then it MUST
      include the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules
      attribute in the Access-Request message towards the home RADIUS
      server.  Furthermore, the visited
   network.

   In order for this scenario network MUST evaluate these
      rules prior to be applicable the following two
   assumptions must hold:

   o transmission of location information either to
      the home network or a third party.  The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to
      distribute Location Objects MUST
      follow the guidance given with these rules.

   o  The visited network is able to learn  If the user's identity.

   The visited network provides location information to a Location
   Recipient (e.g., via SIP RADIUS client receives the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      with Access-Accept or HTTP).  During the network access
   authentication procedure Access-Challenge message then the Basic-
      Policy-Rules MUST be attached in subsequent RADIUS messages that
      contains the Location-Information attribute (such as in interim
      accounting messages).

   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network is able to retrieve receives the
   user's Extended-
      Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
      message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attached in
      subsequent RADIUS messages that contains the Location-Information
      attribute (such as in interim accounting messages).

7.2.2.  RADIUS Server

   The RADIUS server is a natural place for storing authorization
   policies from since the home AAA user has some sort of trust relationship with the
   entity operating the RADIUS server.  This should
   ensure that  Once the visited network acts according infrastructure is
   deployed and useful applications are available there might be a
   strong desire to use location information for other purposes as well
   (such as location aware applications).  Authorization policy rules
   described in [17] and in [16] are tailored for this purpose.  These
   policies might be useful for limiting further distribution of the
   user's
   policies. location to other location based services.  The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.

    visited home RADIUS
   server (or a similar entity) thereby acts as a location server for
   access to location services.

   The home network    | MUST behave according to the following guidelines:

   o  As a default policy the home network
                       |
     +----------+      |
     |Location  |      |
     |Recipient |      |
     |          |      |
     +----------+      |
          ^            |        +----------+
          |            |        |  Rule    |
          |            |        | Holder   |
      notification     |        |          |
       interface       |        +----+-----+
          |            |             |
          |            |         rule|interface
          v            |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+
     |Location  | Rule Transport| Home AAA |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |
     |& Server  |   RADIUS      |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+
                       |

             Figure 17: Location Server at the Visited Network

8.3.  Requirements matching

   Section 7.1 of [10] details MUST NOT distribute the requirements of
      user's location information to third party entities.

   o  If a "Location Object".
   We discuss user provides basic authorization policies then the RADIUS
      server MUST return these requirements rules to the RADIUS client in the subsequent list.

   Req. 1.  (Location Object generalities):

      *  Regarding requirement 1.1, Access-
      Accept, the Location Object has to be
         understood by Access-Reject or the RADIUS server (and possibly Access-Challenge message.

   o  If a Diameter server
         in case of interworking between user provides extended authorization policies then the two) as defined in this
         document.  Due RADIUS
      server MUST return these rules to the encoding of the Location Object it is
         possible RADIUS client using a
      reference to convert it this rule set.  The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute
      MUST include the reference and they MUST be sent to the format used RADIUS
      client in GMLv3 [24].  This
         document uses the civic and geospatial location information
         format used in [6] and in [4]. Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-
      Challenge message.

   o  The format of [6] RADIUS server MUST follow the user provided rule set for both
      local storage and for further distribution.  With regard to the
      usage of [4]
         can be convered into a PIDF-LO [21].

      *  Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in these rules the civic
         location information format are optional.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.3, entity operating the inclusion of type of place item
         (CAtype 29) used in RADIUS server MUST
      ensure that the DHCP civic format gives a further
         classification user's preferences are taken care of within the location.  This attribute can be seen
      given boundaries (such as
         an extension.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.4, legal regulations or operational
      considerations).  For example, a user might not want the home
      network to store information about its location information is not
         defined in this document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.5, beyond
      a indicated time frame.  However, a user might on the other hand
      want to ensure that disputes concerning the billed amount can be
      resolved.  Location Object is useful for
         both receiving and sending location information as described in
         this document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.6, might help to resolve the Location Object contains both dispute.
      The user might, for example, be able to show that he has never
      been at the indicated place.

7.2.3.  RADIUS Broker

   When the RADIUS messages traverses one or more RADIUS broker then the
   RADIUS broker has to follow the privacy policy before utilizing
   location information for a purpose other than then forwarding RADIUS
   messages between the RADIUS client and privacy rules.  Location information
         is described in Section 5.2, in Section 5.3 the RADIUS server, and in Section 5.4.
         The corresponding privacy rules are detailed in Section 5.5 vice
   versa.

7.3.  Identity Information and
         in Section 5.6.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a
         variety of protocols.  The format Information

   For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the object user and his
   device is reused from
         other documents as detailed in Section 5.2, Section 5.3,
         Section 5.4 Section 5.5 and in Section 5.6).

      *  Regarding requirement 1.8, tightly coupled to the encoding transfer of location information.
   If the Location Object
         has an emphasis on identity can be determined by the visited network or RADIUS
   brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a lightweight encoding format.
   particular user.  As such such, it
         is useable on constrained devices.

   Req. 2.  (Location Object fields):

      *  Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried
         within allows the visited network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
         the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within and brokers
   to learn movement patterns of users.

   The user's identity can be "leaked" to the
         EAP method itself).  As described visited network or RADIUS
   brokers in Section 9 it has a number of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear. ways:

   o  The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
      address on such an address.  This
         is possible with certain EAP methods whereby enables the identity in correlation of the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant
         for routing
      particular device to its different locations.  Techniques exist to
      avoid the response use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [25].
      Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
      them dynamically.

   o  Network access authentication procedures, such as PPP CHAP [26] or
      EAP [24], may reveal the user's home network.  The user identity is protected by as a part of the
      authentication and key exchange
         protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is procedure.  Techniques exist to avoid this problem
      in EAP methods, for instance by employing private Network Access
      Identifiers (NAIs) in the
         main scenario the home AAA server.  For a scenario where EAP Identity Response message [27] and
      by method-specific private identity exchange in the
         Location Recipient EAP method
      (e.g., [27], [28] [29], [30]).  Support for identity privacy
      within CHAP is obtaining Location Information not available.

   o  RADIUS may return information from the
         Location Server via HTTP or SIP home network to the respective mechanisms
         defined visited
      in these protocols are used a manner that makes it possible to either identify the recipient.
         The Location Generator cannot, user or
      at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the
      use of static data in a priori, know Class attribute [2] or in some accounting
      attribute usage scenarios [31].

   o  Mobility protocols may reveal some long-term identifier, such as a
      home address.

   o  Application layer protocols may reveal other permanent
      identifiers.

