wdiff draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03.txt draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-04.txt

6TiSCH Working Group M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft Inria University of Montenegro
Intended status: Standards Track J. Simon
Expires: December 17, 2017 Linear Technology May 3, 2018 Analog Devices
K. Pister
University of California Berkeley
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
June 15,
October 30, 2017

Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-03
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-04

Abstract

This document describes the minimal mechanisms configuration required to support
secure enrollment of a pledge, for a device being added new
device, called "pledge", to an IPv6 securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) 802.15.4e) network. It assumes The entities involved use CoAP
(Constrained Application Protocol) and OSCORE (Object Security for
Constrained RESTful Environments). The configuration requires that
the pledge has been provisioned with and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a credential that central
entity), share a symmetric key. How this key is relevant to
the deployment - the "one-touch" scenario. The goal provisioned is out
of scope of this
configuration document. The result of the joining process is to set that
the JRC configures the pledge with link-layer keys, keying material and to establish a secure
end-to-end session between each pledge and the join registrar who may
use that to further configure the pledge.
short link-layer address. This specification also defines a new
Stateless-Proxy CoAP option. Additional security
behaviors and mechanisms may be
added on top of this minimal framework.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 17, 2017. May 3, 2018.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. One-Touch Assumptions Assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Pre-Shared Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Join Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
4.1. Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
4.2. Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7
4.3. Step 3 - Security Handshake Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . 7
4.4. Step 4 - Simple Join Protocol - Join Request Response . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Step 5 - Simple Join Protocol - Join Response . . . . . . 8
5. Architectural Overview and Communication through Join Proxy . 9 8
5.1. Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. OSCORE Security Handshake . . Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Simple Join Protocol Specification
6.1. Persistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. OSCOAP Security Context Instantiation . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. 11
7. Specification of Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. . . 11
8. Specification of Join Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Mandatory to Implement Algorithms and Certificate Format . . 15
9. 11
8.1. Link-layer Requirements Keys Transported in COSE Key Set . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Short Address . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Rekeying and Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Error Handling and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. Key Derivations . . . 13
10. Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
12. Security Considerations . . . . . 14
11. Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. Privacy Considerations 14
12. Link-layer Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
14. IANA 14
13. Rekeying and Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
16. IANA Considerations . . 18
14.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
16.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
15. 16
17. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16. 17
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
16.1. 17
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
16.2. 17
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 18
Appendix A. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 22

1. Introduction

This document describes presumes a 6TiSCH network as described by [RFC7554],
[RFC8180], [I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol], and
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]. By design, nodes in a 6TiSCH network
[RFC7554] have their radio turned off most of the minimal feature set for time, to conserve
energy. As a consequence, the link used by a new device,
termed pledge, to securely device for joining
the network has limited bandwidth [RFC8180]. The secure join
solution defined in this document therefore keeps the number of over-
the-air exchanges for join purposes to a minimum.

The micro-controllers at the heart of 6TiSCH network. As nodes have a successful
outcome small
amount of this process, the pledge code memory. It is able therefore paramount to securely communicate
with its neighbors, participate in the routing structure reuse existing
protocols available as part of the
network or establish 6TiSCH stack. At the application
layer, the 6TiSCH stack already relies on CoAP [RFC7252] for web
transfer, and on OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] for its end-
to-end security. The secure join solution defined in this document
therefore reuses those two protocols as its building blocks.

This document defines a secure session with an Internet host.

When join solution for a pledge seeks admission new device, called
"pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH [RFC7554] network, it first
needs to synchronize to the network. The pledge then specification
configures its
link-local IPv6 address and authenticates itself, different layers of the 6TiSCH protocol stack and also validates
that it is joining the right network. At
defines a new CoAP option. It assumes the presence of a JRC (join
registrar/coordinator), a central entity. It further assumes that
the pledge and the JRC share a symmetric key, called PSK (pre-shared
key). How the PSK is installed is out of scope of this point document.

When the pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH network, it can expect first
synchronizes to
interact it, by initiating the passive scan defined in
[IEEE802.15.4-2015]. The pledge then exchanges messages with the network
JRC; these messages can be forwarded by nodes already part of the
6TiSCH network. The messages exchanged allow the JRC and the pledge
to mutually authenticate, based on the PSK. They also allow the JRC
to configure its the pledge with link-layer keying
material. Only then may material and a short
link-layer address. After this secure joining process successfully
completes, the joined node can establish an end-to-end secure session
with an Internet host using OSCOAP
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security] or DTLS [RFC6347]. Once the
application requirements are known, the host. The joined node interacts can also interact with its peers
neighbors to request additional resources as needed, or to be reconfigured as bandwidth using the network changes 6top Protocol
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol].

This document presumes a network as described by [RFC7554],
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol], and [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology].
It assumes the pledge pre-configured with either a:

o pre-shared key (PSK),

o raw public key (RPK),

o or a locally-valid certificate and a trust anchor.

As the outcome of the join process, the pledge expects one or more
link-layer key(s) and optionally a temporary link-layer identifier.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. These
words may also appear in this document in lowercase, absent their
normative meanings.

The reader is expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
defined in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology], [RFC7252],
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security], and
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. [RFC8152].

The specification also includes a set of informative examples using
the CBOR diagnostic notation [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl].

The following terms are
imported: pledge, join proxy, join registrar/coordinator, drop ship,
imprint, enrollment, ownership voucher.

Pledge: the prospective device, which has the identity provided used throughout this document:

pledge: The new device that wishes to
at the factory.

Joined Node: the prospective join a 6TiSCH network.

joined node: The new device, after having completed the join
process, often just called a Node.

Join Proxy node.

join proxy (JP): A node already part of the 6TiSCH network that
serves as a stateless relay that provides to provide connectivity between the pledge and
the Join Registrar/Coordinator.

Join Registrar/Coordinator JRC.

join registrar/coordinator (JRC): A central entity responsible for
authentication and
the authentication, authorization and configuration of joining nodes. the pledge.

3. One-Touch Assumptions Assumption

This document assumes the a one-touch scenario, where devices are
provided scenario. The pledge is
provisioned with some mechanism by which a secure association may be
made in a controlled environment. PSK before attempting to join the network, and the
same PSK (as well as the uniquer identifier of the pledge) is
provisioned on the JRC.

