draft-ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions-01.txt   draft-ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions-02.txt 
Geopriv J. Winterbottom Geopriv J. Winterbottom
Internet-Draft M. Thomson Internet-Draft M. Thomson
Intended status: Standards Track Andrew Corporation Intended status: Standards Track Andrew Corporation
Expires: April 21, 2010 H. Tschofenig Expires: June 12, 2010 H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks Nokia Siemens Networks
R. Barnes R. Barnes
BBN Technologies BBN Technologies
October 18, 2009 December 9, 2009
Use of Device Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) Use of Device Identity in HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)
draft-ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions-01 draft-ietf-geopriv-held-identity-extensions-02
Abstract
When a Location Information Server receives a request for location
information (using the locationRequest message), described in the
base HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) specification, it uses the
source IP address of arriving message as a pointer to the location
determination process. This is sufficient in environments where the
location of a Device can be determined based on its IP address.
Two additional use cases are addresses by this document. In the
first, location configuration requires additional or alternative
identifiers from the source IP address provided in the request. In
the second, an entity other than the Device requests the location of
the Device.
This document extends the HELD protocol to allow the location request
message to carry Device identifiers. Privacy and security
considerations describe the conditions where requests containing
identifiers are permitted.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 29 skipping to change at page 2, line 4
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2010. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 12, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights publication of this document. Please review these documents
and restrictions with respect to this document. carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
Abstract include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
When a Location Information Server receives a request for location described in the BSD License.
information (using the locationRequest message), described in the
base HTTP Enabled Location Delivery (HELD) specification, it uses the
source IP address of arriving message as a pointer to the location
determination process. This is sufficient in environments where the
location of a Device can be determined based on its IP address.
Two additional use cases are addresses by this document. In the
first, location configuration requires additional or alternative
identifiers from the source IP address provided in the request. In
the second, an entity other than the Device requests the location of
the Device.
This document extends the HELD protocol to allow the location request
message to carry Device identifiers. Privacy and security
considerations describe the conditions where requests containing
identifiers are permitted.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Identifier Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Identifier Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Subjective Network Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. Subjective Network Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2. Transient Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1.2. Transient Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Identifier Format and Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Identifier Format and Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1. IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.2. MAC Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. MAC Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.3. TCP or UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. TCP or UDP Port Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.4. Network Access Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.4. Network Access Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.5. URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4.1. Using NAI for Location Configuration . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.6. Hostname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.5. URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.7. Directory Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.6. Hostname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.8. Cellular Telephony Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.7. Directory Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.9. DHCP Unique Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.8. Cellular Telephony Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.9. DHCP Unique Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Targets Requesting Their Own Location . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.1. Targets Requesting Their Own Location . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Third-Party Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.1.1. Security Considerations for NAI use in WiMAX
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1. Identifier Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 5.2. Third-Party Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Targets Requesting Their Own Location . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.3. Third-Party Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6.1. Identifier Suitability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.2. Targets Requesting Their Own Location . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for 6.3. Third-Party Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3. Registration of HELD 'badIdentifier' Error Code . . . . . 22 8.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.3. Registration of HELD 'badIdentifier' Error Code . . . . . 24
9.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Protocols for requesting and providing location information require a Protocols for requesting and providing location information require a
way for the requestor to specify the location that should be way for the requestor to specify the location that should be
returned. In a location configuration protocol (LCP), the location returned. In a location configuration protocol (LCP), the location
being requested is the requestor's location. This fact can make the being requested is the requestor's location. This fact can make the
problem of identifying the Device simple for LCPs, since IP datagrams problem of identifying the Device simple, since IP datagrams that
that carry the request already carry an identifier for the Device, carry the request already carry an identifier for the Device, namely
namely the source IP address of an incoming request. Existing LCPs, the source IP address of an incoming request. Existing LCPs, such as
such as HELD [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] and DHCP HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)
([RFC3825], [RFC4776]) rely on the source IP address or other [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] and DHCP ([RFC3825],
information present in protocol datagrams to identify a Device. [RFC4776]) rely on the source IP address or other information present
in protocol datagrams to identify a Device.
Aside from the datagrams that form a request, a location information Aside from the datagrams that form a request, a location information
server (LIS) does not necessarily have access to information that server (LIS) does not necessarily have access to information that
could further identify the Device. In some circumstances, as shown could further identify the Device. In some circumstances, as shown
in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps], additional identification in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps], additional identification
information can be included in a request to identify a Device. information can be included in a request to identify a Device.
This document extends the HELD protocol to support the inclusion of This document extends the HELD protocol to support the inclusion of
additional identifiers for the Device in HELD location requests. An additional identifiers for the Device in HELD location requests. An
XML schema is defined that provides a structure for including these XML schema is defined that provides a structure for including these
skipping to change at page 4, line 51 skipping to change at page 5, line 5
authorized to access the requested location information, because it authorized to access the requested location information, because it
is their own location. In contrast, a third-party LR must be is their own location. In contrast, a third-party LR must be
explicitly authorized when requesting the location of a Device. explicitly authorized when requesting the location of a Device.