   Note that to prevent the recipients if
         they correlation of identities with location
   information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity
   information from all sources, not just one.

   Unfortunately, most users are not defined in this protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.3, educated about the credentials importance of
   identity confidentiality and some protocols lack support for identity
   privacy mechanisms.  This problem is made worse by the Location
         Recipient are known fact that
   users may be unable to choose particular protocols, as the RADIUS entities based on the
         security mechanisms defined in choice is
   often dictated by the RADIUS protocol itself.
         Section 10 describes these security mechanisms offered type of network operator they use, by the
         RADIUS protocol.  The same is true for requirement 2.4.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 5.2, Section 5.3 and
         Section 5.4 describe type
   of network they wish to access, the content kind of equipment they have, or
   the Location Field.  Since type of authentication method they are using.

   A scenario where the location format itself user is not defined attached to the home network is, from a
   privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams
   into a visited network since the NAS and the home RADIUS server are
   in this document
         motion the same administrative domain.  No direct relationship between
   the visited and direction vectors the home network operator may be available and some
   RADIUS brokers need to be consulted.  With subscription-based network
   access as listed in requirement 2.6 are
         not defined.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.6, this document provides used today the
         capability user has a contractual relationship with the
   home network provider that could (theoretically) allow higher privacy
   considerations to be applied (including policy rules stored at the
   home network itself for the AAA server purpose of restricting further
   distribution).

   In many cases it is necessary to indicate what type secure the transport of location
   information it would like along the RADIUS infrastructure.  Mechanisms to see from achieve
   this functionality are discussed in Section 7.1.

8.  IANA Considerations

   The authors request that the AAA client.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with
         'sighting time' Attribute Types, and 'time-to-live' field Attribute Values
   defined in
         Section 5.2.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more
         detailed rule set) is provided with this document be registered by the Section 5.6 attribute.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are
         provided as part of Internet Assigned
   Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS protocol or even name spaces as part of
         IPsec.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number described in RADIUS is
         provided with
   the IANA registration of the attributes.  New
         attributes are assigned a new IANA number.

   Req. 3.  (Location Data Types):

      *  Regarding requirement 3.1, this document reuses civic and
         geospatial location information as described "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 3575 [7], in Section 5.4 and accordance with
   BCP 26 [8].  Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in Section 5.3.

      *  With
   the support of civic Diameter name space.  For RADIUS attributes and geospatial location information
         support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.

      *  Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information
         used registries
   created by this document only refers IANA is requested to absolute coordinates.
         However, the granularity of the location information can be
         reduced with the help of place them at
   http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types.

   This document defines the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields
         described in [6].

      *  Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
         added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
         field in [6]) and via extensions following attributes:

         Operator-Name
         Location-Information
         Location-Data
         Basic-Policy-Rules
         Extended-Policy-Rules
         Challenge-Capable
         Requested-Info

   Please refer to [6] and [4]. Section 7.2 of [10] details 5 for the requirements registered list of numbers.

   This document also instructs IANA to assign a "Using Protocol".

   These requirements are listed below:

   Req. 4.:  The using protocol has new value for the
   Error-Cause attribute [3], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.

   Additionally, IANA is requested to obey create the privacy and security
      instructions coded following new
   registries listed in the Location Object regarding subsections below.

8.1.  New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier

   This document also defines an operator namespace identifier registry
   (used in the
      transmission and storage Namespace ID field of the LO.  This document requires Operator-Name attribute).
   Note that
      RADIUS entities sending or receiving location MUST obey such
      instructions.

   Req. 5.:  The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
      associated with the credentials are transported this document requests IANA only to the respective
      parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility maintain a registry of the
      using protocol.  Section 10 specifies how security mechanisms are
      used
   existing namespaces for use in RADIUS this identifier field, and how they can be reused not to provide security
      protection for
   establish any namespaces nor to place any values within namespaces.

   IANA is requested to add the Location Object.  Additionally, following values to the privacy
      considerations (see Section 9) are also relevant operator
   namespace identifier registry using a numerical identifier (allocated
   in sequence), a token for this
      requirement.

   Req. 6.  (Single Message Transfer):  In particular, the operator namespace and a contact person
   for tracking of
      small target devices, the design should allow registry.

  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+
  |Identifier| Operator Namespace | Contact Person                     |
  |          | Token              |                                    |
  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+
  |    0     | TADIG              | TD.13 Coordinator                  |
  |          |                    | (td13@gsm.org)                     |
  |    1     | REALM              | IETF O&M Area Directors            |
  |          |                    | (ops-chairs@ietf.org)              |
  |    2     | E212               | ITU Director                       |
  |          |                    | (tsbdir@itu.int)                   |
  |    3     | ICC                | ITU Director                       |
  |          |                    | (tsbdir@itu.int)                   |
  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+

   Requests to IANA for a single message/
      packet transmission of location as new value for a complete transaction. Namespace ID will be approved
   by Expert Review.  The
      encoding of the Location Object Designated Expert Reviewer team for these
   requests is specifically tailored towards the inclusion into a single message that even respects current Operations Area Director and the (Path)
      MTU size.  The concept RADEXT
   working group chairs or the working group chairs of a transaction is not immediately
      applicable to RADIUS.

   Section 7.3 of [10] details the requirements of designated
   successor working group.

   The Expert Reviewer should ensure that a "Rule based
   Location Data Transfer".  These requirements are listed below:

   Req. 7.  (LS Rules):  With the scenario shown in Figure 16 the
      decision of new entry is indeed required
   or could fit within an existing database, e.g., whether there is a Location Server
   real requirement to provide a Location Recipient
      access to location information token for an Namespace ID because one
   is based on Rule Maker-defined
      Privacy Rules that are stored at already up and running, or whether the home network.  With regard to REALM identifier plus the scenario shown in Figure 17
   name should recommended to the Rule Maker-defined Privacy
      Rules are sent from requester.  In addition, the home network Expert
   Reviewer should ascertain to the visited network (see
      Section 5.5, some reasonable degree of diligence that
   a new entry is a correct reference to an Operator Namespace, when a
   new one is registered.

