draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-04.txt   draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-05.txt 
Geopriv H. Tschofenig Geopriv H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Siemens Internet-Draft Siemens
Expires: January 17, 2006 F. Adrangi Expires: August 16, 2006 F. Adrangi
Intel Intel
M. Jones M. Jones
A. Lior A. Lior
Bridgewater Bridgewater
July 16, 2005 February 12, 2006
Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS
draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-04.txt draft-ietf-geopriv-radius-lo-05.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 17, 2006. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2006.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract Abstract
This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying access This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying access
network ownership and location information based on a civic and network ownership and location information based on a civic and
geospatial location format. geospatial location format.
The distribution of location information is a privacy sensitive task. The distribution of location information is a privacy sensitive task.
Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important
and addressed in this document. and addressed in this document.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Mid-session Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Mid-session Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1 Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA . . . . . 10 4.1. Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA . . . . . 10
4.2 Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other 4.2. Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Description of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1 Operator-Namespace Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2 Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3 Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.2.1. Civic Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3.1 Civic Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.2.2. Geospatial Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3.2 Geospatial Location Information . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Location-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Capability Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 9. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.1. Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.1 Operator-Namespace Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.2. Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10.2 Operator-Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 9.3. Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10.3 Location-Information Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9.4. Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.4 Basic Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9.5. Challenge-Capable Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.5 Extended Policy Rules Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 9.6. Requested-Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
10.6 Location-Type Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10.7 Capability Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 11. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
11. Table of Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 11.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's
12. Matching with Geopriv Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12.1 Distribution of Location Information at the User's
Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Home Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12.2 Distribution of Location Information at the Visited 11.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
12.3 Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 11.3. Requirements matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 12. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
14.1 Entity in the visited network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 13.1. Entity in the visited network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
14.2 Entity in the home network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 13.2. Entity in the home network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
16.1 New Registry: Operator Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 15.1. New Registry: Operator Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
16.2 New Registry: Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 15.2. New Registry: Requested-Info attribute . . . . . . . . . . 50
17. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 16. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
18.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
18.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 56 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 57
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public
places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by
a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators (GSM a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators (GSM
and CDMA), Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed and CDMA), Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed
broadband operators. broadband operators.
When a user executes the network access authentication procedure to When a user executes the network access authentication procedure to
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related information to the user's home AAA server. This document related information to the user's home AAA server. This document
defines attributes for RADIUS [1]. defines attributes for RADIUS [1].
Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for
wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in other types of wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in other types of
wireless and wired networks whenever location information is wireless and wired networks whenever location information is
required. required.
Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized
access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy with regard to access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy with regard to
location information. [11] defines requirements for a protocol- location information. [12] defines requirements for a protocol-
independent model for the access to geographic location information. independent model for the access to geographic location information.
The model includes a Location Generator (LG) that creates location The model includes a Location Generator (LG) that creates location
information, a Location Server (LS) that authorizes access to information, a Location Server (LS) that authorizes access to
location information, a Location Recipient (LR) that requests and location information, a Location Recipient (LR) that requests and
receives information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that provides receives information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that provides
authorization policies to the LS which enforces access control authorization policies to the LS which enforces access control
policies on requests to location information. policies on requests to location information.
Althougth this document focuses on the use cases of location based
authorization, charging, billing and taxation for network access
RADIUS might also be used for location-based authorization for
application layer services as well. The extensions defined in this
document are therefore not only applicable to a network access
scenario. A further description of these scenarios is outside the
scope of this document.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [2]. document are to be interpreted as described in [2].
RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [1] and [3]. RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [1] and [3].
Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and
authorization policy rules is taken from [11]. authorization policy rules is taken from [12].
Based on today's protocols we assume that the location information is Based on today's protocols we assume that the location information is
provided by the access network where the end host is attached. As provided by the access network where the end host is attached. As
part of the network attachment, which includes the execution of an part of the network attachment authentication to the home network is
authentication and authorization protocol exchange, authentication is provided. The authenticated identity might refer to a user, a device
accomplished. The authenticated identity can refer to a user, a or something else. Although there might often be a user associated
device or something else. Although there might often be a user with the authentication process (either directly or indirectly;
associated with the authentication process (either directly or indirectly when a binding between a device and a user exists) there
indirectly; indirectly when a binding between a device and a user is no assurance that a particular real-world entity (such as a
exists) there is no assurance that a particular real-world entity person) triggered this process. Since location based authorization
(such as a person) triggered this process. Since location based is executed based on the network access authentication of a
authorization is executed based on the network access authentication particular "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's privacy
of a particular "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's within this document even though scenarios exist where this might not
privacy within this document even though scenarios exist where this apply (and device or network privacy might be the correct term).
might not apply (and device or network privacy might be the correct Furthermore, the authors believe that there is a relationship between
term). Furthermore, the authors believe that there is a relationship the NAS (or other nodes in the access network) and the location of
between the location of the network and the location of the entity the entity that triggered the network access authentication, such as
that triggered the network access authentication. Knowing the the user. Knowing the location of a network (where the user or end
location of a network (where the user or end host is attached to) host is attached to) might in many networks also reveal the location
might in many networks also reveal the location of the user or end of the user or end host. In some networks it is even possible to
host. In some networks it is even possible to provide a accurate provide accurate location of the user or end host. A similar
location of the user or end host. A similar assumption is also made assumption is also made with regard to the location information
with regard to the location information obtained via DHCP (see for obtained via DHCP (see for example [4]). This information might be
example [4]). This information might be used by applications in used by applications in other protocols (such as SIP [13] with
other protocols (such as SIP [12] with extensions [13]) to indicate extensions [14]) to indicate the location of a particular user even
the location of a particular user even though the location "only" though the location "only" refers to the location of the network or
refers to the location of the network or equipment within the equipment within the network. This assumption might not hold in all
network. The assumption here is also that the location of the scenarios but seems to be reasonable and practicable.
network has some relationship to the location of the end host (and
subsequently to a user). This assumption might not hold in all
scenarios. Nevertheless, it seems to be reasonable.
Please note that the authors use the terms end host and user Please note that the authors use the terms end host and user
interchangably with respect to the used identities as part of the interchangably with respect to the used identities as part of the
network access authentication. The term 'user' is used whenever the network access authentication. The term 'user' is used whenever the
privacy of the user could potentially be compromised. privacy of the user could potentially be compromised.
3. Delivery Methods for Location Information 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information
Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy
rules, are transported over the RADIUS protocol from visited access rules, are transported over the RADIUS protocol from the visited
network to the home AAA server. To embed a Location Object into access network to the home AAA server. To embed a Location Object
RADIUS a number of AVPs are used, such as Location-Information AVP, into RADIUS a number of attribute are used, such as Location-
Basic-Policy-Rules AVP, Extended-Policy-Rules AVP, Location-Type AVP, Information attribute, Basic-Policy-Rules attribute, Extended-Policy-
Operator-Namespace AVP and Operator-Name AVP. These AVPs can be Rules attribute, Operator-Name attribute. These attributes can be
delivered to the RADIUS server during the authentication/ delivered to the RADIUS server during the authentication/
authorization phase described in Section 3.1, or in the mid-session authorization phase described in Section 3.1, or in the mid-session
using the dynamic authorization protocol framework described in using the dynamic authorization protocol framework described in
Section 3.2. This section describes messages flow for both delivery Section 3.2. This section describes messages flows for both delivery
methods. methods.
3.1 Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery 3.1. Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery
Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location Figure 1 shows an example message flow for delivering location
information during the network access authentication/authorization information during the network access authentication/authorization
procedure. Upon a network authentication request from an access procedure. Upon a network authentication request from an access
network client, the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request message which network client, the NAS submits a RADIUS Access-Request message which
contains location information attributes among other required contains location information attributes among other required
attributes. The attributes (including location information) are attributes. The attributes (including location information) are
added based on some criteria, such as local policy and business added based on some criteria, such as local policy and business
relationship with subscriber's home network provider. If no location relationship with subscriber's home network provider.
information is attached although required by the aaa server an error
message is returned.
The authentication and/or authorization procedure is completed based +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
on a number of criteria, including the newly defined Location- | Network | | Network | | AAA |
Information, Operator-Namespace, Operator-Name, Location-Type, | Access | | Access | | Server |
Policy-Information attributes. A RADIUS Accounting Request message | Client | | Server | | |
may also carry location specific attributes. +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | |
| Authentication phase | |
| begin | |
|---------------------->| |
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Access-Request |
| | + Location-Information |
| |----------------------------->|
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Access-Accept |
| |<-----------------------------|
| Authentication | |
| Success | |
|<----------------------| |
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Accounting-Request |
| | + Location-Information |
| |----------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements
If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although
it is required by the RADIUS server to compute an authorization
decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client. This
exchange is shown in Figure 2. The Access-Challenge thereby provides
a hint to Network Access Server regarding the type of location
information attributes that are desired. In the shown message flow
these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request
message. When receiving this Access-Request message the
authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a
number of criteria, including the newly defined Location-Information
and Operator-Name attributes.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| Network | | Network | | AAA | | Network | | Network | | AAA |
| Access | | Access | | Server | | Access | | Access | | Server |
| Client | | Server | | | | Client | | Server | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | | | |
| Authentication phase | | | Authentication phase | |
| begin | | | begin | |
|---------------------->| | |---------------------->| |
| | | | | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Access-Request |
| | + Challenge-Capable |
| |----------------------------->|
| | |
| | RADIUS |
| | Access-Challenge |
| | + Rule set Information |
| | + Requested-Info |
| |<-----------------------------|
| | | | | |
| | RADIUS | | | RADIUS |
| | Access-Request | | | Access-Request |
| | + Location-Information | | | + Location-Information |
| | attributes |
| |----------------------------->| | |----------------------------->|
| | | | | |
: : : : : :
: Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform : : Multiple Protocol Exchanges to perform :
: Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization : : Authentication, Key Exchange and Authorization :
: ...continued... : : ...continued... :
: : : : : :
| | |
| | RADIUS | | | RADIUS |
| | Access-Accept | | | Access-Accept |
| | + Rule set Information | | | + Requested-Info |
| |<-----------------------------| | |<-----------------------------|
| Authentication | | | Authentication | |
| Accept | | | Success | |
|<----------------------| | |<----------------------| |
| | | | | |
| | RADIUS | | | RADIUS |
| | Accounting Request | | | Accounting-Request |
| | + Location-Information | | | + Location-Information |
| | attributes |
| |----------------------------->| | |----------------------------->|
| | | | | |
Figure 1: Message Flow: Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery Figure 2: Location Delivery based on dynamic Request
If the AAA server needs to obtain location information also in
accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info
attribute to the Access-Accept to express that is desired. The
Network Access Server SHOULD then include location information to the
RADIUS accounting messages.