Establishing appropriate authorization and other related privacy Establishing appropriate authorization and other related privacy
concerns are discussed in Section 5. concerns are discussed in Section 5.
1.1. Applications 1.1. Applications
The use of additional identifiers in HELD falls into two categories: The use of additional identifiers in HELD falls into two categories:
1. A Device can use these parameters to provide additional Location configuration: A Device can use these parameters to
identification information about itself to a LIS. Identification identify itself to a LIS. Identification information other than
information, such as the MAC address of the interface card of a IP might be needed to determine the location of a Device.
Target, can be used to reduce the time required to determine the
location by a LIS. In other cases, a LIS might require Device
identification before any location information can be generated.
2. A third-party LR can be granted authorization to make requests Due to the risk that an identifier might be spoofed by a Device,
for a given Device. In particular, network services can be identifiers MUST NOT be used unless specific information is
permitted to retrieve location for a Device that is unable to provided for that identifier describing how the identifier is used
acquire location information for itself (see Section 6.3 of and what measures are used to prevent spoofing.
[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]). This allows use of location-
dependent applications - particularly essential services like This document provides this information for the network access
emergency calling - where Devices do not support a location identifier (NAI) for use in WiMAX networks. All other identifiers
configuration protocol (LCP) or they are unable to successfully described are solely for use in third-party requests.
retrieve location information.
Third-party requests: A third-party location recipient can be
granted authorization to make requests for a given Device. In
particular, network services can be permitted to retrieve location
for a Device that is unable to acquire location information for
itself (see Section 6.3 of [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]). This
allows use of location-dependent applications - particularly
essential services like emergency calling - where Devices do not
support a location configuration protocol or they are unable to
successfully retrieve location information.
This document does not describe how a third party acquires an
identifier for a Device, or how that third-party is authenticated
by a LIS. These issues MUST be resolved before permitting a
third-party request. A pre-arranged contract between the third-
party, a Rule Maker and the LIS operator is necessary to use
device identifiers in this fashion. This contract MUST include
how the request is authenticated and the set of identifiers (and
types of identifiers) that the third-party is authorized to use in
requests.
Note that this is not intended to preclude the definition of
mechanisms that replace this requirement with automated means of
establishing these constraints.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
This document uses the term Location Information Server (LIS) and This document uses the term Location Information Server (LIS) and
location configuration protocol (LCP) as described in location configuration protocol (LCP) as described in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps]. [I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps] and [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch].
The term Device is used specifically as the subject of an LCP, The term Device is used specifically as the subject of an LCP,
consistent with [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery]. This consistent with [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery]. This
document also uses the term Target to refer to any entity that might document also uses the term Target to refer to any entity that might
be a subject of the same location information. Target is used in a be a subject of the same location information. Target is used in a
more general sense, including the Device, but also any nearby entity, more general sense, including the Device, but also any nearby entity,
such as the user of a Device. A Target has a stake in setting such as the user of a Device. A Target has a stake in setting
authorization policy on the use of location information. Both Device authorization policy on the use of location information. Both Device
and Target are defined in [RFC3693]. and Target are defined in [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Device Identity 3. Device Identity
Identifiers are used as the starting point in location determination. Identifiers are used as the starting point in location determination.
They should not be confused with measurement information They should not be confused with measurement information
([I-D.thomson-geopriv-held-measurements]). Measurement information ([I-D.thomson-geopriv-held-measurements]). Measurement information
skipping to change at page 8, line 15 skipping to change at page 8, line 15
Where subjective views differ, the third-party receives information Where subjective views differ, the third-party receives information
that is correct only within the network context of the LIS. The that is correct only within the network context of the LIS. The
location information provided by the LIS is probably misleading: the location information provided by the LIS is probably misleading: the
requester believes that the information relates to a different entity requester believes that the information relates to a different entity
than it was generated for. than it was generated for.
Authorization policy can be affected by a subjective network view if Authorization policy can be affected by a subjective network view if
it is applied based on an identifier, or it's application depends on it is applied based on an identifier, or it's application depends on
identifiers. The subjective view presented to the LIS and Rule Maker identifiers. The subjective view presented to the LIS and Rule Maker
need to agree for the two entities to understand policy on the same need to agree for the two entities to understand policy on the same
terms. For instance, it is possible that the authorization policy terms. For instance, it is possible that the LIS could apply the
applied by the LIS is entirely incorrect if authorization policy is incorrect authorization policy if it selects the policy using a
selected using a subjective identifier. Alternatively, policy might subjective identifier. Alternatively, it may use the correct policy
be incorrectly applied if identifiers differ. but apply it incorrectly if subjective identifiers are used.
In IP networks, network address translation (NAT) and other forms In IP networks, network address translation (NAT) and other forms
of address modification create network contexts. Entities on of address modification create network contexts. Entities on
either side of the point where modification occurs have a either side of the point where modification occurs have a
different view of the network. Private use addresses [RFC1918] different view of the network. Private use addresses [RFC1918]
are the most easily recognizable identifiers that have limited are the most easily recognizable identifiers that have limited
scope. scope.