There are many ways in by which this
might be done, and detailing any of them is out of scope for this
document. But, some notion of how this might provisioning can be done is important so
that done.
Physically, the underlying assumptions PSK can be reasoned about.

Some examples written into the pledge using a number of how to do this could include:

o
mechanisms, such as a JTAG interface

o interface, a serial (craft) console interface

o pushes of physical
interface, pushing buttons simultaneous to network attachment

o unsecured devices operated simultaneously on different devices, over-
the-air configuration in a Faraday cage

There are likely many other ways as well. cage, etc. The provisioning can
be done by the vendor, the manufacturer, the integrator, etc.

Details of how this provisioning is done is out of scope of this
document. What is assumed is that there can be a secure, private
conversation between the Join
Registrar/Coordinator, JRC and the pledge, and that the two devices
can exchange some trusted bytes of information. the PSK.

3.1. Pre-Shared Key

The PSK SHOULD be at least 128 bits in length, generated uniformly at
random. It is RECOMMENDED to generate the PSK with a
cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator. Each pledge
SHOULD be provisioned with a unique PSK.

4. Join Overview

This section describes the steps taken by a pledge in a 6TiSCH
network. When a previously unknown device pledge seeks admission to a 6TiSCH [RFC7554] network, the
following exchange occurs:

1. The pledge listens for an Enhanced Beacon (EB) frame
[IEEE8021542015].
[IEEE802.15.4-2015]. This frame provides network synchronization
information, and tells the device when it can send a frame to the
node sending the beacons, which plays the role of Join Proxy join proxy (JP)
for the pledge, and when it can expect to receive a frame.

2. The pledge configures its link-local IPv6 address and advertizes advertises
it to Join Proxy the join proxy (JP).

3. The pledge sends packets a Join Request to JP in order to securely
identify itself to the network. These packets are The Join Request is directed to
the Join
Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), JRC, which may be co-located on the JP or another device.

4. The In case of successful processing of the request, the pledge
receives one or more packets a join response from JRC (via the JP) that sets up one
or more link-layer keys used to authenticate and encrypt
subsequent transmissions to peers. peers, and a short link-layer address
for the pledge.

From the pledge's perspective, minimal joining is a local phenomenon
- the pledge only interacts with the JP, and it need not know how far
it is from the 6LBR, or how to route to the JRC. Only after
establishing one or more link-layer keys does it need to know about
the particulars of a 6TiSCH network.

The handshake process is shown as a transaction diagram in Figure 1:

+--------+ +-------+ +--------+
| pledge | | JP | | JRC |
| | | | | |
+--------+ +-------+ +--------+
| | |
|<----ENH BEACON (1)-------|
|<---Enhanced Beacon (1)---| |
| | |
|<-Neighbor Discovery (2)->| |
| | |
|<---Sec. Handshake (3)----|---Sec. Handshake (3a)--->|
| | |
.......................................................................
.
|-----Join Request (4)-----|------Join (3)-----|------Join Request (4a)-->| .
. (3a)-->|
| | | Simple Join .
.
|<---Join Response (5)-----|-----Join (4)-----|-----Join Response (5a)---| Protocol .
. (4a)---|
| | | .
.......................................................................

Figure 1: Overview of the a successful join process.

The details of each step are described in the following sections.

4.1. Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon

Due

The pledge synchronizes to the channel hopping nature of 6TiSCH, transmissions take place
on physical channels in a circular fashion. For that reason,
Enhanced Beacons (EBs) are expected to be found network by listening on for, and
receiving, an Enhanced Beacon (EB) sent by a
single channel. However, because some channels may be blacklisted, a
new pledge must listen for Enhanced Beacons for a certain period on
each of node already in the 16 possible channels.
network. This search process entails having
the pledge keep the receiver portion of its radio active for the
entire period of time. is entirely defined by [IEEE802.15.4-2015],
and described in [RFC7554].

Once the pledge hears an EB from a JP, EB, it synchronizes itself to the joining schedule
using the cells contained in the EB. The pledge can hear multiple
EBs; the selection of which beacon EB to start with use is outside out of the scope of for this document.
document, and is discussed in [RFC7554]. Implementers SHOULD make
use of information such as: what Personal Area Network Identifier
(PAN ID) [IEEE802.15.4-2015] the EB contains, whether the L2 source
link-layer address of the EB has been tried before, any Network Identifier
[I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon] seen, and the what signal
strength
of the signal. The different EBs were received at, etc. In addition, the
pledge can may be configured with the Network
Identifier pre-configured to seek when it is configured search for EBs with the PSK.

Once a candidate network has been selected, specific PAN
ID.

Once the pledge can transition selects the EB, it synchronizes to it and transitions
into a low-power mode. It deeply duty cycle, waking up only cycles its radio, switching
the radio on when the provided schedule indicates shared slots which the
pledge may use for the join process. During the remainder of the
join process, the node that has sent the EB to the pledge plays the
role of JP.

At this point point, the pledge may proceed to step 2, or continue to
listen for additional EBs.

A pledge which receives only Enhanced Beacons containing Network ID
extensions [I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon] with the
initiate bit cleared, SHOULD NOT proceed with this protocol on that
network. The pledge SHOULD consider that it is in a network which
manages join traffic, it SHOULD switch to
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join].

4.2. Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery

At this point, the

The pledge forms its link-local IPv6 address based on
EUI64 and may register it at JP, in order to bootstrap the IPv6
neighbor tables. EUI-64, as per
[RFC4944]. The Neighbor Discovery exchange shown in Figure 1 refers
to a single round trip Neighbor Solicitation / Neighbor Advertisement
exchange between the pledge and the JP. The pledge may
further follow the Neighbor Discovery (ND) process described in
Section 5 JP (Section 5.5.1 of [RFC6775].

4.3. Step 3 - Security Handshake [RFC6775]).
The security handshake between pledge and JRC uses Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] to establish
the shared session secret used to encrypt the Simple Join Protocol.