8.2.  New Registry: Location Profiles

   Section 5.6 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute and a Code
   field that contains 8 bit integer value.  Two values, zero and one,
   are defined in this document, namely:

   Value (0): Civic location profile described in Section 9 4.3.1

   Value (1): Geospatial location profile described in Section 4.3.2

   The remaining values are reserved for more details).

   Req. 8.  (LG Rules):  For mid-session delivery it is possible to
      enforce future use.

   Following the user's privacy rules for policies outline in [7] the transfer available bits with a
   description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
   initiated by the Location
      Object.  For the initial transmission of a Location Object O&M Area Directors in consultation with the
      user would have to use network access authentication methods which
      provide user identity confidentiality which would render the
      Location Object completely useless for the visited network.  For
      the scenario shown in Figure 16 RADEXT
   working group chairs or the visited network is already in
      possession working group chairs of a designated
   successor working group.  Updates can be provided based on expert
   approval only.  A designated expert will be appointed by the users location information prior O&M Area
   Directors.  No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is
   envisioned.  Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
   entries from the
      authentication and authorization of the user.  A correlation
      between registry.

   Each registration must include the location value and the user identity might, however, still
      not be possible for corresponding
   semantic of the visited network (as explained in defined location profile.

8.3.  New Registry: Challenge Capable Attribute

   Section 9).  The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided by
      the home AAA server as soon as possible.

   Req. 9.  (Viewer Rules):  The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
      outside 4.6 defines the scope of this document) which policy rules are
      disclosed to other entities.

   Req. 10.  (Full Rule language):  Geopriv has defined Challenge-Capable attribute that contains a rule language
      capable of expressing
   bit map. 16 bits are available whereby a wide range of privacy rules which single bit, bit (0),
   indicating 'Challenge Capable' is
      applicable defined by this document.  Bits
   1-15 are reserved for future use.

   Following the policies outline in [7] the area available bits with a
   description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
   initiated by the distribution of Location Objects.  A
      basic ruleset is provided O&M Area Directors in consultation with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      Section 5.5.  A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
      Section 5.6.  The format RADEXT
   working group chairs or the working group chairs of these rules are described in [18] and
      [19].

   Req. 11.  (Limited Rule language):  A limited (or basic) ruleset is a designated
   successor working group.  Updates can be provided based on expert
   approval only.  A designated expert will be appointed by the Policy-Information attribute Section 5.5 (and O&M Area
   Directors.  No mechanism to mark entries as
      introduced with PIDF-LO [21]).

   Section 7.4 of [10] details "deprecated" is
   envisioned.  Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
   entries from the requirements of a "Location Object
   Privacy registry.

   Each registration must include the bit position and Security".  These requirements the semantic of
   the bit.

8.4.  New Registry: Entity Types

   Section 4.2 defines the Location-Information attribute that contains
   an 8 bit Entity field.  Two values are listed below:

   Req. 12 (Identity Protection):  Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
      provided registered by this document,
   namely:

   Value (0) describes the usage location of a corresponding authentication and key
      exchange protocol.  Such protocols the user's client device

   Value (1) describes the location of the RADIUS client

   All other values are available, reserved for example, future use.

   Following the policies outline in [7] the available bits with a
   description of their semantic will be assigned after Expert Review
   initiated by the O&M Area Directors in consultation with the support RADEXT
   working group chairs or the working group chairs of EAP a designated
   successor working group.  Updates can be provided based on expert
   approval only.  A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
   Directors.  No mechanism to mark entries as network access authentication methods.
      Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
      whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
      This issue "deprecated" is further discussed in Section 10.  The importance for
      user identity confidentiality
   envisioned.  Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
   entries from the registry.

   Each registration must include the value and identity protection has already
      been recognized as an important property (see for example a
      document on 'EAP Method Requirements corresponding
   description.

8.5.  New Registry: Privacy Flags

   Section 4.4 defines the Basic Policy Rules attribute that contains
   flags indicating privacy settings. 16 bits are available whereby a
   single bit, bit (0), indicating 'retransmission allowed' is defined
   by this document.  Bits 1-15 are reserved for Wireless LANs' [25]).

   Req. 13.  (Credential Requirements):  As described future use.

   Following the policies outline in Section 10
      RADIUS signaling messages can be protected [7] the available bits with IPsec.  This
      allows a number
   description of authentication and key exchange protocols to their semantic will be
      used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.

   Req. 14.  (Security Features):  Geopriv defines a few security
      requirements for assigned after Expert Review
   initiated by the protection of Location Objects such as mutual
      end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object
      confidentiality and replay protection.  As described O&M Area Directors in Section 10
      these requirements are fulfilled consultation with the usage of IPsec if mutual
      authentication refers to RADEXT
   working group chairs or the RADIUS entities (acting as various
      Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each other.

   Req. 15.  (Minimal Crypto):  A minimum working group chairs of security mechanisms are
      mandated a designated
   successor working group.  Updates can be provided based on expert
   approval only.  A designated expert will be appointed by the usage of RADIUS.  Communication security for
      Location Objects between AAA infrastructure elements O&M Area
   Directors.  No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is provided
      by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic key
      management framework) rather than on relying
   envisioned.  Based on object security
      via S/SIME (which expert approval it is not available with RADIUS).

9.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
   location information within RADIUS.

   In many cases possible to delete
   entries from the location information of registry.

   Each registration must include the network also reveals bit position and the current location semantic of
   the user with bit.

8.6.  New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute

   This document creates a certain degree of precision
   depending on the mechanism used, new IANA registry for the positioning system, update
   frequency, where Requested-Info
   attribute.  IANA is requested to add the location was generated, size following four values to
   this registry:

    +----------+----------------------+
    |  Value   | Capability Token     |
    +----------+----------------------+
    |    1     | CIVIC_LOCATION       |
    |    2     | GEO_LOCATION         |
    |    4     | USERS_LOCATION       |
    |    8     | NAS_LOCATION         |
    +----------+----------------------+

   The semantic of the network and
   other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).

   Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown these values is defined in Section 4, in
   Figure 16 and in Figure 17:

9.1.  Entity in 4.7.

   Following the visited network

   In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies
   from outline in [7] new Capability Tokens with a
   description of their semantic for usage with the end host (or user) immediately when Requested-Info
   attribute will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by the user attaches to O&M
   Area Directors in consultation with the
   network.  In this case we have to assume that RADEXT working group chairs
   or the visited network
   does not allow unrestricted distribution working group chairs of location information to
   other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities).
   When the AAA messages traverses one or more broker networks, the
   broker network is bound a designated successor working group.
   Updates can be provided based on expert approval only.  A designated
   expert will be appointed by the same guidelines as the visited network
   with respect to the distribution of location information.

   The visited network MUST behave according O&M Area Directors.  No mechanism to the following
   guidelines:

   o  Per default only the home network
   mark entries as "deprecated" is allowed to receive location
      information.  The visited network MUST NOT distribute location
      information envisioned.  Based on expert approval
   it is possible to third parties without seeing delete entries from the user's privacy
      rule set.

   o  If registry.

   Each registration must include:

   Name:

      Capability Token (i.e., an identifier of the home network provides capability)

   Description:

      Brief description indicating the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      either as part meaning of the Access-Accept, info element.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value that is placed into the Access-Reject or Capability attribute
      representing a bit in the
      Access-Challenge message then bit-string of the visited network MUST follow Requested-Info
      attribute.

9.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the
      guidance given following people for their help
   with these rules.

   o  If the home network provides the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes
      either as part an initial version of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the
      Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST fetch the
      full ruleset at the indicated URL this draft and MUST follow for their input: Chuck
   Black, Paul Congdon, Jouni Korhonen, Sami Ala-luukko, Farooq Bari, Ed
   Van Horne, Mark Grayson, Jukka Tuomi, Jorge Cuellar, and Christian
   Guenther.

   Henning Schulzrinne provided the guidance
      given with these rules.

   o  If the RADIUS client civic location information content
   found in this draft.  The geospatial location information format is
   based on work done by James Polk, John Schnizlein and Marc Linsner.
   The authorization policy format is based on the visited network learns the basic rule
      set or a reference work done by Jon
   Peterson.

   The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
   Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
   Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
   feedback to an initial version of this draft.  We would like to thank
   Jari Arkko for his text contributions.  Lionel Morand provided
   detailed feedback on numerous issues.  His comments helped to improve
   the extended rule set by means outside quality of this document.  Jouni Korhonen and John Loughney
   helped us with the Diameter RADIUS protocol (e.g., interoperability.  Andreas
   Pashalidis reviewed a later version document and provided by the end host) then it MUST
      include the Basic-Policy-Rules a number of
   comments.  Bernard Aboba, Alan DeKok, Lionel Morand, Jouni Korhonen,
   David Nelson and Emile van Bergen provided guidance on the Extended-Policy-Rules Requested-
   Info attribute and participated in the Access-Request message towards capability exchange
   discussions.  Allison Mankin, Jouni Korhonen and Pasi Eronen provided
   text for the home AAA
      server.  Furthermore, operator namespace identifier registry.  Jouni Korhonen
   interacted with the visited network MUST evaluate these
      rules prior GSMA to find a contact person for the transmission of location information either to TADIG
   operator namespace and Scott Bradner consulted the home network or ITU-T to find a third party.  The visited network MUST
      follow
   contact person for the guidance given with these rules.

   o  If E212 and the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Basic-
      Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
      message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be attach in subsequent
      RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute
      (such as interim accounting messages).

   o  If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Extended-
      Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
      message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attach in
      subsequent RADIUS messages which contain ICC operator namespace.

   This document is based on the Location-Information
      attribute (such as interim accounting messages).

9.2.  Entity in discussions within the home network

   The AAA server in IETF GEOPRIV
   working group.  Therefore, the home network might be an ideal place authors thank Henning Schulzrinne,
   James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew
   Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for
   storing authorization policies.  The user typically has their time to discuss a contractual
   relationship number
   of issues with his home network us.  We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work
   with 3GPP activities.

   The RADEXT working group chairs, David Nelson and hence the trust relationship
   between Bernard Aboba,
   provided several draft reviews and we would like to thank them is stronger.  Once for
   the infrastructure is deployed help and
   useful applications are available there might be a strong desire their patience.

   Finally, we would like to
   use location information for other purposes as well (such as location
   aware applications).  Authorization policy rules described in [19] thank Bernard Aboba and in [18] are tailored for this environment.  These policies might
   be useful Dan Romascanu for limiting further distribution of
   the user's location to
   other location based services.  The home AAA server (or a similar
   entity) thereby acts as a location server IETF Last Call comments, Derek Atkins for access to location
   services.

   The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:

   o  As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the
      user's location information to third party entities.

   o  If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  If his security area
   directorate review and Yoshiko Chong for spotting a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules
      MUST be returned to the visited network bug in the Access-Accept, the
      Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  If a user provides extended authorization policies then they MUST
      be accessible IANA
   consideration section.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Bradner, S., "Key words for the visited networking using a reference use in RFCs to
      these rule set.  The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MUST include
      the reference Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]   Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and they MUST be sent W. Simpson, "Remote
         Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
         June 2000.

   [3]   Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba,
         "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to the visited network in the
      Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

   o  The home network MUST follow the user provided rule set Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

   [4]   Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
         and DHCPv6) Option for both
      local storage Civic Addresses Configuration
         Information", RFC 4776, November 2006.

   [5]   Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
         Configuration Protocol Option for further distribution.  With regard to the
      usage of these rules the home network MUST ensure that the users
      preferences are taken care of within the given boundaries (such as
      legal regulations or operational considerations).  For example, a
      user might not want the home network to store information about
      its location information beyond a indicated time frame.  However,
      a user might on the other hand want to ensure that disputes
      concerning the billed amount can be resolved. location information
      might help to resolve the dispute.  The user might, for example,
      be able to show that he has never been at the indicated place.

   o  If the policy rules provided by the user indicate that location
      information must not be distributed at all then the home network
      MUST provide the Basic-Policy-Rules to the RADIUS entity in the
      visited network via an Access-Accept, the Access-Reject and the
      Access-Challenge message.  The RADIUS server in the user's home
      network would set the 'Retention-Expires' and the 'Retransmission-
      allowed' field to the user indicated value.

   For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his
   device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information.
   If the identity can be determined by the visited network or AAA
   brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
   particular user.  As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
   to learn movement patterns of users.

