draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt   draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-08.txt 
ACE M. Jones ACE M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz
Expires: March 21, 2020 RISE SICS Expires: April 3, 2020 RISE SICS
G. Selander G. Selander
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
S. Erdtman S. Erdtman
Spotify Spotify
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
Arm Ltd. Arm Ltd.
September 18, 2019 October 1, 2019
Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07 draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-08
Abstract Abstract
This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of- that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also
sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and
CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs. CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 21, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5 3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of- 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-
Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6 3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 7
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [RFC8392] can This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token (CWT) [CWT] can
declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof- declare that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-
of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also of-possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also
sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification
provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800] but using CBOR Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800] but using CBOR
[RFC7049] and CWTs [RFC8392] rather than JSON [RFC8259] and JWTs [RFC7049] and CWTs [CWT] rather than JSON [RFC8259] and JWTs [JWT].
[JWT].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT) This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
[RFC8392], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and [CWT], CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152], and
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] specifications.
These terms are defined by this specification: These terms are defined by this specification:
Issuer Issuer
Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject Party that creates the CWT and binds the claims about the subject
to the proof-of-possession key. to the proof-of-possession key.
Presenter Presenter
Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key
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3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys
By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the
CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that
the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has
possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map
and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key. and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key.
The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT, The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT,
depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some depending upon the application requirements. For instance, some
applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [RFC8392], to applications may use the CWT "sub" (subject) claim [CWT], to identify
identify the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss" claim the presenter. Other applications may use the "iss" claim to
to identify the presenter. In some applications, the subject identify the presenter. In some applications, the subject identifier
identifier might be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" might be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer)
(issuer) claim [RFC8392]. The actual mechanism used is dependent claim [CWT]. The actual mechanism used is dependent upon the
upon the application. The case in which the presenter is the subject application. The case in which the presenter is the subject of the
of the CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) CWT is analogous to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage.
3.1. Confirmation Claim 3.1. Confirmation Claim
The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods. The "cnf" claim in the CWT is used to carry confirmation methods.
Some of them use proof-of-possession keys while others do not. This Some of them use proof-of-possession keys while others do not. This
design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] design is analogous to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject SubjectConfirmation element in which a number of different subject
confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession confirmation methods can be included (including proof-of-possession
key information). key information).
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} }
} }
The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of
that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the
"kid" (Key ID) member. "kid" (Key ID) member.
The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a
symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is
not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is
explained in [RFC8392]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key
key MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3. MUST be encrypted as described in Section 3.3. This procedure is
equivalent to the one defined in section 3.3 of [RFC7800].
3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key
When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the
"Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152] "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key [RFC8152]
representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key known to the
recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0. recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0.
The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could The following example illustrates a symmetric key that could
subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member: subsequently be encrypted for use in the "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member:
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derived from the key or where not all of the parties involved are derived from the key or where not all of the parties involved are
validating the cryptographic derivation, implementers should expect validating the cryptographic derivation, implementers should expect
collisions, where different keys are assigned the same Key ID. collisions, where different keys are assigned the same Key ID.
Recipients of a CWT with a PoP key linked through only a Key ID Recipients of a CWT with a PoP key linked through only a Key ID
should be prepared to handle such situations. should be prepared to handle such situations.
In the world of constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there In the world of constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices, there
is frequently a restriction on the size of Key IDs, either because of is frequently a restriction on the size of Key IDs, either because of
table constraints or a desire to keep message sizes small. table constraints or a desire to keep message sizes small.
Note that the value of a Key ID for a specific key is not necessarily
the same for different parties. When sending a COSE encrypted
message with a shared key, the Key ID may be different on both sides
of the conversation, with the appropriate one being included in the
message based on the recipient of the message.
3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified
Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter Proof of possession is often demonstrated by having the presenter
sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by
the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a
"challenge". There are, however, also other means to demonstrate "challenge". There are, however, also other means to demonstrate
freshness of the exchange and to link the proof-of-possession key to freshness of the exchange and to link the proof-of-possession key to
the participating parties, as demonstrated by various authentication the participating parties, as demonstrated by various authentication
and key exchange protocols. and key exchange protocols.
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specified, as this is also protocol specific. specified, as this is also protocol specific.
Note that other means of proving possession of the key exist, which Note that other means of proving possession of the key exist, which
could be used in conjunction with a CWT's confirmation key. could be used in conjunction with a CWT's confirmation key.
Applications making use of such alternate means are encouraged to Applications making use of such alternate means are encouraged to
register them in the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry register them in the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" registry
established in Section 7.2. established in Section 7.2.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
All the security considerations that are discussed in [RFC8392] also All the security considerations that are discussed in [CWT] also
apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own
unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is
kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that
unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values. unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values.
Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it audience restriction, as described in Section 3.1.3 of [CWT], as it
provides additional protections. Audience restriction can be used by provides additional protections. Audience restriction can be used by
recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients. recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.
A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that
use proof-of-possession keys in CWTs with the "cnf" claim MUST ensure use proof-of-possession keys in CWTs with the "cnf" claim MUST ensure
that the parts of this specification that they use are implemented by that the parts of this specification that they use are implemented by
the intended recipient. the intended recipient.
CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of CBOR Web Tokens with proof-of-possession keys are used in context of
an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework an architecture, such as the ACE OAuth Framework
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necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity
protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data
origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns
about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important
for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary
from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special
care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT
since those not only require integrity protection but also since those not only require integrity protection but also
confidentiality protection (e.g., either by encrypting the "cnf" confidentiality protection (e.g., either by encrypting the "cnf"
element, as specified in Section 3.3, or by encrypting the whole CWT, element, as specified in Section 3.3, or by encrypting the whole CWT,
as specified in [RFC8392]). as specified in [CWT]).
As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes As described in Section 6 (Key Identification) and Appendix D (Notes
on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust on Key Selection) of [JWS], it is important to make explicit trust
decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with decisions about the keys. Proof-of-possession signatures made with
keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied keys not meeting the application's trust criteria MUST NOT be relied
upon. upon.
5. Privacy Considerations 5. Privacy Considerations
A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the
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able to represent the perspectives of different applications using able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts. Experts.
7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration 7.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration
This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web
Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [RFC8392]. Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [CWT].
7.1.1. Registry Contents 7.1.1. Registry Contents
o Claim Name: "cnf" o Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Description: Confirmation o Claim Description: Confirmation
o JWT Claim Name: "cnf" o JWT Claim Name: "cnf"
o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8) o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8)
o Claim Value Type(s): map o Claim Value Type(s): map
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
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o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid" o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid"
o Confirmation Key: 3 o Confirmation Key: 3
o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]]
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[IANA.CWT.Claims] [IANA.CWT.Claims]
IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims", IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
skipping to change at page 13, line 9 skipping to change at page 13, line 27
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", [RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017, RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0 Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21 Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-21
(work in progress), February 2019. (work in progress), February 2019.
[IANA.JWT.Claims] [IANA.JWT.Claims]
IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, May 2015, Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
"Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
2.0-os, March 2005, 2.0-os, March 2005,
skipping to change at page 14, line 18 skipping to change at page 14, line 35
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>. June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the
specification: Roman Danyliw, Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Richardson, and specification: Roman Danyliw, Benjamin Kaduk, Michael Richardson, and
Jim Schaad. Jim Schaad.
Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova. the CelticPlus projects CyberWI and CRITISEC, with funding from
Vinnova.
Document History Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-08
o Addressed remaining Area Director review comments by Benjamin
Kaduk.
-07 -07
o Addressed Area Director review by Benjamin Kaduk. o Addressed Area Director review by Benjamin Kaduk.
-06 -06
o Corrected nits identified by Roman Danyliw. o Corrected nits identified by Roman Danyliw.
-05 -05
o Added text suggested by Jim Schaad describing considerations when o Added text suggested by Jim Schaad describing considerations when
using the Key ID confirmation method. using the Key ID confirmation method.
-04 -04
o Addressed additional WGLC comments by Jim Schaad and Roman o Addressed additional WGLC comments by Jim Schaad and Roman
 End of changes. 24 change blocks. 
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