The security handshake step is OPTIONAL in case PSKs are used, while
it is REQUIRED link-local IPv6 address for RPKs and certificates.

When using certificates, all subsequent
communication with the process continues as described in
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], but MAY result in no network key being
returned. In JP during the join process.

Note that case, ND exchanges at this point are not protected with link-
layer security as the pledge enters a provisional situation
where it provides access to an enrollment mechanism described is not in
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join].

If using a locally relevant certificate, possession of the keys. How
JP accepts these unprotected frames is discussed in Section 12.

The pledge will be able to
validate the certificate of and the JRC via JP SHOULD keep a local trust anchor. In
that case, separate neighbor cache for
untrusted entries and use it to store each other's information during
the JRC will return networks keys as in join process. Mixing neighbor entries belonging to pledges and
nodes that are part of the PSK case.
This would typically be network opens up the case for JP to a device which has slept so long
that it no longer has valid network keys DoS attack.
How the pledge and must go through a
partial JP decide to transition each other from untrusted
to trusted cache, once the join process again.

In case the handshake step completes, is omitted, the shared secret used for
protection out of the Simple Join Protocol in the next step scope.
One implementation technique is to use the PSK.

A consequence is that if information whether the long-term PSK is compromised, keying
material transferred as part of
incoming frames are secured at the join response link layer.

4.3. Step 3 - Join Request

The Join Request is compromised as
well. Physical compromise of a message sent from the pledge, however, would also imply pledge to the compromise of JP using
the same keying material, shared slot as it is likely to be
found described in node's memory.

4.3.1. Pre-Shared Symmetric Key

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the use of EDHOC is optional,
when using a pre-shared symmetric key. This cuts down on traffic
between JRC EB, and pledge, but requires pre-configuration of which the shared
key on both devices.

It is REQUIRED JP forwards to use unique PSKs for each pledge. If there are
multiple JRCs in
the network (such as for redundancy), they would
have to share a database of PSKs.

4.3.2. Asymmetric Keys JRC. The Security Handshake step is required, when using asymmetric keys.
Before conducting the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using EDHOC
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe] the pledge and JRC need to receive and
validate each other's public key certificate. As detailed above,
this can only be done for locally relevant (LDevID) certificates.
IDevID certificates require entering a provisional state as described
in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join].

When RPKs are pre-configured at pledge and JRC, they can directly
proceed to JP forwards the handshake.

4.4. Step 4 - Simple Join Protocol - Join Request

The Join Request that makes part of the Simple Join Protocol is sent
from the pledge to the JP using the shared slot as described in the
EB, and forwarded to the JRC. Which slot the JP uses to transmit to the JRC on the existing
6TiSCH network. How exactly this happens is out of scope: scope of this
document; some networks may wish to dedicate specific slots for this
join traffic.

The join request Join Request is authenticated/encrypted end-to-end using an AEAD
algorithm from [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] [RFC8152] and a key derived from the shared
secret from step 3. Algorithm negotiation is described in detail in
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], PSK, the pledge's
EUI-64 and mandatory to implement algorithms a request-specific constant value. Algorithms which MUST
be implemented are specified in Section 8. 11.

The nonce used when securing the Join Request is derived from the shared secret,
PSK, the pledge's EUI64 EUI-64 and a monotonically increasing counter
initialized to 0 when first starting.

4.5. Step 5 - Simple

Join Protocol Request construction is specified in Section 7, while the
details on processing can be found in Section 7 of
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

4.4. Step 4 - Join Response

The Join Response that makes part of the Simple Join Protocol is sent
from by the JRC to the pledge pledge, and is forwarded
through the JP that as it serves as a stateless relay. Packet The packet
containing the Join Response travels on the path from the JRC to JP using pre-established the
operating routes in the 6TiSCH network. The JP delivers it to the
pledge using the slot information from it has indicated in the EB. EB it sent.
The JP operates as the application-layer proxy proxy, and does not keep any
state to relay the message. It uses information sent in the clear
within the join response Join Response to decide where to forward to.

The join response Join Response is authenticated/encrypted end-to-end using an AEAD
algorithm from [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] and a [RFC8152]. The key derived used to protect the response is
different from the shared
secret one used to protect the request (both are derived
from step 3. the PSK, as explained in Section 6). The nonce response is derived from protected
using the shared secret, pledge's EUI64 and a
monotonically increasing counter matching that of same nonce as in the join request.

The join response Join Response contains one or more link-layer key(s) that the
pledge will use for subsequent communication. Each key that is
provided by the JRC is associated with an 802.15.4 key identifier.
In other link-layer technologies, a different identifier may be
substituted. The Join Response optionally also contains an IEEE 802.15.4 short
address [IEEE8021542015] [IEEE802.15.4-2015] assigned to pledge by JRC, the JRC to the pledge, and
optionally the IPv6 address of the JRC.

Join Response construction is specified in Section 8, while the
details on processing can be found in Section 7 of
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

5. Architectural Overview and Communication through Join Proxy

The protocol Join Request/Join Response exchange in Figure 1 is implemented carried over Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].
CoAP [RFC7252] and secured using OSCORE
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The Pledge pledge plays the role of a CoAP
client,
client; the JRC plays the role of a CoAP server, while server. The JP implements
CoAP forward proxy functionality [RFC7252]. Since Because the JP is can also likely
be a constrained device, it does not need to cannot implement a cache but rather
process cache. Rather, the JP
processes forwarding-related CoAP options and make makes requests on
behalf of pledge that is not yet part of the network. pledge, in a stateless manner.

The pledge communicates with a Join Proxy (JP) JP over link-local IPv6 addresses.
The pledge designates a JP as a proxy by including in the
CoAP requests to the JP the Proxy-Scheme
option with value "coap" (CoAP-to-CoAP proxy). proxy) in CoAP requests it
sends to the JP. The pledge MUST include the Uri-Host option with
its value set to the well-known JRC's alias - "6tisch.arpa". This
allows the pledge to join without knowing the IPv6 address of the
JRC. The pledge learns the actual IPv6 address of the JRC from the join
response and
Join Response; it uses it once joined in order to operate as a JP.