   The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA
   brokers in a number of ways:

   o  The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
      address on such an address.  This enables the correlation of the
      particular device to its different locations.  Techniques exist to
      avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [26].
      Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
      them dynamically.

   o  Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [27] or
      EAP [28] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
      authentication procedure.  Techniques exist to avoid this problem
      in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access
      Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [29] and
      by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
      (e.g., [29], [30], [31]).  Support for identity privacy within
      CHAP is not available.

   o  AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the
      visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the
      user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such
      as the use of static data in a Class attribute [2] or in some
      accounting attribute usage scenarios [32].

   o  Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as
      a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility
      signaling.

   o  Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.

   Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location
   information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity
   information from all sources, not just one.

   Unfortunately, most users are not educated about the importance of
   identity confidentiality and there is a lack of support for it in
   many protocols.  This problem is made worse by the fact that the
   users may be unable to choose particular protocols, as the choice is
   often dictated by the type of network they wish to access, the kind
   of equipment they have, or the type of authentication method they are
   using.

   A scenario where the user is attached to the home network is, from a
   privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams
   into a visited network since the NAS and the home AAA are in the same
   administrative domain.  No direct relationship between the visited
   and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers
   need to be consulted.  With subscription-based network access as used
   today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network
   provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be
   applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for
   the purpose of restricting further distribution).

   In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
   information along the RADIUS infrastructure.  Mechanisms to achieve
   this functionality are discussed in Section 10.

10.  Security Considerations

   Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in
   [10]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data
   object confidentiality and replay protection.  The distribution of
   location information can be restricted with the help of authorization
   policies.  Basic authorization policies are attached to the location
   information itself, in the same fashion as described in [21].  It is
   possible that the user was already able to transfer some
   authorization policies to the access network to restrict the
   distribution of location information.  This is, however, rather
   unlikely in case of roaming users.  Hence, it will be primarily the
   NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization
   policies.  If no authorization information is provided by the user
   then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only
   allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information.
   Other entities, such as the visited network Coordinate-based Location
         Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.

   [6]   Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and possibly AAA brokers
   MUST NOT use the location information J. Arkko,
         "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [7]   Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for a purpose other than
   described in this document.  More extensible authorization policies
   can be stored at the user's home network.  These policies are useful
   when location information is distributed to other entities RADIUS (Remote
         Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003.

   [8]   Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
         Considerations Section in a
   location-based service.  This scenario is, however, outside RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
         October 1998.

10.2.  Informative References

   [9]   Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
         Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [10]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [11]  "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association
         Official Document TD.13",  , June 2006.

   [12]  "The international identification plan for mobile terminals and
         mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212",  , May 2004.

   [13]  "Designations for interconnections among operators' networks,
         ITU-T Recommendation M.1400",  , January 2004.

   [14]  "Codes for the scope representation of this document.

   It is necessary to use authorization policies to limit the
   unauthorized distribution names of location information.  The security
   requirements which are created based on [10] are inline with threats
   which appear countries and their
         subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1",  , 1997.

   [15]  Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
         Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.

   [16]  Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk,
         J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Format for
         Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, February 2007.

   [17]  Schulzrinne, H., "Geolocation Policy: A Document Format for
         Expressing Privacy Preferences for  Location Information",
         draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-12 (work in the relationship with disclosure of location
   information as described progress), May 2007.

   [18]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
         Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
         draft-ietf-simple-xcap-12 (work in [33].  PIDF-LO [21] proposes S/MIME to
   protect the progress), October 2006.

   [19]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object against modifications.  S/SIME relies on
   public key cryptography which raises performance, deployment
         Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.

   [20]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and size
   considerations.  Encryption would require that the local AAA server
   or the NAS knows the recipient's public key (e.g., the public key of
   the home AAA server).  Knowing the final recipient of the location
   information is in many cases difficult for RADIUS entities.  Some
   sort of public key infrastructure would be required to obtain the
   public key D. Mitton, "Diameter
         Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.

   [21]  Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and to verify the digital signature (at the home network).
   Providing per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
         August 2005.

   [22]  Aboba, B. and at the visited network, computationally expensive.

   If no authentication, integrity P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
         (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [23]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
         RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [24]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and replay protection between the
   participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can
   spoof P. Eronen, "The Network
         Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

   [25]  Narten, T. and modify transmitted attributes.  Two security mechanisms are
   proposed R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for RADIUS:

   o  [2] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some
      concerns about the lack dynamic key management.

   o  RADIUS over IPsec [34] allows to run standard key management
      mechanisms, such as KINK, IKE Stateless
         Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

   [26]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
         (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [27]  Arkko, J. and IKEv2 [35], to establish IPsec
      security associations.  Confidentiality protection MUST be used to
      prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information.
      Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this
      document, it is also required H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
         Method for the transport of keying material 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
         (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.

   [28]  Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "EAP Tunneled TLS Authentication
         Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01
         (work in the context of EAP authentication progress), April 2007.

   [29]  Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and authorization.  Hence,
      this requirement is, G. Zorn, "Protected
         EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
         draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in many environments, already fulfilled.
      Mutual authentication must be provided between progress),
         October 2004.

   [30]  Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method",
         draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-13 (work in progress), March 2007.

   [31]  Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., and J. Loughney,
         "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.

   [32]  "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
         Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
         http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm",  ,
         January 2003.

   [33]  Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
         LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

   [34]  Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the local AAA
      server Geopriv Protocol",
         RFC 3694, September 2003.

   [35]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and the home AAA server to prevent man-in-the-middle
      attacks from being successful. E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [36]  Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location
         Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-07 (work in
         progress), February 2007.

Appendix A.  Matching with Geopriv Requirements

   This is another requirement raised section compares the requirements for a GEOPRIV Using Protocol,
   described in [9], against the area approach of key transport distributing Location
   Objects with RADIUS RADIUS.

   In Appendix A.1 and does Appendix A.2 we discuss privacy implications when
   RADIUS is not represent a
      deployment obstacle.  The performance advantages superior compared used according to the these usage scenario.  In
   Appendix A.3 the requirements are matched against these two
   scenarios.