3.2 Mid-session Authorization 3.2. Mid-session Authorization
The mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization The mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization
(COA) message as defined in [5]. At anytime during the session the (COA) message as defined in [5]. At anytime during the session the
AAA server MAY send a COA message containing session identification RADIUS server MAY send a COA message containing session
attributes to the access network. The COA message may instruct the identification attributes to the access network. The COA message MAY
access network to generate an Authorize-Only Access-Request (Access- instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access-
Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in which case the Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in
NAS MUST include the location infromation in this Access-Request. which case the RADIUS client MUST include location information in
this Access-Request if it included location information is previous
Access-Request messages.
Figure 2 shows the approach graphically. Figure 3 shows the approach graphically.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| AAA | | AAA | | AAA | | AAA |
| Client | | Server | | Client | | Server |
| (NAS) | | | | (NAS) | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | |
| COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
|<----------------------------------------------| |<----------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" | | COA NAK + Service-Type "Authorize Only" |
| + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" | | + Error-Cause "Request Initiated" |
|---------------------------------------------->| |---------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"| | Access-Request + Service-Type "Authorize Only"|
| + Location Information attributes | | + Location-Information |
| + Location Information policy | | + Policy-Rules |
|---------------------------------------------->| |---------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| Access-Accept | | Access-Accept |
|<----------------------------------------------| |<----------------------------------------------|
| | | |
Figure 2: Message Flow: Mid-session Authorization Figure 3: Mid-session Authorization
Upon receiving the Authorize-Only message from the access network, Upon receiving the Authorize-Only message from the access network,
the AAA server MUST respond with either an Access-Accept message or the RADIUS server MUST respond with either an Access-Accept or an
an Access-Reject message. Access-Reject message.
4. Scenarios 4. Scenarios
In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of
location information. The location information may refer to the location information. The location information may refer to the
(visited) network or to the user. How the network obtains the user's (visited) network or to the user. How the network obtains the user's
location information is out of the scope of this document. There are location information is out of the scope of this document. There are
two consumers of location information: the AAA server and location- two potential consumers of location information: the AAA server and
based services. The privacy implications of these scenarios are location-based services. The privacy implications of these scenarios
described in Section 14. are described in Section 13.
4.1 Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA 4.1. Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA
The home network operator requires location information for The home network operator requires location information for
authorization and billing purposes. The operator may deny service if authorization and billing purposes. The operator may deny service if
location information is not available, or it may offer limited location information is not available, or it may offer limited
service. The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA service. The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA
server. server.
The user's location is transferred from the NAS to the RADIUS server. The location of the AAA client and/or the end host is transferred
The NAS and intermediaries (if any) are not allowed to use that from the NAS to the RADIUS server (based on a pre-established
information other than to forward it to the home network. agreement or if the RADIUS server asks for it). The NAS and
intermediaries (if any) are not allowed to use that information other
than to forward it to the home network.
The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the user requesting The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the user requesting
access to the network. If the user's location policies are available access to the network. If the user's location policies are available
to the RADIUS server, the RADIUS server must deliver those policies to the RADIUS server, the RADIUS server MUST deliver those policies
in an Access Accept to the RADIUS client. This information may be in an Access Accept to the RADIUS client. This information MAY be
needed if intermediaries or other elements want to act as Location needed if intermediaries or other elements want to act as Location
Servers (see Section 4.2). If intermediaries do not receive these Servers (see Section 4.2). If the NAS or intermediaries do not
policies then they MUST NOT make any use of the location information receive policies from the RADIUS server (or the end host itself) then
other than forwarding it to the home network. they MUST NOT make any use of the location information other than
forwarding it to the user's home network.
Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages. Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages.
Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and
periodically. Accounting messages may also be generated when the periodically. Accounting messages may also be generated when the
user roams during handoff. This information may be needed by the user roams during handoff. This information may be needed by the
billing system to calculate the user's bill. For example, there may billing system to calculate the user's bill. For example, there may
be different rates applied based on the location and there may be be different rates applied based on the location and there may be
different tax rates applied based on the location. Unless otherwise different tax rates applied based on the location. Unless otherwise
specified by authorization rules, location information in the specified by authorization rules, location information in the
accounting stream MUST NOT be transmitted to third parties. accounting stream MUST NOT be transmitted to third parties.
The location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent The location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent
in the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise). in the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise).
4.2 Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services 4.2. Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services
Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location
information and transmit it to other entities. In this second information and transmit it to other entities. In this second
scenario, Location Servers comprise also the NAS and the RADIUS scenario, Location Servers comprise also the NAS and the RADIUS
server. The RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited server. The RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited
network, or in broker networks. network, or in broker networks.
Unless explicitly authorized by the user's location policy, location Unless explicitly authorized by the user's location policy, location
information MUST NOT be transmitted to other parties outside the information MUST NOT be transmitted to other parties outside the
proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server. proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server.
Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server must Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server MUST
transmit the ruleset (if available) in an Access-Accept. The RADIUS transmit the ruleset (if available) in an Access-Accept. The RADIUS
client, intermediate proxies are allowed to share location client, intermediate proxies are allowed to share location
information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed. information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed.
Note that the NAS is the source of all location information that is 5. Description of Attributes
disseminated by RADIUS. The NAS tags the location information with
the policy rules or a reference to the policy rules received in an
Access-Accept. All location information in the accounting stream
will also be tagged.
5. Overview
Location information and ownership of the access network is conveyed Location information and ownership of the access network is conveyed
in the following RADIUS attributes: Operator-Namespace, Operator- in the following RADIUS attributes: Operator-Name and Location-
Name, Location-Information and Location-Type. Furthermore, the Information. Furthermore, the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-
Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes are Policy-Rules attributes are attached to the Location-Information
attached to the Location-Information attribute turning location attribute turning location information into a Location Object as
information into a Location Object as defined in [11]. defined in [12].
5.1 Operator-Namespace Attribute 5.1. Operator-Name Attribute
This attribute contains the description of an operator namespace This attribute contains the operator namespace and the operator name.
which combined with the Operator-Name attribute serves to uniquely The operator name is combined with the Namespace to uniquely identify
identify the owner of an access network. The attribute value is a the owner of an access network. The value of the Operator-Name is a
non-NULL terminated string whose Length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes. non-NULL terminated string whose length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes.
This document defines three values for this attribute: GSM, CDMA, and The attribute value uniquely identifies the operator name within the
REALM. Additional namespaces require IANA registration and MUST be scope of the operator namespace
This Namespace field within the Operator-Name attribute provides
information about the operator namespace.
This document defines four values for this attribute: GSM, CDMA,
REALM and ITU.
Additional namespaces require IANA registration and MUST be
associated with an organization responsible for assigning and associated with an organization responsible for assigning and
managing the operator namespace. managing the operator namespace.
GSM (0):
The GSM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names The GSM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names
based on GSMA TADIG codes. The TADIG Working Group within the GSM based on GSMA TADIG codes. The TADIG Working Group within the GSM
Association is the authority responsible for issuing unique Operator- Association is the authority responsible for issuing unique
Name values for operators of this type. Operator-Name values for operators of this type.
CDMA (1):
The CDMA operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names The CDMA operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names
based on the Home Network Identifier (HNI). The HNI is the based on the Home Network Identifier (HNI). The HNI is the
concatenation of the 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC) and 3-digit concatenation of the 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC) and 3-digit
Mobile Network Code (MNC). The IMSI Oversight Council (IOC) is the Mobile Network Code (MNC). The IMSI Oversight Council (IOC) is
authority responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values for the authority responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values
operators of this type. for operators of this type.
The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names REALM (2):
based on any registered domain name. Such names are required to be
unique and the rights to use a given realm name are obtained
coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular Fully
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
5.2 Operator-Name Attribute The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator
names based on any registered domain name. Such names are
required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are
obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
This attribute contains an operator name which combined with the ITU (3):
Operator-Namespace attribute serves to uniquely identifies the owner
of an access network. The attribute value is a non-NULL terminated
string whose Length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes. The attribute value
uniquely identifies the operator name within the scope of the
operator type.
5.3 Location-Information Attribute The ITU operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names
based on ITU Carrier codes. The Telecommunication Standardization
Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T is the authority responsible for the
repository. Each national regulatory authority is responsible for
issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of this type.
5.2. Location-Information Attribute
This document describes two formats for conveying location This document describes two formats for conveying location
information: civic and geospatial location information. information: civic and geospatial location information.
Section 5.3.1 defines the civic location information format. Section 5.2.1 defines the civic location information format.
Section 5.3.2 defines the geospatial location information format. Section 5.2.2 defines the geospatial location information format.
Additionally, the following fields provide more details about the Additionally, the following fields provide more details about the
transmitted location information. transmitted location information.
Entity: With the help of the 'Entity' field it is possible to Entity: With the help of the 'Entity' field it is possible to
differentiate whether the described Location Object refers to differentiate whether the described Location Object refers to the
either the user's client device (as estimated by the network) or user's client device (as estimated by the network) or to the
to the location of the AAA client (such as NAS). location of the AAA client.
Method: The 'Method' field describes the method for obtaining Method: The 'Method' field describes the method for obtaining
location information. GPS or manual configuration are possible location information. GPS or manual configuration are possible
methods for obtaining location information. The inclusion of this methods for obtaining location information. The inclusion of this
field should help the user's home network to deduce further field should help the user's home network to deduce further
information about the accuracy and to provide an easier information about the accuracy and to provide an easier
translation into a Location Object for transmission to third party translation into a Location Object for transmission to third party
entities (e.g., using SIP). Note that the values for this field entities (e.g., using SIP). Note that the values for this field
are taken from [14]. are taken from [15].