The
initial bootstrap of JRC can be co-located on the 6LBR. Before the 6TiSCH network is
started, the 6LBR would require explicit provisioning MUST be provisioned with the IPv6 address of the JRC address.
JRC.

5.1. Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option

The CoAP proxy by default defined in [RFC7252] keeps per-client state
information in order to forward the response towards the originator
of the request
(client). request. This state information comprises includes at least the CoAP
token, but the
implementations also need to keep track of the IPv6 address of the host, as well as and the corresponding UDP source port number. In
If the
setting where JP used the stateful CoAP proxy is a constrained device and there are
potentially many clients, as defined in the case of JP, this makes [RFC7252], it would
be prone to Denial of Service Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, due to the its limited
memory.

The Stateless-Proxy CoAP option (c.f. Figure 2) 2 allows the proxy JP to
insert within be entirely
stateless. This option inserts, in the request request, the state
information necessary needed for relaying the response back to the client. Note that the The
proxy still
needs to keep keeps some state, such as general state (e.g. for performing congestion control or
request retransmission, retransmission), but what is aimed with Stateless-Proxy
option is to free the proxy from keeping per-client state. no per-client state.

The Stateless-Proxy CoAP option is critical, Safe-to-Forward, not
part of the cache key, not repeatable and opaque. When processed by OSCOAP,
OSCORE, the Stateless-Proxy option is neither encrypted nor integrity
protected.

+-----+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name | Format | Length |
+-----+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------|
| TBD | x | | x | | Stateless-Proxy | opaque | 1-255 |
+-----+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------+
C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable

Figure 2: Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option

Upon reception of a Stateless-Proxy option, the CoAP server MUST echo
it in the response. The value of the Stateless-Proxy option is
internal proxy state that is opaque to the server. Example state
information includes the IPv6 address of the client, its UDP source
port, and the CoAP token. For security reasons, the state
information MUST be authenticated, MUST include a freshness indicator
(e.g. a sequence number or timestamp) and MAY be encrypted. The
proxy may use an appropriate COSE structure [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] [RFC8152] to wrap the
state information as the value of the Stateless-Proxy option. The
key used for encryption/authentication of the state information may
be known only to the proxy.

Once the proxy has received the CoAP response with Stateless-Proxy
option present, it decrypts/authenticates it, checks the freshness
indicator and constructs the response for the client, based on the
information present in the option value.

Note that a CoAP proxy using the Stateless-Proxy option is not able
to return 5.04 Gateway Timeout error in case the request to the
server times out. Likewise, if the response to the proxy's request
does not contain the Stateless-Proxy option, for example when the
option is not supported by the server, the proxy is not able to
return the response to the client.

6. Security Handshake

In order to derive a shared session key, pledge and JRC run the EDHOC
protocol [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]. During this process, pledge
and JRC mutually authenticate each other and verify authorization
information before proceeding with the Simple Join Protocol. In case
certificates are used for authentication, this document assumes that
a special certificate with role attribute set has been provisioned to
the JRC. This certificate is verified by pledge in order to
authorize JRC to continue with the join process. How such a
certificate is issued to the JRC is out of scope of this document.

Figure 3 details the exchanges between the pledge and JRC that take
place during the execution of the security handshake. Format of
EDHOC messages is specified in [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]. The
handshake is initiated by the pledge. JRC may either respond with an
empty CoAP acknowledgment, signaling to the pledge that it needs to
wait, or directly with the second message of EDHOC handshake. How
JRC decides whether it will immediately proceed with the handshake is
out of scope of this document.

+--------+ +--------+
| pledge | | JRC |
| | | |
+--------+ +--------+
| |
| EDHOC message_1 |
+-------------------------------->|
| |
| Optional ACK |
|< - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -+
~ ~
| |
| EDHOC message_2 |
|<--------------------------------+
| |
| EDHOC message_3 |
+-------------------------------->|
| |

Figure 3: Transaction diagram of present, it decrypts/authenticates it, checks the security handshake.

7. Simple Join Protocol Specification

Simple Join Protocol is a single round trip protocol (c.f. Figure 4)
that facilitates secure enrollment of a pledge, freshness
indicator and constructs the response for the client, based on the
information present in the option value.

Note that a shared
symmetric secret. In case CoAP proxy using the pledge was provisioned by an
asymmetric key (certificate or RPK), Simple Join Protocol Stateless-Proxy option is preceded
by not able
to return a security handshake, described 5.04 Gateway Timeout Response Code in Section 6. When case the pledge request to
the server times out. Likewise, if the response to the proxy's
request does not contain the Stateless-Proxy option, for example when
the option is
provisioned with a PSK, Simple Join Protocol may be run directly.

Pledge and JRC MUST protect their exchange end-to-end (i.e. through not supported by the proxy) using Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

+--------+ +--------+
| pledge | | JRC |
| | | |
+--------+ +--------+
| |
| Join Request |
+-------------------------------->|
| |
| Join Response |
|<--------------------------------+
| |

Figure 4: Transaction diagram of server, the Simple Join Protocol.

7.1. OSCOAP proxy is not able to
return the response to the client.

6. OSCORE Security Context Instantiation

The OSCOAP OSCORE security context MUST be derived at the pledge and the JRC
as per Section 3.2 3 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] using HKDF SHA-256
[RFC5869] as the key derivation function. [I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

o the Master Secret MUST be the secret generated by the run of EDHOC as
per Appendix B of [I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe], or PSK.

o the PSK in
case EDHOC step was omitted. Master Salt MUST be pledge's EUI-64.

o the Sender ID of the pledge MUST be set to the concatenation of its
EUI-64 and byte string 0x00.

o the Recipient ID (ID of the JRC) MUST be set to the concatenation of
pledge's EUI-64 and byte string 0x01. The construct uses pledge's
EUI-64 to avoid nonce reuse in the response in the case same PSK
is shared by a group of pledges.

o the Algorithm MUST be set to the value from [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] [RFC8152], agreed out-
of-band by the run of EDHOC, or out-of-band in case of PSKs. same mechanism used to provision the PSK. The
default is AES-CCM-16-64-128.

o the Key derivation function MUST be agreed out-of-band. Default
is HKDF SHA-256.