A LIS can be configured to recognize scenarios where the subjective A LIS can be configured to recognize scenarios where the subjective
view of a requester or Rule Maker might not coincide with the view of view of a requester or Rule Maker might not coincide with the view of
skipping to change at page 9, line 52 skipping to change at page 9, line 52
Figure 1 Figure 1
A LIS that supports this specification echoes the "target" element in A LIS that supports this specification echoes the "target" element in
a successful HELD response, including the identifiers that were used a successful HELD response, including the identifiers that were used
as the basis for location determination. Absence of this indication as the basis for location determination. Absence of this indication
means that the location information was generated using the source IP means that the location information was generated using the source IP
address in the request. address in the request.
If an identifier is invalid, not supported by the LIS, or the If an identifier is invalid, not supported by the LIS, or the
requester is not authorized to use that identifier, a HELD error requester is not authorized to use that identifier, a HELD error
response of "badIdentifier". This code is registered in Section 7.3. response of "badIdentifier". This code is registered in Section 8.3.
If the LIS requires an identifier that is not provided in the If the LIS requires an identifier that is not provided in the
request, the desired identifiers MAY be identified in the HELD error request, the desired identifiers MAY be identified in the HELD error
response, using the "requiredIdentifiers" element. This element response, using the "requiredIdentifiers" element. This element
contains a list of XML qualified names [W3C.REC-xml-names11-20060816] contains a list of XML qualified names [W3C.REC-xml-names11-20060816]
that identify the identifier elements required by the LIS. Namespace that identify the identifier elements required by the LIS. Namespace
prefix bindings for the qualified names are taken from document prefix bindings for the qualified names are taken from document
context. Figure 2 shows an example error indicating that the context. Figure 2 shows an example error indicating that the
requester needs to include a MAC address (Section 3.3.2) if the requester needs to include a MAC address (Section 4.2) if the request
request is to succeed. is to succeed.
<error xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held" <error xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held"
code="badIdentifier"> code="badIdentifier">
<message xml:lang="en">MAC address required</message> <message xml:lang="en">MAC address required</message>
<requiredIdentifiers <requiredIdentifiers
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
mac mac
</requiredIdentifiers> </requiredIdentifiers>
</error> </error>
Figure 2 Figure 2
3.3. Identifiers 4. Identifiers
A limited selection of identifiers are included in this document. A limited selection of identifiers are included in this document.
The basic Device identity schema allows for the inclusion of elements The basic Device identity schema allows for the inclusion of elements
from any namespace, therefore additional elements can be defined from any namespace, therefore additional elements can be defined
using different XML namespaces. using different XML namespaces.
3.3.1. IP Address 4.1. IP Address
The "ip" element can express a Device identity as an IP address. An The "ip" element can express a Device identity as an IP address. An
optional "v" attribute identifies the IP version. The element uses optional "v" attribute identifies the IP version. The element uses
the textual format specific to the indicated IP version. the textual format specific to the indicated IP version.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<ip v="6">2001:DB8::1:ea7:fee1:d1e</ip> <ip v="6">2001:DB8::1:ea7:fee1:d1e</ip>
</device> </device>
In situations where location configuration does not require In situations where location configuration does not require
additional identifiers, using IP address as an identifier enables additional identifiers, using IP address as an identifier enables
authorized third-party requests. authorized third-party requests.
3.3.2. MAC Address 4.2. MAC Address
The media access control (MAC) address used by the IEEE 802 family of The media access control (MAC) address used by the IEEE 802 family of
access technologies is an identifier that is assigned to a particular access technologies is an identifier that is assigned to a particular
network device. A MAC address is a unique sequence that is either network device. A MAC address is a unique sequence that is either
assigned at the time of manufacture of a device, or assigned by a assigned at the time of manufacture of a device, or assigned by a
local administrator. A MAC address rarely changes; therefore, a MAC local administrator. A MAC address rarely changes; therefore, a MAC
address is an appropriate identifier for a Device. address is an appropriate identifier for a Device.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<mac>A0-12-34-56-78-90</mac> <mac>A0-12-34-56-78-90</mac>
</device> </device>
A LIS that operates on the same layer 2 segment as a Device sees the A LIS that operates on the same layer 2 segment as a Device sees the
MAC address of the Device and can authenticate the device in that MAC address of the Device and can authenticate the device in that
fashion. If a router is interposed between LIS and Device, other fashion. If a router is interposed between LIS and Device, other
means of authentication are required. means of authentication are required.
3.3.3. TCP or UDP Port Number 4.3. TCP or UDP Port Number
On its own, a TCP or UDP port number is insufficient to uniquely On its own, a TCP or UDP port number is insufficient to uniquely
identify a single host, but in combination with an IP address, it can identify a single host, but in combination with an IP address, it can
be used in some environments to uniquely identify a Device. be used in some environments to uniquely identify a Device.