A.1.  Distribution of S/MIME and object security since Location Information at the expensive
      authentication and key exchange protocol run needs to be provided
      only once (for a long time).  Symmetric channel security with
      IPsec is highly efficient.  Since IPsec protection is suggested as
      a mechanism to protect User's Home Network

   This section focuses on location information transport from the local
   RADIUS already no additional considerations
      need to be addressed beyond those described in [34].  Where an
      untrusted AAA intermediary is present, server (acting as the Location Object MUST
      NOT be provided Generator) to the intermediary.

   In case home RADIUS
   server (acting as the Location Server).  To use a more generic
   scenario we assume that IPsec protection is not available for some reason the visited RADIUS and the home RADIUS specific security mechanisms have server
   belong to be used then the
   following considerations apply. different administrative domains.  The Access-Request message is not
   integrity protected.  This would allow an adversary to change Location Recipient
   obtains location information about a particular Target via protocols
   specified outside the
   contents scope of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes
   and fields this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or to delete attributes.  To address these problems an
   API).

   Please note that the
   Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect main usage scenario defined in this document
   assumes that the
   entire Access-Request packet.  The Message-Authenticator (80) is also
   required when EAP is used Location Server and hence is supported by many modern
   RADIUS servers.

   Access-Request packets including the Location attribute(s) without Recipient are co-
   located into a
   Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by single entity with regard to location based network
   access authorization, taxation and billing.

   The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.

    visited network    |        home network
                       |
                       |        +----------+
                       |        |  Rule    |
                       |        | Holder   |
                       |        |          |
                       |        +----+-----+
                       |             |
                       |         rule|interface
                       |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
     |Location  |  publication  | Location |  notification |Location  |
     |Generator |<------------->| Server   |<------------->|Recipient |
     |          |  interface    |          |  interface    |          |
     +----------+      |        +----------+               +----------+
                       |
     Local RADIUS server.  A    RADIUS server supporting the     Home RADIUS     SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
     Server            |         Server
                       |

              Figure 19: Location
   attributes MUST calculate the correct value of Server at the Message-
   Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard Home Network

   The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 19 denotes the packet if it does not
   match entity that creates
   the value sent.

   Access-Accept, including authorization rule set.

A.2.  Distribution of Location attribute(s) without a Message-
   Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by Information at the NAS.
   A NAS supporting Visited Network

   This section describes a scenario where location information made
   available to Location Recipients by some entity in the Location attribute MUST calculate visited
   network.

   In order for this scenario to be applicable the correct
   value of following two
   assumptions must hold:

   o  The visited network deploys a received Message-Authenticator(80) Location Server and MUST silently
   discard the packet if it does not match wants to
      distribute Location Objects

   o  The visited network is able to learn the value sent.

   RADIUS user's identity.  RFC
      4282 [24] and Diameter make some assumptions about the trust between
   traversed AAA entities RFC 4372 [31] discuss this aspect in sense that object level security is not
   provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter.  Hence, some trust has more detail.

   The visited network provides location information to be
   placed on a Location
   Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP).  During the AAA entities network access
   authentication procedure the visited network is able to behave retrieve the
   user's authorization policies from the home RADIUS server.  This
   should ensure that the visited network acts according to the defined rules.
   Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve user's
   policies.

   The subsequent figure shows the user in their
   protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information
   (such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure. interacting entities graphically.

    visited network    |        home network
                       |
     +----------+      |
     |Location  |      |
     |Recipient |      |
     |          |      |
     +----------+      |
          ^            |        +----------+
          |            |        |  Rule    |
          |            |        | Holder   |
      notification     |        |          |
       interface       |        +----+-----+
          |            |             |
          |            |         rule|interface
          v            |             V
     +----------+      |        +----------+
     |Location  | Rule Transport| Home     |
     |Generator |<------------->| RADIUS and
   Diameter have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution.
   Hence, in   |
     |& Server  |   RADIUS      | Server   |
     +----------+      |        +----------+
                       |

             Figure 20: Location Server at the past there were some concerns about Visited Network

A.3.  Requirements matching

   Section 7.1 of [9] details the trust placed
   into requirements of a "Location Object".
   We discuss these requirements in the infrastructure particularly from subsequent list.

   Req. 1.  (Location Object generalities):

      *  Regarding requirement 1.1, the security area when it
   comes Location Object has to keying.  The EAP keying infrastructure is described in [28].

11.  IANA Considerations

   The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values
   defined in this document be registered
         understood by the Internet Assigned
   Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces server as described defined in this document.
         Due to the "IANA Considerations" section encoding of RFC 3575 [8], in accordance with
   BCP 26 [9].  Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in the Diameter name space.  For Radius attributes and registries
   created by this document IANA Location Object it is requested possible to place them at
   http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types.

   This document defines the following attributes:

         Operator-Name
         Location-Information
         Basic-Policy-Rules
         Extended-Policy-Rules
         Challenge-Capable
         Requested-Info

   Please refer
         convert it to Section 6 for the registered list of numbers. format used in GMLv3 [32].  This document also instructs IANA to assign a new value for
         uses the
   Error-Cause attribute [5], civic and geospatial location information format used
         in [5] and in [4].  The format of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.

   Additionally, IANA is requested to create [5] and of [4] can be
         convered into a PIDF-LO [19].

      *  Regarding requirement 1.2, a number of fields in the following new
   registries:

11.1.  New Registry: Operator Namespace Identifier

   This document also defines an operator namespace identifier registry
   (used civic
         location information format are optional.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item
         (CAtype 29) used in the Namespace ID field DHCP civic format gives a further
         classification of the Operator-Name attribute).
   Note that location.  This attribute can be seen as
         an extension.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.4, the location information is not
         defined in this document requests IANA only to maintain a registry of
   existing namespaces document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for use
         both receiving and sending location information as described in
         this identifier field, document.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both
         location information and not to
   establish any namespaces nor to place any values within namespaces.

   IANA privacy rules.  Location information
         is requested to add the following values to the operator
   namespace identifier registry using a numerical identifier (allocated described in sequence), a token for the operator namespace Section 4.2, in Section 4.3.1 and a contact person
   for the registry.