The derivation in [I-D.ietf-core-object-security] results in traffic
keys and static IVs a common IV for each side of the conversation. Nonces are
constructed by XOR'ing the static common IV with the current sequence number.
The context derivation process occurs exactly once.

Implementations number
and sender identifier. For details on nonce construction, refer to
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security].

It is RECOMMENDED that a PAN ID be provisioned to the pledge out-of-
band by the same mechanism used to provision the PSK. This prevents
the pledge from attempting to join a wrong network. If the pledge is
not provisioned with the PAN ID, it SHOULD attempt to join one
network at a time. In that case, implementations MUST ensure that
multiple CoAP requests to different JRCs result in the use of the
same OSCOAP OSCORE context so that sequence numbers are properly incremented
for each request.

6.1. Persistency

Implementations MUST ensure that mutable OSCORE context parameters
(Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window) are stored in persistent
memory. A technique that prevents reuse of sequence numbers,
detailed in Section 6.5.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-object-security], MUST be
implemented. Each update of the OSCORE Replay Window MUST be written
to persistent memory.

This may happen is an important security requirement in a scenario where there are multiple 6TiSCH networks present order to guarantee nonce
uniqueness and resistance to replay attacks across reboots and
rejoins. Traffic between the pledge tries and the JRC is rare, making
security outweigh the cost of writing to join one network at a time.

7.2. persistent memory.

7. Specification of Join Request

Message

The Join Request the pledge sends SHALL be mapped to a CoAP request:

o The request method is GET. POST.

o The type is Non-confirmable (NON).

o The Proxy-Scheme option is set to "coap".

o The Uri-Host option is set to "6tisch.arpa".

o The Uri-Path option is set to "j".

o The object security Object-Security option SHALL be set according to
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security] and OSCOAP parameters
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]. The OSCORE Context Hint SHALL be
set as
described above.

7.3. to pledge's EUI-64. The OSCORE Context Hint allows the JRC to
retrieve the security context for a given pledge.

o The payload is empty.

8. Specification of Join Response

If OSCOAP processing is a success the JRC successfully processes the Join Request using OSCORE, and
if the pledge is authorized to join the network, message the Join Response
the JRC sends back to the pledge SHALL be mapped to a CoAP response:

o The response Code is 2.05 (Content).

o Content-Format option is set to application/cbor. 2.04 (Changed).

o The payload is a CBOR [RFC7049] array containing, in order:

* the COSE Key Set, specified in [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], [RFC8152], containing one or
more link-layer keys. The mapping of individual keys to
802.15.4-specific parameters is described in Section 7.3.1. 8.1.

* Optional. Link layer the link-layer short address that is assigned to be used by the pledge. The
format of the short address follows Section 7.3.2. 8.2.

* Optional. optionally, the IPv6 address of the JRC transported as a byte
string. If the IPv6 address of the JRC is not present in the
response, JRC is co-located with 6LBR.

payload the
Join Response, this indicates the JRC is co-located with 6LBR,
and has the same IPv6 address as the 6LBR. The address of the
6LBR can then be learned from DODAGID field in RPL DIOs
[RFC6550].

response_payload = [
COSE_KeySet,
?
short_address,
? JRC_address : bstr,
]

7.3.1.

8.1. Link-layer Keys Transported in COSE Key Set

Each key in the COSE Key Set [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] [RFC8152] SHALL be a symmetric key. If
the "kid" parameter of the COSE Key structure is present, the
corresponding keys SHALL belong to an IEEE 802.15.4 KeyIdMode 0x01
class. In that case, parameter "kid" of the COSE Key structure SHALL
be used to carry the IEEE 802.15.4 KeyIndex value. If the "kid"
parameter is not present in the transported key, the application
SHALL consider the key to be an IEEE 802.15.4 KeyIdMode 0x00
(implicit) key. This document does not support IEEE 802.15.4
KeyIdMode 0x02 and 0x03 class keys.

7.3.2.

8.2. Short Address

Optional

The "short_address" structure transported as part of the join
response payload represents the IEEE 802.15.4 short address assigned
to the pledge. It is encoded as a CBOR array object, containing containing, in
order:

o Byte string, containing the 16-bit address.

o Optional Optionally, the lease time parameter, "lease_asn". The value of
the "lease_asn" parameter is the 5-byte Absolute Slot Number (ASN)
corresponding to its expiration, carried as a byte string in
network byte order.

short_address = [
address : bstr,
? lease_asn : bstr,
]
It is up to the joined node to request a new short address before the
expiry of its previous address. The mechanism by which the node
requests renewal is the same as during join procedure, as described
in Section 10. 13. The assigned short address is used for configuring
both Layer 2 link-layer short address and Layer 3 IPv6 addresses.

7.3.3.

9. Error Handling

In and Retransmission

Since the case JRC determines that pledge Join Request is not supposed mapped to join a Non-confirmable CoAP message,
OSCORE processing at JRC will silently drop the
network (e.g. by failing to find request in case of a
failure. This may happen for a number of reasons, including failed
lookup of an appropriate security context), context, failed decryption,
positive replay window lookup, formatting errors possibly due to
malicious alterations in transit. Silent drop at JRC prevents a DoS
attack where an attacker could force the pledge to attempt joining
one network at a time, until all networks have been tried.

Using Non-confirmable CoAP message to transport Join Request also
helps minimize the required CoAP state at the pledge and the Join
Proxy, keeping it
should respond with to a 4.01 Unauthorized error. Upon reception minimum typically needed to perform CoAP
congestion control. It does, however, introduce complexity at the
application layer, as the pledge needs to implement a retransmission
mechanism.

The following binary exponential back-off algorithm is inspired by
the one described in [RFC7252]. For each Join Request the pledge
sends while waiting for a Join Response, the pledge MUST keep track
of a
4.01 Unauthorized, timeout and a retransmission counter. For a new Join Request,
the timeout is set to a random value between TIMEOUT and (TIMEOUT *
TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR), and the retransmission counter is set to 0.
When the timeout is triggered and the retransmission counter is less
than MAX_RETRANSMIT, the Join Request is retransmitted, the
retransmission counter is incremented, and the timeout is doubled.
Note that the retransmitted Join Request passes new OSCORE
processing, such that the sequence number in the OSCORE context is
properly incremented. If the retransmission counter reaches
MAX_RETRANSMIT on a timeout, the pledge SHALL SHOULD attempt to join the
next advertised 6TiSCH network. If the pledge receives a Join
Response that successfully passed OSCORE processing, it cancels the
pending timeout and processes the response. The pledge MUST silently
discard any response not protected with OSCORE, including error
codes. For default values of retransmission parameters, see
Section 10.