Use of a particular port number can be transient; often significantly Use of a particular port number can be transient; often significantly
more than use of any given IP address. However, widespread use of more than use of any given IP address. However, widespread use of
network address translation (NAT) means that some Devices cannot be network address translation (NAT) means that some Devices cannot be
uniquely identified by IP address alone. An individual Device might uniquely identified by IP address alone. An individual Device might
be identified by a flow of packets that it generates. Providing that be identified by a flow of packets that it generates. Providing that
skipping to change at page 11, line 39 skipping to change at page 12, line 18
identified uniquely. identified uniquely.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<ip v="6">2001:DB8::1:ea7:fee1:d1e</ip> <ip v="6">2001:DB8::1:ea7:fee1:d1e</ip>
<udpport>51393</udpport> <udpport>51393</udpport>
</device> </device>
Use of port numbers is especially reliant on the value remaining Use of port numbers is especially reliant on the value remaining
consistent over time. consistent over time.
3.3.4. Network Access Identifier 4.4. Network Access Identifier
A Network Access Identifier (NAI) [RFC4282] is an identifier used in A Network Access Identifier (NAI) [RFC4282] is an identifier used in
network authentication in a range of networks. The identifier network authentication in a range of networks. The identifier
establishes a user identity within a particular domain. Often, establishes a user identity within a particular domain. Often,
network services use an NAI in relation to location records, tying network services use an NAI in relation to location records, tying
network access to user authentication and authorization. network access to user authentication and authorization.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<nai>user@example.net</nai> <nai>user@example.net</nai>
</device> </device>
skipping to change at page 12, line 14 skipping to change at page 12, line 41
cannot be expressed using XML. Therefore, this expression of NAI cannot be expressed using XML. Therefore, this expression of NAI
permits escaping. Non-unicode characters (and any other character) permits escaping. Non-unicode characters (and any other character)
are expressed using a backslash ('\') followed by two hexadecimal are expressed using a backslash ('\') followed by two hexadecimal
digits representing the value of a single octet. digits representing the value of a single octet.
The canonical representation of an NAI is the sequence of octets that The canonical representation of an NAI is the sequence of octets that
is produced from the concatenation of UTF-8 encoded sequences of is produced from the concatenation of UTF-8 encoded sequences of
unescaped characters and octets derived from escaped components. unescaped characters and octets derived from escaped components.
This sequence MUST conform to the constraints in [RFC4282]. This sequence MUST conform to the constraints in [RFC4282].
3.3.5. URI 4.4.1. Using NAI for Location Configuration
In a WiMAX network, an IP address is not sufficient information for a
LIS to locate a Device. The procedure described in
[WiMAX-T33-110-R015v01-B] relies on an NAI to identify the Device.
Third-party requests in a WiMAX network always require the inclusion
of an NAI. However, if a LIS receives a request that does not come
from an authenticated and authorized third-party requester, it can
treat this request as a location configuration request.
After receiving a location request that includes an NAI, the LIS
sends a "Location-Requestor-Authentication-Protocol" access request
message to the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
server. This request containing a "MS-Identity-Assertion" parameter
containing the NAI.
The AAA server consults network policy and if the request is
permitted, the response includes the IP address that is currently
assigned to the Device. If this IP address matches the source IP
address of the HELD location request, the location request is
permitted; otherwise, the request is rejected.
This relies on the same IP address spoofing protections that are
required by [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery]. In addition,
the request made of the AAA uses the Diameter protocol [RFC3588], and
therefore relies on the security of the Diameter exchange. In order
to rely on the access request, the AAA server MUST be authenticated
to be a trusted entity for the purpose of providing a link between
the NAI and IP address. The Diameter exchange MUST also be protected
from modification. Some part of these protections can be provided
through use of IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS [RFC5246], as mandated in
[RFC3588].
4.5. URI
A Device can be identified by a URI. Any URI can be used providing A Device can be identified by a URI. Any URI can be used providing
that the requester and LIS have a common understanding of the that the requester and LIS have a common understanding of the
semantics implied by use of the URI. semantics implied by use of the URI.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<uri>sip:user@example.net;gr=kjh29x97us97d</uri> <uri>sip:user@example.net;gr=kjh29x97us97d</uri>
</device> </device>
3.3.6. Hostname Particular care needs to be taken in ensuring that a particular URI
only refers to a single Device. In many cases, a URI can resolve to
multiple destinations. For example, a SIP address of record URI can
correspond to a service subscription rather than a single Device.
4.6. Hostname
A domain name can be used as the basis for identification using the A domain name can be used as the basis for identification using the
"hostname" element. "hostname" element.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<hostname>host.example.net</hostname> <hostname>host.example.net</hostname>
</device> </device>
3.3.7. Directory Number A domain name does not always correspond to a single IP address or
host. If this is the case, a domain name is not a suitable
identifier.