5.3.1 Civic Location Information 5.2.1. Civic Location Information
Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an
entity. Using an unstructured (as a text string) or a custom format entity. An unstructured location format limits automatic processing
for civic location format would limit automatic processing capabilities by the RADIUS server. For this document, we therefore
capabilities are limited. reuse the civic location format defined in [4].
For this document, we take the civic location format defined in [4].
The civic location format includes a number of fields, including the The civic location format includes a number of fields, including the
country (expressed as a two-letter ISO 3166 code) and the country (expressed as a two-letter ISO 3166 code) and the
administrative units A1 through A6 of [4] . This designation offers administrative units A1 through A6 of [4] . This designation offers
street-level precision. street-level precision.
For completeness we include more detailed information from [4] with For completeness we include more detailed information from [4] with
regard to the defined civic location elements: regard to the defined civic location elements:
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
| Label | Description | Example | | Label | Description | Example |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
| country | The country is | US | | country | The country is identified by the | US |
| | identified by the | | | | two-letter ISO 3166 code. | |
| | two-letter ISO 3166 | |
| | code. | |
| | | | | | | |
| A1 | national | New York | | A1 | national subdivisions (state, region, | New York |
| | subdivisions (state, | | | | province, prefecture) | |
| | region, province, | |
| | prefecture) | |
| | | | | | | |
| A2 | county, parish, gun | King's County | | A2 | county, parish, gun (JP), district (IN) | King's County |
| | (JP), district (IN) | |
| | | | | | | |
| A3 | city, township, shi | New York | | A3 | city, township, shi (JP) | New York |
| | (JP) | |
| | | | | | | |
| A4 | city division, | Manhattan | | A4 | city division, borough, city district, | Manhattan |
| | borough, city | | | | ward, cho (JP) | |
| | district, ward, cho | |
| | (JP) | |
| | | | | | | |
| A5 | neighborhood, block, | Morningside Heights | | A5 | neighborhood, block, chome (JP) | Morningside |
| | chome (JP) | | | | | Heights |
| | | | | | | |
| A6 | street, banchi and | Broadway | | A6 | street, banchi and gou (JP) | Broadway |
| | gou (JP) | |
| | | | | | | |
| AC | Additional code, JIS | 13203000003 | | AC | Additional code, JIS address code (JP) | 13203000003 |
| | address code (JP) | |
| | | | | | | |
| PRD | Leading street | N, W | | PRD | Leading street direction | N, W |
| | direction | |
| | | | | | | |
| POD | Trailing street | SW | | POD | Trailing street suffix | SW |
| | suffix | |
| | | | | | | |
| STS | Street suffix | Avenue, Street | | STS | Street suffix | Avenue, |
| | | Street |
| | | | | | | |
| HNO | House number, | 123 | | HNO | House number, numeric part only. | 123 |
| | numeric part only. | |
| | | | | | | |
| HNS | House number suffix | A, 1/2 | | HNS | House number suffix | A, 1/2 |
| | | | | | | |
| LMK | Landmark or vanity | Low Library | | LMK | Landmark or vanity address | Low Library |
| | address | | | | | |
| LOC | Additional location | Room 543 | | LOC | Additional location information | Room 543 |
| | information | |
| | | | | | | |
| FLR | Floor | 5 | | FLR | Floor | 5 |
| | | | | | | |
| NAM | Name (residence, | Joe's Barbershop | | NAM | Name (residence, business or office | Joe's |
| | business or office | | | | occupant) | Barbershop |
| | occupant) | |
| | | | | | | |
| PC | Postal code | 10027-0401 | | PC | Postal code | 10027-0401 |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +---------+-----------------------------------------+---------------+
Table 1 Table 1
More description of these civic location elements can be found in More description of these civic location elements can be found in
Section 3.4 of [4]. These elements can be used to express further Section 3.4 of [4]. These elements can be used to express further
information about the location, language specific settings via the information about the location, language specific settings via the
'language' item and encoding information via the 'script' item. 'language' item and encoding information via the 'script' item.
Section 13 shows usage examples of this attribute. Section 12 shows usage examples of this attribute.
All attributes are optional and can appear in any order. The values All attributes are optional and can appear in any order. The values
are encoded using UTF-8 [6]. are encoded using UTF-8 [6].
5.3.2 Geospatial Location Information The usage of the type of place element (CAtype 29). The values in
this element defined for usage are definded with the location type
registry [7].
This document reuses geospatial location information from [7] which By using these location types it is possible to define more accurate
defines latitude, longitude, and altitude, with resolution indicators location information. The type of place element (CAtype 29) may
appear more than once. The content of this value will not be
displayed to the user but rather used for authorization decisions.
As such, internationalization support is not required. If multiple
type of place elements are used then no specific semantic is
associated regarding the order.
Example values for location types are 'aircraft', 'airport', 'cafe',
'classroom', 'convention-center', 'restaurant', 'office' etc.
5.2.2. Geospatial Location Information
This document reuses geospatial location information from [8] which
defines latitude, longitude, and altitude with resolution indicators
for each. The value in the Altitude field either indicates meters or for each. The value in the Altitude field either indicates meters or
floors (via the Altitude Type field). As a coordinate reference floors (via the Altitude Type field). As a coordinate reference
system Section 2.1 of [7] defines (via extensible mechanism using system Section 2.1 of [8] defines (via extensible mechanism using
IANA registration) three values in the 'Datum' field: WGS 84, NAD 83 IANA registration) three values in the 'Datum' field: WGS 84, NAD 83
(with the associated vertical datum for the North American Vertical (with the associated vertical datum for the North American Vertical
Datum of 1988), NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the Datum of 1988), NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the
Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW). WGS 84 is used by the GPS system. Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW). WGS 84 is used by the GPS system.
During a protocol run it is possible to return Location-Information The NAS might return civic and geospatial location information. Per
attributes which provide both types of location information elements. default civic location SHOULD be added.
If only one location information element is provided then civic
location SHOULD be included in the request.
6. Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes 6. Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes
In some environments it is possible for the user to attach In some environments it is possible for the user to attach
information about its privacy preferences. These preferences allow information about its privacy preferences available to the network.
the visited network, intermediate RADIUS proxies and the home network These preferences allow the visited network, intermediate RADIUS
to authorize the distribution of the user's location information. proxies and the home network to authorize the distribution of the
user's location information. The home network will typically possess
the user's authorization policies.
Without the user providing authorization information two approaches Without the user providing authorization information two approaches
are possible: are possible:
o The user hides its location information from the access network o The user hides its identity information from the access network
and from intermediate networks using the appropriate network and from intermediate networks using the appropriate network
access authentication mechanism. Section 14 discusses these access authentication mechanism. Section 13 discusses these
issues in more details. issues in more details.
o The access network attaches default authorization policies which o The access network attaches default authorization policies which
indicates that intermediate networks and the home network should indicates that intermediate networks and the home network should
not distribute the location information to other entities. not distribute the location information to other entities. If the
Additionally, the home network might have authorization policies user is able to provide authorization policies to the NAS then
which control distribution of location information. Users can these policies will be attached. Additionally, the home network
dynamically change their policies using the authroization might have authorization policies which control distribution of
framework defined in [15] and [16]. location information. These policies are sent from the RADIUS
server to the RADIUS client. Users can dynamically change their
policies using the authroization framework defined in [16] and
[17].
With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done
in [14] and encodes it in an non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting in [15] and encodes it in an non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting
time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location- time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-
Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv Requirements [11], Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv Requirements [12],
Section 2.7. Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose: Basic- Section 2.7. Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose: Basic-
Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute. The Basic-Policy- Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute. The Basic-Policy-
Rule attribute contains a fixed set of privacy relevant fields Rule attribute contains a fixed set of privacy relevant fields
whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule attribute contains a reference to a whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule attribute contains a reference to a
more extensive authorization rule set. more extensive authorization rule set.
7. Location-Type Attribute 7. Requested-Info Attribute
This document uses the values defined in the location type registry The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate
[8]. whether it needs civic and/or geospatial location information of the
NAS or the end host (i.e., the entities that are indicated in the
Entity field of the Location-Information attribute).
By using these location types it is possible to define more accurate If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request
location information. Note that multiple values can be specified in basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the
this attribute. following cases need to be differentiated. If the AAA client and the
AAA server have agreed out-of-band to mandate the transfer of
location information for every network access authentication request
then the issues listed below are not applicable.
8. Capability Attribute o The RADIUS server requires location information for computing the
authorization decision. If the RADIUS client does not provide
location information with the Access-Request message then the
Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge to
indicate what is required. Two cases can be differentiated:
The capability attribute allows the RADIUS client to indicate whether 1. If the RADIUS client sends the requested information then the
civic and/or geospatial location information can be provided to the RADIUS server can process the location-based attributes.
RADIUS server. This is useful to avoid sending location information
with every request if no further out-of-band arrangements are made
with regard to the transport of location information. The AAA server
uses the capability attribute to indicate that the AAA client has to
provide civic and/or geospatial location information as part of this
particular protocol exchange. If the AAA server does not send a
capability attribute then the AAA client MUST NOT return location
information. The user's authorization policies MUST be consulted by
the AAA server before requesting location information delivery from
the AAA client. If the AAA server encounters that the AAA client
does not support the desired location information it might respond
with an Access-Reject with the corresponding error cause attribute
(with the Location-Info-Required error code).
Figure 3 shows a simple protocol exchange where the AAA client 2. If the RADIUS server does not receive the requested
indicates that it is able to provide civic and geospatial location information in response to the Access-Challenge (including the
information and the AAA server indicates that that civic location Requested-Info attribute) then the RADIUS server responds with
information is desired for this particular exchange. an Access-Reject with an Error-Cause attribute (including the
"Location-Info-Required" error value). Note that an Access-
Reject message SHOULD only be sent if the RADIUS server MUST
use location information for returning a positive access
control decision.
o If the RADIUS server would like location information in the
Accounting-Request message but does not require it for computing
an authorization decision then an Access-Accept MUST include a
Required-Info attribute. This is typically the case when location
information is used for inclusion to the user's bill only.The
RADIUS client SHOULD attach location information to the
Accounting-Request (unless authorization policies dictate
something different), if it is available.