If all join attempts have failed at
pledge, to advertised networks have failed, the pledge
SHOULD signal to the user by an out-of-band
mechanism the presence of an error condition.

In the case that the JRC determines that condition, through
some out-of-band mechanism.

10. Parameters

This specification uses the pledge is not (yet)
authorized following parameters:

+-----------------------+----------------+
| Name | Default Value |
+-----------------------+----------------+
| TIMEOUT | 10 s |
+-----------------------+----------------+
| TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR | 1.5 |
+-----------------------+----------------+
| MAX_RETRANSMIT | 4 |
+----------------------------------------+

The values of TIMEOUT, TIMEOUT_RANDOM_FACTOR, MAX_RETRANSMIT may be
configured to values specific to join the network, but a further zero-touch process
might permit it, the JRC responds with deployment. The default values
have been chosen to accommodate a 2.05 (Content) code, but the
payload contains the single CBOR string "prov" (for "provisional").
No link-layer keys or short address is returned.

This response is typically only expected when in asymmetric
certificate mode using 802.1AR IDevID certificates. But for reasons wide range of provisioning or device reuse, this could occur even when a one-
touch PSK authentication process was expected.

8. deployments, taking
into account dense networks.

11. Mandatory to Implement Algorithms and Certificate Format

The mandatory to implement symmetric-key AEAD algorithm for use with
OSCOAP OSCORE is AES-CCM-16-64-128 AES-
CCM-16-64-128 from [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]. [RFC8152]. This is the algorithm used in 802.15.4, for
securing 802.15.4 frames, and hardware acceleration for it is present
in hardware on many
platforms. virtually all compliant radio chips. With this choice, CoAP
messages are therefore protected with an 8-byte CCM authentication tag tag, and the
algorithm uses 13-byte long nonces.

The mandatory to implement hash algorithm is SHA-256 [RFC4231].

Certificates or pre-configured RPKs may be used to exchange public
keys between the pledge and JRC. The mandatory to implement Elliptic
Curve is P-256, also known as secp256r1. The mandatory to implement
signature algorithm is ECDSA with SHA-256.

The certificate itself may be a compact representation of an X.509
certificate, or a full X.509 certificate. Compact representation of
X.509 certificates is out of scope of this specification. The
certificate is signed by a root CA whose certificate is installed on
all nodes participating in a particular 6TiSCH network, allowing each
node to validate the certificate of the JRC or pledge as appropriate.

12. Link-layer Requirements

In an operational 6TiSCH network, all frames MUST use link-layer
frame security. The frame security options MUST include frame
authentication, and MAY include frame encryption.

Link-layer frames are protected with a 16-byte key, and a 13-byte
nonce constructed from current Absolute Slot Number (ASN) and the
source (the JP for EBs) address, as shown in Figure 5:

+-------------------------------------------+
| Address (8B or 00-padded 2B) | ASN (5B) |
+-------------------------------------------+

Figure 5: Link-layer CCM* nonce construction 6TiSCH network, all frames MUST use link-layer
frame security [RFC8180]. The frame security options MUST include
frame authentication, and MAY include frame encryption.

The pledge does not initially do any authentication of the EB frames,
as it does not know the K1 key. key [RFC8180]. When sending frames, the
pledge sends unencrypted and unauthenticated frames. The JP accepts
these frames (exempt mode (using the "exempt mode" in 802.15.4) for the duration
of the join process. How the JP learns whether the join process is
ongoing is out of scope of this specification.

As the EB itself cannot be authenticated by the pledge, an attacker
may craft a frame that appears to be a valid EB, since the pledge can
neither know the ASN a priori nor verify the address of the JP. This
permits
opens up a Denial possibility of Service (DoS) attack at the pledge. DoS attack, as discussed in Section 14.
Beacon authentication keys are discussed in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal].

10. [RFC8180].

13. Rekeying and Rejoin

This protocol specification handles initial keying of the pledge. For reasons
such as rejoining after a long sleep, or expiry of the short address, or
node-initiated rekeying, the joined node MAY send a new Join Request over
using the previously
established secure end-to-end session with JRC. already-established OSCORE security context. The JRC then
responds with up-to-date keys and a (possibly new) short address. The node may also use the
Simple Join Protocol exchange for node-initiated rekeying.
How the joined node
learns that it should be rekeyed decides when to rekey is out of scope. Additional work,
such as in [I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey] can be used.

11. Key Derivations

When EDHOC is used to derive keys, the cost of the asymmetric
operation can be amortized over any additional connections that may
be required between the node (during or after joining) and the JRC.

Each application SHOULD use a unique session key. EDHOC was designed
with this in mind. In order to accomplish this, the EDHOC key
derivation algorithm can be run with a different label. Other users scope of this key MUST define
document. Mechanisms for rekeying the label.

12. network are defined in
companion specifications, such as
[I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey].

14. Security Considerations

In case PSKs are used, this

This document mandates recommends that the pledge and JRC are pre-configured provisioned with
unique keys. PSKs. The uniqueness of generated
nonces is guaranteed under request nonce and the assumption of unique EUI64 response nonce are the same,
but used under a different key. The design differentiates between
keys derived for requests and keys derived for responses by different
sender identifiers (0x00 for each pledge. pledge and 0x01 for JRC). Note that the
address of the JRC does not take part in nonce or key construction. Therefore, even should an error occur, and
Even in case of a misconfiguration in which the same PSK shared by a group of is used for
several nodes, the nonces constructed as part of keys used to protect the requests/responses from/
towards different responses pledges are unique. different, as they are derived using
the pledge's EUI-64 as Master Salt. The PSK is still important for
mutual authentication of the pledge and authentication of the JRC to the
pledge. JRC. Should an attacker come
to know the PSK, then a man-in-the-
middle man-in-the-middle attack is possible. The well known
well-known problem with Bluetooth headsets with a "0000" pin applies
here. The design differentiates
between nonces constructed for requests and nonces constructed for
responses by different sender identifiers (0x00 for pledge and 0x01
for JRC).