4.7. Directory Number
Telephony devices are typically identified by the number that is used Telephony devices are typically identified by the number that is used
to reach them. Within enterprises, where globally accessible to reach them. Within enterprises, where globally accessible
telephone numbers might not be used, a directory number is the usual telephone numbers might not be used, a directory number is the usual
form of identification. form of identification.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<dn>7515</dn> <dn>7515</dn>
</device> </device>
3.3.8. Cellular Telephony Identifiers 4.8. Cellular Telephony Identifiers
A range of different forms of mobile station identifiers are used for A range of different forms of mobile station identifiers are used for
different cellular telephony systems. Elements are defined for these different cellular telephony systems. Elements are defined for these
identifiers. The following identifiers are defined: identifiers. The following identifiers are defined:
msisdn: The Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network msisdn: The Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network
Number (MSISDN) is an E.164 number between 6 and 15 digits long. Number (MSISDN) is an E.164 number between 6 and 15 digits long.
imsi: The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) an imsi: The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) an
identifier associated with all GSM and UMTS mobile subscribers. identifier associated with all GSM and UMTS mobile subscribers.
skipping to change at page 13, line 24 skipping to change at page 14, line 43
min: The Mobile Identification Number (MIN) is a unique number min: The Mobile Identification Number (MIN) is a unique number
assigned to CDMA handsets. assigned to CDMA handsets.
mdn: The Mobile Directory Number (MDN) is an E.164 number, with mdn: The Mobile Directory Number (MDN) is an E.164 number, with
usage similar to MSISDN. usage similar to MSISDN.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<msisdn>11235550123</msisdn> <msisdn>11235550123</msisdn>
</device> </device>
3.3.9. DHCP Unique Identifier 4.9. DHCP Unique Identifier
The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) uses a binary The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) uses a binary
identifier for its clients. The DHCP Unique Identifier (DUID) is identifier for its clients. The DHCP Unique Identifier (DUID) is
expressed in Option 61 of DHCPv4 (see [RFC4361]) or Option 1 of expressed in Option 61 of DHCPv4 (see [RFC4361]) or Option 1 of
DHCPv6 and follows the format defined in Section 9 of [RFC3315]. The DHCPv6 and follows the format defined in Section 9 of [RFC3315]. The
"duid" element includes the binary value of the DUID expressed in "duid" element includes the binary value of the DUID expressed in
hexadecimal. hexadecimal.
<device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"> <device xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id">
<duid>1234567890AaBbCcDdEeFf</duid> <duid>1234567890AaBbCcDdEeFf</duid>
</device> </device>
4. XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:id="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<!-- Device Identity -->
<xs:element name="device" type="id:deviceIdentity"/>
<xs:complexType name="deviceIdentity">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="requiredIdentifiers" type="id:qnameList"/>
<xs:simpleType name="qnameList">
<xs:list itemType="xs:QName"/>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="ip" type="id:ipAddress"/>
<xs:complexType name="ipAddress">
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:token">
<xs:attribute name="v" use="optional">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\da-fA-F]"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="mac" type="id:macAddress"/>
<xs:simpleType name="macAddress">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\da-fA-F]{2}(-[\da-fA-F]{2}){5}"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="udpport" type="id:portNumber"/>
<xs:element name="tcpport" type="id:portNumber"/>
<xs:simpleType name="portNumber">
<xs:restriction base="xs:nonNegativeInteger">
<xs:maxInclusive value="65535"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="nai" type="xs:token"/>
<xs:element name="uri" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:element name="dn" type="id:digits"/>
<xs:simpleType name="digits">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\d]+"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="hostname" type="id:domainName"/>
<xs:simpleType name="domainName">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<!-- the following pattern does not include whitespace;
whitespace is added only to conform to document
formatting restrictions -->
<xs:pattern value="([A-Za-z\d]([A-Za-z\d-]*[A-Za-z\d])*\.)*
[A-Za-z\d]([A-Za-z\d-]*[A-Za-z\d])*"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="duid" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
<xs:element name="msisdn" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:element name="imsi" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:element name="imei" type="id:digit15"/>
<xs:element name="min" type="id:digit10"/>
<xs:element name="mdn" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:simpleType name="e164">
<xs:restriction base="id:digit15">
<xs:minLength value="6"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="digit15">
<xs:restriction base="id:digits">
<xs:maxLength value="15"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="digit10">
<xs:restriction base="id:digits">
<xs:length value="10"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
Location configuration protocols can make use of an authorization Location configuration protocols can make use of an authorization
model known as "LCP policy", which permits only Targets to be the model known as "LCP policy", which permits only Targets to be the
recipients of their own locations. In effect, an LCP server (that recipients of their own locations. In effect, an LCP server (that
is, the LIS) follows a single rule policy that states that the Target is, the LIS) follows a single rule policy that states that the Target
is the only authorized Location Recipient. is the only authorized Location Recipient.
The security and privacy considerations of the base HELD protocol The security and privacy considerations of the base HELD protocol
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] are applicable, except as [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] are applicable, except as
skipping to change at page 17, line 32 skipping to change at page 16, line 32
one or more Rule Makers. one or more Rule Makers.
In the case that the LIS exclusively provides Targets with their own In the case that the LIS exclusively provides Targets with their own
locations, the LIS can still be said to be following the "LCP locations, the LIS can still be said to be following the "LCP
policy". In all cases, the Geopriv security and privacy policy". In all cases, the Geopriv security and privacy
considerations [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch] are applicable. considerations [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch] are applicable.