If the RADIUS server does not send a Requested-Info attribute then
the RADIUS client MUST NOT attach location information to messages to
the RADIUS server The user's authorization policies MUST be consulted
by the RADIUS server before requesting location information delivery
from the RADIUS client.
Figure 4 shows a simple protocol exchange where the RADIUS server
indicates the desire to obtain location information, namely civic
location information of the user, to grant access. Since the
Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge the
RADIUS server indicates that location information is required for
computing an authorization decision.
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| AAA | | AAA | | RADIUS | | RADIUS |
| Client | | Server | | Client | | Server |
| | | |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
| | | |
| | | |
| RADIUS | | RADIUS |
| Access-Request | | Access-Request |
| + Capability | | +Challenge-Capable |
| ('CIVIC_LOCATION', |
| 'GEO_LOCATION') |
|----------------------------->| |----------------------------->|
| | | |
| RADIUS | | RADIUS |
| Access-Challenge | | Access-Challenge |
| + Capability | | + Requested-Info |
| ('CIVIC_LOCATION') | | ('CIVIC_LOCATION', |
| 'USERS_LOCATION') |
|<-----------------------------| |<-----------------------------|
| | | |
| RADIUS | | RADIUS |
| Access-Request | | Access-Request |
| + Location-Information | | + Location-Information |
| (civic-location) | | (civic-location) |
|----------------------------->| |----------------------------->|
| | | |
| .... | | .... |
Figure 3: Capability Exchange Example Figure 4: RADIUS server requesting location information
9. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability 8. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability
In deployments where RADIUS clients communicate with DIAMETER servers In deployments where RADIUS clients communicate with Diameter servers
or DIAMETER clients communicate with RADIUS servers then a or Diameter clients communicate with RADIUS servers then a
translation agent will be deployed and operate. The NASREQ translation agent will be deployed and operate. The NASREQ
specification [17] provides translation services. Furthermore, the specification [18] provides translation services. Furthermore, the
RADIUS attributes specified in this document are also applicable for RADIUS attributes specified in this document are also applicable for
deployments where DIAMETER clients talk with DIAMETER servers. deployments where Diameter clients talk with Diameter servers.
DIAMETER AVP Code numbers for corresponding RADIUS attributes are Diameter AVP Code numbers for corresponding RADIUS attributes are
allocated as specified in DIAMETER Base Protocol specification allocated as specified in Diameter Base protocol specification
Section 4.1 [9]. Section 4.1 [9].
10. Attributes 9. Attributes
This section defines the Operator-Namespace AVP, Operator-Name AVP, This section defines the Operator-Name attribute, Location-
Location-Information AVP, Basic Policy Rules AVP, Extended Policy Information attribute, Basic Policy Rules attribute, Extended Policy
Rules AVP, Location-Type AVP and the Capability AVP. Rules attribute, and the Capability attribute.
10.1 Operator-Namespace Attribute 9.1. Operator-Name Attribute
Operator-Namespace Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and The Operator-Name attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start, Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim, or Stop. Interim, or Stop.
A summary of the Operator-Namespace Attribute is shown below. A summary of the Operator-Name attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Operator-Namespace ... | Type | Length | Namespace | Operator-Name ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Namespace
Length:
>= 3 Bytes
Operator-Namespace:
The text field contains an Access Network Operator Type.
Example: REALM
10.2 Operator-Name Attribute
Operator-Name Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim, or Stop.
A summary of the Operator-Name Attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Operator-Name ... | Operator-Name ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Name To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Name
Length: Length:
>= 3 Bytes >= 3 Bytes
Namespace:
The value within this field contains the
Operator Namespace identifier.
Example: 1 for CDMA
Operator-Name: Operator-Name:
The text field contains an Access Network Operator Name. The text field of variable length contains an
Access Network Operator Name.
This field is a RADIUS base data type of Text.
Example: anyisp.com Example: anyisp.com
10.3 Location-Information Attribute 9.2. Location-Information Attribute
Location-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and Location-Information attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start, Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim or Stop if available. Interim or Stop if available.
The Location-Information Attribute has two variations depending on The Location-Information Attribute has two variations depending on
civic or geospatial location information. The format is shown below. civic or geospatial location information. The format is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
skipping to change at page 23, line 46 skipping to change at page 22, line 46
(6) IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point (6) IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point
Location-Info (variable): Location-Info (variable):
Contains either civic or Contains either civic or
geospatial location information attributes. geospatial location information attributes.
The following two fields need some explanation: The following two fields need some explanation:
sighting time: This field indicates when the Location Information was sighting time: This field indicates when the Location Information was
accurate. The data type of this field is a string and the format accurate. The data type of this field is a string and the format
is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [18]. is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [19].
time-to-live: This field gives a hint until when location information time-to-live: This field gives a hint until when location information
should be considered current. Note that the time-to-live field is should be considered current. Note that the time-to-live field is
different than retention-expires, which indicates the time the different than retention-expires, which indicates the time the
recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
information and its encapsulating Location Object. The data type information and its encapsulating Location Object. The data type
of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp
[18]. [19].
For civic location information the Location-Info field in the above For civic location information the Location-Info field in the above
structure is defined as followed: structure is defined as followed:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Countrycode | Civic address elements ... | Countrycode | Civic address elements ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Countrycode (16 bits): Countrycode (16 bits):
Two-letter ISO 3166 country code in capital ASCII letters. Two-letter ISO 3166 country code in capital ASCII letters.
Civic address elements (variable): Civic address elements (variable):
The text field contains location information element. The text field contains location information element.
The format of the civic address elements is described in Section 3.3 The format of the civic address elements is described in Section 3.3
of [4] with a TLV pair (whereby the Type and Length fields are one of [4] with a TLV pair (whereby the Type and Length fields are one
octet long). An example is given in Section 13. octet long). An example is given in Section 12.
For geospatial location information the Location-Info field is For geospatial location information the Location-Info field is
defined as follows: defined as follows:
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LaRes | Latitude + | LaRes | Latitude +
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Latitude | LoRes | Longitude + | Latitude | LoRes | Longitude +
skipping to change at page 26, line 8 skipping to change at page 25, line 8
The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253 The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253
octets. The length of the geospatial location information format is octets. The length of the geospatial location information format is
fixed with 16 bytes plus a four byte header. fixed with 16 bytes plus a four byte header.
The 'Datum' field contains an identifier for the coordinate system The 'Datum' field contains an identifier for the coordinate system
used to interpret the values of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude. used to interpret the values of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude.
The field with value (2) and the value (3) both represent the NAD 83 The field with value (2) and the value (3) both represent the NAD 83
coordinate reference system but they differ from each other with coordinate reference system but they differ from each other with
regard to their vertical datum representation as briefly noted in regard to their vertical datum representation as briefly noted in
Section 5.3.2 and described in more detail in [7]. Section 5.2.2 and described in more detail in [8].
10.4 Basic Policy Rules Attribute 9.3. Basic Policy Rules Attribute
The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be sent in Access-Accept, The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be sent in Access-Accept,
Access-Challenge, Access-Request, Access-Reject and Accounting- Access-Challenge, Access-Request, Access-Reject and Accounting-
Request messages if location information is transmitted with this Request messages if location information is transmitted with this
exchange. If authorization policy rules are available to the RADIUS exchange. If authorization policy rules are available to the RADIUS
client then the Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules client then the Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules
attribute to to the RADIUS server. attribute to to the RADIUS server.
A summary of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below. A summary of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.
skipping to change at page 26, line 51 skipping to change at page 25, line 51
retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved. retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved.
Retention Expires (64 bits): Retention Expires (64 bits):
NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field. NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.
Note Well (variable): Note Well (variable):
This field contains a URI which points to This field contains a URI which points to
human readable privacy instructions. human readable privacy instructions.
This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described
in [14]. These fields have the following meaning: in [15]. These fields have the following meaning:
retransmission-allowed: When the value of this element is '0', then retransmission-allowed: When the value of this element is '0', then
the recipient of this Location Object is not permitted to share the recipient of this Location Object is not permitted to share
the enclosed location information, or the object as a whole, with the enclosed location information, or the object as a whole, with
other parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location other parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location
information with other parties by considering the extended policy information with other parties by considering the extended policy
rules. rules.
retention-expires: This field specifies an absolute date at which retention-expires: This field specifies an absolute date at which
time the Recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location time the Recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location
information. The data type of this field is a string and the information. The data type of this field is a string and the
format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [18]. format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [19].
note-well: This field contains a URI which points to human readable note-well: This field contains a URI which points to human readable
privacy instructions. This field is useful when location privacy instructions. This field is useful when location
information is distributed to third party entities, which can information is distributed to third party entities, which can
include humans in a location based service. RADIUS entities are include humans in a location based service. RADIUS entities are
not supposed to process this field. not supposed to process this field.
Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system the URI in the Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system the URI in the
note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable text. note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable text.
For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a SIP For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a SIP
based environment then the human readable text is placed in the based environment then the human readable text is placed in the
text is put into the 'note-well' attribute inside the 'usage- text is put into the 'note-well' attribute inside the 'usage-
rules' element inside the PIDF-LO document (see [14]). rules' element inside the PIDF-LO document (see [15]).
10.5 Extended Policy Rules Attribute 9.4. Extended Policy Rules Attribute
The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Accept, The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Accept,
Access-Challenge, Access-and Access-Reject messages if location Access-Challenge, Access-and Access-Reject messages if location
information is transmitted with this exchange. If authorization information is transmitted with this exchange. If authorization
policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the Access- policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the Access-
Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the RADIUS Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the RADIUS
server. server.
Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length. It Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length. It
contains a URI that indicates where a richer ruleset is available. contains a URI that indicates where a richer ruleset is available.
The full ruleset SHOULD be fetched using Transport Layer Security The full ruleset SHOULD be fetched using Transport Layer Security
(TLS). As a deviation from [14] this field only contains a reference (TLS). As a deviation from [15] this field only contains a reference
and does not carry an attached rule set. This modification is and does not carry an attached rule set. This modification is
motivated by the size limitations imposed by RADIUS. motivated by the size limitations imposed by RADIUS.