Being a stateless relay, the JP blindly forwards the join traffic
into the network. While the exchange between pledge and JP takes
place over a shared 6TiSCH cell, join traffic is forwarded using
dedicated cells on the JP to JRC multi-hop path. In case of
distributed scheduling, the join traffic may therefore cause
intermediate nodes to request additional bandwidth. (EDNOTE: this is a problem that needs to be solved) Because the
relay operation of the JP is implemented at the application layer,
the JP is the only hop on the JP-6LBR path that can distinguish join
traffic from regular IP traffic in the network. It is therefore
recommended to implement stateless rate limiting at JP: JP; a simple
bandwidth (in bytes or packets/second) cap would be appropriate.

The shared nature of the "minimal" cell used for the join traffic
makes the network prone to DoS attacks by congesting the JP with
bogus radio traffic. As such an attacker is limited by its emitted
radio power, the redundancy in the number of deployed JPs alleviates
the issue and also gives the pledge a possibility to use the best
available link for join. joining. How a network node decides to become a
JP is out of scope of this specification.

At the time beginning of the join, join process, the pledge has no means of
verifying the content in the EB EB, and has to accept it at "face
value". In case the pledge tries to join an attacker's network, the join response
Join Response message
in such cases will either fail the security check or time
out. The pledge may implement a blacklist in order to filter out
undesired
beacons EBs and try to join using the next seemingly valid network. The EB.
This blacklist alleviates the issue issue, but is effectively limited by
the node's available memory. Such bogus Bogus beacons will prolong the join time of
the pledge pledge, and so the time spent in "minimal"
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal] [RFC8180] duty cycle
mode.

13.

15. Privacy Considerations

This specification relies on the uniqueness of EUI64 the node's EUI-64 that
is transferred in clear as part of the security context identifier.
(EDNOTE: should we say IID here?) an OSCORE Context Hint. Privacy
implications of using such long-term identifier are discussed in
[RFC7721] and comprise correlation of activities over time, location
tracking, address scanning and device-specific vulnerability
exploitation. Since the join protocol is executed rarely compared to
the network lifetime, long-term threats that arise from using EUI64 EUI-64
are minimal. In addition, the join response Join Response message contains an optional a short
address which can be is assigned by JRC to the pledge. The assigned short
address is independent of SHOULD be uncorrelated with the long-term identifier EUI64 and EUI-64 identifier.
The short address is encrypted in the response. For that reason, it is not possible to
correlate the short address with the EUI64 used during the join. Use of short
addresses once the join protocol completes mitigates the
aforementioned privacy risks. In addition, EDHOC may be used for
identity protection during the join protocol by generating a random
context identifier in place of the EUI64
[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe].

14.

16. IANA Considerations

Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this
document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.

This document allocates a well-known name under the .arpa name space
according to the rules given in: [RFC3172]. The name "6tisch.arpa"
is requested. No subdomains are expected. No A, AAAA or PTR record
is requested.

14.1.

16.1. CoAP Option Numbers Registry

The Stateless-Proxy option is added to the CoAP Option Numbers
registry:

+--------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Number | Name | Reference |
+--------+-----------------+-------------------+
| TBD | Stateless-Proxy | [[this document]] |
+--------+-----------------+-------------------+

15.

17. Acknowledgments

The work on this document has been partially supported by the
European Union's H2020 Programme for research, technological
development and demonstration under grant agreement No 644852,
project ARMOUR.

The authors are grateful to Thomas Watteyne and Goeran Selander for
reviewing the draft
reviewing, and to Klaus Hartke for providing input on the
Stateless-Proxy Stateless-
Proxy CoAP option. The authors would also like to thank Francesca Palombini and
Palombini, Ludwig Seitz and John Mattsson for participating in the
discussions that have helped shape the document.

16.

18. References
16.1.

18.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-ietf-core-
object-security-03 for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", draft-ietf-core-object-security-06 (work in
progress), May October 2017.

[I-D.ietf-cose-msg]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
draft-ietf-cose-msg-24 (work in progress), November 2016.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC3172] Huston, G., Ed., "Management Guidelines & Operational
Requirements for the Address and Routing Parameter Area
Domain ("arpa")", BCP 52, RFC 3172, DOI 10.17487/RFC3172,
September 2001, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3172>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3172>.

[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.

[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

16.2.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.

18.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol]
Wang, Q., Vilajosana, X., and T. Watteyne, "6top Protocol
(6P)", draft-ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol-05 (work in
progress), May 2017.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join]
Richardson, M., "6tisch Secure Join protocol", draft-ietf-
6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join-01 (work in progress),
February 2017.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal]
Vilajosana, X., Pister, K., and T. Watteyne, "Minimal
6TiSCH Configuration", draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-21 draft-ietf-6tisch-6top-protocol-09 (work in
progress), February October 2017.

[I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology]
Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang,
"Terminology in IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE
802.15.4e", draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-08 (work in
progress), December 2016.

[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason,
S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-
keyinfra-06 draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-09 (work in
progress), May June 2017.

[I-D.richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon]
Dujovne, D.

[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and M. Richardson, "IEEE802.15.4 Informational
Element encapsulation of 6tisch Join Information", draft-
richardson-6tisch-join-enhanced-beacon-01 C. Bormann, "Concise data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-cddl-00
(work in progress), March July 2017.

[I-D.richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey]
Richardson, M., "Minimal Security rekeying mechanism for
6TiSCH", draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-01 (work in
progress), February 2017.

[I-D.selander-ace-cose-ecdhe]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., and F. Palombini, "Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", draft-selander-ace-
cose-ecdhe-06 draft-richardson-6tisch-minimal-rekey-02 (work in
progress), April August 2017.