The spoofing protections provided when using HELD with identity The spoofing protections provided when using HELD with identity
extensions to provide Targets with their own locations differ from extensions to provide Targets with their own locations differ from
the protections inherent in an LCP. For an LCP, return routability the protections inherent in an LCP. For an LCP, return routability
is considered sufficient protection against spoofing. A similar is considered sufficient protection against spoofing. For a
degree of assurance is required if a similar policy is to be used. similarly policy to be used, specific measures MUST be defined to
protect against spoofing of the alternative identifier. This
document defines this for an NAI when used in WiMAX networks (see
Section 4.4.1), but for no other identifier.
A Rule Maker might require additional verification that the A Rule Maker might require additional verification that the
identifier is owned by the requester. Verification that depends on identifier is owned by the requester. Verification that depends on
return routability can only provide weaker assurances than those return routability can only provide weaker assurances than those
provided by return routability; therefore, policy might require the provided by return routability; therefore, policy might require the
use of additional, independent methods of verification. use of additional, independent methods of verification.
Care is required where a direct one-to-one relationship between Care is required where a direct one-to-one relationship between
requester and Device identity does not exist. If identifiers are not requester and Device identity does not exist. If identifiers are not
identical, the use of HELD identity extensions to provide Targets identical, the use of HELD identity extensions to provide Targets
skipping to change at page 18, line 6 skipping to change at page 17, line 9
For example, it is not appropriate to provide Targets with their For example, it is not appropriate to provide Targets with their
own locations under these terms where a requester is authenticated own locations under these terms where a requester is authenticated
by NAI and the supplied Device identity is a MAC address, even if by NAI and the supplied Device identity is a MAC address, even if
that MAC address is currently registered with the network under that MAC address is currently registered with the network under
the given NAI. In this case, the requester might be requesting the given NAI. In this case, the requester might be requesting
from a different MAC address registered under the same NAI. The from a different MAC address registered under the same NAI. The
correct way of gaining authorization is to establish a policy that correct way of gaining authorization is to establish a policy that
permits this particular request as a third party request. permits this particular request as a third party request.
5.1.1. Security Considerations for NAI use in WiMAX Networks
Section 4.4.1 discusses the implications of using an NAI as an
identifier for location requests made of a LIS serving a WiMAX
network. Additional security considerations are discussed in
[WiMAX-T33-110-R015v01-B].
5.2. Third-Party Requests 5.2. Third-Party Requests
The LCP policy does not allow requests made by third parties. If a The LCP policy does not allow requests made by third parties. If a
LIS permits requests from third parties using Device identity, it LIS permits requests from third parties using Device identity, it
assumes the rule of a Location Server (LS). As a Location Server, assumes the rule of a Location Server (LS). As a Location Server,
the LIS MUST explicitly authorize requests according to the policies the LIS MUST explicitly authorize requests according to the policies
that are provided by Rule Makers, including the Target. This that are provided by Rule Makers, including the Target. The LIS MUST
includes authentication of requesters where required by the also authenticate requesters according to the agree authorization
authorization policies. policy.
An organization that provides a LIS that allows third party requests An organization that provides a LIS that allows third party requests
must provide a means for a Rule Maker to specify authorization must provide a means for a Rule Maker to specify authorization
policies as part of the LIS implementation (e.g, in the form of policies as part of the LIS implementation (e.g, in the form of
access control lists). Authorization must be established before access control lists). Authorization must be established before
allowing third party requests for the location of any Target. Until allowing third party requests for the location of any Target. Until
an authorization policy is established, the LIS MUST reject requests an authorization policy is established, the LIS MUST reject requests
by third parties (that is, the default policy is "deny all"). by third parties (that is, the default policy is "deny all").
When the LIS is operated by an access network, the relationship When the LIS is operated by an access network, the relationship
between the Target and the LIS can be transient. However, the between the Target and the LIS can be transient. As the Target is a
process of establishing network access usually results in a form of potential Rule Maker, this presents a problem. However, the process
agreement between the Target and the network provider. This process of establishing network access usually results in a form of agreement
offers a natural vehicle for establishing location privacy policies. between the Target and the network provider. This process offers a
natural vehicle for establishing location privacy policies.
Establishing authorization policy might be a manual process, an Establishing authorization policy might be a manual process, an
explicit part of the terms of service for the network, or an explicit part of the terms of service for the network, or an
automated system that accepts formal authorization policies (see automated system that accepts formal authorization policies (see
[RFC4745], [RFC4825]). This document does not mandate any particular [RFC4745], [RFC4825]). This document does not mandate any particular
mechanism for establishing an authorization policy. mechanism for establishing an authorization policy.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in The security considerations in
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] describe the use of TLS for [I-D.ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery] describe the use of TLS for
skipping to change at page 21, line 5 skipping to change at page 20, line 5
Requests from third parties have the same requirements for server Requests from third parties have the same requirements for server
authentication, confidentiality and protection from modification as authentication, confidentiality and protection from modification as
Target requests for their own locations. However, because the third- Target requests for their own locations. However, because the third-
party needs to be authorized, the requester MUST be authenticated by party needs to be authorized, the requester MUST be authenticated by
the LIS. In addition, third-party requests MUST be explicitly the LIS. In addition, third-party requests MUST be explicitly
authorized by a policy that is established by a Rule Maker. authorized by a policy that is established by a Rule Maker.