  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+
  |Identifier| Operator Namespace | Contact Person                     |
  |          | Token              |                                    |
  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+
  |    0     | TADIG              | Christer Gullstrand                |
  |          |                    | (Christer.Gullstrand@syniverse.com)|
  |    1     | REALM              | Hannes Tschofenig                  |
  |          |                    | (Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com)    |
  |    2     | E212               | ITU Director                       |
  |          |                    | (tsbdir@itu.int)                   |
  |    3     | ICC                | ITU Director                       |
  |          |                    | (tsbdir@itu.int)                   |
  +----------+--------------------+------------------------------------+

   Requests to IANA for a new value for a Namespace ID will be approved
   by Expert Review. in
         Section 4.3.2.  The Designated Expert Reviewer team for these
   requests is the current Operations Area Director corresponding privacy rules are detailed in
         Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5.

      *  Regarding requirement 1.7, the RADEXT
   working group chairs or the working group chairs of Location Object is usable in a designated
   successor working group.
         variety of protocols.  The Expert Reviewer should ensure that a new entry is indeed required
   or could fit within an existing database, e.g., whether there format of the object is a
   real reused from
         other documents as detailed in Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1,
         Section 4.3.2 Section 4.4 and in Section 4.5).

      *  Regarding requirement to provide a token for 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object
         has an Namespace ID because one emphasis on a lightweight encoding format.  As such it
         is already up and running, or whether the REALM identifier plus useable on constrained devices.

   Req. 2.  (Location Object fields):

      *  Regarding requirement 2.1, the
   name should recommended to Target Identifier is carried
         within the requester.  In addition, network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
         the Expert
   Reviewer should ascertain to some reasonable degree of diligence that
   a new entry is a correct reference to an Operator Namespace, EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the
         EAP method itself).  As described in Section 7.2 it has a
   new one
         number of advantages if this identifier is registered.

11.2.  New Registry: Requested-Info Attribute not carried in
         clear.  This document creates a new IANA registry is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the
         identity in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information
         relevant for routing the Requested-Info
   attribute.  IANA is requested response to add the following four values to
   this registry:

    +----------+----------------------+
    |  Value   | Capability Token     |
    +----------+----------------------+
    |    1     | CIVIC_LOCATION       |
    |    2     | GEO_LOCATION         |
    |    4     | USERS_LOCATION       |
    |    8     | NAS_LOCATION         |
    +----------+----------------------+ user's home network.
         The semantic of these values user identity is protected by the authentication and key
         exchange protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is defined in Section 5.8.

   Following the policies outline in [8] new Capability Tokens with
         main scenario the home RADIUS server.  For a
   description of their semantic for usage with scenario where the Requested-Info
   attribute will be assigned after Expert Review initiated by
         Location Recipient is obtaining Location Information from the O&M
   Area Directors
         Location Server via HTTP or SIP the respective mechanisms
         defined in consultation with these protocols are used to identify the RADEXT working group chairs
   or recipient.
         The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the working group chairs recipients if
         they are not defined in this protocol.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of a designated successor working group.
   Updates can be provided the Location
         Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on expert approval only.  A designated
   expert will be appointed the
         security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself.
         Section 7 describes these security mechanisms offered by the O&M Area Directors.  No mechanism to
   mark entries as "deprecated"
         RADIUS protocol.  The same is envisioned.  Based on expert approval true for requirement 2.4.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 4.2, Section 4.3.1 and
         Section 4.3.2 describe the content of the Location Field.
         Since the location format itself is not defined in this
         document motion and direction vectors as listed in requirement
         2.6 are not defined.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.6, this document provides the
         capability for the RADIUS server to indicate what type of
         location information it would like to see from the RADIUS
         client.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is possible provided with
         'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in
         Section 4.2.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to delete entries from the registry.

   Each registration must include:

   Name:

      Capability Token (i.e., an identifier of the capability)

   Description:

      Brief description indicating external (more
         detailed rule set) is provided with the meaning Section 4.5 attribute.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are
         provided as part of the info element.

   Numerical Value:

      A numerical value that is placed into the Capability attribute
      representing RADIUS protocol or even as part of
         IPsec.

      *  Regarding requirement 2.10, a bit version number in RADIUS is
         provided with the bit-string IANA registration of the Requested-Info
      attribute.

12.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their help
   with attributes.  New
         attributes are assigned a previous version of new IANA number.

   Req. 3.  (Location Data Types):

      *  Regarding requirement 3.1, this draft and for their input:

      Chuck Black

      Paul Congdon

      Jouni Korhonen

      Sami Ala-luukko

      Farooq Bari

      Ed Van Horne

      Mark Grayson

      Jukka Tuomi

      Jorge Cuellar

      Christian Guenther

   Henning Schulzrinne provided the document reuses civic and
         geospatial location information content
   found as described in this draft.  The Section 4.3.2
         and in Section 4.3.1.

      *  With the support of civic and geospatial location information format is
   based on work done by J. Polk, J. Schnizlein and M. Linsner.  The
   authorization policy format
         support requirement 3.2 is based on the work done by Jon
   Peterson.

   The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
   Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
   Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
   feedback to an initial version of this draft.  We would like to thank
   Jari Arkko for his text contributions.  Lionel Morand provided
   detailed feedback on numerous issues.  His comments helped fulfilled.

      *  Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information
         used by this document only refers to improve absolute coordinates.
         However, the quality granularity of this document.  Jouni Korhonen and John Loughney
   helped us the location information can be
         reduced with the Diameter RADIUS interoperability.  Andreas
   Pashalidis reviewed a later version document and provided a number help of
   comments.  Bernard Aboba, Alan DeKok, Lionel Morand, Jouni Korhonen,
   David Nelson and Emile van Bergen provided guidance on the Requested-
   Info attribute and participated AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields
         described in the capability exchange
   discussions.  Allison Mankin, Jouni Korhonen [5].

      *  Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
         added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
         field in [5]) and Pasi Eronen provided
   text for the operator namespace identifier registry.  Jouni Korhonen
   interacted with the GSMA via extensions to find [5] and [4].

   Section 7.2 of [9] details the requirements of a contact person for "Using Protocol".
   These requirements are listed below:

   Req. 4.:  The using protocol has to obey the TADIG
   operator namespace privacy and Scott Bradner consulted security
      instructions coded in the ITU-T to find a
   contact person for Location Object regarding the E212
      transmission and storage of the ICC operator namespace. LO.  This document is based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV
   working group.  Therefore, requires that
      RADIUS entities sending or receiving location MUST obey such
      instructions.

   Req. 5.:  The using protocol will typically facilitate that the authors thank Henning Schulzrinne,
   James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew
   Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time to discuss a number
   of issues with us.  We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work keys
      associated with 3GPP activities.