A summary of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below. A summary of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Ruleset reference ... | Type | Length | Ruleset reference ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type : Type :
To Be Assigned by IANA - Extended-Policy-Rules To Be Assigned by IANA - Extended-Policy-Rules
Length: Length:
> 3 Bytes > 3 Bytes
Ruleset reference: Ruleset reference:
The text field contains a URI which points to policy rules. The text field contains a URI which points to policy rules.
10.6 Location-Type Attribute 9.5. Challenge-Capable Attribute
Location-Type Attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Request, and
Accounting-Request records where the Acc-Status-Type is set to Start,
Interim, or Stop if available.
A summary of the Location-Type Attribute is shown below. The Challenge-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a
proxy server) to indicate support for processing general purpose
Access-Challenge messages from the RADIUS server, beyond those
specified for support of the authentication methods of textual
challenge-response, CHAP or EAP. This mechanism allows the RADIUS
server to request additional information from the RADIUS client prior
to making an authentication and authorization decision. The
Challenge-Capable attribute MUST appear in Access-Request Messages,
if the NAS supports this feature, as a hint to the RADIUS Server.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Loc-Type | | Type | Length | Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type (8 bits): Type (8 bits):
To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Name To Be Assigned by IANA - Challenge-Capable Attribute
Length (8 bits): Length (8 bits):
4 Bytes = 4 Bytes
Loc-Type (16 bits):
The content of this field corresponds to the integer codes for
access network location type.
These integer codes for the location type can be found in Section 7. Value (16 bits):
The content of this field MUST be set to 0.
10.7 Capability Attribute 9.6. Requested-Info Attribute
The Capability attribute SHOULD be sent in the Access-Request and the The Requested-Info attribute MUST be sent by the RADIUS server if it
Access-Challenge messages. wants the RADIUS client to return civic and/or geospatial
information. This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access-
Accept or in the Access-Challenge messages.
A summary of the Capability attribute is shown below. A summary of the attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Capabilities ... | Type | Length | Requested-Info |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Requested-Info |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: Type:
To Be Assigned by IANA - Operator-Name To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute
Length: Length:
>= 3 Bytes 6 Bytes
Capabilities (128 bits): Requested-Info (48 bits):
This text field contains a numerical value that encodes the This text field contains a numerical value that encodes the
corresponding capabilities. requested information attributes.
Each value represents a bit position. Each value represents a bit position.
Currently the following capabilities are specified: Currently the following capabilities are specified:
Capability Name: Name:
CIVIC_LOCATION CIVIC_LOCATION
Description: Description:
In the direction from the AAA client to the AAA server this The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from
capability refers to the ability to sent civic location the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value
information. In the direction from the AAA server to the AAA representing CIVIC_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach
client this capability refers to the desire of the AAA server to civic location attributes.
receive civic location.
Numerical Value: Numerical Value:
A numerical value of this attribute is '0'. A numerical value of this attribute is '0'.
Capability Name: Name:
GEO_LOCATION GEO_LOCATION
Description: Description:
In the direction from the AAA client to the AAA server this The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from
capability refers to the ability to sent geospatial location the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value
information. In the direction from the AAA server to the AAA representing GEO_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach
client this capability refers to the desire of the AAA server to geospatial location attributes.
receive geospatial location.
Numerical Value: Numerical Value:
A numerical value of this attribute is '2'. A numerical value of this attribute is '2'.
11. Table of Attributes Name:
USERS_LOCATION
Description:
The numberical value representing USERS_LOCATION indicates that
the AAA client must sent a Location-Information attribute that
contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing
the value of zero (0). A value of zero indicates that the
location information in the Location-Information attribute refers
to the user's client device.
Numerical Value:
A numerical value of this attribute is '4'.
Name:
NAS_LOCATION
Description:
The numberical value representing NAS_LOCATION indicates that the
AAA client must sent a Location-Information attribute that
contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing
the value of one (1). A value of one indicates that the location
information in the Location-Information attribute refers to the
AAA client.
Numerical Value:
A numerical value of this attribute is '8'.
If neither the NAS_LOCATION nor the USERS_LOCATION bit is set then
per-default the location of the user's client device MUST be
returned. If neither the CIVIC_LOCATION nor the GEO_LOCATION bit is
set then per-default geospatial location information MUST be
returned. The value of NAS_LOCATION and USERS_LOCATION refers to the
location requested via CIVIC_LOCATION and/or via GEO_LOCATION. As an
example, if the bits for NAS_LOCATION, USERS_LOCATION and
GEO_LOCATION are set then location information of the AAA client and
the users' client device are returned in a geospatial location
format.
10. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in
which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity. which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity.
Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting # Attribute Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting # Attribute
Request Request
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Operator-Name 0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Operator-Name
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Operator-Namespace
0+ 0 0 0 0+ TBD Location-Information 0+ 0 0 0 0+ TBD Location-Information
0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 TBD Basic-Policy-Rules 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 TBD Basic-Policy-Rules
0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 TBD Extended-Policy-Rules 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 0-1 TBD Extended-Policy-Rules
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 TBD Location-Type 0 0-1 0 0-1 0-1 TBD Requested-Info
0-1 0 0 0-1 0 TBD Capability 0-1 0 0 0 0 TBD Challenge-Capable
The Location-Information attribute may appear more than once. This The Location-Information attribute may appear more than once. This
is useful if the size of one Location-Information attribute exceeds is useful if the size of one Location-Information attribute exceeds
the maximum size of an AVP. This might happen in case of civic the maximum size of an attribute. This might happen in case of civic
location information that has a variable number of fields. The location information that has a variable number of fields. The
individual fields used for representing civic location information individual fields used for representing civic location information
inside the Location-Information AVP (see Section 5.3.1 MUST NOT inside the Location-Information attribute (see Section 5.2.1) MUST
appear more than once. For example, it is not allowed to have a NOT appear more than once. For example, it is not allowed to have a
CAtype of 3 (indicating the name of the city) to appear more than CAtype of 3 (indicating the name of the city) to appear more than
once. once.
The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute. The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute.
Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting # Attribute Request Accept Reject Challenge Accounting # Attribute
Request Request
0 0 0-1 0-1 0-1 TBD Location-Info-Required 0 0 0-1 0 0 TBD Location-Info-Required
0 0 0-1 0 0 101 Error-Cause 0 0 0-1 0 0 101 Error-Cause
12. Matching with Geopriv Requirements 11. Matching with Geopriv Requirements
This section compares the Geopriv requirements described in [11] and This section compares the Geopriv requirements described in [12] and
the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS. the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS.
The main usage scenario aimed for Location Object transport in RADIUS The main usage scenario aimed for Location Object transport in RADIUS
assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co- assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co-
located at a single entity with regard to location based network located at a single entity with regard to location based network
access authorization, taxation and billing. In Section 12.1 and access authorization, taxation and billing. In Section 11.1 and
Section 12.2 we discuss privacy implications when RADIUS is not used Section 11.2 we discuss privacy implications when RADIUS is not used
according to these usage scenario. according to these usage scenario.
In Section 12.3 Geopriv requirements are matched against these two In Section 11.3 Geopriv requirements are matched against these two
scenarios. scenarios.
12.1 Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network 11.1. Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network
This section focuses on location information transport from the local This section focuses on location information transport from the local
AAA server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home AAA server AAA server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home AAA server
(acting as the Location Server). To use a more generic scenario we (acting as the Location Server). To use a more generic scenario we
assume that the visited AAA and the home AAA server belong to assume that the visited AAA and the home AAA server belong to
different administrative domains. The Location Recipient obtains different administrative domains. The Location Recipient obtains
location information about a particular Target via protocols location information about a particular Target via protocols
specified outside the scope this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an specified outside the scope this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an
API). API).
skipping to change at page 33, line 30 skipping to change at page 33, line 30
| |
Local AAA RADIUS Home AAA SIP/HTTP/API/etc. Local AAA RADIUS Home AAA SIP/HTTP/API/etc.
Server | Server Server | Server
| |
Figure 16: Location Server at the Home Network Figure 16: Location Server at the Home Network
The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 16 denotes the entity which creates The term 'Rule Holder' in Figure 16 denotes the entity which creates
the authorization ruleset. the authorization ruleset.
12.2 Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network 11.2. Distribution of Location Information at the Visited Network
This section describes a scenario where Location Information is This section describes a scenario where Location Information is
distributed by the visited network. distributed by the visited network.
In order for this scenario to be applicable the following two In order for this scenario to be applicable the following two
assumptions must hold: assumptions must hold:
o The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to o The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to
distribute Location Objects of a user distribute Location Objects of a user
skipping to change at page 34, line 29 skipping to change at page 34, line 29
v | V v | V
+----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | +----------+
|Location | Rule Transport| Home AAA | |Location | Rule Transport| Home AAA |
|Generator |<------------->| Server | |Generator |<------------->| Server |
|& Server | RADIUS | | |& Server | RADIUS | |
+----------+ | +----------+ +----------+ | +----------+
| |
Figure 17: Location Server at the Visited Network Figure 17: Location Server at the Visited Network
12.3 Requirements matching 11.3. Requirements matching
Section 7.1 of [11] details the requirements of a "Location Object". Section 7.1 of [12] details the requirements of a "Location Object".
There are: There are:
Req. 1. (Location Object generalities): Req. 1. (Location Object generalities):
* Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be * Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be
understood by the RADIUS server (and possibly a Diameter server understood by the RADIUS server (and possibly a Diameter server
in case of interworking between the two) as defined in this in case of interworking between the two) as defined in this
document. Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is document. Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is
possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3 [19]. The possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3 [20]. The
same civic location information format is used in PIDF-LO [14] same civic location information format is used in PIDF-LO [15]
and this document. and this document.
* Regarding requirement 1.2, some fields of the Location Object * Regarding requirement 1.2, some fields of the Location Object
defined in this document are optional. See Section 5.3.1 as an defined in this document are optional. See Section 5.2.1 as an
example. example.
* Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of the Location-Type * Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item
attribute which gives a further classification of the location. (CAtype 29) gives a further classification of the location.
This attribute can be seen as an extension. This attribute can be seen as an extension.
* Regarding requirement 1.4, the Location Object is extensible in * Regarding requirement 1.4, the Location Object is extensible in
the same fashion as RADIUS is extensible. the same fashion as RADIUS is extensible.
* Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for * Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for
both receiving and sending location information as described in both receiving and sending location information as described in
this document. this document.
* Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both * Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both
location information and privacy rules. Location information location information and privacy rules. Location information
is described in Section 5.3 and the corresponding privacy rules is described in Section 5.2 and the corresponding privacy rules
are detailed in Section 10.4 and in Section 10.5. are detailed in Section 9.3 and in Section 9.4.
* Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a * Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a
variety of protocols. The format of the object is reused from variety of protocols. The format of the object is reused from
other documents as detailed in the respective sections (see other documents as detailed in the respective sections (see
Section 5.3, Section 10.4 and in Section 10.5). Section 5.2, Section 9.3 and in Section 9.4).
* Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object * Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object
has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format. As such it has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format. As such it
is useable on constrained devices. is useable on constrained devices.
Req. 2. (Location Object fields): Req. 2. (Location Object fields):
* Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried * Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried
within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within
the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the
EAP method itself). As described in Section 14 it has a number EAP method itself). As described in Section 13 it has a number
of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear text. of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear text.
This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the identity This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the identity
in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant
for routing the response to the user's home network. The user for routing the response to the user's home network. The user
identity is protected by the authentication and key exchange identity is protected by the authentication and key exchange
protocol. protocol.
* Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is in the * Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is in the
main scenario the home AAA server. For a scenario where the main scenario the home AAA server. For a scenario where the
Location Recipient is obtaining Location Information from the Location Recipient is obtaining Location Information from the
Location Server via HTTP or SIP the respective mechanisms Location Server via HTTP or SIP the respective mechanisms
defined in these protocols are used to identify the recipient. defined in these protocols are used to identify the recipient.
The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if
they are not defined in this protocol. they are not defined in this protocol.
* Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location * Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location
Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the
security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself. security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself.
Section 14 describes these security mechanisms offered by the
Section 15 describes these security mechanisms offered by the
RADIUS protocol. The same is true for requirement 2.4. RADIUS protocol. The same is true for requirement 2.4.
* Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 5.3 describes the content of * Regarding requirement 2.5, Section 5.2 describes the content of
the Location Field. Motion and direction vectors as listed in the Location Field. Motion and direction vectors as listed in
requirement 2.6 are not provided as attributes. It is, requirement 2.6 are not provided as attributes. It is,
however, possible to deduce the motion and direction of an however, possible to deduce the motion and direction of an
entity via the Mid-session Delivery mechanism as shown in entity via the Mid-session Delivery mechanism as shown in
Figure 2. Figure 3.
* Regarding requirement 2.6, this document only describes one * Regarding requirement 2.6, this document only describes one
Location Data Type for civic and for geospatial location Location Data Type for civic and for geospatial location
information, respectively. No negotiation needs to take place. information, respectively. No negotiation needs to take place.
* Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with * Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with
'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in 'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in
Section 10.4. Section 9.3.
* Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more * Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more
detailed ruleset) is provided with the Section 10.5 attribute. detailed ruleset) is provided with the Section 9.4 attribute.
* Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are * Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are
provided as part of the RADIUS protocol or even as part of provided as part of the RADIUS protocol or even as part of
IPsec. IPsec.
* Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number in RADIUS is * Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number in RADIUS is
provided with the IANA registration of the attributes. New provided with the IANA registration of the attributes. New
attributes are assigned a new IANA number. attributes are assigned a new IANA number.
Req. 3. (Location Data Types): Req. 3. (Location Data Types):
* Regarding requirement 3.1, this document defines two Location * Regarding requirement 3.1, this document defines two Location
Data Types as described in Section 5.3. Data Types as described in Section 5.2.
* With the support of civic and geospatial location information * With the support of civic and geospatial location information
support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled. support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.
* Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information * Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information
as defined in this document only refers to absolute as defined in this document only refers to absolute
coordinates. However, the granularity of the location coordinates. However, the granularity of the location
information can be reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes, information can be reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes,
LaRes fields described in the Location-Information attribute LaRes fields described in the Location-Information attribute
(see Section 10.3). (see Section 9.2).
* Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be * Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be
added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum
field in the Location-Information attribute of Section 5.3), field in the Location-Information attribute of Section 5.2),
extensions to existing fields (e.g., new location types as extensions to existing fields or via additional attributes.
shown in Section 7) or via additional attributes.
Section 7.2 of [12] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".
Section 7.2 of [11] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".
These requirements are listed below: These requirements are listed below:
Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding
Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO. This Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO. This
document requires, that RADIUS entities sending or receiving document requires, that RADIUS entities sending or receiving
location MUST obey such instructions. location MUST obey such instructions.
Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
associated with the credentials are transported to the respective associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
using protocol. Section 15 specifies how security mechanisms are using protocol. Section 14 specifies how security mechanisms are
used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security
protection for the Location Object. Additionally, the privacy protection for the Location Object. Additionally, the privacy
considerations (see Section 14) are also relevant for this considerations (see Section 13) are also relevant for this
requirement. requirement.
Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of
small target devices, the design should allow a single message/ small target devices, the design should allow a single message/
packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The
encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards
the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path) the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path)
MTU size. The concept of a transaction is not immediately MTU size. The concept of a transaction is not immediately
applicable to RADIUS. applicable to RADIUS.
Section 7.3 of [11] details the requirements of a "Rule based Section 7.3 of [12] details the requirements of a "Rule based
Location Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below: Location Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 16 the Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 16 the
decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient
access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined
Privacy Rules which are stored at the home network or are Privacy Rules which are stored at the home network or are
accessible for the home network. With regard to the scenario accessible for the home network. With regard to the scenario
shown in Figure 17 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules are sent shown in Figure 17 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules are sent
from the home network to the visited network as part of the from the home network to the visited network as part of the
Policy-Information attribute (see Section 10.4, Section 10.5 and Policy-Information attribute (see Section 9.3, Section 9.4 and
Section 14 for more details). Section 13 for more details).
Req. 8. (LG Rules): For mid-session delivery it is possible to Req. 8. (LG Rules): For mid-session delivery it is possible to
enforce the user's privacy rules for the transfer of the Location enforce the user's privacy rules for the transfer of the Location
Object. For the initial transmission of a Location Object the Object. For the initial transmission of a Location Object the
user would have to use network access authentication methods which user would have to use network access authentication methods which
provide user identity confidentiality which would render the provide user identity confidentiality which would render the
Location Object completely useless for the visited network. For Location Object completely useless for the visited network. For
the scenario shown in Figure 16 the visited network is already in the scenario shown in Figure 16 the visited network is already in
possession of the users location information prior to the possession of the users location information prior to the
authentication and authorization of the user. A correlation authentication and authorization of the user. A correlation
between the location and the user identity might, however, still between the location and the user identity might, however, still
not be possible for the visited network (as explained in not be possible for the visited network (as explained in
Section 14). The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided Section 13). The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided
by the home AAA server as soon as possible. by the home AAA server as soon as possible.
Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms
outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are
disclosed to other entities. disclosed to other entities.
Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language
capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is
applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A
basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute
Section 10.4. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in Section 9.3. A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in
Section 10.5. The format of these rules are described in [15] and Section 9.4. The format of these rules are described in [16] and
[16]. [17].
Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is
provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 10.4 (and as provided by the Policy-Information attribute Section 9.3 (and as
introduced with PIDF-LO [14]). introduced with PIDF-LO [15]).
Section 7.4 of [11] details the requirements of a "Location Object Section 7.4 of [12] details the requirements of a "Location Object
Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below: Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below:
Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is
provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key
exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example, exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example,
with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods. with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods.
Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality
whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality. whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality.
This issue is further discussed in Section 15. The importance for This issue is further discussed in Section 14. The importance for
user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already
been recognized (see for example a document on 'EAP Method been recognized (see for example a document on 'EAP Method
Requirements for Wireless LANs' [20]). Requirements for Wireless LANs' [21]).
Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 15 Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in Section 14
RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This
allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be
used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK. used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.
Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security
requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual
end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object
confidentiality and replay protection. As described in Section 15 confidentiality and replay protection. As described in Section 14
these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if the these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if the
mutual authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as mutual authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as
various Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each various Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each
other. other.
Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are
mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for
Location Objects between AAA infrastructure elements is provided Location Objects between AAA infrastructure elements is provided
by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic key by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic key
management framework) rather than on relying on object security management framework) rather than on relying on object security
via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS). via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).
13. Example 12. Example
This section provides an example for a civic location information This section provides an example for a civic location information
format within the Location-Information attribute. The size of the format within the Location-Information attribute. The size of the
geo-spatial location information object is fixed and well-described geo-spatial location information object is fixed and well-described
examples can be found in the Appendix of [7]. examples can be found in the Appendix of [8].
Due to the size limitations of the RADIUS attributes we give a more Due to the size limitations of the RADIUS attributes we give a more
detailed example borrowed from Section 4 of [4]. detailed example borrowed from Section 4 of [4].
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-------------------+
| Type | Length | Value | | Type | Length | Value |
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-------------------+
| Type | 8 bits | TBD | | Type | 8 bits | TBD |
| Length | 8 bits | --total length-- | | Length | 8 bits | --total length-- |
| Code | 16 bits | 1 | | Code | 16 bits | 1 |
skipping to change at page 42, line 5 skipping to change at page 42, line 5
| CAvalue | 1 byte | 180-8585 | | CAvalue | 1 byte | 180-8585 |
| CAtype | 8 bits | 32 | | CAtype | 8 bits | 32 |
| CAlength | 8 bits | 11 | | CAlength | 8 bits | 11 |
| CAvalue | 5 bytes | 13203000003 | | CAvalue | 5 bytes | 13203000003 |
+-------------+-----------+-------------------+ +-------------+-----------+-------------------+
Please note that the CAtype 32 ("additional code" item) provides an Please note that the CAtype 32 ("additional code" item) provides an
additional, country-specific code identifying the location, such as additional, country-specific code identifying the location, such as
the Japan Industry Standard (JIS) address code. the Japan Industry Standard (JIS) address code.
14. Privacy Considerations 13. Privacy Considerations
This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of
location information within RADIUS. location information within RADIUS.
In many cases the location information of the network also reveals In many cases the location information of the network also reveals
the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision
depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update
frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and
other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation). other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).
Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown in Section 4, in Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown in Section 4, in
Figure 16 and in Figure 17: Figure 16 and in Figure 17:
14.1 Entity in the visited network 13.1. Entity in the visited network
In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies
from the end host (or user) immediately when the user attaches to the from the end host (or user) immediately when the user attaches to the
network. In this case we have to assume that the visited network network. In this case we have to assume that the visited network
does not allow unrestricted distribution of location information to does not allow unrestricted distribution of location information to
other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities). other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities).
The visited network MUST behave according to the following The visited network MUST behave according to the following
guidelines: guidelines:
skipping to change at page 43, line 19 skipping to change at page 43, line 19
message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be attach in subsequent message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be attach in subsequent
RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute
(such as interim accounting messages). (such as interim accounting messages).
o If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Extended- o If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Extended-
Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge
message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attach in message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attach in
subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information
attribute (such as interim accounting messages). attribute (such as interim accounting messages).
14.2 Entity in the home network 13.2. Entity in the home network
The AAA server in the home network might be an ideal place for The AAA server in the home network might be an ideal place for
storing authorization policies. The user typically has a contractual storing authorization policies. The user typically has a contractual
relationship with his home network and hence the trust relationship relationship with his home network and hence the trust relationship
between them is stronger. Once the infrastructure is deployed and between them is stronger. Once the infrastructure is deployed and
useful applications are available there might be a strong desire to useful applications are available there might be a strong desire to
use location information for other purposes as well (such as location use location information for other purposes as well (such as location
aware applications). Authorization policy rules described in [16] aware applications). Authorization policy rules described in [17]
and in [15] are tailored for this environment. These policies might and in [16] are tailored for this environment. These policies might
be useful for limiting further distribution of the user's location to be useful for limiting further distribution of the user's location to
other location based services. The home AAA server (or a similar other location based services. The home AAA server (or a similar
entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to location entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to location
services. services.
The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines: The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:
o As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the o As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the
user's location information to third party entities. user's location information to third party entities.
skipping to change at page 44, line 39 skipping to change at page 44, line 38
brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a
particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers
to learn movement patterns of users. to learn movement patterns of users.
The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA
brokers in a number of ways: brokers in a number of ways:
o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP
address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the
particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to
avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [21]. avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [22].
Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change
them dynamically. them dynamically.
o Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [22] or o Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [23] or
EAP [23] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the EAP [24] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the
authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem
in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access
Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [24] and Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [25] and
by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method
(e.g., [25], [26], [27]). Support for identity privacy within (e.g., [26], [27], [28]). Support for identity privacy within
CHAP is not available. CHAP is not available.
o AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the o AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the
visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the
user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such
as the use of static data in a Class attribute [1] or in some as the use of static data in a Class attribute [1] or in some
accounting attribute usage scenarios [28]. accounting attribute usage scenarios [29].
o Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as o Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as
a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility
signaling. signaling.
o Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers. o Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.
Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location
information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity
information from all sources, not just one. information from all sources, not just one.
skipping to change at page 45, line 42 skipping to change at page 45, line 39
administrative domain. No direct relationship between the visited administrative domain. No direct relationship between the visited
and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers
need to be consulted. With subscription-based network access as used need to be consulted. With subscription-based network access as used
today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network
provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be
applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for
the purpose of restricting further distribution). the purpose of restricting further distribution).
In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location
information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanisms to achieve information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanisms to achieve
this functionality are discussed in Section 15. this functionality are discussed in Section 14.
15. Security Considerations 14. Security Considerations
Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in
[11]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data [12]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data
object confidentiality and replay protection. The distribution of object confidentiality and replay protection. The distribution of
location information can be restricted with the help of authorization location information can be restricted with the help of authorization
policies. Basic authorization policies are attached to the location policies. Basic authorization policies are attached to the location
information itself, in the same fashion as described in [14]. It is information itself, in the same fashion as described in [15]. It is
possible that the user was already able to transfer some possible that the user was already able to transfer some
authorization policies to the access network to restrict the authorization policies to the access network to restrict the
distribution of location information. This is, however, rather distribution of location information. This is, however, rather
unlikely in case of roaming users. Hence, it will be primarily the unlikely in case of roaming users. Hence, it will be primarily the
NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization
policies. If no authorization information is provided by the user policies. If no authorization information is provided by the user
then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only
allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information. allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information.
Other entities, such as the visited network and possibly AAA brokers Other entities, such as the visited network and possibly AAA brokers
MUST NOT use the location information for a purpose other than MUST NOT use the location information for a purpose other than
described in this document. More extensible authorization policies described in this document. More extensible authorization policies
can be stored at the user's home network. These policies are useful can be stored at the user's home network. These policies are useful
when location information is distributed to other entities in a when location information is distributed to other entities in a
location-based service. This scenario is, however, outside the scope location-based service. This scenario is, however, outside the scope
of this document. of this document.
It is necessary to use authorization policies to limit the It is necessary to use authorization policies to limit the
unauthorized distribution of location information. The security unauthorized distribution of location information. The security
requirements which are created based on [11] are inline with threats requirements which are created based on [12] are inline with threats
which appear in the relationship with disclosure of location which appear in the relationship with disclosure of location
information as described in [29]. PIDF-LO [14] proposes S/MIME to information as described in [30]. PIDF-LO [15] proposes S/MIME to
protect the Location Object against modifications. S/SIME relies on protect the Location Object against modifications. S/SIME relies on
public key cryptography which raises performance, deployment and size public key cryptography which raises performance, deployment and size
considerations. Encryption would require that the local AAA server considerations. Encryption would require that the local AAA server
or the NAS knows the recipient's public key (e.g., the public key of or the NAS knows the recipient's public key (e.g., the public key of
the home AAA server). Knowing the final recipient of the location the home AAA server). Knowing the final recipient of the location
information is in many cases difficult for RADIUS entities. Some information is in many cases difficult for RADIUS entities. Some
sort of public key infrastructure would be required to obtain the sort of public key infrastructure would be required to obtain the
public key and to verify the digital signature (at the home network). public key and to verify the digital signature (at the home network).
Providing per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home Providing per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home
and at the visited network, computationally expensive. and at the visited network, computationally expensive.
If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the
participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can
spoof and modify transmitted AVPs. Two security mechanisms are spoof and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are
proposed for RADIUS: proposed for RADIUS:
o [1] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some o [1] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some
concerns about the lack dynamic key management. concerns about the lack dynamic key management.
o RADIUS over IPsec [30] allows to run standard key management o RADIUS over IPsec [31] allows to run standard key management
mechanisms, such as KINK [31], IKE and IKEv2 [32], to establish mechanisms, such as KINK [32], IKE and IKEv2 [33], to establish
IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be
used to prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location used to prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location
information. Confidentiality protection is not only a property information. Confidentiality protection is not only a property
required by this document, it is also required for the transport required by this document, it is also required for the transport
of keying material in the context of EAP authentication and of keying material in the context of EAP authentication and
authorization. Hence, this requirement is, in many environments, authorization. Hence, this requirement is, in many environments,
already fulfilled. Mutual authentication must be provided between already fulfilled. Mutual authentication must be provided between
the local AAA server and the home AAA server to prevent man-in- the local AAA server and the home AAA server to prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks from being successful. This is another the-middle attacks from being successful. This is another
requirement raised in the area of key transport with RADIUS and requirement raised in the area of key transport with RADIUS and
does not represent a deployment obstacle. The performance does not represent a deployment obstacle. The performance
advantages superior compared to the usage of S/MIME and object advantages superior compared to the usage of S/MIME and object
security since the expensive authentication and key exchange security since the expensive authentication and key exchange
protocol run needs to be provided only once (for a long time). protocol run needs to be provided only once (for a long time).
Symmetric channel security with IPsec is highly efficient. Since Symmetric channel security with IPsec is highly efficient. Since
IPsec protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RAIDUS IPsec protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RAIDUS
already no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond already no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond
those described in [30]. Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is those described in [31]. Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is
present, the Location Object MUST NOT be provided to the present, the Location Object MUST NOT be provided to the
intermediary. intermediary.
In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and
RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the
following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not
integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the
contents of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes contents of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes
and fields or to delete attributes. To address these problems the and fields or to delete attributes. To address these problems the
Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the
skipping to change at page 47, line 52 skipping to change at page 47, line 52
attributes MUST calculate the correct value of the Message- attributes MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-
Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not
match the value sent. match the value sent.
Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a Message- Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a Message-
Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS. Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS.
A NAS supporting the Location attribute MUST calculate the correct A NAS supporting the Location attribute MUST calculate the correct
value of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently value of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently
discard the packet if it does not match the value sent. discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.
RADIUS and DIAMETER make some assumptions about the trust between RADIUS and Diameter make some assumptions about the trust between
traversed AAA entities in sense that object level security is not traversed AAA entities in sense that object level security is not
provided by neither RADIUS nor DIAMETER. Hence, some trust has to be provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has to be
placed on the AAA entities to behave according to the defined rules. placed on the AAA entities to behave according to the defined rules.
Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve the user in their Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve the user in their
protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information
(such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure. RADIUS and (such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure. RADIUS and
DIAMETER have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution. Diameter have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution.
Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the trust placed Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the trust placed
into the infrastructure particularly from the security area when it into the infrastructure particularly from the security area when it
comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is described in [33]. comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is described in [34].
16. IANA Considerations 15. IANA Considerations
The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values
defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in
the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 2865 [1], in accordance with the "IANA Considerations" section of RFC 3575 [10], in accordance
BCP 26 [10]. Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered with BCP 26 [11]. Additionally, the Attribute Type should be
in the Diameter name space. registered in the Diameter name space.
This document defines the following AVPs: This document defines the following attributes:
Operator-Name Operator-Name
Operator-Namespace
Location-Information Location-Information
Basic-Policy-Rules Basic-Policy-Rules
Extended-Policy-Rules Extended-Policy-Rules
Location-Name Challenge-Capable
Capability Requested-Info
Please refer to Section 11 for the registered list of numbers. Please refer to Section 10 for the registered list of numbers.
This document also instructs IANA to assign a new value for the This document also instructs IANA to assign a new value for the
Error-Cause attribute [5], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA. Error-Cause attribute [5], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.
Additionally, IANA is requested to create the following new Additionally, IANA is requested to create the following new
registries: registries:
16.1 New Registry: Operator Type 15.1. New Registry: Operator Type
This document also defines a registry for the Operator-Namespace This document also defines an operator namespace registry (used in
attribute. Initially, IANA is requested to register the following the Namespace field of the Operator-Name attribute). Initially, IANA
values and associated registry owners for the operator namespace: is requested to register the following attribues: identifier and
operator-namespace / associated registry owners for the operator
namespace:
+--------------------+----------------------------+ +----------+--------------------------------------+
| Operator-Namespace | Registry Owner | |Identifier| Operator-Namespace / Registry Owner |
+--------------------+----------------------------+ +----------+--------------------------------------+
| GSM | GSM Association: TADIG WG | | 0 | GSM - GSM Association/TADIG WG |
| CDMA | IMSI Oversight Council | | 1 | CDMA - IMSI Oversight Council |
| REALM | IANA or delegate | | 2 | REALM - IANA or delegate |
+--------------------+----------------------------+ | 3 | ITU - ITU-T/TSB |
+----------+--------------------------------------+
Following the policies outline in [10] new Operator-Namespaces will Following the policies outline in [11] new Operator-Namespaces will
be assigned after Expert Review by the Geopriv working group or its be assigned after Expert Review by the Geopriv working group or its
designated successor. designated successor. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. No mechanism to mark entries entries as "deprecated"
is envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry.
16.2 New Registry: Capabilities 15.2. New Registry: Requested-Info attribute
This document creates a new IANA registry for capabilities. This document creates a new IANA registry for the Requested-Info
attribute. Currently four info elements are defined, as shown in
Section 7
Currently two capabilities are defined as shown in Section 10.7 Following the policies outline in [10] new Operator-Namespaces will
be assigned after Expert Review by the RADEXT working group or its
designated successor. Updates can be provided based on expert
approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area
Directors. No mechanism to mark entries entries as "deprecated is
envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete
entries from the registry.
Following the policies outline in RFC 2434 [10], these tokens are Each registration must include the name of the info element, a brief
assigned on a 'First Come First Served' policy. Each registration description and a numerical value respresenting a bit in the bit-
must include the name of the capability, a brief description and a string:
numerical value respresenting a bit in the capability bit-string:
Capability Name: Name:
Identifier of the capability Identifier of the capability
Description: Description:
Brief description indicating the meaning of the capability. Brief description indicating the meaning of the info element.
Numerical Value: Numerical Value:
A numerical value that is placed into the Capability attribute. A numerical value that is placed into the Capability attribute.
17. Acknowledgments 16. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their help The authors would like to thank the following people for their help
with a previous version of this draft and for their input: with a previous version of this draft and for their input:
Chuck Black Chuck Black
Paul Congdon Paul Congdon
Jouni Korhonen Jouni Korhonen
skipping to change at page 51, line 43 skipping to change at page 51, line 43
authorization policy format is based on the work done by Jon authorization policy format is based on the work done by Jon
Peterson. Peterson.
The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam, The authors would like to thank Victor Lortz, Jose Puthenkulam,
Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal Bernrad Aboba, Jari Arkko, Parviz Yegani, Serge Manning, Kuntal
Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their Chowdury, Pasi Eronen, Blair Bullock and Eugene Chang for their
feedback to an initial version of this draft. We would like to thank feedback to an initial version of this draft. We would like to thank
Jari Arkko for his text contributions. Lionel Morand provided Jari Arkko for his text contributions. Lionel Morand provided
detailed feedback on numerous issues. His comments helped to improve detailed feedback on numerous issues. His comments helped to improve
the quality of this document. Jouni Korhonen and John Loughney the quality of this document. Jouni Korhonen and John Loughney
helped us with the Diameter RADIUS interoperability. Finally, helped us with the Diameter RADIUS interoperability. Andreas
Andreas Pashalidis reviewed the final document and provided a number Pashalidis reviewed the final document and provided a number of
of comments. comments. Bernard Aboba, Alan DeKok, Lionel Morand, Jouni Korhonen,
David Nelson and Emile van Bergen provided guidance on the Requested-
Info attribute and participated in the capability exchange
discussions.
This document is based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV This document is based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV
working group. Therefore, the authors thank Henning Schulzrinne, working group. Therefore, the authors thank Henning Schulzrinne,
James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew James Polk, John Morris, Allison Mankin, Randall Gellens, Andrew
Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time to discuss a number Newton, Ted Hardie, Jon Peterson for their time to discuss a number
of issues with us. We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work of issues with us. We thank Stephen Hayes for aligning this work
with 3GPP activities. with 3GPP activities.
18. References 17. References
18.1 Normative References 17.1. Normative References
[1] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote [1] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865,
June 2000. June 2000.
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement [2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", March 1997. Levels", March 1997.
[3] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000. [3] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
[4] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4 [4] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4
and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses Configuration and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses Configuration
Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-06 (work in Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-dhcp-civil-09 (work in
progress), May 2005. progress), January 2006.
[5] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba, [5] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba,
"Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003. In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003.
[6] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", [6] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[7] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host [7] Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Location Types Registry",
draft-ietf-geopriv-location-types-registry-03 (work in
progress), August 2005.
[8] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location
Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004. Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.
[8] Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Location Types Registry",
draft-ietf-geopriv-location-types-registry-01 (work in
progress), July 2005.
[9] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, [9] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003. "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[10] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA [10] Aboba, B., "IANA Considerations for RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service)", RFC 3575, July 2003.
[11] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998. October 1998.
18.2 Informative References 17.2. Informative References
[11] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D. [12] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, D., and D.
Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
[12] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., [13] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002. Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[13] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location [14] Polk, J. and B. Rosen, "Session Initiation Protocol Location
Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-00 (work in Conveyance", draft-ietf-sip-location-conveyance-01 (work in
progress), June 2005. progress), July 2005.
[14] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object [15] Peterson, J., "A Presence-based GEOPRIV Location Object
Format", draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-03 (work in progress), Format", draft-ietf-geopriv-pidf-lo-03 (work in progress),
September 2004. September 2004.
[15] Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
Preferences", draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-04 (work in
progress), February 2005.
[16] Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy [16] Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
Preferences", draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-06 (work in
progress), October 2005.
[17] Schulzrinne, H., "A Document Format for Expressing Privacy
Preferences for Location Information", Preferences for Location Information",
draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-05 (work in progress), November 2004. draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-07 (work in progress), October 2005.
[17] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter [18] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D., and D. Mitton, "Diameter
Network Access Server Application", Network Access Server Application",
draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17 (work in progress), draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17 (work in progress),
July 2004. July 2004.
[18] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification, [19] Mills, D., "Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification,
Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992. Implementation", RFC 1305, March 1992.
[19] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation [20] "Open Geography Markup Language (GML) Implementation
Specification", OGC 02-023r4, Specification", OGC 02-023r4,
http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", , http://www.opengis.org/techno/implementation.htm", ,
January 2003. January 2003.
[20] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible [21] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless
LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005. LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.
[21] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless [22] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001. Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 3041, January 2001.
[22] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [23] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[23] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [24] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[24] Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier", [25] Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
draft-ietf-radext-rfc2486bis-05 (work in progress), draft-ietf-radext-rfc2486bis-06 (work in progress), July 2005.
February 2005.
[25] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol [26] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement
(EAP-AKA)", draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-15 (work in progress), (EAP-AKA)", draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-15 (work in progress),
December 2004. December 2004.
[26] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected [27] Josefsson, S., Palekar, A., Simon, D., and G. Zorn, "Protected
EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2", EAP Protocol (PEAP) Version 2",
draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress), draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-10 (work in progress),
October 2004. October 2004.
[27] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method (EAP-IKEv2)", [28] Tschofenig, H., "EAP IKEv2 Method",
draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-06 (work in progress), May 2005. draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-09 (work in progress),
February 2006.
[28] Adrangi, F., "Chargeable User Identity", [29] Adrangi, F., "Chargeable User Identity",
draft-ietf-radext-chargeable-user-id-05 (work in progress), draft-ietf-radext-chargeable-user-id-06 (work in progress),
May 2005. October 2005.
[29] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol", [30] Danley, M., "Threat Analysis of the Geopriv Protocol",
RFC 3694, September 2003. RFC 3694, September 2003.
[30] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial [31] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003. (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[31] Sakane, S., "Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK)", [32] Sakane, S., "Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK)",
draft-ietf-kink-kink-08 (work in progress), July 2005. draft-ietf-kink-kink-11 (work in progress), December 2005.
[32] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [33] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), October 2004. draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-17 (work in progress), October 2004.
[33] Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key [34] Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-06 (work in Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-09 (work in
progress), April 2005. progress), January 2006.
[34] Schulzrinne, H., "RPID: Rich Presence Extensions to the [35] Schulzrinne, H., "RPID: Rich Presence Extensions to the
Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)", Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)",
draft-ietf-simple-rpid-07 (work in progress), June 2005. draft-ietf-simple-rpid-10 (work in progress), December 2005.
[35] Adrangi, F., "Access Network Bandwidth Capability", [36] Adrangi, F., "Access Network Bandwidth Capability",
draft-adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability-01 (work in draft-adrangi-radius-bandwidth-capability-01 (work in
progress), July 2004. progress), July 2004.
[36] Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier", [37] Aboba, B., "The Network Access Identifier",
draft-arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis-02 (work in progress), draft-arkko-roamops-rfc2486bis-02 (work in progress),
July 2004. July 2004.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739 Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
F. Adrangi Farid Adrangi
Intel Corporatation Intel Corporatation
2111 N.E. 25th Avenue 2111 N.E. 25th Avenue
Hillsboro OR Hillsboro OR
USA USA
Email: farid.adrangi@intel.com Email: farid.adrangi@intel.com
Mark Jones Mark Jones
Bridgewater Systems Corporation Bridgewater Systems Corporation
303 Terry Fox Drive 303 Terry Fox Drive
skipping to change at page 56, line 41 skipping to change at page 57, line 41
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