More detail on the privacy implications of third-party requests are More detail on the privacy implications of third-party requests are
covered in Section 5. covered in Section 5.
7. IANA Considerations 7. XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:id="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<!-- Device Identity -->
<xs:element name="device" type="id:deviceIdentity"/>
<xs:complexType name="deviceIdentity">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="requiredIdentifiers" type="id:qnameList"/>
<xs:simpleType name="qnameList">
<xs:list itemType="xs:QName"/>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="ip" type="id:ipAddress"/>
<xs:complexType name="ipAddress">
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="xs:token">
<xs:attribute name="v" use="optional">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\da-fA-F]"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="mac" type="id:macAddress"/>
<xs:simpleType name="macAddress">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\da-fA-F]{2}(-[\da-fA-F]{2}){5}"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="udpport" type="id:portNumber"/>
<xs:element name="tcpport" type="id:portNumber"/>
<xs:simpleType name="portNumber">
<xs:restriction base="xs:nonNegativeInteger">
<xs:maxInclusive value="65535"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="nai" type="xs:token"/>
<xs:element name="uri" type="xs:anyURI"/>
<xs:element name="dn" type="id:digits"/>
<xs:simpleType name="digits">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<xs:pattern value="[\d]+"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="hostname" type="id:domainName"/>
<xs:simpleType name="domainName">
<xs:restriction base="xs:token">
<!-- the following pattern does not include whitespace;
whitespace is added only to conform to document
formatting restrictions -->
<xs:pattern value="([A-Za-z\d]([A-Za-z\d-]*[A-Za-z\d])*\.)*
[A-Za-z\d]([A-Za-z\d-]*[A-Za-z\d])*"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="duid" type="xs:hexBinary"/>
<xs:element name="msisdn" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:element name="imsi" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:element name="imei" type="id:digit15"/>
<xs:element name="min" type="id:digit10"/>
<xs:element name="mdn" type="id:e164"/>
<xs:simpleType name="e164">
<xs:restriction base="id:digit15">
<xs:minLength value="6"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="digit15">
<xs:restriction base="id:digits">
<xs:maxLength value="15"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="digit10">
<xs:restriction base="id:digits">
<xs:length value="10"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:schema>
8. IANA Considerations
This document registers an XML namespace and schema with IANA in This document registers an XML namespace and schema with IANA in
accordance with guidelines in [RFC3688]. It also creates a new accordance with guidelines in [RFC3688]. It also creates a new
registry for device identity types, and stipulates how new types are registry for device identity types, and stipulates how new types are
to be added. to be added.
7.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for 8.1. URN Sub-Namespace Registration for
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id
This section registers a new XML namespace, This section registers a new XML namespace,
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id", as per the guidelines in "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id", as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688]. [RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id
Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group,
(geopriv@ietf.org), James Winterbottom (geopriv@ietf.org), James Winterbottom
skipping to change at page 21, line 45 skipping to change at page 23, line 45
<body> <body>
<h1>Namespace for HELD Device Identity Parameters</h1> <h1>Namespace for HELD Device Identity Parameters</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id</h2> <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:geopriv:held:id</h2>
[[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX [[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: Please update RFC URL and replace XXXX
with the RFC number for this specification.]] with the RFC number for this specification.]]
<p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p> <p>See <a href="[[RFC URL]]">RFCXXXX</a>.</p>
</body> </body>
</html> </html>
END END
7.2. XML Schema Registration 8.2. XML Schema Registration
This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in This section registers an XML schema as per the guidelines in
[RFC3688]. [RFC3688].
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:held:id URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:geopriv:held:id
Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org), Registrant Contact: IETF, GEOPRIV working group, (geopriv@ietf.org),
James Winterbottom (james.winterbottom@andrew.com). James Winterbottom (james.winterbottom@andrew.com).
Schema: The XML for this schema can be found as the entirety of Schema: The XML for this schema can be found as the entirety of
Section 4 of this document. Section 7 of this document.
7.3. Registration of HELD 'badIdentifier' Error Code 8.3. Registration of HELD 'badIdentifier' Error Code
This section registers the "badIdentifier" error code in the "Geopriv This section registers the "badIdentifier" error code in the "Geopriv
HELD Registries, Error codes for HELD" IANA registry. HELD Registries, Error codes for HELD" IANA registry.
badIdentifier This error code indicates that the Device identifiers badIdentifier This error code indicates that the Device identifiers
used in the HELD request were either: not supported by the LIS, used in the HELD request were either: not supported by the LIS,
badly formatted, or that the requester was not authorized to make badly formatted, or that the requester was not authorized to make
a erquest for that identifier. a erquest for that identifier.
8. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the NENA VoIP location working group for The authors wish to thank the NENA VoIP location working group for
their assistance in the definition of the schema used in this their assistance in the definition of the schema used in this
document. Special thanks go to Barbara Stark, Guy Caron, Nadine document. Special thanks go to Barbara Stark, Guy Caron, Nadine
Abbott, Jerome Grenier and Martin Dawson. Bob Sherry provided input Abbott, Jerome Grenier and Martin Dawson. Bob Sherry provided input
on use of URIs. Thanks to Adam Muhlbauer and Eddy Corbett for on use of URIs. Thanks to Adam Muhlbauer and Eddy Corbett for
providing further corrections. Bernard Aboba provided extensive providing further corrections. Bernard Aboba provided extensive
feedback on use cases and the security model; Bernard, along with feedback on use cases and the security model; Bernard, along with
Alan DeKok, also helped resolve an issue with NAIs. Ray Bellis Alan DeKok, also helped resolve an issue with NAIs. Ray Bellis
provided motivation for the protocol port parameters. Marc Linsner provided motivation for the protocol port parameters. Marc Linsner
and Alissa Cooper provided guidance and text (respectively) that and Alissa Cooper provided guidance and text (respectively) that
greatly clarified the discussion on LCPs. greatly clarified the discussion relating to LCPs. Thanks to Jon
Peterson and Cullen Jennings for forcing us to be practical.
9. References 10. References
9.1. Normative references 10.1. Normative references
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004. January 2004.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005. Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
[RFC4361] Lemon, T. and B. Sommerfeld, "Node-specific Client [RFC4361] Lemon, T. and B. Sommerfeld, "Node-specific Client
Identifiers for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Identifiers for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
Version Four (DHCPv4)", RFC 4361, February 2006. Version Four (DHCPv4)", RFC 4361, February 2006.
skipping to change at page 24, line 39 skipping to change at page 26, line 42
draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-16 (work in draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-16 (work in
progress), August 2009. progress), August 2009.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps] [I-D.ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps]
Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7 Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7
Location Configuration Protocol; Problem Statement and Location Configuration Protocol; Problem Statement and
Requirements", draft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-10 (work in Requirements", draft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-10 (work in
progress), July 2009. progress), July 2009.
[W3C.REC-xml-names11-20060816] [W3C.REC-xml-names11-20060816]
Hollander, D., Bray, T., Layman, A., and R. Tobin, Hollander, D., Layman, A., Bray, T., and R. Tobin,
"Namespaces in XML 1.1 (Second Edition)", World Wide Web "Namespaces in XML 1.1 (Second Edition)", World Wide Web
Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-names11-20060816, Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-names11-20060816,
August 2006, August 2006,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml-names11-20060816>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2006/REC-xml-names11-20060816>.
9.2. Informative references [WiMAX-T33-110-R015v01-B]
WiMAX Forum, "Protocols and Procedures for Location Based
Services", WiMAX Forum Network Architecture T33-110-
R015v01-B, May 2009.
10.2. Informative references
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996. BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC3693] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and [RFC3693] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and
J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004. J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
[RFC3825] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host [RFC3825] Polk, J., Schnizlein, J., and M. Linsner, "Dynamic Host
Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based
Location Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004. Location Configuration Information", RFC 3825, July 2004.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4388] Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration [RFC4388] Woundy, R. and K. Kinnear, "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006. Protocol (DHCP) Leasequery", RFC 4388, February 2006.
[RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., [RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745, Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
February 2007. February 2007.
[RFC4776] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol [RFC4776] Schulzrinne, H., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses (DHCPv4 and DHCPv6) Option for Civic Addresses
Configuration Information", RFC 4776, November 2006. Configuration Information", RFC 4776, November 2006.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007. Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch] [I-D.ietf-geopriv-arch]
Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications", Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
draft-ietf-geopriv-arch-00 (work in progress), July 2009. draft-ietf-geopriv-arch-01 (work in progress),
October 2009.
[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]
Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for
Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling", Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling",
draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-13 (work in progress), draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-13 (work in progress),
July 2009. July 2009.
[I-D.thomson-geopriv-held-measurements] [I-D.thomson-geopriv-held-measurements]
Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Using Device-provided Thomson, M. and J. Winterbottom, "Using Device-provided
Location-Related Measurements in Location Configuration Location-Related Measurements in Location Configuration
Protocols", draft-thomson-geopriv-held-measurements-04 Protocols", draft-thomson-geopriv-held-measurements-05
(work in progress), May 2009. (work in progress), October 2009.
[LLDP] IEEE, "802.1AB, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan [TS.3GPP.23.271]
area networks, Station and Media Access Control 3GPP, "Functional stage 2 description of Location Services
Connectivity Discovery", June 2005. (LCS)", 3GPP TS 23.271 8.0.0, December 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
James Winterbottom James Winterbottom
Andrew Corporation Andrew Corporation
Andrew Building (39) Andrew Building (39)
Wollongong University Campus Wollongong University Campus
Northfields Avenue Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, NSW 2522 Wollongong, NSW 2522
AU AU
 End of changes. 48 change blocks. 
226 lines changed or deleted 323 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.37b. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/