   The RADEXT working group chairs, David Nelson and Bernard Aboba,
   provided several draft reviews and we would like to thank them for the help and their patience.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs credentials are transported to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", March 1997.

   [2]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
        Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
        June 2000.

   [3]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.

   [4]  Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
        and DHCPv6) Option for Civic  Addresses Configuration
        Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-09 (work the respective
      parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
      using protocol.  Section 7 specifies how security mechanisms are
      used in
        progress), January 2006.

   [5]  Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., RADIUS and B. Aboba,
        "Dynamic Authorization Extensions how they can be reused to Remote Authentication Dial
        In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.

   [6]  Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
        Configuration Protocol Option provide security
      protection for Coordinate-based the Location
        Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.

   [7]  Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
        "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [8]  Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations Object.  Additionally, the privacy
      considerations (see Section 7.2) are also relevant for RADIUS (Remote
        Authentication Dial this
      requirement.

   Req. 6.  (Single Message Transfer):  In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003.

   [9]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines particular, for Writing an IANA
        Considerations tracking of
      small target devices, the design should allow a single message/
      packet transmission of location as a complete transaction.  The
      encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards
      the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path)
      MTU size.  The concept of a transaction is not immediately
      applicable to RADIUS.

   Section 7.3 of [9] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location
   Data Transfer".  These requirements are listed below:

   Req. 7.  (LS Rules):  With the scenario shown in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.

13.2.  Informative References

   [10]  Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
         Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.

   [11]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [12]  Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Figure 19 the
      decision of a Location
         Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-04 (work Server to provide a Location Recipient
      access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
      Privacy Rules that are stored at the home network.  With regard to
      the scenario shown in
         progress), August 2006.

   [13]  "TADIG Naming Conventions, Version 4.1", GSM Association
         Official Document TD.13",  , June 2006.

   [14]  "The international identification plan for mobile terminals Figure 20 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy
      Rules are sent from the home network to the visited network (see
      Section 4.4, Section 4.5 and
         mobile users, ITU-T Recommendation E.212",  , May 2004.

   [15]  "Designations Section 7.2 for interconnections among operators' networks,
         ITU-T Recommendation M.1400",  , January 2004.

   [16]  "Codes more details).

   Req. 8.  (LG Rules):  For mid-session delivery it is possible to
      enforce the user's privacy rules for the representation transfer of the Location
      Object.  For the initial transmission of names a Location Object the
      user would have to use network access authentication methods which
      provide user identity confidentiality which would render the
      Location Object completely useless for the visited network.  For
      the scenario shown in Figure 19 the visited network is already in
      possession of countries the users location information prior to the
      authentication and their
         subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes, ISO 3166-1",  , 1997.

   [17]  Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
         Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.

   [18]  Schulzrinne, H., "Common Policy: authorization of the user.  A Document Format for
         Expressing Privacy Preferences",
         draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-11 (work in progress),
         August 2006.

   [19]  Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
         Preferences correlation
      between the location and the user identity might, however, still
      not be possible for Location  Information",
         draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-08 (work the visited network (as explained in progress), February 2006.

   [20]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
         Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",
         draft-ietf-simple-xcap-11 (work
      Section 7.2).  The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided
      by the home RADIUS server as soon as possible.

   Req. 9.  (Viewer Rules):  The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
      outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
      disclosed to other entities.

   Req. 10.  (Full Rule language):  Geopriv has defined a rule language
      capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
      applicable in progress), May 2006.

   [21]  Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
         Format", RFC 4119, December 2005.

   [22]  Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter
         Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005, August 2005.

   [23]  Eronen, P., Hiller, T., the area of the distribution of Location Objects.  A
      basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
      Section 4.4.  A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
      Section 4.5.  The format of these rules are described in [16] and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
         August 2005.

   [24]  "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
         Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
         http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm",  ,
         January 2003.

   [25]  Stanley, D., Walker, J.,
      [17].

   Req. 11.  (Limited Rule language):  A limited (or basic) ruleset is
      provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 4.4 (and as
      introduced with PIDF-LO [19]).

   Section 7.4 of [9] details the requirements of a "Location Object
   Privacy and B. Aboba, "Extensible
         Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements Security".  These requirements are listed below:

   Req. 12 (Identity Protection):  Support for Wireless
         LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

   [26]  Narten, T. unlinkable pseudonyms is
      provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions key
      exchange protocol.  Such protocols are available, for Stateless
         Address Autoconfiguration example,
      with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
      Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
      whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
      This issue is further discussed in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.

   [27]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
         (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [28]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The Network
         Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

   [29]  Arkko, J. Section 7.  The importance for
      user identity confidentiality and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol identity protection has already
      been recognized as an important property (see for example a
      document on 'EAP Method Requirements for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
         (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.

   [30]  Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected
         EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
         draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work Wireless LANs' [33]).

   Req. 13.  (Credential Requirements):  As described in progress),
         October 2004.

   [31]  Tschofenig, H., "EAP Section 7
      RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec.  This
      allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
      used as part of IKE, IKEv2 Method",
         draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-11 (work in progress), June 2006.

   [32]  Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J., or KINK.

   Req. 14.  (Security Features):  Geopriv defines a few security
      requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual
      end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object
      confidentiality and J. Loughney,
         "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.

   [33]  Danley, M., "Threat Analysis replay protection.  As described in Section 7
      these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if mutual
      authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as various
      Geopriv Protocol",
         RFC 3694, September 2003.

   [34]  Aboba, B. entities) which directly communicate with each other.

   Req. 15.  (Minimal Crypto):  A minimum of security mechanisms are
      mandated by the usage of RADIUS.  Communication security for
      Location Objects between RADIUS infrastructure elements is
      provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
         In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
         (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

   [35]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
         RFC 4306, December 2005. its dynamic
      key management framework) rather than on relying on object
      security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).

Authors' Addresses

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.com

   Farid Adrangi
   Intel Corporatation
   2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
   Hillsboro OR
   USA

   Email: farid.adrangi@intel.com

   Mark Jones
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: mark.jones@bridgewatersystems.com

   Avi Lior
   Bridgewater Systems Corporation
   303 Terry Fox Drive
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3J1
   CANADA

   Email: avi@bridgewatersystems.com

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