[IEEE8021542015]

[IEEE802.15.4-2015]
IEEE standard for Information Technology, ., "IEEE Std
802.15.4-2015 Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area
Networks (WPANs)", 2015.

[RFC4231] Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-
224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, DOI 10.17487/RFC4231, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.

[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4231>.

[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 5869, 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.

[RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6347, 6550,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.

[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.

[RFC7554] Watteyne, T., Ed., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using
IEEE 802.15.4e Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) in the
Internet of Things (IoT): Problem Statement", RFC 7554,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7554, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7554>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7554>.

[RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

[RFC8180] Vilajosana, X., Ed., Pister, K., and T. Watteyne, "Minimal
IPv6 over the TSCH Mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH)
Configuration", BCP 210, RFC 8180, DOI 10.17487/RFC8180,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8180>.

Appendix A. Example

Figure 6 3 illustrates a successful join protocol exchange in case PSKs are used.
Pledge exchange. The pledge
instantiates the OSCOAP OSCORE context and derives the traffic keys and
nonces from the PSK. It uses the instantiated context to protect the CoAP request
Join Request addressed with a Proxy-Scheme option and option, the well-known
host name of the JRC in the Uri-Host option. option, and its EUI-64
identifier as OSCORE Context Hint. Triggered by the presence of
Proxy-Scheme option, the JP forwards the request to the JRC and adds
the Stateless-Proxy option with value set to the internally needed
state, authentication tag, and a freshness indicator. The JP learned
the IPv6 address of JRC when it acted as a pledge and joined the
network. Once the JRC receives the request, it looks up the correct
context based on the Sender ID (sid) Context Hint parameter. It reconstructs OSCOAP's
OSCORE's external Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) needed for
verification based on:

o the Version field of the received CoAP header.

o Code field of the received CoAP header.

o Algorithm value agreed out-of-band, default being the AES-CCM-16-64-128 AES-CCM-
16-64-128 from [I-D.ietf-cose-msg]. [RFC8152].

o the Request ID being set to pledge's EUI-64 concatenated with 0x00. the value of the "kid" field of the
received COSE object.

o the Join Request Sequence sequence number set to the value of "Partial IV"
field of the received COSE object.

o Integrity-protected options received as part of the request.

Replay protection is ensured by OSCOAP OSCORE and the tracking of sequence
numbers at each side. In the example below, the response contains
sequence number 7 meaning that there have already been some attempts
to join under a given context, not coming from the pledge. Once the JP receives the response, Join Response, it
authenticates the Stateless-Proxy option before deciding where to
forward. The JP sets its internal state to that found in the
Stateless-Proxy option. option, and forwards the Join Response to the correct
pledge. Note that the JP does not posses possess the key to decrypt the
COSE object (join_response) present in the payload so the
join_response object is opaque to it. payload. The response Join
Response is matched to the
request Join Request and verified for replay
protection at the pledge using OSCOAP OSCORE processing rules. The response In this
example, the Join Response does not contain JRC's the IPv6 address as in
this particular example, we assume that of the
JRC, the pledge hence understands the JRC is co-located with the
6LBR.

<--E2E OSCOAP-->

<---E2E OSCORE-->
Client Proxy Server
Pledge JP JRC
| | |
+----->|
+------>| | Code: [0.01] (GET) { 0.02 } (POST)
| GET | | Token: 0x8c
| | | Proxy-Scheme: [coap] [ coap ]
| | | Uri-Host: [6tisch.arpa] [ 6tisch.arpa ]
| | | Object-Security: [sid:EUI-64 [ kid: 0 ]
| 0, seq:1, | | Payload: Context-Hint: EUI-64
| {Uri-Path:"j"}, | | [ Partial IV: 1,
| <Tag>] | | { Uri-Path:"j" },
| Payload: - | | <Tag> ]
| | | +----->|
| +------>| Code: [0.01] { 0.01 } (GET)
| | GET | Token: 0x7b
| | | Uri-Host: [6tisch.arpa] [ 6tisch.arpa ]
| | | Object-Security: [sid:EUI-64 [ kid: 0 ]
| | | 0, seq:1, Stateless-Proxy: opaque state
| | | {Uri-Path:"j"}, Payload: Context-Hint: EUI-64
| | | <Tag>] [ Partial IV: 1,
| | | Stateless-Proxy: opaque state { Uri-Path:"j" },
| | | Payload: - <Tag> ]
| | |
| |<-----+ |<------+ Code: [2.05] { 2.05 } (Content)
| | 2.05 | Token: 0x7b
| | | Object-Security: -
| | | Stateless-Proxy: opaque state
| | | Payload: [ seq:7,
| | | {join_response}, <Tag>] { join_response }, <Tag> ]
| | |
|<-----+
|<------+ | Code: [2.05] { 2.05 } (Content)
| 2.05 | | Token: 0x8c
| | | Object-Security: -
| | | Payload: [ seq:7,
| | | {join_response}, <Tag>] { join_response }, <Tag> ]
| | |

Figure 6: 3: Example of a successful join protocol exchange with a PSK. {} exchange. { ... }
denotes encryption and authentication, [] [ ... ] denotes
authentication.

Where join_response is as follows.

join_response:
[
[ / COSE Key Set array with a single key /
{
1 : 4, / key type symmetric /
2 : h'01', / key id /
-1 : h'e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffd33e6' / key value /
}
],
[
h'af93' / assigned short address /
]
]

Encodes to
h'8281a301040241012050e6bf4287c2d7618d6a9687445ffd33e68142af93' with
a size of 30 bytes.

Authors' Addresses

Malisa Vucinic (editor)
Inria
2 Rue Simone Iff
Paris 75012
France
University of Montenegro
Dzordza Vasingtona bb
Podgorica 81000
Montenegro

Email: malisa.vucinic@inria.fr malisav@ac.me

Jonathan Simon
Linear Technology
Analog Devices
32990 Alvarado-Niles Road, Suite 910
Union City, CA 94587
USA

Email: jsimon@linear.com jonathan.simon@analog.com

Kris Pister
University of California Berkeley
512 Cory Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
USA

Email: pister@eecs.berkeley.edu
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
470 Dawson Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1Z5V7
Canada

Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca